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
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HARTE'S
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,
King of Sweden.

Vol. II.

A

THE
HISTORY
OF
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,
KING OF SWEDEN,
SURNAMED THE GREAT.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
AN ESSAY ON THE MILITARY STATE OF EUROPE,
CONTAINING
THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS
IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
BY THE REV. WALTER HARTE, M. A.
CANON OF WINDSOR.

THE THIRD EDITION,
With great Alterations and Additions; including The APPENDIX;
Revised, Corrected, and Improved,
By JOHN JOSEPH STOCKDALE,
Translator of Voltaire's Charles XII. Encyclopædia for Youth, &c.
ILLUSTRATED WITH A PORTRAIT, AND PLANS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

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HIS ASHES IN A PEACEFUL URN SHALL REST;
HIS NAME A GREAT EXAMPLE STANDS TO SHOW,
HOW STRANGELY HIGH ENDEAVOURS MAY BE BLEST,
WHERE PIETY AND VALOUR JOINTLY GO.

Dryden.

THE HISTORY OF

THE LIFE OF

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

AT length the Imperial General, unable to bring on an engagement, and not willing to see his troops perish by hunger, made a march by way of feint, as if he proposed to return to Magdeburg. The King could not be allured from his well-chosen situation. He remained firm in his post, and allowed his enemy to make what motions he thought best on that side of his empire. This coolness of the king disappointed Tilly, and mortified him likewise. At length, not knowing well what steps to pursue, he pointed his course in earnest, first to Tangermund*, and then to Einleben, a town famous for its magnificent Gothic tombs erected to the honour of the counts of Mansfelt†, but more renowned for being the place of Martin Luther's nativity.

During these transactions the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, amongst whose subjects at that time general Tilly fomented a revolt‡, sought the protection and assistance of Gustavus, who received him graciously, and after the conclusion of a treaty between them, dismissed him with a reinforcement of three complete regiments, commanded by duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, when he had joined the Hessian troops at Cassel, made an irruption into the chapter lands of the convent of Hirschfeld§. Shaping his

* This well-peopled town lies at the confluence of the Elbe and Tanger. Charles IV. had a scheme to make it a commercial dépôt between Bohemia and Lower Saxony, and thence to extend its communication to the Northern sea. If death had not cut short this emperor's project, perhaps Tangermund had been precisely what Hamburg now is.

† The small county of Mansfelt was sequestered in 1570, and continues under sequestration to this very day. Part belongs to Saxony, and part to Brandenburg. The present prince of Mansfelt possesses a few bailiwicks, which happened not to be recited in the sequestration, and exercises some rights, principally consistorial ones, over the county.

‡ *High Dutch Historical Authentic Relation*, Part i. 114, 115.

§ These lands were secularized at the peace of Munster, and being erected into a principality, were conferred on the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel as indemnification for the expences, which the war had occasioned to him and his family.

course thence to Fulda*, he compelled the abbot to redeem his territories from plunder; and then raised a contribution of £.2000. from a neighbouring prelate in the electorate of Mentz.

The treaty above-mentioned, the full substance of which, in reference to the contracting powers on either side, Chemnitz has thought fit to preserve†, may be considered as the groundwork, whereupon Gustavus, and the German princes, all built their future alliances. The main draught of it had been contrived and reduced to articles many months before, but it never arrived to any actual conclusion, till now at Werben.

Upon this, Fugger, watch-master general of the army of the league, with a view to prevent the landgrave from infusing new life into the subjects of Saxony, by declaring so explicitly in behalf of Gustavus, advanced with ten regiments, raised by the said league, and marched as far as Vacha in Lower-Hesse. Not trusting over-much in new-raised troops, he tried what might be done by persuasion, and sent letters from Tilly to the states of the province, exhorting them to make amends for the indiscretion of their prince by returning immediately to the emperor's protection. Count Furstenberg at the head of a considerable body of Imperialists, having compelled the circles of Suabia and Franconia to renounce the *conclusions* agreed upon at Leipzig, intended to make another irruption into Hesse on the side of Fulda. This storm soon blew over, for the latter general received counter-orders to march and join Tilly, and carried with him forty-one troops of horse, and thirty-five companies of foot. Tieffenbach formed another corps for the same

* The abbacy of Fulda is about ninety miles over either way. The abbot is more powerful than many bishops, and formerly disputed precedence with the archbishop of Magdeburg and the bishop of Hildesheim. But since those alterations, he has been allowed, in order to prevent disputes, to sit in the diet, at the foot of the Imperial throne. He is a prince of the empire, and in virtue of high-chancellor to the empress, has a right to crown her in quality of first official. He is also primate of all the German abbeys. After his election, he pays the pope, his only ecclesiastical superior, the inconsiderable sum of about 40*l*. The pope in 1727 allowed him the power of causing himself to be chosen suffragan or vicar-general. All the members of his abbey, which is of the Benedictine order, must be *noble*; and in them is vested the power of election. The abbot in Gustavus's time, Bernard Schenk, chosen March 12, 1623, made no ceremony of cloathing himself in armour, and following the fortunes of Tilly and Wallstein. He was killed at the battle of Lutzen not very gloriously; for having mounted the staircase of the wind-mills, that stood at some distance from the main action, and which are to be seen at this moment, he had his head struck off by a cannon-ball.

† Tom. i. pag. 162, &c. APPENDIX, Art. xxiii.

purpose

purpose out of the garrisons of Silesia and Lusatia; and John, baron Aldringer*, with all possible expedition marched an

* Born of obscure parents in the county of Luxemburg, was originally valet de chambre, and then secretary to a French nobleman, but rose, at length, upon Cratz being superseded, to the supreme command of the Bavarian army. He applied himself intensely to reading, and was employed in the *chancery* at Trent. As he was a man of ready and enterprising parts, his colleagues soon conceived a jealousy against him, and counterworked and traversed him so much, that in a rage, conformably to the superstition of those times, he quitted his employment, and determined to take up the profession of the first man he met upon the road. In his way to Innspruck, he fell in with a soldier crossing a bridge, and accompanied him into Italy. His pen rendered him very serviceable in the regiment wherein he enlisted, and soon raised him to a lieutenancy. Having, at the head of fifty men, defended a post to admiration, he was chosen by a nephew of the archbishop of Salzburg to be his military director, and advanced, by him, to the place of serjeant-major. He then rose to the rank of colonel, an employment of great importance and honour in those days, some colonels having commanded a body of twelve or fifteen thousand men; and in the year 1630 had, jointly with Galas, upon the death of Colalto, the chief direction of affairs before Mantua.

He was the best debater of the age, in a council of war, and was thought necessary in Bavaria to compose the misunderstandings between that court and Vienna. He had the misfortune to be wounded in the head at the passage of the Lech, being then a general, and grand-master of the artillery. The same campaign, he joined Wallstein in Bohemia, notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to counteract him, but returned to Bavaria to oppose Horn. His best exploit as a general, after my period of history concludes, was his contributing to raise the siege of Constance in 1633. He then served under the duke of Feria, who conducted the Spanish troops, and by Wallstein's orders contrived to thwart and perplex him to such a degree, as to break his heart: for the duke was a person of very delicate sensations in point of honour and all engagements between man and man. The public esteemed him one of the finest gentlemen of that age, and it was his character to be humane and merciful beyond description. He was known at home to be the best politician in the court of Madrid, but it was his misfortune to resort late to the profession of arms, merely by the compulsion of his master. He died of grief at Munich, much in the manner of his predecessor and instructor, the great Spinola, at Scrivia, and of the self-same malady.

Aldringer was killed in the same year, 1634, on the bridge at Landshut, whether by the Swedes or his own men, is uncertain. The latter may be suspected, for with all his parts, and several good qualities, he was austere, passionate, and revengeful. He attempted to kill Sirot for drawing on a lieutenant-colonel in his pretence, though the provocation was great and sudden, and never could be induced to spare his life, so far as was in his power, either at the council of war in Italy, or in his representations to the supreme council at Vienna. His parts were so solid, adroit, penetrating, and lively, that he was usually called the *Spaniard Italianised*. Which puts me in mind of a very figurative observation, (which comes nearer to Aldringer's case) made, if I mistake not, by the author of the *Memoirs of the duke de Grammont*, for not having the work before me, I take the liberty to quote my memory; *Un Allemand dépaisé & Italienisé est un diable incarné*.

I must observe, lastly, that he drew up most of the political papers and manifestos, that were published in behalf of the catholic league. He amassed vast wealth in the plunder of Mantua, not much to his honour. Neverthe-

army of 8000 men, proposing and expecting to reach his generalissimo in about three weeks. Many of these troops were men of approved service, and had performed great things, in Italy, under their commander.

Ever since the publication of the Leipsic conclusions, the house of Austria had not been inattentive to the part, which the court of Saxony might think fit to act; and of course Hagenmüller, one of the interior council at Vienna, had been dispatched to the elector with instructions to beg him and his colleagues to discontinue levying of soldiers, and allow free passage and subsistence to the Imperial armies; requesting him likewise to perform the part of a mediator, and bring about a peace between Gustavus and the emperor. The latter proposal was not disagreeable to the elector's private cast of politics, nor did it cross the opinion of Arnheim, who was in effect his prime-minister, as well as his general. Still this prince had not courage to declare openly on either side. He accordingly made fresh professions of loyalty and obedience to the house of Austria, secretly inclined to do it service, if a fair opportunity presented itself; but this was only a transient private wish, and not a settled political principle; for, at the same time, he knew Gustavus, and feared to disoblige him. On this account he gave himself up to that fluctuation of mind, which is usually determined by the doctrine of apparent convenience. Something likewise was insinuated, as if the house of Austria should consider certain measures, supposing them to be taken, a sort of high treason against the empire; and, what was still less politic, the letters from Munich took the liberty to adopt the same tone*.

All the catholic troops before mentioned, were intended to overpower the elector of Saxony, and the Imperialists had the presumption to call themselves *the invincible army*. Meanwhile Tilly attempted to draw the elector into the catholic interests, by gentle means, and, with that view, requested him, as he was then at Merzburg, to give an audience to three persons, deputed from him with full authority to treat and ratify; namely, John Reinart, baron of Metternich, catholic administrator of the diocese of Magdeburg, Otho Frederic, baron de Schomberg, grand-master of the artillery, who was killed at Leipsic, and Bernardi,

less he spent it with magnificence and profusion, and yet left considerable sums in the banks of Genoa and Venice. After receiving the fatal wound, he passed the little time he lived in making strict enquiries after the person who shot him. He was buried with great marks of honour. The emperor had created him first a baron, and then a count.

* *Memoires d'Eleſtrice Palatine*, 290.

nardi, Tilly's secretary. The elector, who loved hospitality, made them welcome, and dissembled his resentment extremely well; but after dinner told them coolly, that he considered himself and the emperor as Ulysses and Polyphemus, *and that the only favour he had to expect, was to be devoured the last.* Saxony, continued he, is reserved as the desert, which is to crown the Imperial banquet. Remember, gentlemen, that in the fruits that help to compose a desert, some are austere and of dangerous digestion, and some have stones, that can only be cracked to the detriment of the teeth *.

He pronounced these words with so forbidding an air, that the commissioners hardly cared to proceed to business. However, at length they explained to him Tilly's proposals, which, when compared to what had happened, and what naturally might happen, with reference to the conduct of the house of Austria, were considered as mere sounds, and not realities.

Enraged at this diffidence in the court of Dresden, the Imperial general was tempted to make a false step as a politician, and ruined himself and his master's cause, greatly to the disapprobation of that wise and artful prince the duke of Bavaria †. His business was mildly to have allured the elector into the catholic interests by all sorts of promises, concessions, and gratifications; and, in case nothing of that nature could have succeeded, then to have removed his arms from Saxony, which single circumstance might have pacified the elector, who wished nothing more than to be exempted from war, and carried the scene of action into Pomerania and Mecklenburg, since, by such a diversion Gustavus in the long run must have been obliged to follow him; for in those days he could not have subsisted, if the intercourse had been cut off between him and Sweden. Tilly's genius and fortune both began to decline. Either ill luck made this general irascible, or his fretfulness blinded his judgment, and rendered him unlucky. However that may be, he delivered himself up to the peevishness of old age. Of course, without waiting for the return of the deputies, he, on the side of Leipzig, having united Furstenberg's army, which consisted of 10,000 men, with his own forces; and Holk ‡

* *Memoires d'Eleatrice Palatine*, 301.

† *Adelsreiter, Annal. Bavar.* Part iii. lib. 16. Fol. Lips. 1710.

‡ As Holk's cruelties surpassed all credibility, it is a misfortune, that Tilly, speaking in the person of the tutelar deity of Saxony, had not made use of Tasso's words, in his instructions to this general:

Guarda tu le mei leggi, e i sacri tempi
Fa, ch'io del sangue mio non bagni e lavi;

and Galas * joining him on the side of Misnia, they poured into the electorate like two raging torrents, and spread nothing round them but devastation; having upon the whole at least 40,000 soldiers under their command. No military execution ever resembled this irruption, except that unhappy one, which Turenne was obliged to make into the Palatinate in 1674, and which continues an everlasting reproach to the humanity of his nature and the politeness of the nation which he served. Though courts are in the end principally to be blamed for these barbarities, yet the generals, who carry them into execution, can neither be justified by their friends, nor can they exculpate themselves to their own consciences. As if Providence ordained that such actions should counterwork the very intentions of their contrivers, the inhabitants of Saxony, far from being terrified, were thereby rather hardened against the emperor. Nevertheless, when their deputies remonstrated to Tilly, on the depopulation and ravages committed by his soldiers, he replied with an ill-natured countenance, That his Walloons and Burgundians were not birds; nor could they subsist on air: and then dismissed the remonstrators with an adage of Cato, desiring it might make some impression on their memories, *Fronte capillatâ, post est occasio calva*. Thus a necessity of the house of Austria's own creation, for Tilly owns in a letter dated seventeen days after the battle of Leipzig, that he entered Saxony in obedience to a mandate from Vienna,

Afficura le vergini da gli empîi.
E i sepolcri e le ceneri de gli avi,
A te piangendo i lor passati tempi.
Monfian la branchia chioma i vecchi gravi,
A te la moglie le mammoille e'l petto,
Le cune e' il figli e'l marital suo letto. Cant. xx.

* Matthias, count Galas, a native of the bishopric of Trent, whose real name was Galasso. He succeeded Colalto, in conjunction with Aldringer, at the siege of Mantua, and rose at length to one of the supreme commands in the Imperial army. He released old count Thurn, whom he happened to take prisoner in Silesia, either from greatness of mind, as he did not choose a brave enemy should die ignominiously on a scaffold, or from the fear probably, as has been elsewhere suggested, of disobliging Wallstein. This retarded his preferment for some months; but on the assassination of that general, in whose death he would take no public part, though it is thought by some, that he indirectly promoted his fall, the court thought it worth while to make use of his assistance. He died in 1646, and left behind him one of the finest palaces in Prague, where the family is still settled.

The king of Hungary gave him the chief command at the famous battle of Nordlingen, as did also the cardinal infant at the same king's request. His disposition was so fine, that Leganez, a renowned general, could not help crying out, "The best officer in the world might learn something from Galas."

Vienna*, forced the elector into the arms of the king of Sweden, to whom, as he still continued in his camp at Werben, being determined not to move till he was first invited, Arnheim was immediately dispatched on post-horses, to implore his assistance, and beseech him to raise the siege of Leipzig. That town, the most important in Saxony of wealth and commerce, was then actually invested by the Imperial general; whom a large cannon-ball happened to miss, but killed a cavalier on horseback close by him, and reserved him for the mortification of surviving his military glory in the fatal battle, which afterwards took place on the plains of Leipzig.

Gustavus received Arnheim with a dignified air, coolly observing, *that nothing had happened but what he foresaw, and had predicted to his master on various occasions. He made no scruple to own, that he had taken his motions with a view to force this event into existence; and that if the elector had lent a favourable ear to his representations, neither Magdeburg had been taken, nor Saxony endangered.* He then interperfed a few condolences artfully enough, and concluded with saying, *That he had formed a plan of employing his troops to great advantage elsewhere, being obliged out of gratitude to support the elector of Brandenburg, and the princes of Lower Saxony: yet he was always ready, as a man of honour and generosity, to forgive and protect the unfortunate.* He expected, nevertheless, upon such concessions and advances made on his part, *That the electoral prince should serve in his army as an hostage. That the town of Wittemberg should be consigned to him for a place of retreat †. That the elector should furnish his troops with three months pay. That he should produce the traitors of the Austrian faction, who had given him evil counsel; and that he, Gustavus, should be their judge ‡. Lastly, that a treaty should be signed, offensive and defensive, between the king of Sweden and the elector of Saxony.*

Arnheim flew to his master on wings of joy, if his own account might be credited, and returned directly with the following answers: *That the elector as well as the prince his son would take up their residence in the Swedish army. That not Wittemberg only, but the whole electorate should*

* *Lettre du Comte de Tilly à un sien ami.* De Halberstadt, le 24 Sept. 1631.

As Dessau bridge had been broken down, vol. i. p. 352, here was the only convenient bridge in those parts over the Elbe.

† This was meant at Arnheim and others in *terrorem*, for the king never intended to insist sincerely on this head; as, if he had, he must have tripped the elector at once of his generalissimo, his prime-minister, count Swartenberg, and Dr. Hoc his first chaplain.

be open to the Swedes in case of a retreat. That a month's pay should be advanced immediately, and security given for the residue. That a specification should be delivered in of the several traitors: who should all be punished in the most exemplary manner *: and, finally, the elector empowered Arnheim to declare, *that he would embark his life and fortunes in the cause of Sweden*; concluding with equal candour and politeness, *that his obligations to Gustavus were proportionate to his distresses.*

These preliminaries being adjusted, it was added farther, on the part of the elector, from his own free impulse, "That he would undertake to subsist the Swedish army so long as they continued in Saxony, and undertook the defence thereof; that he would resign to the king all the rights of supreme command, rendering himself conformable to his will as far as all human compliance could carry him; and in the last place gave his honour to conclude no peace without his majesty's concurrence."

To all these replies and proposals, Gustavus answered in a few words, without a moment's pause: *That the elector must pardon him for taking the liberty to insist upon securities, as he had so long kept his attention on the perpetual alarm. Nevertheless, if he advanced but a month's pay to his soldiers, he would take upon him to promise, that they should earn it well; provided always, the supreme direction vested in himself alone; for there the king would have no competitor.*

It may appear matter of astonishment to many, that the elector of Saxony did not join Gustavus sooner! But observers of this description allow themselves to be imposed upon by the superficial appearances of things; *Qui ad pauca respiciunt, de facili pronuntiant*, says the historian. Upon closer examination, it appears to me, that the Saxon ministers, if you can excuse them being *pensioners* to the court of Vienna, were neither weak men nor cowards. A neutrality, had it been possible, was the wisest measure they could have pursued: they had no desire to crush Gustavus or the house of Austria. Matters at length proceeded to such extremities, that there remained no middle course to steer. The Imperial resentments broke forth in earnest on one side, inasmuch that when Hagenmüller, the Austrian ambassador, made an offer to kiss the elector's hand on his return to Vienna, he plainly told him it was the kiss of Judas, and Gustavus, on the other, was a monarch, neither to be trifled with nor cajoled. The former conduct of John George, the present elector, whether by accident

* *Artañibai Arma Suecica, 184.*

or prudence, I will not take upon me to assert, had occasioned no material disadvantage to the king of Sweden, if we except the mortification and disappointment his majesty underwent with reference to Magdeburg. The entire disbelief that this prince, and the other protestant powers, would ever presume to join Gustavus, till after the occurrence of some event very unfavourable to the house of Austria, was the secret reason, which gave that monarch time and leisure to take root and flourish, like a tree, unobserved; for at first, Tilly, Wallstein, and their masters, all overlooked him and despised him. It is even probable our hero would have been greatly retarded in the execution of his enterprise, if the *Leipfic confederation* had openly espoused the Swedish cause; for three Imperial generals were then hovering round the electorate we are now speaking of; and Tilly, in case he had omitted the siege of Magdeburg, might have posted himself between Pomerania and Saxony. Hence it appears, that the Dresden ministers were not such weak or unsuccessful politicians, at this trying conjuncture, as most people have been apt to imagine.

The aspect of the German hemisphere began now to preface a storm; upon foreseeing which, the Imperialists and princes of the league were resolved to make a considerable effort. The emperor sent his prime-minister, the prince of Eggenberg*, into Stiria, Carinthia, and Carniola, in order to collect a fresh supply of men. The same was done in Bohemia, Hungary, Moravia, and Silesia. Cardinal Dietrichstein† raised some regiments himself: and the new levied Bavarian recruits, both of infantry and cavalry, were pronounced in appearance the finest that Europe had hitherto seen.

Tilly, at the head of 44,000 veteran troops, having miscarried in the attempt to cross the Elbe at Torgau, which Arnheim's vigilance prevented, made himself master of Zeitz and Merzburg; and then investing Leipzig, sent word to the commander, that, unless he surrendered immediately, he must expect the fate of Magdeburg. The governor requested leave to ask advice of the elector; who was en-

* John Ulric, duke of Crommau, prince of Eggenberg, knight of the Golden Fleece, director of the council, &c.

† Francis, bishop of Olmutz, privy-counsellor, protector of the hereditary dominions, pleisopotentiary-governor and commissary-general of Moravia, first baron in that country, &c. and, in the emperor's absence, lieutenant of the Lower Austria. This prelate was severely questioned by the Moravians, whether he acted in concert with Wallstein or not, in 1619, had a guard placed round him, and was obliged to give his parole of honour, which he did with tears, not to quit the country without the privacy of the states. He rose upon the disgrace of cardinal Klesel.

camped

camped at Torgau, about thirty miles from him; but that indulgence was denied him. He afterwards made some slight resistance; and a cannon-ball, unfortunately for Tilly's reputation, missed killing him, as was before observed, by an hair's breadth. The town was given up the second day; three messengers bearing exhortations from the elector to the governor, to acquit himself like a man of honour, were hanged; and the castle of Pleissenberg, which might have made a week's resistance, surrendered in the same infamous manner. Yet so relaxed was the discipline of the Saxon army in those days, that the same man, whose name I think was Vopel, was restored to his government after the battle of Leipzig, and delivered up the citadel a second time in the same manner to general Holk, the ensuing year. The unhappy town redeemed itself from plunder, by paying 32,000 l. or thereabouts.

Oxenstiern had no hand in the important and critical negotiation, already mentioned, betwixt his master and the elector of Saxony; he was then in command of a separate army in *Regal* Prussia, being directed to observe the countenance of the Polanders. So great indeed were Gustavus's parts in all respects, that he had rarely occasion for *him* as a politician even on the most pressing emergencies, any further than to free himself from a multiplicity of trouble and business. Whilst Oxenstiern secured the eastern part of Germany, which borders on the Baltic, Horn and Banier were commanded to clear the western part: for his Swedish majesty, in the midst of his conquests, always secured the possibility of a good retreat. These two generals established a regency in the provinces of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. Banier blockaded the former, but Pappenheim obliged him to raise the siege. When the duke of Lunenburg joined him with a small but well-conducted army, the Imperial general was compelled to evacuate Magdeburg, abandon the open country, and retire to Westphalia and Franconia, into which circles the Swedes pursued him step by step. Magdeburg being thus re-conquered, the few of its surviving inhabitants returned, for all admired the lenity of the Swedish government; many old emigrants flocked in from other countries; and under such protection every person set to work to revive trade and rebuild the town.

Tilly's first object was to make his irruption into Saxony by Torgau, where there was a bridge over the Elbe; hoping, with great reason, to prevent the junction of the Swedish and Saxon armies, by posting his troops midway betwixt them

them both. Arnheim forestalled him in that attempt, by previously possessing himself of a pass of such great importance. Meanwhile, Gustavus laid by as a reserved and cautious spectator at Wittemberg; and the elector of Brandenburg was with him. The elector of Saxony joined them there; and they all entered into as strong an union as could be devised. The Swedish army passed the Elbe, and joined the Saxon forces near Dieben, a small town lying on the great road to Berlin, about twelve miles from Leipzig. Here Gustavus invited the two electors into his own apartment; and held, at the same time, a grand political debate, and a council of war. With all the coolness of an experienced statesman, he proposed to act upon the *defensive* principle, supporting his ideas of the matter to this effect. That, as Tilly had taken care to post himself very advantageously, having by this time entered Saxony by way of Merseburg and Halle, and invested Leipzig, the judicious part would be, either to wait for some favourable opportunity to attack him by surprise, or lead him on by artifice into plain ground, and decide the affair upon equal terms. Such an old and prudent general, continued Gustavus, will never sacrifice the flower of the Imperial troops, and the fair reputation of an uninterrupted series of victories for thirteen years past, except the necessity be great and urgent:—and if he should happen to overcome us, you two princes are lost beyond redemption. The elector of Saxony, impatient and enraged to the last degree, to see his country depopulated, and his subjects ruined by a sort of military inquisition, declared strenuously for a speedy and decisive battle. This opinion, *being privately that of Gustavus*, was, after some objections and representations, frankly complied with; and the rather, as Aldringer, who then lay at Erfurt, had not arrived with his part of the Imperial army. Gustavus and John George, the elector of Brandenburg, for some private reasons being returned home, marched their combined troops within sight of the enemy, who, having conquered Leipzig town and castle forty-eight hours before, had advanced that day as far as Breitenfeld, a small town about four miles from Leipzig; which was thought by many a great oversight, whereof we shall give a distinct account hereafter. It is still more remarkable, that Tilly knew nothing of the junction of the Swedes and Saxons till towards noon*, when he received intelligence from some of his *partisans* who were scouring the country, that the *united* troops had been discovered in full march against him; and thus he acknow-

* *Arma Suecica*, 189.

ledges

ledges in a letter, which we have cited some pages before. Of course, he had removed from Leipzig with a view to encounter only the elector of Saxony, who indeed had declared he would attack the Imperialists, in case Gustavus refused to join him. The old Walloon expected nothing more impatiently than this event; for the electoral army amounted to something less than half the number of his; nor were the commanders, Arnheim excepted, and his military character was not without blemish, a set of men much renowned in war; and as to the common soldiers, they were new raised levies, and without experience.

No general ever acted with more coolness and prudence than Gustavus, in all the steps he took, previous to this great event. He determined, from the moment Tilly pointed his invasion into Saxony, in good earnest, to advance near enough the elector, to be enabled to join him; and yet at the same time resolved, never to effect that junction, except after the most pressing and repeated solicitations; which indeed he wisely foresaw must soon be made in the common nature of things. Having therefore reduced his thoughts to a system on this occasion, he made a speedy march, at the head of the best part of the cavalry that belonged to the camp at Werben, and 2000 dragoons, to the important pass of Wittemberg, leaving Bauditzen to command such regiments of horse as remained in their lines, and Hepburn the infantry, and secured his point before Tilly had received intelligence of his motions. He at the same time issued out orders to Horn and Banier, to meet him immediately with their respective armies, at a place of rendezvous, sixteen miles from Wittemberg; and conveyed similar instructions to colonel Cag, who then laid at Havelburg with his own regiment and that of Monro. Here the king joined them, attended only by a few followers, and employed a week not only in reviewing and modelling them, but in giving the finishing hand to the treaty then in agitation betwixt him and John George. This march to Wittemberg may be considered as the key, which opened to Gustavus the door to his future path of renown and glory. Yet so delicate was he in point of honour, and so extremely averse to make use of compulsive measures, in spite of all *that* superiority, which Providence had given him, that, having once secured the bridge of Wittemberg, he commanded his army to encamp on the western side of the Elbe, the elector and his forces being lodged on the eastern side, nor did he permit his troops to cross the river, till he received authority to march, from the duke of Saxony.

When this junction was formed, it was matter of surprize to contemplate the appearance of the two combined armies.

The

The Swedes had slept all night upon a dusty new-ploughed field, for the season of the year was extremely dry, inso-much that every regiment seemed to be cloathed in one dirty uniform of the same brown colour; not to mention the dust they had raised in a march of eighteen miles that day. The Saxons, on the other hand, were well lodged and new apparelled, even to a fantastic degree of ostentation. The officers had ornamented themselves with more plumes than heroes on a theatre; but neither they nor their soldiers fulfilled the observation of the historian, *etiam uncti pugnabunt*.

It was here the king received undoubted intelligence, that Tilly had taken Leipfic, and advanced to Breitenfeld. Not displeased to find, that an aged and experienced general had quitted a situation so extremely advantageous as that near Leipfic, he, in spite of all fatigues, laid hold of the ardour of his troops, whilst they were in good humour and high spirits, *that being his maxim*, and marched them twelve miles the next morning, till he came in sight of the Imperial camp; having spent the early part of the day in close devotion, and commanded public prayers throughout the army.

Being now sure of coming to a general decision, inas-much as Tilly had dislodged from a more commodious encampment, he left all his baggage and tents behind him under a proper guard, partly that his retreat, in case of accidents, might not be encumbered; and partly, because it was his fixed resolution to sleep without tents in the open fields, and keep the ardour of his followers on the full stretch, till the termination of the affair, which he had the power to bring on the next day. Thus, by a sort of conduct very determined, it appeared plainly to the meanest soldiers, that their master had resolved to decide the fate of Germany in a less space of time than eight and forty hours.

Some days before this nearer approach of the protestant army, it is reported, that Tilly sent a trumpeter to the king, and, * according to a custom, not uncommon in those times, invited him, as a *brave cavalier*, to march forwards, and give him battle. *Friend*, said Gustavus to the messenger, with an air of disdain, *tell your master I am a KING, as well as a cavalier, and shall make it my business to find him soon*. After this military herald was dismissed, he turned round, in a sort of pique, to his generals, and said, *That he should advance with pleasure, to make a collision betwixt a crown and two electoral bonnets on the one side, and the carcass of an old corporal on the other* †.

* *Soldat. Suedois. Sued. Discipline*, part iii. p. 7.

† It was a common saying with Gustavus, that Tilly was an *old corporal*.
WALCIN

Those of Tilly's army, who were influenced by superstitious presages, were much dejected, when it appeared that the general, by mere chance, had held his council of war, two evenings before the battle, in the house of a poor man, whose business it was to be gentleman usher to the funerals in the suburbs of Leipzig. The very house, if I mistake not, is still shewn, and the outside walls appear to have been decorated with skulls, coffins, hour-glasses, and thank-bones, painted in fresco. It has been observed, that the *undaunted* Pappenheim was never known to show signs of uneasiness but upon this occasion. Till that moment, he had considered all presages and omens as the effects of melancholy and weakness. Some remarked too, that the battle of Leipzig might happen precisely the same day twelve months with the massacre at Pafwalk.

The king's troops were much elated, some few minutes before the engagement, to see a bird of so wild and timorous a nature as the ring-dove, perch itself on one of the royal standards; a trifling circumstance, which appeared to the Swedish soldiers a certain omen of victory.

A decisive battle seemed now to be settled, for great generals require but a single glance to comprehend each other's motions and intentions. This sort of military intuition is acquired by knowing, precisely, the abilities and interests of their adversary, and by a substitution of themselves in his place, with the same wants, and the same degree of capacity, as he has. Hence it is, that feints and false marches rarely alarm, or draw them into a disagreeable situation. Tilly was so circumstanced as to excite compassion. He was now entering his seventieth year, and in vain sought for himself in his own breast. The affair of Magdeburg hung heavy on his spirits, and age had *lessened* his authority over the army. Pappenheim's appetite for danger forced him into perpetual hazards, and the petulant desire of fighting, right or wrong, in the younger officers, seemed tacitly to reproach him, either with the *want* of resolution, or with *not* being the hero he had *once* been. What emotions this general felt, under such circumstances, is beyond my ability to describe! He had never yet incurred a military disgrace, but, on the contrary, had been victorious in *thirty-six* signal engagements and pitched battles. One of the greatest misfortunes

Walstein a *madman*, but Pappenheim, a *soldier*; and that he feared no general belonging to the enemy, excepting this *Salafré*, or *cicatricibus deformem*, as Wassenberg translates it: (Florus German. p. 316.) for Pappenheim carried on his body the marks of an hundred wounds, though at that time, being of the same age with Gustavus, he had entered only into his thirty-seventh year.

tunes that 'can befall a general, is to outlive his prosperity, or to continue in the exercise of the military command when too old. Thus Alexander, prince of Parma, had died the most illustrious warrior of his age, if, after the fine siege of Antwerp, he had bade farewell to war, as his friends advised him; since he made no considerable figure afterwards in the Low Countries, but, on the contrary, lost Zutphen, Deventer, Huisst, Nimeguen, Breda, &c. Such likewise was Tilly's unhappiness, in having missed what Tacitus somewhere elegantly calls the *opportunitatem mortis**. It now was his destiny to have to do with a warrior, in whom the supreme command was invested without any reserve or abridgment of power: a hero, vigilant, skillful, intrepid, in the very flower both of activity and judgment. Though the Imperial troops were the fiercest and best seasoned of any that Europe had ever seen, many having served in the Low-Country wars twenty years and more, in Germany from the year 1618, and all, in every battle, bating the fewest exceptions, invincible; yet there were reasons to dread a body of men, who, though comparatively novices in military practice, were sober, patient, and virtuous; better disciplined, clothed, and fed; bearing an entire submission to their leader, and placing an absolute confidence in him, who was moreover Tilly's superior in the management of artillery, and in the disposition and arrangement of his troops. All Europe stood aloof at this most interesting event; and when these circumstances are combined together, can the reader be astonished, if poor old Tilly turned *pale* once or twice, when he saw the Swedish army advance to the attack, drawn up in the most beautiful array, and ranged upon principles, to him, then unknown, approach-

* What has been said in like circumstances of Spinola's bodily torments, and mental perturbation, on a death-bed, may, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to Tilly and the prince of Parma. Nor is the picture of the former inelegantly delineated by a poet of that age:

Sive illam sua fors, seu spes decepta Cafalis
Abstulerit, virtus sive indignata domari,
Incertum est;—doluit longa obsidione teneri
Cafalias arces: desperatoque triumpho
Sollicitum invasit morbus; convellitur inis
Visceribus, penitusque virum vis ignea vexat;
Arma amens petit, armatis trepida undique cingi
Castra putat: Francoſque ſuo cum Rege ruentes
Ægra mente videt, patriamque clatus in urbem
Poſt tot deviſtos populos, tot bella, tot hoſtes,
Oppida tot, tot caſtra, urbeſque arceſque ſubactas,
Vincitur a fato invictus, vitæque ſupremam
Hæc ubi primam hauſit, clauſit Dux Spinola lucem.

Cafalium Bis Liberatum, p. 142. octavo.

ing

ing slowly and silently, with that considerate determined countenance, which presages no good to the army that is to engage with them?—Although some writers* mention the circumstance of Tilly's changing colour upon such a prospect, invidiously, yet it is probable this discomposure arose not from fear, as appears by his future conduct in the battle, but from conviction of the error, which the younger officers had drawn him into, and from the probability of setting the greatest share of military success, that perhaps any one man had ever possessed, upon the chance of a single die, that very chance not judiciously chosen, himself being so far advanced in years, that he could never hope to restore his character by future services!

For these reasons, he wisely determined within himself, either to fortify his camp, or evade a battle; and the rather, as he expected Aldringer and Tieffenbach to join him with 12,000 experienced troops. Pappenheim's impetuosity, however, was irresistible, nor was it in his power, without totally losing the hearts of his army, to put in practice his favourite maxim, never to dip his foot in water, till he had made some experiment of the degree of cold; or, as other historians relate the saying, "never to wade in a stream, except his eye-sight could command the bottom."

His first purpose in the council of war held at the gravedigger's house, and which appears to have been the best, his private opinion being in truth his real interest and duty as a general, was to have maintained his original intrenchments, with, at his elbow, the rich town of Leipzig; whence he might have drawn provisions in the same manner, having his own garrison in the town, as the king supported himself in the lines of Werben. During that interval, it is possible likewise, that the troops of Cologne might have arrived. Nor could he, in this camp, have extended his front in the imprudent manner he did afterwards on the field of battle. He saw plainly too, that it was not his business to fight, except urged thereto by some extraordinary and almost irresistible necessity. He well remembered the cruelty and outrages which the Imperial army had committed, and concluded every peasant, in an enemy's territory, an enlisted soldier against him, in case of a defeat. All the world knows, that ill success is doubly dangerous in an hostile country; and, what is yet more, he wanted nothing in the camp near Leipzig. It is thought too, winter being then fast approaching, that if he had declined a battle, and in-

* *Histoire des Guerres & des Traitez qui precederent la Paix de Munster*, par Pere Bougeant, iii. tom. 4^e. There is no authority for this assertion.
trenched

trenched himself wisely, the elector of Saxony would have been tired of his new guests long before the spring*. Pappenheim, seemingly impeaching the courage of the generalissimo, touched his sensibility to the very quick, and induced him to relinquish his first camp; the old man still determined, within himself, not to bring on a general engagement.

The self-same debate was resumed on the approach of Gustavus, and the new camp near Breitenfeld was protected with some temporary intrenchments the day before the battle. Schomberg, and some of the elder officers, concurred with Tilly in the opinion of declining a general battle, if it were possible: but Pappenheim drew the count de Furstenberg, who aimed at succeeding Tilly, and the younger colonels into a contrary opinion, and though the majority inclined to countenance the commander in chief, his great zeal contrived the next day, to accomplish that event in the field, which he had fruitlessly laboured to effect in a council of war†.

A fair champaign country spreads itself all round the side of Leipzig, where the imperial general fixed his camp; but part, as it was now the month of September, had been fresh ploughed. It was the very spot, according to some historians, and named, if I mistake not, *God's acre*, where Charles V. overthrew Frederic, elector of Saxony, and took him and Philip, landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, prisoners, divesting the former both of the duchy and the electorate.

The two armies being now within three miles of each other, his majesty, the evening before the battle, assembled all the generals that served under him, and having ranged them round him in a circle in the middle of the plain, for the Swedes slept that night in the open air, told them plainly, since he discovered a spirit of resolution in their countenances, *That they were to fight with troops, to-morrow, of a different stamp from Poles and Cossacks. Fellow Soldiers*, said he, *I shall not dissemble the danger; you will have a day's work, that is worthy of you. It is not my temper to diminish the merit of veteran troops like the Imperialists; but I know my officers at bottom, and scorn the thoughts of deceiving them. I foresee too, that our numbers will prove inferior to those of the enemy; but my friends, God is just,—AND REMEMBER MAGDEBURG‡!*

* Chemnitz, tom. i. 171.

† Letter from an Imperial Officer to a Friend. Halberstadt, September 22, 1631.

‡ I have only given the more material substance of this speech, which Chemnitz sets forth at large, tom. i. 170.

Some few minutes before, he made the tour of his army, and told every body of troops, with a peculiar cheerfulness on his countenance, what particular duties they were to perform the next day. He seemed most in pain for one large division of cavalry, the horsemen being unarmed, and the horses of a slight make; well knowing, that the Imperial cuirassiers, covered with iron from head to foot, and mounted upon beasts of a considerable bulk, would soon disunite them by the simple effort of squeezing. His advice therefore was *to advance briskly up to the enemy without firing*, and apply their sabres with an oblique sliding motion to their horses noses, heads, and necks. Thus, says he, the Imperial ranks will soon be broken, and the dismounted cavalier will find his armour too cumbersome to be enabled to molest you, during the remaining part of the engagement*. What highly deserves observation, is, that the best commentator on the military life of Gustavus makes use of this very practice in the discipline of the Prussian cavalry. The king flanked these troops with good bodies of infantry, and interlined others amongst them at various intervals.

The elector of Brandenburg, for some private reasons, returned home the very day before the engagement. The king's army slept in battle-array, on the bare ground; and the king himself passed the whole night in his coach, discoursing at intervals with Horn, Banier, and Teüffel, who sat with him. Immediately after the dawn of day the troops were formed, and each of the combined armies received orders to march, the Swedes making a column on the right, and the Saxons one on the left, each army amounting to about 15,000 men. The king had 7000 horse and 8000 foot, and the elector 11,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry†. The vanguard consisted of three regiments, two Scottish and one German, all conducted by Scots officers, namely, sir James Ramfey, furnished the Black, sir John Hamilton, and Robert Monro, baron of Fowles. The troops, in order to distinguish one another, wore a small green branch on their heads. All historians agree, that the king dreamt, in his coach, that he and Tilly engaged with fists; and, in the morning he told his companions, that having thrown his adversary to the ground, he received a bite from him in his left breast; which was interpreted, afterwards, to signify the Saxon army, which advanced on the left of the Swedes.

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 173.

† Some writers enlarge the number of the Saxons: but this mistake seems to arise from the absence of Solmes's and Hofkirck's regiments, the one infantry and the other cavalry, which had been detached towards Bohemia.

There

There was a little rivulet and dirty swampy pass where only a few men could march in front, at a small village called Schortza, which lay between the king and Tilly. As the latter, not caring to bring on a general engagement, did not choose to dispute it with all the vigour he was capable of exerting, which has been reckoned by some amongst the oversights of the day, the Swedish and Saxon armies soon cleared this pass, and when word was brought of it to Tilly, he turned round to his soldiers, and said, *Now, my old friends, we must look for blows.*

About ten in the morning, his majesty cleared the pass at Schortza, and having examined Arnheim's plan of the disposition of the Saxon army, and interlined here and there a few remarks, with his pencil, drew up his own army in complete order of battle, giving directions for placing his artillery in the most convenient situations, during the course of the engagement; paying little or no regard to the field-marchals and serjeant-majors *di battaglia*, but leading up every brigade and column of troops himself, disposing them in their respective stations, and leaving general instructions to their commanders. The king then rode up and down his own lines, and asked his men, with a cheerful and animated countenance, *if they felt a disposition within them to perform a hard day's service?*—one universal *vivat* spread itself immediately through the army: upon which Gustavus, in order to keep his men in spirits, and humour the practice of the age, beckoned to a trumpeter, in the front of all his troops, and taking something out of his pocket, bid him carry that little note to Tilly, *for he wanted to speak with him.* Tilly returned word back, readily enough, *that he was always prepared to receive his majesty's commands, when notified by him:* which looks as if he was determined not to fight, except upon compulsion; and thus ended the military ceremonial*.

It was at this battle Gustavus put in practice the principal part of all those fine inventions in the military art, which he had meditated and reasoned upon a thousand times before. It is the *inventive* and *creating* power, which makes a man great in any science or profession; and in this light, our hero shone distinguished. He exhibited, in the course of one day's action, more knowledge in the tactical and fighting parts, and in that branch of war, which relates to artillery, than mankind had discovered from the time of the Romans, till the invention of gunpowder, and from that period, till the day's service at Leipzig.

The king's *inventive* genius in war had made its appearance, in many instances, before this period. His grand ruling prin-

* *Swed. Discipline*, 4°. Lond. 1632. Part iii. 12.

ciple was, to make an enemy's country the *seat* of hostilities; the invaders being always supposed to undertake their business with greater spirit, and more determined resolution than the defendants. He was the first, it is commonly thought, who *intermixed* infantry amongst the horse; which, if I remember right, he practised at the very beginning of the Polish war; but as my authority for this assertion, which I discovered in some good author, has escaped me, after various researches and enquiries, I can only venture to present it to the reader upon the like footing it comes to me. Mansfelt, at or near the same time, as has been hinted elsewhere, had some idea of a similar practice; since in a famous picture of the battle of Prague, now in the possession of lord Chesterfield, and which appears to me to be better painted than those, with which the house of Austria has adorned the pavilion in the *star-park*, where the main stress of the action laid, something of this kind may be discovered in the arrangement of the troops. Gustavus likewise was the first who altered the musquets of the cavalry to *carbines*. He was dissatisfied also with the *Imperial cuirassiers*, who were completely cased in armour from head to foot; and commanded his own men to carry only a breast-plate and a head-piece. He relieved the cavalry of their useless incumbrance of *pikes*; and ordered his soldiers, for the expression came first from him, *never to give fire, till they could see their own image in the pupil of their enemy's eye**. He changed also into a pouch, which contained a certain number of cartridges, those senseless utensils called *bandileers*, which made a clattering in the time of action, and entangled themselves one with another; giving a military man the appearance of a High German rhymmer, or an Italian zani. He ridiculed greatly the *forked rests*, used to support the musquets in giving fire; and when his officers, who had a secret hankering to continue old customs, made an attempt to satisfy him by reducing the size and weight of those rests, so as to render them of a more manageable nature, he abolished them, once for all, by a supreme act of authority.

Yet an higher instance, not of the *improving* but *inventive* nature, remains behind: and though all the world talks much of the LEIPSIK-BRIGADE, or COLUMN of Gustavus, which latter word is not precisely agreeable to the original nature of the subject in question, and commenced only to become a term in vogue, towards the conclusion of the last century, yet I flatter myself, that there is no true and faithful drawing of this column extant, but what I here pre-

* *Loccen. Hist. p. 537. 4º. Schefferi Memorab. Suecicæ Gentis, p. 42, &c.*

sent to the reader; to its authenticity no solid objection can ever be made. Lord Reay, who drew it, was one of the king's favourite colonels, and the draught is so precisely exact and minute, that a letter of the alphabet is placed for every single man; and the post of each officer may be assigned and ascertained to the distance of a foot square. Indeed the intervals between corps and corps in the original are unduly wide and spacious; but his lordship found himself obliged to reserve these vacuums, in order to insert the *letters*, which denote the position of each particular commander. Yet, as I observed before, the word COLUMN is not the proper expression, whereby to denominate the LEIPSIK-BRIGADE, except we comprehend it in the sense and configuration, into which Folard supposes Gustavus to have improved it before he fought the battle of Lutzen, for which I can produce neither authority, nor corroborating proof. Here I hope to obtain the reader's pardon for bringing to light a true representation of the LEIPSIK-COLUMN, so long disused, if not totally forgotten. Nor ought one to compose the life of Gustavus, and overlook that great man in the character of a *field-officer*.—All we contend for is, that the idea was GREAT and NEW.

The opinion of military men concerning the brigade of Gustavus in that age, was as follows; if you attempt to attack it in front or rear, it will present a head at either end, like the *amphibena*: and if you undertake to assault its flanks and angles, you only seize a bunch of thorns which will give you a wound wherever you think fit to grasp it.

The plain, on which the battle was fought, extends itself in a line almost entirely through Misnia, and even in a clear day it is hardly possible to distinguish a mountain in the whole neighbourhood round it; since, at most, it is only diversified here and there with small elevations and declivities. As the combined armies proposed to commence the attack, the Imperial general had the choice of the ground. Of course he possessed the slope of a gently rising hill to the south-west of Podelwitz, which extended itself near two miles; foreseeing, as the battle could hardly become serious till after mid-day, that he should have the advantage of the *sun*, a matter then supposed to be of great consequence in the art of war. He had the good fortune also, according to the opinion of those times, to gain the *wind* right in his favour; for, as it blew that day extremely brisk, it carried the smoke and dust, of which there was enough that day, directly from him: and in those times generals were so fond of these advantages, that they very often shifted their troops in the heat of action,

which sort of movements, by the way, are extremely dangerous, in order to gain a point of wind and sun. Gustavus was in no degree dismayed to see these little advantages snatched from him. It must not be dissimbled, that he knew the convenience of this elevated slope, and the wood behind it, as well as his adversary who laid near it, and had ordered an advanced party to possess it by all possible means; but in that attempt the Imperial general forestalled him: for he was master of that post a day before the battle. Gustavus could not make greater expedition than he did after signing the treaty with the elector of Saxony, for he marched thirty miles in a day and an half, and fought his enemy the afternoon of the second day. The Swedish dragoons made a desperate attack upon the spot of ground we have mentioned, but were obliged to desist, when they saw the whole army of the Imperialists prepared to pour upon, and cut them to pieces*. Here Tilly intrenched his Walloon infantry, having planted two large batteries, consisting of forty pieces of heavy artillery, on the summit of the rising slope behind him at very considerable distances. One fronted the right wing of the Swedes in a direct line, where he concluded the king would command, that being with *him*, for reasons to me unknown, the post of honour, and the place where he affected to place himself, as he did afterwards at the battle of Lutzen, and the other, being advanced more forward, according to the natural turn of the hill, cut the Saxon and Swedish army obliquely. Behind him was a large wood, which he proposed for a rallying place in case of defeat. His army consisted of 44,000 fighting men, and the enemy produced only three-fourths of that number to oppose him. His watchword was *Jesu Maria*, the same he had used at Magdeburg; and his men, in imitation of their former practice in storming that town, wore white ribbons on their hats and helmets, and white strings round their right arms. The watchword of the Swedes was *Emanuel*, or *God with us*, which was always carried inscribed on the colours. They wore green branches on their hats and helmets. The Imperial general followed the old discipline of the Low Country wars, of drawing up his men in great square bodies, which in part contributed to his ruin. Not that the discipline was then bad, but the dispositions of Gustavus were better. Two highways passed through the field of battle, but as they went upon the same lines, by which the combined army advanced, the convenience and inconveniency of them were just reciprocal to either party.

* *Burgi Mars Sueco-German.* L. ii. 128. Leod. 1633. 12°.

Tilly,

Tilly, who formed his main body and the two wings into three separate armies, making only one mighty front, which reached from Sohaufen to Lindenthal, a vastness of extent hardly to be believed*, rejecting the assistance of a second line and corps de reserve, posted himself on the eminence before-mentioned, with the wood behind him.

As to the Saxon army, it performed so little, that I shall only observe that the elector led the right wing, Bindauf the left, and Arnheim conducted the main body. Yet to these that prince's parts, and Arnheim's invidious temper, the troops were drawn up nearly upon the same principle with the Imperialisists. The king made some objections to this disposition; but the Saxon general, who had passed his apprenticeship under Wallstein, chose rather to abide by the more received and established forms.

Such, as had a talent for war, soon perceived a manifest superiority between the arrangement of the king's troops and those under Tilly's command: for the latter were as much beaten by genius as by valour. It was the custom of the best generals, before this engagement, to draw up their forces in huge square bodies, which they called *tertius*; the very unwieldiness of which masses of troops helped to destroy them: for upon any great confusion each man overturned his neighbour, and when the whole corps was jumbled into one chaos, no officers could move from one situation to another, nor reduce the men into their former places. Whereas the king's army was intersected and divided into numberless straight lines and avenues, some greater and some smaller, like the uniform ground-plot of a regular city or parterre: and the troops could advance, retreat, or move from side to side, just as if they were in a defile between two hedges or walls. Thus the whole army was one complicated but unperplexed machine, consisting of innumerable parties or *pelotons* of men, all little systems by themselves, all acting under a chieftain of their own, yet all contributing to the grand establishment of the *whole together*. By these means, and by the power of moving easily from place to place, he brought more hands to act than the enemy possibly could; and though his men might be *killed*, yet, scientifically speaking, they could not well be *ruined*, for help was ever at hand, and the destruction of one part did not necessarily involve the destruction of another. The directions of the general had always free passage, as the blood is poured first from the heart, and then regularly dispersed, not only through arteries and veins, but even through

* It was, saith Monro, two English miles in length, Part ii.

the smallest capillaries*. In proof of how much this grand invention avoided confusion in the very first experiment, only one regiment amongst all the royal forces was squeezed out of its place, and that was Callenbach's regiment of horse.

This reduction of an army to one piece of machinery, in the day of battle was the *vis vivida*, the distinguishing individuating principle of Gustavus's creative genius. Nevertheless, he displayed his talents in exhibiting many collateral military inventions in the battle of Leipzig, which deserve highly to be mentioned by an exact historian. He found wonderfully good effects from mixing his musqueteers amongst the horse, as also from flanking the horse with musqueteers. Upon the principles of his plan, there were always openings for them to retreat, in case they were in danger of being overpowered. These musqueteers, intermingled with the cavalry, performed great service in the *times* we are speaking of; for the Imperial cuirassiers being completely clothed in armour that was pistol-proof, marched up to the Swedish cavalry with absolute unconcern, and, regardless of their firearms, parted their ranks and squeezed them out of their places by mere stress of weight. The *calibre* of the musquets of the infantry being *then* larger than *now*, enabled the musqueteers to deliver a ball, which at pistol-shot distance, the distance cavalry generally engage at, would often pierce the best armour, and always make contusions, which were very painful and inconvenient. Tilly received *one* in this very battle, which tormented him more than all his wounds, and in his flight was obliged to send for the town-surgeon at Halle, who cut out all the bruised flesh; and Gustavus lost his life from the effects of *another*; for on the day of the battle of Lutzen he determined to fight in his common wearing apparel, an elk-skin waistcoat excepted, having lately received a contusion in his shoulder, which rendered the least wrench of his cuirass insupportable. Before Gustavus introduced this alteration in the art of war, it was sufficient that the armour of the Imperial cuirassiers was *pistol-proof*.

This was also the first time, that any general had ventured to thin the depth of his files, which the king reduced to six deep, the brigades or columns excepted; whereas the Imperialists, though drawn up in one front only, opposed him with at least thrice the same number. It was objected to his

* See some curious remarks made on this subject by a German officer, who visited the camp of Gustavus as early as the month of November 1630. Vol. II.

majesty,

majesty, that such a comparatively thin body of men could not resist a ponderous impression; but his answer was, for it must be remembered he fought upon two lines, independent of the bodies of reserve, that upon his principle, passages were always open for new troops to advance and sustain their companions; that he could stop a leak in his army with as much ease as a sea-captain could prevent the ill effects of one in his ship; and that the power of bringing more hands to act, abundantly counterbalanced the weight of the objection. His field-artillery, made of *hardened leather*, rendered him also excellent service, being so very portable, that he could remove a little battery, or make a new one, in ten minutes time, or advance it occasionally before his troops, here and there, just when a fresh attack was forming against him. Here too for the first time, except in reviews, was practised in good earnest the method of firing in *platoons*. In a word, nothing of consequence escaped Gustavus in the whole system of the fighting part, from the battle of Leipzig till the present hour, except the invention of the *bayonet*, which probably was overlooked by a searching and speculative genius, merely because it was simple and obvious. Though many are of opinion*, that something between the pike and the partizan might be invented, which would prove more useful in repulsing the cavalry. It is highly natural to imagine, that Gustavus knew this: for he shortened the handle, and varied the figure of the head of the pike, according to the idea I have just mentioned†.

To return to the battle itself. Tilly upon this occasion made some *mistakes* as a general, which may properly be called his *own*, and *some* he was ensnared into by the rashness and impetuosity of younger men. As to the latter, I have, and shall explain myself more fully concerning them in their respective places, remarking here, in addition to some oversights of the Imperial commander already specified, that he was worse served with intelligence than he ought to have been, even in an enemy's country; for his Swedish majesty approached him unexpectedly‡; whence it happened, that no contemptible body of troops was employed in foraging at a distance, and not to be recalled in time convenient, and that Holk with a considerable party had been detached to make conquests about Naumburg||. Tilly did ill likewise

* *Chevalier de Folard, &c.*

† *Schefferi Memorab. Suecicz Gentis.*

‡ *Lettre de Tilly. Halberstadt, Sept. 24, 1631.*

|| *Lettre d'un capitaine Imperial à un sien ami. Sept. 22, 1631.* This account must be read with care, as it wants to be supported by other authorities. For example,

wife not to order an army, that laid idle in Silesia, to have attacked the electorate on that side, which would have incapacitated half the Saxon forces from joining Gustavus. It may be observed further, that when Pappenheim violated his orders, and forced him to descend from his eminence, his presence of mind, which was doubtless discomposed by so vexatious an incident, seems to have deserted him a few minutes; for being compelled, first by teasing and artifice, and then by dint of necessity, to make a sacrifice of his prudence and judgment, he commanded his troops to advance with so much ardour and confusion, that the best and most proper regiments were not placed in their respective situations, excepting the regiments of Piccolomini, Schomberg, and Cronenberg, which were esteemed the flower of the Imperial cavalry. In a word, Tilly was too *old* for his employment.

In consequence of this precipitate measure, the main body, which even at this time was not distinctly formed, made an irregular advance; for the cavalry destined to support it received no orders to keep pace with the infantry. To understand this passage the better, the reader must be informed, that the center was sustained by six regiments of horse, which had no connexion with the wings of the army. From hence it likewise followed, that there was no time to appoint a proper body of reserve; nor were any infantry interperfed among the cavalry. The best troops opposed the new raised Saxons, which may be considered as an extraordinary oversight*. "I asked several commanders," said one who was an eye-witness of the battle, "if they knew their instructions; but by their answers it appeared they had none. Seemingly to me the hope was, that God would work miracles in proportion to the errors we had committed." Pappenheim, as *maréchal of the field*, made the disposition of the battle: and when it was told him that his own wing was too weak in itself, and unsupported likewise by any reserve, his answer was, that he had taken care to provide a reinforcement; whether truly or not cannot be ascertained; yet sure it is, that no reinforcement ever appeared; except it

example, he names *six regiments of cavalry independent of the wings*, and we apprehend he ought to know his own army; yet in a single sheet plan, engraven almost under the king's eye immediately after the battle, by Olave Hans of Leipzig, his chief quarter-master and engineer, and long before any book appeared on the subject, we cannot discover these regiments; so that after the first shock or tumult, they must have united themselves to the extreme parts of the two wings, which seem by the plan to be more extended than the front line of the allied army.

* Riccio de Bellis German, 271.

proved

proved some of the regiments we have mentioned by way of note in the preceding page.

The last error, which in truth may be considered as a misfortune, was that Furstenberg, who was a friend of Pappenheim, but wanted the spirit of that commander, disliked the orders of the generalissimo, yet had not resolution to disobey them. Chance brought about what he privately wished to see effected; for an old colonel at length told him, that he would begin the battle without his orders. This rash departure from instructions in either wing compelled Tilly to descend from his eminence; for if Furstenberg had not engaged, it is more than probable Tilly would have left Pappenheim to the mercy of Gustavus: but perceiving the battle to thicken round him, and dreading the reproaches of sacrificing the better part of the Imperial army, for the public always favours fighting people, right or wrong, he at length determined to order his main body of infantry to advance. Part of it consisted of 8000 troops, till then supposed to be invincible, and which in truth might have performed wonders, if the cavalry attached to had received commands to march forwards and support them: but that circumstance, in the hurry, happened to be totally forgotten.

Having thus sketched out the previous ideas necessary for comprehending one of the most important battles, which the world had then seen, I may by this time, and perhaps with little difficulty, obtain my reader's permission to enter into a distinct description of the action itself; inasmuch as the plan here annexed will give a more exact idea of the field dispositions than can be described in words.

This battle was fought on Wednesday the seventh of September, which the Germans call *dies reginae*. The front of each army extended itself nearly two English miles in breadth. Many old officers declared, that the mighty battle, at the *white mountain* near Prague in 1620, was but a sort of pantomime in comparison to this*. As the intermingled musqueteers carried no colours, the Imperialists did not discover them till it was too late. Tilly had the advantage of ground, wind, and sun†; but Gustavus performed great things with his artillery, and exceeded the Austrian general, who piqued himself particularly in that respect. The victory was principally owing to the easy shifting and quick discharge of the new-invented leather cannon, and the intermingled musqueteers,

* *Arlamibai Arma Suecica*, 138, 4°.

† *Monro's Expedition*, ii. 64.

whose

HISTORY OF TABLE of REFERENCE TO THE FIELD-DISPOSITION at LEIPSIĆ.

IMPERIAL ARMY.		
1. Regiment of Renconi,	Horse.	38. 180 commanded Musketeers of Banier's.
2. Merodé,		39. 800 West - Gothland Horse.
3. New Saxon,		40. 180 Musketeers, Banier's.
4. Baumgarten,		41. 800 Smaland Horse, Steinboch's.
5. Piccolomini,		42. 180 commanded Musketeers, Halle's.
6. Strozzi,		43. 400 East - Gothland Cavalry.
7. Holstein,		44. Lily's Brigade.
8. Chiefa,		45. Teuffel's Brigade, Pretorian Guards.
9. Galas,		46. Halle's Brigade.
10. Furstenberg,		47. Wincle's Brigade.
11. Montecuculi,	Infantry.	48. 200 Horse, Horne's.
12. Balderon and Dietrichstein united,		49. 500 Horse, Callenbach's.
13. Tilly,		50. 360 commanded Musketeers.
14. Coronini,		51. 500 Horse, Callenbach's.
15. Götz,		52. 280 Musketeers, Oxentien.
16. Colorado,		53. 300 Horse, Bauditzen.
17. Ernitz,		54. 300 Foot, Erichuisen's.
18. Savelli,		55. 300 Horse, Bauditzen.
19. Blancard,		56. 300 Musketeers, Erichuisen's.
20. Pappenheim,		57. 300 Horse, Bauditzen.
21. Haracour,	Horse.	58. 360 Musketeers, Hamilton's.
22. Rynach and Comargo,		59. 500 Horse of the King's own Regiment.
23. Wallis,		60. 400 Musketeers, Munro's.
24. Wraugler,		61. 300 Horse of the King's own Regiment.
25. Late Bernstein,		62. 350 Musketeers, Ramsey's.
26. Schomberg,		63. 400 Horse, Rhingrave's.
27. Cronenberg,		64. 400 the same.
28. Old Saxon,		65. 400 the same.
29. Wingarti,		
30. Two Regiments of Croats,		
31. Reformed Dragoons.		
SWEDISH ARMY.		
32. 400 Finland Horse.		66. 400 Livonian Horse.
33. 400 Finland Horse.		67. 400 Courland Horse.
34. 180 commanded Musketeers of Banier.		68. 300 Horse, Damitz.
35. 400 of Tod's Horse.		69. 400 Horse, Sperräuter's
36. The same.		70. Brigade, Halle, Walstein, Thurn, &c.
37. The same.		71. Brigade, Damitz, Hepburn, &c.
		72. Brigade, Mitval, Vittdum, Ruthven.
		73. 600 Horse, Halle's.
		74. 600 Horse, ditto.
		75. 400 Horse, Courville's
		76. 500 Horse, Schaafman, Reserve.
		77. 500 Horse, Cochtitzki, Reserve.
SAXON ARMY.		
		78. — Horse, Steinau.
		79. — Horse, ditto.
		80. 400 Horse, Bindauf.
		81. 400 Horse, ditto.
		82. 400 Horse, Provincial Gentry.
		83. — Horse, Arnheim.
		84. Infantry, ditto.
		85. Infantry, ditto.
		86. 350 Foot, Schwalbach.
		87. 350 Foot, ditto.
		88. 700 Foot, Löfers.
		89. 600 Foot, Electoral Regiment.
		90. 350 Foot, Glitzingen.
		91. 350 Foot, ditto.
		92. 350 Foot, Starchedel.
		93. 350 Foot, ditto.
		94. 400 Horse, Provincial Gentry.
		95. 400 Horse, Sax-Altenberg
		96. 400 Horse, ditto.
		97. 400 Horse, Electoral Regiment.
		98. 400 Horse, ditto
		99. 400 Horse, ditto.

A minute Plan of the Battle of *Leipsic* is a thing greatly to be wished for, inasmuch as his *Swedish* Majesty that day exhibited an art of war entirely new and thoroughly scientific.

Folard's Ichnography illustrates, in no degree, the important truths I am mentioning; since the size of the squares bears not any proportion to the number of troops contained in them, and the ground itself is partly ideal. We do not know horse from foot: an inaccuracy to be remarked in most Plans; besides, without a just idea of the precise quantity of men in each peloton, and in what places the infantry were intermingled with the cavalry, it is impossible to comprehend the fine disposition then made by *Gustavus*, who added more to the art of war in this day's service, than had been discovered since the time of *Julius Cæsar*.

whose fire was too heavy and violent to be opposed by the pistol-shots of cavalry. It was likewise enjoined the Swedes first to receive the enemy's discharge, and return it afterwards *.

Tilly exceeded the two combined armies by *ten or twelve* thousand men at least †, according to Monro, who was then present; but our computation, which we profess to have rated very low, makes the superiority about *five* thousand. The whole Saxon army fled, excepting only their master's guards, and one other regiment. His majesty obtained the victory at the head of two and twenty thousand men, and, what is very remarkable, not a Swedish soldier behaved ill, and only one regiment was squeezed out of its place, and that was Callenbach's; whereas, on the other hand, the four Walloon bodies, that retired at last to the wood, had been posted at considerable distances one from the other ‡.

After a furious cannonade of no small duration, the king, clothed in a new suit of grey cloth, wearing a green plumage on his beaver, and mounted on a horse *de poil d'étourneau* §, began the attack on Pappenheim sword in hand, and, after a desperate resistance from that intrepid and most experienced commander, compelled him to retreat to such a distance, as procured a point of the wind in his majesty's favour. What induced the king to push this onset forwards with a degree of fury that can hardly be paralleled, was partly to avoid the wind and dust, which were both perplexing that day beyond imagination; and partly to secure the left flank of his wing (Nº. 41, &c.) from Tilly's great battery, which traversed it obliquely §.

This advance of the Swedes caused a larger opening than appeared at first, between the king's line, and the corps posted behind him under the direction of Banier; and of course the brave duke of Holstein, whose regiment of foot

* *Schefferi Mem. Suec. Gentis.*

† *Monro's Expedition*, ii. 64.

‡ Namely at Nº. 8. 12. 15. 19.

§ What the grooms call a *sea-bitten* colour. It was certainly a false affectation in his majesty, and in that respect Pappenheim copied him, either from a contempt of danger, or in order to be better discerned by his troops, ever to ride a steed which carried some distinguishing marks; as may be observed not only here, but at the siege of Ingolstadt, and the fatal battle of Lutzen. It was probably on this account, that the artful Richelieu and father Joseph sent a horse to be sold, in the Swedish camp, very uncommonly marked. As they foresaw, his majesty purchased it in a moment; but Gassion standing then high in his favour, he bestowed it on him, and the horse was killed under the Frenchman in the next day's cannonade. *Mem. de Gassion par M. le Père*, 12 tom. i. 110, 111.

§ *Soldat Suedois*, 128.

is described in the plan N^o. 7, at the extremity of Tilly's main body, and flanking Pappenheim's wing of cavalry, made a motion, it is thought, from his own opinion, and quitting his line of battle, fell furiously on the king's rear. But a part of his majesty's corps facing about immediately, and Banier, who supported his master at a proper distance, advancing with three divisions of the Rhingrave's horse, the Imperial regiment was soon cut to pieces, and the duke of Holstein mortally wounded.

Pappenheim being thus forced out of his line, edged round to the king's right flank; where Gustavus soon made proper evolutions to confront him; and Banier having by this time cut to pieces the duke of Holstein's regiment, co-operated vigorously with his royal master. Thenceforwards the Imperial left wing acquitted itself manfully, yet never turned the scale against the army of Sweden. Pappenheim returned to the charge seven times successively. In the third attack, which was conducted with great readiness and impetuosity, he missed little of overpowering his opponents; for he was quicker in rallying, than the Swedes could be in pursuing their advantage; so that Banier was obliged to fly once more to succour his monarch, and the reinforcement was as roughly handled as the party to whose assistance it marched. It was in the heat of this rencounter that Pappenheim and Gassion fought hand to hand*.

About fifteen minutes from the commencement of Pappenheim's first attack, the count de Furstenberg fell upon the Saxon army, and after a short conflict intirely dispersed the right wing, which part of his troops pursued farther than good soldiers ought to have done. The occasion of this sudden defeat may be attributed solely to the inexperience and pusillanimity of the provincial Saxon horse, which had been raised by vassals†. Notwithstanding, indecise as this slight advantage may appear, it tempted Tilly to dispatch part of his main body to overpower the residue of the Saxon forces, and induced him likewise, which may be considered an indiscretion‡, to descend from his convenient and well-chosen eminence, and let loose on Horn, who commanded the left wing of the Swedish army; part of those veteran bands of infantry, which had made all Germany tremble for the space of thirteen years.

* *Hist. du maréchal Gassion*, p. 52. tom. i.

† *Heylmanni Leo Arctæus*, 4^o. 34.

‡ *Wassebergii Florus German.* 255. Franc. 1648.

The Imperial generalissimo soon dispersed the Saxon forces, and when his troops appeared over-eager in pursuing the fugitives, *Turn back, said he, comrades; let us beat the Swedes, and the empire is our own**. He never recovered so many pursuers, as, unquestionably, he wished to recal. Meanwhile the Saxons, like excellent foldiers, took the liberty to plunder their own waggons, and then consulted their safety by flight. Their electoral master was the first man, who carried the news of the defeat to Eülenburg†, a little town on the banks of the Molda, about ten miles from the field of action. Arnheim having saved two, or as some say four, regiments, and placed them under Horn's protection, flew immediately to the king to ask his advice and assistance‡. All the Imperialists, however, did not pursue the Saxons; for Furstenberg, with his Italian cavalry, and Cronenberg, whose regiment of German horse was esteemed the very flower of the Austrian army, stopped their troops in full career, and attacked Horn, who soon made proper evolutions, and received them so bravely||, that Gustavus ever afterwards acknowledged that he was indebted to him for the victory. Tilly likewise bent part of his efforts on this left-wing of the Swedes, which by the flight of the Saxons was for a time exposed in one flank, yet it was protected a little with a high road and hedges; which Gustavus probably foresaw in the first dispositions he made, and consequently destined them as a small line of partition between his own and the electoral forces.

It may naturally be asked, what sufficient reason could induce Tilly to decline attacking the main body of the royal army conducted by Teüffel? To which may be assigned a very just and satisfactory answer: namely, that the centre was protected, as will appear by the plan, with one entire line of large artillery §.

Meanwhile Gustavus, who had greatly checked the impetuosity of Pappenheim, and who, foreseeing his presence might be necessary in more places than one, had made Banier, provisionally, commander over the right wing, receiving advice upon advice of the misbehaviour and defeat of the Saxons, sent a message to Teüffel to lead the centre** on

* *Swed. Discipline*, part iii. 19.

† *Introd. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 140.

‡ *Iidem* *ibid.*

|| See Horn's *Letter in the Swed. Discipline*, part iii. 20, 21.

§ *Arlanibai Arm. Suecica*, 4^o. 187.

** It is remarkable, that two battalions of pioneers were posted in the centre, intermixt with N^{os} 47, 45, 50, 53. *Hist. Authentic Relation*, tom. ii. 122. This peculiarity has passed, hitherto, unobserved.

to the charge; but that brave officer was struck dead by a musket-ball as he was listening attentively to the king's message*. His majesty, unapprized of this event, pursued his course down the interval behind the front line, crying out with an air of sprightliness in his countenance as he rode along, *Alegramente, soldados, alegramente*: to which the troops replied with alacrity, *Vivat! vivat!* At the same time, with a view to strengthen Horn's flank, he ordered the foot regiment of Hepburn, and half that of Vitzdum†, to march from the rear of the centre‡: as likewise the regiment of Westergothian horse from his own wing (Nº. 39.) having cut to pieces the regiment that confronted it; namely, Holftein's (Nº. 7.) and pretty well blunted the edge of Pappenheim's violence.

Being arrived in that part of Horn's wing|| where Callenbach commanded, he cried out with a tone of eagerness, *Callenbach! charge, man, in God's name! Charge, man, in God's name!* That officer soon obeyed the royal orders, but fell, unfortunately, in the first fire**.

The king, notwithstanding the clouds of dust that annoyed him, discovered some large masses of troops, that seemed to advance. He asked the persons round him, who they might be, and what they thought of them? Their answer was, they concluded them to be Swedes. Gustavus knew, that this did not agree with his own plan, and galloping his horse at some distance beyond the lines, for his eye-sight was by no means the most perfect, returned and arranged his troops in order to receive them: *They are Imperialists*, added he, *I have discovered the Burgundian†† crests amongst their ensigns*. This said, he returned to such places where he thought his presence most necessary. Here it was, namely, in the sharp conflict betwixt Horn and Tilly, that the Scottish regiments first practised firing in *platoons*‡‡, which amazed the Imperialists to such a degree, that they hardly knew how to conduct themselves.

* *Vernulaus de Bell. Sueco-Germ.* 150. 4º. *Cologn.* 1643. Others say the king sent for him to Horn's left wing, and having ordered him to reconnoitre a large body of troops supposed to be the Imperial, that he obeyed his master's commands with alacrity, but was killed in returning. *Memoir's Second Expedition*, 66. *Sued. Discipline*, part iii. 23.

† Nº 82 and 85. See the plan.

‡ *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 176.

|| It is plain Bougeant knew nothing of this battle, for he makes Horn command the centre, tom. i. 267.

** *Sued. Discipline*, part iii. p. 22.

†† The Austrian eagle, when Ferdinand II. entered Ratisbon, June 19, 1630, at the great diet convened there, carried on its breast a scutcheon half Austrian and half Burgundian.

‡‡ *Swedish Intelligence*, part i. 224. *Sued. Discipline*, part iii. 25, 26.

Still the main body of the Swedes, as we observed before, and the major part of Tilly's Walloon infantry, which stood over-against them, remained spectators of each other, if we except only their cannonade, and the detachment of certain bodies occasionally, as urgent necessities here and there seemed to demand such sorts of assistance.

Some few minutes after four o'clock the king perceived matters drawing towards a favourable conclusion: for having squeezed Pappenheim quite out of his place, and advanced half way towards the village of Little Weiderich, he judged it expedient to attack on every side that great mass of Imperial infantry, which composed the centre, and consisted originally of eighteen regiments, looked upon by all next to invincible*. What followed, was rather obstinacy than fighting; and the contest was so very warm, that narrators who were there present, neither are, nor pretended to be exact in their accounts. However, it is natural to suppose, that the king brought his whole centre to act, conjointly with such other forces as he could then produce†.

It was now more than the dusk of the evening, it was almost dark‡; and though the Imperialists had been broken through and through various times, such was their resistance, that the victory hardly yet appeared decisive; for four regiments of infantry, though posted at considerable distances from each other||, formed themselves merely by the habitude and instinct of war, and, without the assistance of any one principal commander, retired gloomily and sullenly to the skirts of the wood which laid behind them. There they repulsed the united efforts of the Swedes, without ever mentioning the word *quarter*, and continued to fight on, even when half-disabled, and overthrown. It is certain, that Tilly behaved with great intrepidity to the last moment§, and burst into tears, when he saw the slaughter his soldiers optionally

* No 8, 12, 15, 19. *Swed. Discipl.* part iii. 27. and thus Baumgarten's regiment, N° 4, in the middle part of Pappenheim's wing, was squeezed almost into the centre of Furstenberg's wing, between the regiments of Schomberg and Cronenberg, N° 26, 27, which two points made almost the extremities of the line. *Ibid.*

† *Monro*, part ii. 66. *Swed. Discip.* part iii. 23, 24, &c.

‡ *Riccio de Bell. Germ.* 269. 4°.

|| *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania*, 4° p. 33.

§ *Hist. de Galeazzo Gualdo*, tom. ii. 53. 4°.

submitted to*. At length, under the protection of darkness, the valiant Cronenberg carried him off at the head of these unconquerable Walloons, who were reduced now to 600 men. The battle lasted, not to mention the cannonading, from twelve at noon till after six; and for the first two hours of close engagement the victory was doubtful†.

We shall conclude with observing, that his majesty, on this occasion, caused a medal to be struck; which, far from carrying the least tincture of vain glory with it, appears to me rather an example of religious humility to succeeding conquerors. On one side was the following inscription; DEO. TER. OPT. MAX. GLORIA. ET. LAUS. QUI. GUSTAVO. ADOLPHO. SUECORUM. VANDALORUMQUE. REGI. CONTRA. CÆSAREANUM. AC. LIGUSTICUM. EXERCITUM. VICTORIAM. TRIBUIT. AD. LIPSIAM. DIE. VII. SEPTEMBRIS. ANNO. MDCXXXI. On the other side was engraven the word JEHOVAH, half concealed beneath clouds that intermix themselves with sun-shine, and this lemma underneath; A. DOMINO. FACTUM. EST. ISTUD‡.

There was a circumstance preceding this battle, that explains Tilly's conduct, and which few historians seem to know. As the Imperial general, far from being the aggressor, had determined not to fight, except compelled by unavoidable necessity; how happened it, that he engaged in the manner all writers mention, when Pappenheim had no power to prescribe laws to him? I always knew there was some omission of history in this important point; and though the true reason occurred to me from the natural result of probabilities, yet I did not care to hazard my conjectures till I could ground them upon some substantial authority§. Now the reader may remember, that if Tilly had chosen to fight, he ought above all things to have disputed the swampy palls at Scholka||. This employment Pappenheim ardently sought, but Tilly gave him an absolute denial; nevertheless, being of a nature no ways arbitrary, he consented, after repeated solicitations, to allow Pappenheim, at his own pressing request, and under strict promise of not engaging in earnest,

* *Hist. de Galeazzo Gualdo*, tom. ii. 53. 4°. Bologn. 1641. *Swed. Discipline*, part iii. 31.

† *Burgi Mars Sueco Germ.* 134. *Lettre du Baron de Cronenberg.*

‡ *Memoirs communicated.*

§ *Relation de la Bataille donnée près de Leipzig & de la retraite, écrite par un capitaine de l'armée Impériale à un sien ami.* D'Halberstadt le 22 de Septembre, 1631.

|| *Introduction de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 138. Some call the village Zschortza.

to observe the numbers and countenance of the enemies as they passed the rivulet, allowing him only 2000 cavalry for that service, and protesting, that even such a permission was too much for a commander in chief to grant.

Pappenheim's appetite for glory, joined to the natural impetuosity of his temper, soon brought on a very dangerous skirmish; inasmuch, that he was obliged at length to inform the generalissimo, that if he did not send him 2000 fresh horsemen, he, and a couple of the best regiments in the Imperial service, must be cut to pieces or taken prisoners. In this perplexity, which from its sudden appearance scarcely admitted an alternative, Tilly had no time for liberty of choice: and as the clamour and insinuations of the younger officers almost distracted him, he decided wrong merely for present ease; nevertheless, not wanting spirit to charge the colonel, who commanded the reinforcement, to tell Pappenheim, that in case he failed to disengage himself at all events, he must expect to lay down his life as a sacrifice for his rashness and disobedience, in a solemn trial before a court-martial. The good old man soon forgave this constitutional warmth of his lieutenant-general, and in a letter he wrote, under great anguish of mind, not more than sixteen days after the defeat, did not allow the most remote hint to fall from his pen to the disadvantage of Pappenheim. It is a letter worth reading, as a pattern of Christian resignation in a great commander, who had never met with a repulse during the course of thirty very signal engagements. It is addressed to a friend, and runs thus:

"SIR,

"I was in great hopes, after such a series of fatiguing and intricate affairs, which I have been obliged to struggle with through the whole preceding campaign, and which in truth hindered me from keeping up an epistolary intercourse, to have conveyed to you at last some important news of an advantageous nature. But the Supreme Being has thought fit to give things another turn, and visit us at length with a signal chastisement; inasmuch as when on the seventh of this month I had made myself master of the town and castle of Leipzig, with a view, according to my orders, to compel the elector of Saxony to obey the mandate of his Imperial majesty, and renounce the treaty of Leipzig, the king of Sweden, supported by the forces of the said elector and the elector of Brandenburg, advanced upon me all at once, and compelled me to enter into a general engagement, wherein, after a long and obstinate dispute, it

was the misfortune of our troops, much inferior in point of numbers, and greatly incommoded by clouds of dust, and the continual fire of the enemy's artillery, to fall into disorder by imperceptible degrees, and at length quit the field of battle. This may be termed the reverse of all our past prosperities: over which we allowed ourselves to slumber, without pursuing our point vigorously. May God, who proposes, perhaps, to awaken us, and sharpen us by this disaster, inspire us for the future with a double quantity of attention and zeal.—The losses and confusion on the enemy's side, were very considerable: nor did they pursue their blow with such expedition, as to prevent a party of our troops from retiring in safety, whom I am now modelling and reducing to order in the best manner I can. As to my person, God has preserved me so far, that out of two shots, that happened to strike me, one only pierced my cloaths, and the other gave me a contusion on the reins, which seems to be attended with no symptoms of danger †.

“ Your faithful friend and servant,

“ JOHN; COUNT DE TILLI.”

Nor was the letter Gustavus wrote to Charles I. on the same event, less modest, or less moderate. The Imperial general was not dejected, and the Swedish monarch appears not to be elated. The reader, if he please, may cast his eye over it by way of contrast.

“ Most serene prince, brother,
kinsman, and dearest friend,

“ As we know well the affection your serenity bears not only to us, but to the common cause, and as we are assured likewise, that you feel for us in all our successes and hazards relative to the public safety; it would be un-

* Though this circumstance may at first sight appear as a minute and trifling incident, yet it must be remembered, that the battle was fought in a dry season, on a vast plain, reduced to powder by several ploughings; and the wind being brisk during the time of action, it is incredible to say how great an obscurity was raised among the Imperialists after the king gained two points of the wind. See *Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato*, lib. ii. 4°. 53.

† *Lettre du comte de Tilly à un sien ami, écrite de Halberstadt, le 24 de Septembre, 1631.*

‡ Here Tilly is a little insincere; for he mentions nothing of the blows Langfritz gave him with the butt-end of his carabine, from which bruises he received unspeakable torment. The veteran commander well knew the delicate feelings of honour; *Lex non supponit odiosa.*

pardon-

pardonable at the present juncture not to inform you of that signal and memorable victory, which the divine bounty in these days has bestowed upon us. In a word, after the elector of Saxony had joined his troops with ours, and the combined armies had marched forwards in order to give the enemy battle, the Imperial general* thought proper to advance five miles at the head of all his troops from his camp at Leipzig, and oppose his whole force against ours. The battle began with great fury, and was maintained four hours on each side with uncommon obstinacy†, till at length the Imperial army, as the favour of Divine Providence seemed to co-operate with the unwearied resolution of my soldiers, began by degrees to break its ranks and disappear. Our troops pursued their adversaries to the very walls of Leipzig, and rendered themselves masters of their artillery, baggage-waggons, and a great number of colours.

“The general having received a wound, thought proper to point his course towards the bishopric of Halberstadt, leaving the troops, that were afterwards to follow him, to our clemency, and the mercy of war. Great numbers of the enemy fell on the field of battle, amongst whom was the watch-master general‡, and some other commanders of note. The number of prisoners amounts to several thousands, and under that head may be mentioned the duke of Holstein, and various officers of no small distinction.—For all which series of successes, let us give thanks to God, as the real author and promoter of them, and ascribe entirely, as we justly ought, to his benignity, that not only the long-expected hope, so ardently conceived by thousands, of the restoration of civil and religious liberty, at length presents itself afresh to our imagination, but that there appears likewise no *difficult prospect of undertaking a second time the re-establishment of the oppressed Palatine family.*

“We doubt not, but your serenity will receive the news of this victory with affection and joy; that you will consider the present opportunity as a circumstance not to be *neglected*, directing your whole attention to this single ob-

* As Gustavus neither loved nor esteemed Tilly, on account of the barbarities committed by him in the storming of Magdeburg, it has been observed elsewhere, that he usually styled him the *Old Walloon* and *Old Corporal*. Even in this letter it is very evident, he affects twice to avoid calling him by his proper name.

† His majesty includes neither the cannonade nor the defeat.

‡ Erwitze.

ject, and making it your royal care to advance the good of the Christian world, and promote the welfare of your own relations, by assistance in *men* and *money*, and by *magnanimous resolutions*. For our own part, from henceforwards, we will never allow ourselves to be thought remiss in regard to you and yours, recommending your serenity to divine protection, in full expectation, that things may continue to take a turn still more prosperous in our behalf*.

“Your affectionate brother and kinsman,

“At Halle in Saxony,
Sept. 13, 1631.”

“GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.”

Tilly left 7000 men dead in the field: but the number of slain does not always constitute the real loss that attends a defeat. Men may be procured and purchased again: but the loss of such a number of veteran troops, infantry especially, is *never* to be recovered during an old general's life. Few people extend this remark through military history, though the consequences are, humanly speaking, almost infallible. The emperor half ruined his fortunes just before Gustavus arrived, by disbanding a body of 17,000 well seasoned and experienced troops, with a view to please the diet at Ratisbon; and Spain afterwards received a mortal wound by losing a respectable body of Walloons at the battle of Rocroy †, nor had she recovered her loss even at the time when the peace of Munster was concluded.

It has been ‡ remarked, by some historians, that in the course and consequences of this defeat, the Imperialists lost more men under the article of prisoners than in the action itself; for out of forty thousand effective soldiers, according to their computation, Tilly, by Puppenheim's confession, preserved no more than *one half*. Great numbers of the enemy

* From a *MS. Latin letter in the Ashmole collection* at Oxford. APPENDIX, Art. XXIV.

† The marquis de Fontaines commanded the centre, composed of Walloon infantry, which body of troops, when both wings were defeated, maintained their post to the last man. Next morning the general, who had been afflicted with the gout, was found dead in his arm chair at the head of his soldiers, who lay all stretched round him in regular lines, covering the same ground which they had occupied whilst alive.

‡ The court of Vienna sustained another loss of this kind soon after the peace of Utrecht, being induced from arguments of economy to dismiss about 18,000 troops, which had distinguished themselves through the *war of the succession*. Prince Eugene made remonstrance after remonstrance, and descended even to intercede and supplicate for their continuance; but receiving in a private audience a positive denial from the emperor, he left the cabinet with great emotion, and shed tears on the occasion.

took

took the opportunity to desert a sinking cause; 3000 persons were taken prisoners in the day of battle, to whom the king granted quarter without the effusion of a drop of blood. Some likewise were killed in their flight; for Gustavus pursued the Imperialists eight and thirty miles, and at Merzburg particularly, destroyed a thousand more, and compelled fifteen hundred to surrender.

The camp of the enemy was taken standing, so that the officers and soldiers lost great part of their ill-acquired plunder. In a word, there was hardly a soldier amongst the killed, or prisoners, who had less than ten ducats in his pockets, and more was found concealed in their girdles and their saddles. Almost all the baggage-waggons fell into the hands of the Swedes, as also 100 ensigns and cornets, and more than two thirds of the train of artillery. The victors were pleased to find many of the latter, inscribed with the names, and decorated with the arms of their friends and enemies; as the king of Bohemia, elector of Brandenburg, and duke of Brunswick, on the one hand, and of the dukes of Bavaria and Friland, also of his Imperial majesty, on the other. The king divided the spoils of Tilly's camp amongst his men in a manner remarkably equitable and uncommon: for, being apprized of the lodgment and disposition of the enemy's troops, he appointed each Swedish regiment to occupy the same ground which an Imperial regiment had possessed before; and no man was allowed to plunder out of his own district, under the most severe military pains and penalties*.

The Swedes, who behaved well, lost only 1000 men in this engagement; and the Saxons, who faced the enemy only a few minutes, verified the old observation,

Mors & fugacem persequitur virum,

for their loss amounted to at least 2000. Amongst the dead on the Imperial side, may be reckoned Adolphus duke of Holstein, a Protestant, who expired some few hours after he was taken †; sergeant-major general Schoenberg, watch master general Erwitz, Baumgarten general of the artillery, the colonels Blancard and Colorado, Lerma aid-de-camp, and the marquis of Gonzaga; Lieutenant-colonels,

* *Monro's Expedition*, part ii. p. 71.

† This does not clash with the king's account to Charles I. who considered him only in the light of a prisoner. It is said Gustavus Horn questioned him severely in his last hours for serving under the Roman catholics. His answer was, for in all probability he had reconciled himself to the Romish opinions, that a man of the sword, and a professor of theology, were two different beings.

the baron de Grotta, Caratelli, and don Joseph de Ainsa, who commanded the regiment of Savelli in the duke's absence; adjutant-general Zinzendorf, and the commissary-generals Walmerode and Graff, were taken prisoners; as were also then, and a few days afterwards, at Leipzig and Halle, Coronini, Cratz, and six other colonels, together with Bernardi, secretary and treasurer to Tilly, and several ecclesiastics, who were immediately dismissed without ransom. Amongst the Swedes were killed Maximilian Teüffel*, who commanded the royal regiment of foot guards, Hall, Caltenbach, Aldergast, and Damitz, all colonels. Courville was taken prisoner, for, having received a glancing shot across the forehead, and being blinded with the blood that streamed down upon his eyes, he mixed with the enemy's troops without knowing them. Colonel Lumfidel, and lieutenant-colonel Mostyn, were both wounded. The elector of Saxony lost serjeant-major general Bindhauf, Loëfel, Dieckau, the two Starchedels, and some other colonels.

Tilly received, some say, three wounds from musquet-balls and pistol-shots, and a very disagreeable contusion on his neck from the butt-end of a horseman's carbine. He was once taken prisoner by one Frederic, a captain of cavalry in the Rhingrave's regiment, whom the army, on account of his stature, surnamed Langfritz†; who, knowing him, made him an offer of quarter, and upon Tilly's refusal gave him the blow above-mentioned; but Rodolphus duke of Saxe-Lauenberg flew to his assistance with two or three horsemen, and bravely rescued him, killing Langfritz with a pistol-shot, taking, even in such confusion, so true an aim, that the bullet entered one ear, and passed through the other. Pappenheim received six or seven wounds, *according to custom*‡; and the count de Furstenberg was wounded, but not mortally. Cronenberg carried off the general at the head of the unconquerable Walloons, who were reduced

* Baron of Gindersdorf and Weyersberg. This brave man was a German born, but left the Imperial service upon some disgust. Lansperg, who loved the turgid style, speaks very pompously of this hero, upon supposition, that his real name, Teüffel, i. e. Devil, was a *nom de guerre*. Suedorum nonnullis exprimiariis occubuit: cæterisque insignior Maximilianus cognomento DIABOLUS, medii agminis (quod monui) ductor, regi ob fortitudinem charissimus. It was a common saying with the German wits, that Gustavus must counterwork and defeat his enemies, since one of his generals was *Death*, (*Todt*) and the other the *Devil*, (*Teüffel*). *Gust. Magn. Bellum Germ.* 1650, p. 329.

† Long-sides.

‡ He received *the like number* of wounds at the battle of Prague, and laid for a considerable time stripped and undistinguished amongst the slain.

to 600 men, and lodged him by break of day at twenty-one miles distance in the town of Halle. Furstenberg attended Tilly in another coach, and the duke of Saxe-Lauenberg assisted Cronenberg in conducting the party. The regiment of Schoenberg soon followed them, but the major part of the broken troops pointed their course towards Halberstadt.

In this confusion sixteen troops of horse formed themselves between the field of battle and the town of Leipzig, but they had no officers to command them; and neither the generalissimo, nor *maréchal de camp*, nor *serjeant-major di battaglia* were to be found. At length Pappenheim appeared, and, having mounted a fresh horse, led them on to make a final effort. That attempt not succeeding, he carried them off under favour of the night, pursuing the road which we have just mentioned. All supposed the general to be dead, nor did Pappenheim appear much afflicted at that report; for Tilly and he had never agreed since he dissuaded the former to desist from his enterprise on the king's camp at Werben *.

The king, according to some accounts †, slept all the night succeeding the battle near a little fire made of fragments of wood, which his soldiers had collected together; having first dispatched a body of troops to pursue the fugitives. Others tell us, that he invited the elector of Saxony to take part of a cold repast with him in his tent; and all who knew his majesty's warmth of temper, expected he would throw out an oblique hint or two on the misbehaviour of the Saxon troops; but, on the contrary, he told the elector, *That his men, considering they were chiefly new-raised recruits, behaved extremely well*: and then asked him, *how he liked his conduct in that day's service; protesting at the same time, he would follow his point vigorously, and pursue the old corporal to the utmost limits of the world*. Next morning, after public prayers, and a solemn act of thanksgiving at the head of his army, he mounted on horseback, and returned thanks to his *men*, regiment by regiment; and notwithstanding the Imperial army suffered at that time a sort of general wreck, and every moment was precious to a conqueror, in order to render his victory more complete upon easier terms, yet this wise and religious prince could not allow himself to pursue the stroke at the very instant his arm was lifted up, till he had first returned his acknowledgment to the Supreme

* *Mercurius François*, 1631, p. 690.

† *Continuation of the Laurea Austriaca*, fol. p. 26, &c.

Being,

Being, and discharged the debt of gratitude, which he owed to his faithful foldiers; bestowing particular encomiums on the Swedish and Finland horse conducted by Horn, as also on that brave body of Scottish infantry which Hepburn commanded.

Thus ended one of the greatest battles that Europe had then seen. It lasted indeed only four hours and an half; for we will not include the two hours employed in cannonading. It was in this respect that Tilly prided himself particularly: and, what was still more, some of his artillery appeared to be of the heaviest sort then in use, and all his batteries were ready fixed; but after the first carnage was passed over, the king's portable cannons performed wonders*, as Tilly himself acknowledges in his letter. It is true, he says nothing of his majesty's peculiar method of fighting that day in *columns*, of which the king had made an experiment before in an engagement with the duke de Savelli, nor of some *evolutions*, which were then esteemed extraordinary†. This silence is not to be wondered at, since it was impossible for Tilly to have commended Gustavus in these present circumstances, without depreciating his own merit. The ground, if we except the rivulet and the morass of Scholka, the elevation of the Imperial batteries, and the advantage of the wood where the troops rallied, may be considered tolerably equal; nor were any intrenchments made use of on either side, there being indeed no time to prepare them. Many regiments charged *ten* or *fifteen* times, and some fought with only momentary intermissions, from the beginning of the battle to the end. What is worth remarking, no officer or soldier in the Swedish or Imperial armies was ever afterwards called to an account for *misbehaviour*. It may likewise be observed, that the Swedish cavalry

* We have never had the fortune to meet with a sufficient reason for the discontinuance of the leather cannon, which this prince invented. It certainly had its use in point of portability, and was highly necessary for the sake of shifting, varying the attack, and rallying; as also in deep and miry countries with small armies, and upon sudden expeditions. See note to p. 156 of vol. i. We have inquired likewise of several excellent German officers, what they thought of this uncommon sort of artillery. Their answer was, That they did not know the secret whereby the king constructed it, and supposed the peculiar method of making it, to have been long lost in oblivion. That, conformably to their own ideas at present, no artist could form a cannon of this sort that could be discharged many times successively.—Yet those of Gustavus were fired seven or eight times in the same day's service. *Memoires communicatees*. One Braunius, a German, has published a dissertation on the subject, but we never could procure it.

† *Lanſbergii Guſt. Magn. Bellum Germ.* p. 324, 325, 12°. Rot. 1652.

did

did not discharge a pistol till they had received their adversaries fire, and almost touched the heads of their horses. The effect was the more fatal, as the *peletons* of intermixt musqueteers disunited and broke the enemy's line by mere weight of ball, when opposed to the short pieces of carbiners and the pistols of horsemen. It alike deserves notice, that neither the king nor his troops discovered the least *dismay* upon the flight of the Saxons, though Horn's left wing was thereby laid open and naked, and though the number of the electoral forces was half equal, to say the least of them, to that of the Swedes. It is probable his majesty posted these troops by themselves, because he suspected they might not do their duty.

The loss of this battle, struck the whole catholic league dumb, after an uninterrupted series of victory for thirteen successive years; and caused so great an astonishment even in the court of Vienna, that the emperor, not thinking himself secure in his capital, removed his household to Gratz, the metropolis of Stiria.

The king, having employed himself the morning after the battle according to the manner we have related, distributed the 3000 Imperial prisoners amongst his troops. In all these corps were only three subjects of his Britannic majesty, though considerable numbers, Irish especially, then served in the emperor's armies. This finished, he permitted his soldiers, who had slept all night on the bare ground, and had eaten nothing worth mentioning for two days, to take possession of the Imperialists camp near Leipzig, where they found abundant provisions of every kind. He then, at the head of part of his cavalry, invested Leipzig, but leaving the siege to the elector of Saxony, who by this time was returned from Eilenberg, to which place he and his army had fled on the afternoon of the battle, he pushed on, the next morning, as far as Merzburg*, whose governor, the baron de Palant, received orders from Tilly to withdraw his garrison. Papenheim, who at that period was in effect general over the generalissimo, passing through Merzburg after Tilly, left counter-orders with the baron, which that commander thinking fit to comply with, made a resistance more becoming a man of honour than a man of prudence; for not only he and

* Three days afterwards the castle of Merzburg was taken, by which means colonel Ullar regained his liberty, having been captive there ever since the storming of Magdeburg. Gustavus sent the governor of the castle, who was a subject of Saxony, to plead his cause, and make his excuses to the elector his master.

his

his garrison, but several broken companies which had straggled thither after the battle of Leipzig, were all made prisoners of war.

The king, out of pure politeness, left the reconquering of Leipzig to its lawful possessor, inasmuch as it was pretty certain, that town must submit of course; and in effect Wangler, the Imperial commander, surrendered after a deliberation of two days, and saved 3000 good troops, upon condition that, thenceforwards, they were never to bear arms against the crown of Sweden; such commanders and soldiers excepted, as did not belong *bona fide* to the garrison. So that about one hundred persons, chiefly officers, were detained as prisoners; and many brave Swedes were released, who had been confined there ever since the storming of Magdeburg; and by this time the king, as Monro, who was there present, assures us, had increased his army since the battle of Leipzig, with an addition of 7000 Imperial forces, including prisoners.

In the meantime his majesty, at the head of 15,000 men, attended by an army of 10,000 more, advanced as far as Halle, and made himself master of the town and castle with no great difficulty. Here he refreshed his men for some days, and returned public thanks to God in the great cathedral, employing every leisure moment in planning and adjusting his future operations. Before he left the town, many protestant princes, with the elector of Saxony at their head, made him a visit; and here it was, that measures were taken for the completion of the great work, which was to come on. What is yet more, this mighty plan was all reduced to form in one evening, though that evening was dedicated to festivity; for the elector of Saxony loved the enjoyments of the table above measure. Some minutes before supper, colonel Monro entered the room out of curiosity, and the king, who disliked drinking, took him by the shoulder, and said with a whisper, *I wish, Monro, you could be master of the bottles and glasses to night, in the absence of old major-general sir Patrick Ruthven; but you want a strength of head to relieve me on such an occasion.* Then turning round to the elector, he made a long encomium on the Scottish nation; and beckoning to colonel Hepburn, who stood in another part of the room, recapitulated the purport of his discourse, and recommended him, Lumfidel, and Monro, to the elector's more immediate notice.

At length it was agreed on all hands, that as to pursue Tilly was only loss of time, it was therefore more expedient, since the emperor and the catholic league could not produce

duce a fresh army very soon, to fall upon the respective dominions of certain popish princes, while their minds were strongly impressed with terror. Before this great work could be undertaken, it was concluded necessary to employ part of the troops in securing the princes of the house of Anhalt, as likewise the two dioceses of Magdeburg and Halberstadt; and then Gustavus determined to march, in person, at the head of the residue of his army, even into Bavaria, if that were possible, with an intent to give laws, at the same time, as he went along, to the ecclesiastical electors, and the bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg; and it was allotted the elector of Saxony to carry on the war in Lusatia, Silesia, and Bohemia. What induced Gustavus, who was then ascending to the zenith of his power, and absolute in his decisions in the assembly at Halle, to assign this department, and in effect the high road which led to Vienna, to the elector of Saxony, has been a point beyond the power of most historians to explain fully; and many persons have been the more perplexed in their considerations of it, inasmuch as the great Oxenstiern pronounced it to be a *false measure* *. Nevertheless, we shall speak more amply concerning this difficulty hereafter, not in the least to his Swedish majesty's dishonour, but, on the contrary, very abundantly to his glory.

We will now for a moment turn to the unfortunate Tilly, who, reaching Halle in the best manner he could before break of day; sent for the town-surgeon to dress his wounds, and make an incision into his contusion, which then gave him inexpressible torments. Upon examining the bruised flesh, the sagacious operator pronounced the general's body to be *gefrorn*, that is to say, in other words, to have been rendered impenetrable by magical incantations, and talismanical signatures † ‡.

From Halle the Imperial commander fled to Halberstadt in a litter, and there, having just sufficient strength to bear being placed on a horse for a single hour, made a review of his shattered troops, which amounted to 5000 cavalry, if we include ten cornetries of horse just arrived from Cologne, and some broken bodies of infantry; for the greater part of the army, concluding it more safe to adhere to Pappenheim, pursued another route under that officer's protection.

* *Succum vincere, victoriâ uti nescivisse.* Loccen. 587.

† *Swedish Intelligencer.*

‡ *Quod militæ dehoneftamentum quantum a Tillio abfuerit, ſciunt qui hominem novère.* *Brachel. Hiſt. noſtr. temp.* p. 266.

The little handful of men reassembled at Halle expressed great joy to behold once more their aged general; who, when he arrived at Ascherleben, dispatched the Cologne regiment to join Pappenheim at Mansfelt, and support his retreat. When Pappenheim received this reinforcement, it is asserted by some*, that he discovered very visible signs of distaste upon being so certainly assured, that the generalissimo was *living*. Be that as it may, Tilly in two days sent four expresses to Aldringer, requesting he would join him at his general rendezvous in the duchy of Brunswick, which distressed unfortunate country he considered partly as his own; for the emperor had bestowed upon him, by way of gratuity, a considerable part of the territories of the brave duke Christian, who was also bishop of Halberstadt. From Ascherleben he shaped his course through the diocese of Hildesheim, and arrived, in ten days after the battle, at Alvede, a little town on the river Leyne, which afterwards runs through Hanover. This journey may be considered more as a flight than a march, for in that time he led his troops 140 miles.

The king of Poland had long lain in wait for the event of a decisive battle; hoping, if Tilly had proved once successful, to have recovered all that the Swedes possessed in Prussia. Matters taking a contrary turn, he thought proper to offer up his incense to the conquering party. His Danish majesty made public rejoicings at Copenhagen; yet so deeply rooted was his jealousy of Gustavus, that he privately wished well to the house of Austria. Gustavus knew both these kings to the very bottom, and chose to build upon their *fears* much rather than upon their compliments. On the other hand, the dukes of Brunswick and Lunenberg were more explicit; and the prince of Anhalt, with all his family, made no ceremony of espousing the cause of Sweden by public treaty; wherein it was declared by him, That, reposing himself upon the protection of Gustavus, his intention was to contribute his contingency towards the expences of the war, allowing the Swedes to erect fortifications wherever the king pleased, and construct a bridge over the Elbe; towards the completing of which work he agreed to furnish both men and money †. Gustavus, moderate in prosperity, as well as undismayed in adversity, received all these princes with thankfulness, and caressed them all; and though the elector of Saxony after the battle, expected, as we observed before, but cold reception

* *Lettre d'un Capitaine, &c. à un sien ami.*

† *Chemnitzius*, tom. i. 179.

from

from a prince of so much valour, severity, and frankness, yet our hero commended him for the infinite pains he took to rally his men, and for the sensible regret he manifested upon account of their misbehaviour. The elector, charmed with a treatment so unexpected, vowed to follow the fortune of Gustavus to his last moments, and offered the whole of his assistance to procure him to be elected king of the Romans. The Saxon generals and ministers, who were most of them pensioners to the court of Vienna, soon however persuaded their master to change his mind: nevertheless, to all outward appearance the two princes lived together in perfect cordiality, *manente in speciem concordia*.

By this time, as a sort of natural consequence from the victory of Leipzig, Gustavus began to discover, that civil affairs increased upon his hands, as well as the military; and for these reasons ordered Oxenstiern, who had been absent from him ever since his arrival in Germany, to quit his warlike command in Prussia, and take upon him the office of director-general in the new-conquered countries; or, as others say, *legatus ab exercitu*. The chancellor set out immediately upon this charge, which seemed more suitable to his inclinations, and natural abilities; yet did not reach Halle till the king had crossed Thuringia, and conquered great part of Franconia.

It was debated in the evening of the entertainment we have lately mentioned, by what methods, and through what inroads the Swedish and Saxon troops should invade the empire, and the allies of the Imperial family; proper departments being already assigned to the elector of Brandenburg, the landgrave of Hesse, and the dukes of Mecklenburg. On both hands it was quickly agreed, that to pursue Tilly into Lower-Saxony would remove the seat of war too far from Vienna and Munich, and revive a new scene of distress and misery among the protestant princes of that circle. This scheme therefore being considered as injudicious and chimerical, only two roads presented themselves, whereby it was possible to invade and annoy the house of Austria and the catholic league; namely, the *left-hand* passage by way of Bohemia, straight to Vienna, which appeared at first sight most practicable, as the road, except such defiles and mountains as you find on the northern and southern frontiers, was plain and wide, the country itself abounding in good provisions of all sorts; the Imperialists having prepared no troops in those parts by way of opposition;—and the *right-hand* entrance into Thuringia, which might lead ultimately as far as Munich, but where many bye conquests were

to be made, and princes of various characters to be cajoled or threatened: added likewise, that the vast dreary forest of Thuringia, commonly called the *Düringer-Wald*, was to be crossed; and lastly, that the roads were narrow, winding, rocky in some places, and miry in others; especially in and near Bavaria, which abounds in rivers and morasses.

The elector of Saxony not daring, or not choosing to exasperate the house of Austria more than was needful, frankly made the king an offer of resigning to him the Bohemian passage into Austria, which Gustavus positively rejected without assigning any reasons. It is thought by many, that he entertained no high opinion of Arnheim's honesty, and placed as little confidence in the elector's abilities or sincerity. Nor was he satisfied, in case these difficulties could have been removed, that either Arnheim or his master were capable of reducing to obedience even the single circle of Franconia, inasmuch as Tilly, when he had once joined his troops with those of Aldringer, Fugger, and the Lorainers, might return upon them, as nearest to him, with great force, and give them, in all probability, a total overthrow. He saw too plainly in the day's service at Leipzig, that the Saxon generals and soldiers, however well intentioned, could perform but little in opposition to the rough and well-seasoned veterans of the Imperial army. For these reasons, he thought it prudent to engage their honesty no farther than his own eye could superintend it, nor embark them so deeply, as to run the risk of sacrificing the whole upon any miscarriage on their part; concluding it more advisable to keep them in breath by maintaining a diversion, and inure them to an apprenticeship in war, before they sate up for principals and masters in such a difficult profession.—Having therefore well arranged and digested all these ideas in his own mind, he pronounced only the result of his private reasonings to the assembly, declaring in a few words, That as the princes and orders of Silesia had considered the elector of Saxony as the first protector of the protestant cause ever since the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles, it was highly incumbent on the elector to fix his footing in Silesia, and then extend his conquest into Bohemia.—That for his own part, with the concurrence of his electoral highness, he had resolved once for all to penetrate through Thuringia into Franconia, having already prepared every thing necessary for such an expedition; being determined not only to allow a breathing-space to the princes and states of Upper-Germany, but to make the enemy a visit in his own lodgings, and give Tilly a second chance, if he thought proper to confront him in the field
of

of battle*. Thus spoke the king, and as no man replied, both the debate and the conversation ended, though the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the dukes of Mecklenburg, and the princes of the house of Anhalt and Weimar were all present at this august assembly.

About this time Christian, margrave of Culmbach, entered into a *confederation* with his majesty upon the same footing as that which had been concluded with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, whereto the administrator of Wirtemberg afterwards acceded. This gave the Swedes great credit in the circle of Suabia. The bishop of Bamberg † made a pretence too of copying their examples, and saved himself for that time by a mean act of equivocation: but the Swedes remembered him at a more convenient season, so that upon the whole he lost the reputation of a man of honour, and gained nothing but the character of a dissembler, who weakly attempted to overreach a prince of superior talents.

The king then dispatched Chemnitz‡, and another deputy, named Relinghen, to the margrave of Brandenburg's § place of residence. From Bareüth he instructed them to go forwards and sound the intentions of the Nurenbergers, and other protestants, with orders to use both kind words and menaces. Chemnitz acquitted himself very well in the embassies, but the Nurenbergers at first had not courage to make any declarations against the house of Austria: for indeed they had only just transmitted a paper of allegiance to Aldringer, sealed and signed in due form by the whole body of their patricians. Poppy also, an Imperial deputy who then resided at Amberg, constantly reminded them of this solemn engagement; so that the most they offered was a species of neutrality, upon which the king wrote them a letter with his own hand, observing, *That he saw through the surfaces of their hearts the Imperial interests in full proportion and distinctness at bottom; and that the middle course, which they proposed to steer, was calculated upon no other principle, than to amuse and deceive him.* "For my own part," continued he, "I look upon all neutralities with an eye of contempt, and shall treat neutral protestants upon the footing of enemies, wherever I find them." This letter being read in the public senate-house,

* Chemnitius, tom. i. p. 180.

† John George de Dornheim, elected 1622, died 1633.

‡ This was not the historian, but one Martin Von Chemnitz, a privy-counsellor.

§ Christian, Margrave of Brandenburg.

in presence of an assembly of 200 patricians, either terrified them into reason, or served as a pretext to justify them for quitting the interests of the house of Austria. Upon this the whole magistracy unanimously inclined to the cause of Sweden, and signed afterwards a treaty of alliance in conjunction with the other orders and states of the circle of Franconia. Chemnitz then received fresh instructions to continue at Nurenberg, and the other deputy went on to Ulm, and thence to Guntzburg, in which journey, being by profession a captain of horse, he fell, with his little escort, on an Imperial commissary, guarded by a body of twenty musqueteers, and having killed the officer with a pistol-ball, carried along with him to Strasburg the strong box, containing upwards of a thousand pounds, and generously applied the whole sum to his master's service.

Meanwhile the king, conformably to his late plan, it being only ten days after the battle of Leipsic, advanced at the head of his army to make himself master of Erfurt, a large city in the famous forest of Thuringia, dependant by dubious and disputable tenure on the elector of Mentz*, which prelate was the first prince of the catholic league, against whom Gustavus thought proper to begin hostilities. Before it was possible for him to demand admission, a body of delegated magistrates respectfully told him, that he was extremely welcome to make his residence among them in person, but begged to be excused from admitting a garrison. His answer was, *That he came as a friend, and not as an enemy: and more for their advantage than his own; that it was never his custom to make strangers his guards, and place himself in such a situation as to be obliged to receive laws from other men; Alterius non sit, qui suus esse potest.* These were the very words he made use of on the occasion; and upon the departure of the senators, he ordered duke William of Saxe Weimar, under pretence of escorting them with a body of horse, to take possession of the city at the same time that they entered. He then told the inhabitants in a long speech, which may be considered not only as a public justification of himself for entering Germany, but as a pattern of christian magnanimity, and religious moderation: That the public might be curious to be informed of what nature those motives were, which induced him first to interpose in the Germanic system.

* Frederick Greiffenclau, bishop of Worms; elected by the chapter 1626 in the room of John Suïcard, whose family name was Cronenberg.

For the various claims and pretensions to Erfurt the reader may consult *La Geographie de Hubner*, tom. vi. p. 258.

“ I em-

"I embark," said he, "in a war, far from my native dominions, and seem to court those dangers and difficulties, which another man might labour to decline; but the Searcher of the human heart well sees and knows, that it was neither ambition, that tempted me, nor the avarice of extending my dominions, nor the appetite of fighting. nor the mischievous temper of loving to interfere in my neighbours concerns. Other object I had none, than to support the afflicted and oppressed, to maintain the religious and civil rights of society, and bear my testimony against a tyranny over the whole human race. The Supreme Being hitherto has conferred upon me the marks of a providential concurrence, and has rendered me the willing, but unworthy instrument of restoring liberty both corporeal and mental to the late unhappy inhabitants in the various provinces of Lower-Germany. Let us, my friends, always remember, that in this general wreck of mankind, no one interested person must propose to glean any ruins to himself; nor sit, abjectly, lamenting, with folded arms, when the helm requires one man, when the anchor asks a second, and the sails a third. As is well known, I solicited for peace before my army entered Germany; I asked for it a second time very near the period of the inhuman massacre at Magdeburg; and am open to receive it now, even fourteen days after the decisive victory of Leipzig.—The instinct of God prompts me still to continue amongst you, and the necessity of things, in the first chain of which I had no concern, compels me to protect and make conditions for my allies, my kinsmen, and brethren in religion: nor will I ever desert them, till God resumes that existence, which at present he has thought fit to make my portion.—I acknowledge, with gratitude to the Supreme Being, that my mind is yet firm, and my body robust. I thank him likewise for having blessed me with no vulgar success, and for enduing me with abilities capable of applying that success to suitable purposes. Nevertheless, I am neither vain-glorious in my past prosperities, nor inapprehensive of the future frowns of Providence. It is certain too, that I contend with an army of veteran troops, rendered masters of their profession by experience, and sharpened afresh by disappointment and despair: and besides all this, it is a point incontestable, that war, in the very best hands, is a game of uncertainty.—If I oppress any man, merely through the necessity of affairs, it is I that feel, as well as he:—if I request you to receive a garrison, and expend some money in new fortifying your city, it is because I would make good that protection which I sincerely promise you. It has never been my custom first to conquer, and then enslave; and of this the town of Riga is an irrefragable instance. You may repose on the sincerity of my protection when I assure you, that I intend to leave among you, as a pledge or depositum, the invaluable object of all my affections

*affections in this world, and that is, the QUEEN OF SWEDEN**†.

His majesty, when the town-deputies met him between Halle and Erfurt, graciously gave them his word of honour to protect the liberties of the people, and not interrupt the established religion, with which the magistrates appeared highly contented. Being extremely delicate with regard to all imputations of subterfuge and retraction, he reduced his engagements, under nine distinct articles, into writing‡, which, being duly signed and sealed, gave such satisfaction to the principal inhabitants of the town and district, that they presented on their side a counterpart protestation, wherein, after having first obliged themselves, by oath, to continue faithful and obedient to him, his heirs, his crown and allies, during the whole period of this religious war, they engaged to defend their town *bona fide* against all hostile attacks; to attempt nothing to the detriment of his majesty's arms, but, on the contrary, to make discovery of all things, that tended to his prejudice; concluding with this general protest, that they enrolled themselves under the king's protection with submission and gratitude, sincerely, candidly, and irreproachably, in a manner befitting liberal persons, and men of honour§.

The king, who always made the tour of every city the first leisure moment after he had conquered it, for he loved to see the populace, and found it his interest likewise to be seen by them, directed his steps, as some think by design, into the church of St. Peter, and meeting the abbot at his first entrance, requested him to advise his sovereign to *withdraw his troops from the army of the league, and not strengthen the enemies of the protestants. That for his own part he bore no ill-will to the electoral body, and should be greatly mortified, if necessitated to use them contrary to his intentions. That the emperor only, was his man and his object; and as the Imperial soldiers had robbed him of a beaver hat § in Pomerania, he was come thus far to recover it and carry it home***.

When the-jesuits threw themselves at his feet, he raised them from the ground, and said, *They had much to answer for*

* Chemnit. tom. i. pag. 184—187.

† When her majesty arrived, the seat of war was removed so far from Erfurt, that the completion of the promise seemed entirely unnecessary.

‡ The author of the *Swedish Intelligencer* gives us twelve, part ii. p. 4.

§ Chemnit. tom. i. 188.

§ See the rencounter between him and Sirot, in that officer's *Memoirs*.

** *Le Soldat Suédois*, p. 147.

before

before God's tribunal, on account of the commotions they had raised, and the blood they had occasioned to be spilt throughout the world. That for his own part he was so far a jesuit, as to be able to comprehend, that their projects were ill-intentioned, their proceedings sinister, and their maxims dangerous. That it would become them better to peruse their breviaries, and handle their rosaries, in imitation of the decorum and moderation of other good catholic ecclesiastics, than to embroil themselves in the intrigues of state, and make the world a sea of blood: exhorting them to continue in quiet, and advertise their brethren of this discourse, since if they remained inactive, and in profound submission, strict care should be taken, that no person should molest them.*

Things being thus adjusted and explained, he gave the papists assurances, that they had free liberty to continue, undisturbed, in the exercises of their religion, or to sell their estates and effects, and retire into what country they pleased; but as to such, as had deserted their places of abode without waiting for an explanation, he should make no scruple to confiscate their goods in order to fit up the mansion destined for the reception of his royal consort. With regard to the protestant clergy, as likewise schoolmasters and professors in the university, he placed them, with singular honour, under his own immediate protection, and exempted them from the hardship of quartering soldiers, or contributing in any shape towards the expences of the war. In respect to the catholic ecclesiastics, he contented himself with their solemn declaration, that they would no ways prejudice the Swedish crown, nor the allies of Sweden. He then in the last place, having made a treaty with the dukes of Saxe-Weimar, appointed William, the elder brother, a prince extremely popular, and who had many connexions in those parts, governor of the city and district of Erfurt, which contains about seventy-three parishes, and the whole province of Thuringia: nominating the count of Lowenstein to be commander of the garrison†, and referring all civil matters to Sternberg, who acted in the double capacity of judge and public minister. In like manner, some days before, he created Lewis, prince of Anhalt, stadtholder of Halle, and director of the duchy of Magdeburg, joining with him Stalman as chancel-

* *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 148.

† The garrison consisted of Fowle's Scottish regiment, consisting of 1500 men. For the preservation of the province of Thuringia, were left behind, Courville's and Lowenstein's regiments of cavalry; Mitzval's, Monro's, and Forbes's regiments of infantry, with four companies of foot, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Chemnitz; all veteran troops of established reputation.

lor, and colonel Sneydwin * as military commander in the city, precisely for the same reasons; *cautiously avoiding to put native Swedes into such employment, for fear of giving umbrage to the Germans.*

His majesty now † turned all his thoughts towards the reduction of Franconia, a circle of more importance to the Imperialists than any other, as it afforded them means of resisting and retarding their aggressors, partly from the abundance of narrow defiles and difficult passes, and partly from the rocky and unequal nature of the ground in various places. Yet although one half of the country be wild, woody, and scantily peopled, which renders the march of an enemy highly disagreeable, yet the other half, at the same time, vies with any tract or territory in the empire, both for populousness of inhabitants, and for a plentiful supply of corn and forage: all which are reasons why the Imperial troops should not have evacuated that circle. Tilly had overshot these objects in marching so precipitately to the north-west, which may be considered as a *signal oversight*; for on his return to relieve Wurtzburg, he found Gustavus had adjusted his game in such a manner, that he had reserved to himself the power of starving the Imperialists, and declining an engagement.

The king, partly to extend his conquests, and partly to subsist his army, which consisted of 20,000 effective men, through the fatigues of a long and painful march, where provisions were to be obtained with difficulty, and the roads were deep and miry, judged extremely well to divide his forces into two bodies, in order to cross, with greater convenience, the vast forest of Thuringia, which had few villages, and only here and there a market-town, or city. The column, which took the right-hand road, was committed to the care of Bauditzen, as commander in chief, and colonel Hepburn. Bauditzen made himself master of Smalcalden, Meinungen, Newstadt, Hamelburg, Gemund, and Carlstadt, in his route. This general was as cool in reflection, and as brave in execution, as any officer under the king; but in money matters he was of a low rapacious temper ‡. Hence it was, that in order to

* He had been an old officer under the governor of Magdeburg.

† i. e. Fourteen days after the battle of Leipzig.

‡ He married Mademoiselle Rantzau, a lady born in Holstein, who (though a co-heiress with three other sisters) brought him an extraordinary fortune, for that age and country; namely, £. 16,000. sterling.

squeeze contributions from the inhabitants of the principal cities, through which his course laid, he consented to quarter his foldiers in little dorps and open fields; and thus, in a march of only eight days*, he contrived to put five thousand pounds in his pocket without the privity of his royal master; nor did he give a single dollar to the brave Hepburn, and such other officers as acted under him; probably, indeed, they would not have taken it. When the king heard the story, he thought proper to remove him to a more remote command in Pomerania, partly from abhorrence of such practices, and partly because the troops protested they did not care to serve under such a general. Nevertheless, it must be observed, upon the whole, that the land officers in that age dealt a little too largely in prize-money; which hung like a dead weight on his majesty's spirits, who wisely foresaw, when troops were warmly cloathed, well fed, and punctually paid, that such kind of practices must in time subvert all discipline, all principle, and all military enthusiasm: for nothing renders foldiers so cruel, and so pusillanimous, as the love of money;

— *Ibit, qui zonam perdidit, aiunt.*

Therefore it was with Gustavus, a sort of maxim, which he always threw out to his officers, as they stood round him; *That the science of war was an humane and liberal profession; and that he ever drew a line of partition between the man of service and the ruffian; the hero and the Croatian.* Nor did the king in this exception lay any restraint on the freedom of his own conduct: for he, Pappenheim, Horn, Gassion, &c. were all men of very exact and regular lives, and so was Tilly, if we except his bigotry and cruelty at the siege of Magdeburg. They performed far greater exploits in the field, than "those extraordinary heroes, whose immoralities," says an ingenious author†, "make almost as much noise as their victories."

* There is something surprizingly rapid in Gustavus's motions, even in bad roads, and at a time when he was encumbered with very heavy artillery. From a diary of this march it appears, that Bauditzen crossed the forest, twenty-seven miles, in two days; laid the third night at Meinungen, thirteen miles and a half; the fourth at Millerstadt, thirteen miles and a half; the fifth at Newstadt, thirteen miles and a half; the sixth at Gemund, thirteen miles; the seventh at Carlstadt, nine miles; and the eighth at Wurtzburg, nine miles. So that in this expedition he marched *one hundred and eleven miles and a half* in eight days, and received the capitulations of six considerable towns as he went along. He reached Wurtzburg, and took it before his lieutenant-general arrived.

† M. Bayle, under the article of Henry IV.

The morning his majesty left Erfurt, he sent a message to the count of Schwartzenberg*, that he purposed to take a bed in his castle of Gunter near Arnstadt, the ensuing evening. The nobleman was very uneasy at this unexpected frankness, because one of his ancestors had done the Swedes great mischief in a former war. He was weak enough to make his apologies on that head; but Gustavus told him, with a smile and composure, *That he had nothing to fear, inasmuch as his predecessor had acted like a man of honour and fidelity; and that he only desired such a brave and affectionate set of officers under himself.* During this visit, a party, detached from the main army, took Gotha by surprise; and the king dispatched letters of accommodation to the two principal personages of the catholic league in Franconia; namely, the bishops of Wurtzburg† and Bamberg. He then, having refreshed his men a little at Ilmenau, crossed the Düringer-Wald; and as the troops broke up their quarters early, and reached them late, the road they were to take was illuminated mornings and nights with matches fastened to trees, and lanterns erected on posts stationed at proper distances. The difficulties of carrying the artillery through this forest, as appeared plainly to me at the time I crossed it, were sufficient to have dismayed any general less enterprising than Gustavus. Nevertheless, he surmounted the rocks and hills, steered his course dexterously along the precipices, and glided between the thick woods in so serpentine and judicious a manner, that he reached the south-west boundaries of this wild or forest on the third evening; having presented himself as he passed along, before the strong castle of Masfeld, which being since dismantled, now is a heap of ruins, whilst an advanced party of his light-horse had the good fortune to seize Dacosta, governor of the fortress, and commissary over the district round it, who at that time, like a vigilant warrior, was amusing himself in courting a hare. In consequence of such unparalleled carelessness on the part of the commander, this important strong-hold surrendered to the conqueror upon

* He or one of the name had been the Imperial ambassador to England. He offended the French ambassador much at London, in 1622, by paying his compliments to the Spanish ambassador first. Some of this nobleman's predecessors, their family names were Gunter, settled in England with the Saxons. This branch enjoyed considerable possessions in Berkshire and elsewhere in the beginning of the last century. The chief of the family was created a prince in 1671; and the country has been since styled a principality. The old English historians call the Gunters, *Gutbrunni*.

† Francis Hatzfeld.

easy terms. His majesty pursued his journey next morning to Koëninghofen; not the Koëninghofen, which stands on the Tauber, for there are two towns of the name in the circle of Franconia, but that which belongs to the bishop of Wurtzburg, and is the key to that diocese, and the diocese of Bamberg. As the numerous garrisons in the town and castle seemed to make preparations for no common resistance, the king thundered upon them by break of day from such batteries as he could erect the preceding night; for he wanted this town exceedingly, it being victualled for a twelvemonth's siege, which was no small allurement to an hungry army. However during this momentary siege, whilst his mind was kept upon the stretch of impatience, he gave the public a very particular example of humanity. Having battered down one of the principal towers, he sent word to the garrison, *That his intention was to lay the whole city in ashes; but if they would send out the women and children, he would give them a courteous and hospitable reception* *.

Struck with such marks of benignity joined to a valour and firmness, which they had thoroughly experienced, the besieged immediately capitulated without ceremony; though few places of the same size with Koëninghofen, it being the magazine and arsenal of the diocese of Wurtzburg, as well as the principal fortress, could be supposed to be better furnished with ammunition, provisions, arms, and artillery. In this supposed asylum was deposited great part of the wealth and rich moveables, that belonged to the nobility and gentry, who lived in the district round about it. One good regiment was left in the town by way of garrison, and Ernest, another prince of the house of Saxe Weimar, and brother to William and Bernard, was appointed governor. It was during this siege, that the king gave an extraordinary proof not only of his intrepidity, but that he imagined no soldiers, even those belonging to the enemy, could be guilty of a cowardly and illiberal action. For riding up within half a musquet-shot of the town-gate, after he had sent a trumpeter to summon the garrison to capitulate, he observed the guards blowing their matches to give fire against his person; *Sacrament* †, cried he, the only time

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 151. *Suedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 7.

† Though I cite this passage in the manner I find it, yet it is doubtful to me, whether the king made use of the sort of oath, not uncommon in German mouths, which is here mentioned. It was remarked of him [*Merc. Fran. Tom. XVI.*] that far from digressing into any rash oath in the ordinary course of conversation, he was rarely or never known to be betrayed into a single expression of that kind, even under the influence of passion, or when any extraordinary event surprized him; and as a proof of this, since it is

hardly

time he was ever known to swear, *if you discharge one piece, the king shall know it; and he has made a vow, that in case such an accident should happen, not a single soul shall receive quarter; but if you treat fairly, your own conditions shall then be granted you* *.

Next morning, for the siege and capitulation lasted only one day, his majesty, willing to improve by the enemy's consternation, and to verify what was said of him, partly out of spite to Tilly, by the partisans of Walstein; namely, that he conquered the first circle of the empire, before the expresses could carry the news of his irruption to the court of Vienna; pursued his road to Sweinfurt very briskly. He marched his army twenty-six miles in one day, three weeks after the autumnal equinox, and that, in spite of the hard service of the day preceding, and the march the day before that, namely, from Schleüßing to Kœnigshofen, which may be computed at twenty miles and a half.

In the space of a single hour, his majesty invested Sweinfurt, and admitted the governor into a capitulation, allowing the garrison to retire to Wurtzburg, and appointing Charles Harte commander of the town, at the head of a regiment well approved and thoroughly experienced. In the middle of the day's march to this place, an old Imperial captain with one eye, assisted by such resolute peasants as he could assemble, took possession of a wooden house, that projected into the street of a little village or dorp, called Lauringen, through which place lay a narrow and difficult pass, and stopped the whole van-guard of the Swedish cavalry for a very considerable time, till at length the dragoons found themselves obliged to dismount, and cut this diminutive garrison to pieces. When the king refreshed himself at Lauringen some hours afterwards, and learnt what retardment had been occasioned to his progress by the inflexible obstinacy of a single man, he vowed, with the view, as it is thought, to acquire the knowledge of some secrets, to put the *one-eyed* officer to death, for sacrificing the poor peasants, and making a resistance, which favoured more of the madman than the soldier. In the transports therefore of his resentment, he sent for the provost-marshal and the executioner; but neither

one

hardly probable he would have counterworked his own example, it was a point of discipline with him, that whenever any soldier had been proved guilty either of cursing or swearing, he was condemned to stand for a considerable time, with his hands tied up against a pike in such manner, as if he implored the divine forgiveness.

* *Appendix to the Swedish Intelligence*, part iii. p. 127.

one nor the other could be found *. During the time employed in these enquiries and searches, the captain contrived to make his peace with his majesty, by informing him of the strength of Wurtzburg, and the approaches that led to the fortifications: and thus the affair ended, with reciprocal satisfaction on either side.

The amazing rapidity of the king's conquests dissolved immediately the catholic part of the assembly *then* convened at Franckfort upon the Mayne, it being agreed both by papists and protestants, that the sword might cut through the difficulties of the *edict of restitution* much sooner than the nice hands of the *jur-publicists* could pretend to unravel them. The first person that died was the grand-master of the Teutonic order †, who sat as president in this assembly, conscious of an irreligious and unguarded speech he had once made, namely, That the holy empire would never see a peaceable moment, till every protestant was massacred, who had arrived to the seventh year of his age. On this account he had no desire to pay his compliments to a man of spirit like Gustavus. Nor did the bishop of Wurtzburg, who had distinguished himself by an uncommon zeal for the cause of the *league*, choose to receive a Swedish visit in his own metropolis; but dislodging, just before the letter of summons reached the town, threw himself, boldly enough, into the army of the house of Austria, and for this reason, in the month of January following, was sent ambassador into France in the name of all the catholic electors.

The bishop of Bamberg, who had parts inferior to this prelate, and less firmness, sheltered himself, as persons of little minds are apt to do, under the low arts of duplicity and evasion. Having agreed by his deputies, according to his own proposals, not only to advance the king three tons

* *Cheimit.* tom. i. This very circumstance serves to confirm us, that the king's anger was only assumed; for there were four provosts and an executioner then belonging to every regiment that acted under him. Nor is it to be supposed, that he, who never committed one act of cruelty in all his campaigns, should have put to death a brave old Walloon, who at that very instant was mortally wounded. Well knowing, that the man despised simple death as much as himself, he chose to operate upon him by proposing a sort of exit which carried with it an idea of disgrace; and counterfeited anger for a few moments, in order to palliate and justify a resolution, to the poor man's apprehension, which would otherwise have argued an inflexibility in the heart, and an obliquity in the judgment of the great Gustavus.

† John Caspar, prince of Anhalt: see the *Court Register of Vienna*, Anno 1632. *Hist. or Authentic Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. 126. *Hist. du Règne de Louis XIII. par le Vaisor.* tom. vii. p. 54.

of

of gold *, and pay the same monthly contingent he paid the army of the *league*, but to recal his forces from the catholic service, and deliver up the strong fortresses of Forcheim and Cronach; he suddenly, upon the approach of Tilly, renounced all that he had stipulated. This infamous violation of faith gave the king not only vexation, but new employment, and obliged him to detach Horne from the main army in order to carry on a fresh war in the episcopal territories.

Gustavus by this time was greatly pleased to find himself within one day's march of the town of Wurtzburg. Nevertheless, he had a previous work still upon his hands, a nice point of the highest importance to him, an adopted favourite idea in one branch of his military system; that was, to secure the *free navigation of rivers*, and the Mayne especially, at the present conjuncture; for it was a doctrine with him, as war was *then* circumstanced, few towns being fortified so as to make more than a fortnight's resistance. That the general, who commanded the great rivers, commanded more or less the countries adjacent; possessing himself of the most fruitful tracts in corn and herbage, enabled to receive provisions from remote territories, and transport his heavy artillery with no considerable difficulty. *I observe*, said he, and the observation was true at the time, *that countries are conquered upon the same principle they were first peopled, the method of war and the method of nature being in these cases the same. Rivers are the great ducts and arteries in the system of the world. On the banks of rivers stand always the richest and most populous cities; nor can a general be compelled to fight, when one half of his intrenchments is the best natural fosse in the world ready made to his hands; namely, a large and deep body of water†.* Upon this principle therefore his majesty, influenced by other reasons above assigned, not to mention, that he chose to have the Mayne between him and Tilly, commanded Banditzen to pursue a separate route on the banks of the river for the space of thirty miles below Wurtzburg, himself directing his course the same number of miles on the banks of the same river above the town, for the Mayne here forms a sort of an horseshoe, so that about one and the same time he and his lieutenant-general made themselves masters of Hasfurt, Gemund, Lohr, Volkach, Kitzing, Oxenfurt, Remlingen, and Carlstadt, all places of importance, which

* About twenty-seven thousand pounds sterling.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 8.

commanded the navigation of the Mayne. Nor were these precautions unworthy of Gustavus; for Tilly, by this time being joined by Aldringer, Fugger, and the troops of Lorraine, advanced full speed at the head of 50,000 men, in order to stop or raise the siege of Wurtzburg. The king, contented with possessing the bridges and passes, and not displeased with placing so deep a river as the Mayne between himself and his enemy, pursued his journey to Wurtzburg without dismay, and having invested the city, and *petarded* one of its gates before nine in the morning, received a visit from father Ogleby, abbot of the Scotch monastery, and a citizen, whom the magistracy had deputed to sign terms of capitulation with him. Of course all hostilities were ordered to cease, and articles were agreed upon without delay, upon the plan of those which had lately been concluded at Erfurt.

The rich and populous city of Wurtzburg lies in a semicircle, of which the Mayne forms the diameter. The town, in point of strength, was *no great object*, so that the magistrates sent the keys by Ogleby, after a very slight resistance: during which, the Bohemian colonel Schevaliski, an officer of great repute, was struck in the side by an *arquebuse à croc*, as he was making some remarks to Gustavus. The castle called Marienberg was *really something*. It stands to the westward of the city, and communicates with it, by means of a fine large bridge, consisting of six arches, and wide enough to admit threescore men to march in front. It is mistress of the city beneath it, and is commanded by no adjacent hill. Being looked upon as inaccessible, all the wealth of the country was heaped up in it. The only approach was on the side of the city, and that was extremely hazardous. The garrison consisted of a thousand men, abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions for a siege equal in duration to that of Ostend. His majesty sent captain Keller, the commandant, the general compliment which happens at the beginning of all sieges; namely, a polite offer of honourable terms, in case he thought fit to surrender. The brave German received the Swedish deputies with great civility, and gave them a handsome supper at the best inn in the town; but persisted inflexible against all their proposals, and during the course of the repast blew up one arch of the bridge. Next morning he tormented the assailants above measure by a perpetual discharge of artillery, which, to make it still worse, raked the bridge from one end to the other; so that, as the Swedes could only place one plank over the broken arch, and that plank was

forty-eight feet above the surface of the water, there seemed to be a mixture of wantonness and rashness to attempt to pass over it. Gustavus seemed irresolute for some moments what to do, for Tilly and the duke of Lorrain were in full march against him, at the distance of only three days journey from Wurtzburg. After a slight pause he cut the dilemma short, as Bauditzen and his army were expected to arrive the next day, by determining to take the castle at all hazards; and with this view employed one Ramsay, who talked excellent German, a Scots lieutenant in the regiment of Sir James Ramsay, to pass over the plank in disguise, and procure a boat or two from the neighbouring peasants and fishermen: for the king saw plainly, that the watry ordeal of passing the plank would be extremely slow and hazardous, and that one company of Keller's men, posted on the opposite side of the bridge, would overturn his single soldiers as fast as they arrived. He foresaw too, that the uncommonly dangerous, and, to hardened veteran troops like his, ridiculous nature of the passage would engage the whole army's attention very unprofitably, as it might turn a serious attack into a sort of military pantomime. Nevertheless, the honest North-Briton, undertook his commission with great cheerfulness; but as he was endued with more courage than foresight, he forgot to change a fine waistcoat, which the Imperialists soon discovered. Thus was he thereby made prisoner; nor did he recover his liberty till the castle of Marienberg was taken by storm. Other expedients were found out, and a boat at length arrived, in which Gustavus sent over handfuls of men by little and little; who made a lodgment, and increasing imperceptibly, defended themselves so well, that though Keller descended from his eminence to the foot of the rock, he found it impossible to force them. After a sharp engagement, the besieged mounted a half moon about mid-way up the precipice, and in that situation night came on. Before this, when the Swedish soldiers in the town saw their comrades had crossed the water, and began to entrench themselves, they run over the plank like men possessed; so that no inconsiderable body of troops passed the river one by one in the afternoon*. At night care was taken to repair this passage in a better manner; but the king could not spare a moment's leisure for that purpose the preceding day, waiting the arrival of Bauditzen, and being in some suspense about Tilly.

Having now fixed his footing on the south side of the Mayne,

* For the minute circumstances of this siege, see *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 192. *Monro*, part ii. p. 78, &c. and *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 10—15.

he

he began to study the fortifications of Marienberg* with great attention, soon perceiving, that nature had done wonders, and art but little, if we except a deep *graff* or moat hewn out of the solid rock, which environed the castle, and of such a depth and breadth, that there was no crossing it, but in front of the main fortifications by means of a narrow draw-bridge. If this fossè, and the works that protected the drawbridge, had been out of the question, the castle was nothing more than a magnificent Gothic palace, flanked at the angles with four principal towers in the antient taste. Upon one of these towers, the king thundered all that night and two successive days, reasonably expecting, that the fall of this antique structure might fill the ditch with rubbish and ruins. The event, though the tower was at length levelled, did not answer the idea which he had formed. Removing therefore the intended attack from that quarter, he fixed his whole attention, the line of circumvallation being now finished, first on the half-moon abovementioned, and then on the castle gate and stone bridge over the ditch. In the first of these attacks, sir James Ramsay, for the Scots, in conjunction with Axel Lily's regiment, had the honour of the action, had the misfortune to be shot through the left arm; but his companion, sir John Hamilton, carried on the assault with unparalleled bravery, and in two hours this important out-work was taken. The king surveyed the action at a few paces distance, peeping through the ruins of an old gateway between the bridge and the castle. Projecting his head and part of his body, to issue his orders more distinctly, a cannon ball flew directly towards him, and covered him with mortar and rubbish. He then stepped out to give some additional directions, and a musquet bullet struck the top of his buff leather glove, and tore it off his hand. Scheffer assures us, that at this siege, fighting, in one attack, at the head of his men, he received an ugly wound in the fleshy part of his breast, and that the waistcoat stained with royal blood is still preserved in Sweden†.

Next morning he determined, at the head of his troops‡ to make a second general attack, sword in hand, one hour before break of day, allotting this honour to Axel Lily's regiment, and the old blue brigade, supported afterwards by the whole body of Swedish and German infantry, having first sent a trumpeter to Keller, with proposals of such a nature as might be listened to by a brave commander and a resolute

* *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. i. fol. 145.

† *Memorabilia Suec. Gentis*, p. 95.

‡ *Merc. Franc.*

garrison;

garrison; but the governor had no ear for an accommodation. Chance very often produces wonderful events to the resolute and determined; or, in other words, in certain enterprises of extreme peril, unforeseen accidents present themselves; but their passage is so swift, and their existence so short, that only the intrepid or the sagacious man can seize them flying.

In the midst of the besiegers' preparations, and about half an hour before the general attack, a Swedish lieutenant, born of Scottish parents*, with only seven followers†, for what reasons cannot be guessed, approached, in the dark, the drawbridge leading into the outward court of the castle, wherein were lodged near two hundred Imperialists. Being challenged, according to the word of the night, and asked, who he and his party were, he replied abruptly and naturally, without any scheme or foresight, *That they were Swedes*: whence may be fairly imagined, he had never prepared himself to return an answer to such sort of questions; being a hero better calculated for blows than discussions. Upon this, the officer, who commanded the party within, immediately attempted to draw up the bridge, but the Lifelander jumped upon it with an extraordinary effort of activity, and his companions followed him: in consequence whereof, the enemy were struck with a sudden panic, which darkness contributed to increase, and fell back with some confusion, supposing great numbers to be rushing in. The lieutenant called loudly to a large body of Swedes, stationed at no great distance from him; and thus the outward court of the castle was secured in an instant. Of course the fortress of Marienberg was now, as it were, taken: yet the king, who always had a great abhorrence to bloodshed and tumultuous murder, made fresh signals of accommodation to the garrison; but Keller continued inflexible to the very last. Some hundreds of Imperialists threw away their lives with uncommon obstinacy, till at length the Swedes cried out in a rage, *Magdeburg-quarter, Magdeburg-quarter*. Amongst the dead were found at least twenty friars, who had occasionally handled the pike and the musquet. The commander, Keller, was taken prisoner sword in hand, by colonel Torstenſon‡, who generously protected him, on condition, that he should discover

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 14, &c.

† His majesty hearing of this success, entered, the ninth man, into the castle. *Ibid.*

‡ Leonard Torstenſon, then general of artillery. He proved afterwards one of Gustavus's most able successors. The reader must be informed, that Mongo, by mistake, always calls him Richardson.

a cer-

a certain secret vault hewn into the rock, where inestimable treasures, in plate and money, were concealed. Great part of the wealth of the diocese was here deposited, as also the sum which the elector of Bavaria had sent to Tilly in order to repair his shattered army after the unfortunate defeat at Leipsic. Corn and provisions were found in abundance, and a very large quantity of wine*. An equerry belonging to the bishop made fresh discoveries, and amongst other things, gave information of a certain coffer, well filled with ducats, which Gustavus had an idea of appropriating to the uses of his own privy purse; but its weight in the removal burst the bottom; and as the soldiers cast a longing eye on these glittering reliques, and began to pick them up for their master's use, with a private view to secrete here and there a few for themselves, the king made a merit of necessity, and said with a loud laugh, *I see plainly it must be so: let the rogues convert them to their own property* †.

Having allowed his soldiers to plunder, with moderation, for the space of one hour, he reserved nothing for his own use but the fine library of books, which was sent to the university of Upsal‡, by way of reprisal upon Tilly, who had transported the Palatine collection to the Vatican, as also the bishop's magnificent service of plate, and a stable of horses, thought superior to any in the empire: besides the artillery, which amounted to thirty large pieces, and all the small arms, being a quantity sufficient to furnish at least 7000 men. It may be worth remarking, that amidst all this scene of bloodshed, confusion, and plunder, not a nun was violated, though the nuns had taken refuge in this asylum from all parts of the diocese||, not a matron affronted, nor a child frightened; the king's orders being expressly to the contrary: and what may alike merit observation, all the valuable effects, in the vault, belonging to the inhabitants of the city, were restored to them. Free exercise of the Romish religion was granted to all that made profession of it, and a new chamber of justice was erected, consisting of twelve

* Honest Ferrand Spence, who worked in the bookseller's manufactory of the last century, in translating *Du Prade's Life of Gustavus*, having heard something of the common random accounts of German hard-drinking, conceived a resolution to stock the bishop's cellars very copiously; for he says there were found in them some *millions of pipes of wine*, [*quelques milliers de tonneaux de vin.*]

† *Kiccius de Bellis Germanicis.*

‡ *Schefferi Memorab.* 149, 150.

|| *Mercurie François*, ii partie du tome xvii. p. 78.

members, half protestants and half papists; half gentlemen, and half civilians.

Two other circumstances, which took their rise from this siege, must not be omitted. Hamilton was so offended, that the Scottish soldiers had not the honour of conducting the last assault, that he demanded his dismissal from Gustavus, who immediately allowed it: secondly, when the king entered the castle, the very instant after it was stormed, he perceived, that the pavement of the court-yard was all covered with seemingly dead men; but, inspecting them more narrowly, discovered that some of the men, who did not care to be quite so much in earnest as their commander, looked very florid in the countenance. Being by this time convinced, that part of the number only counterfeited death, he commanded them, with a cheerful accent of voice, *to arise, for their lives were safe*. In consequence, a considerable number started up from the ground, and returned his majesty their best acknowledgments.

Upon taking Wurtzburg and several other Roman catholic towns, some of the king's generals persuaded him to lay heavy contributions on the citizens for making profession of an erroneous and persecuting religion. His answer upon these occasions was always to one effect: *It is now my city, and appertains no longer to the enemy. I came to unfetter the consciences of my fellow-creatures, and not to enslave them. Let free beings live as best pleases them, conformably to their antient habits. I change no religious laws to those who act consistently with such as they have hitherto professed*;—a new, though a better shoe, may pinch too much at first. He sometimes added, *that papists and protestants, supposing them sincere in their search after truth, and in its practice, were all God's workmanship*. In effect, when he conquered a country, the Romanists lost nothing but their prince, which some did not greatly regret; and the protestants regained the free exercise of their religion. Thus one party was transported with joy, and the other felt very little sorrow. The humane and prudent deportment of Gustavus recals to my mind a similar piece of conduct in one of his predecessors, and that no less person than Theodoric, king of the Goths, who shared the Roman empire with Justinian. A strange and remote example, mankind may be apt to say! and yet not unworthy of being produced on this occasion; for in one of his rescripts he expresses himself precisely thus: *Aliorum forte regum praelia captarum civitatum prædas appetunt aut ruinas: nobis*

propositum est, Deo juvante, sic vincere ut subiecti se doleant nostrum dominium tardius acquisisse *.

His Swedish majesty, if we consider how zealously the bishop of Wurtzburg † had appeared against him, sent him terms upon the reduction of Marienberg, which were neither severe nor ungenerous, since it was only proposed, that he should pay the protestant army the same contingent that he had subscribed to the forces of the league, in the like proportions as he had contributed formerly, and at the same times of payment. In consequence of this, he was likewise to disclaim all connexions with the king's enemies, and redeem his territories from plunder at the expence of something more or less than thirty-six thousand pounds. Hatzfield, the then bishop, professed to enter into a fair and candid accommodation; but it was only a pretext to gain time till Tilly, who was then only at nine miles distance, could take some opportunity to cross the Mayne, and drive Gustavus out of Franconia.

Before we leave Wurtzburg, it may not be improper to observe, that sir Henry Vane was admitted to his first audience ‡ with Gustavus in this place, though the German, French, and Italian historians all suppose their first conference to have been held at Francfort. This new negotiator appeared to many but poorly qualified for the embassy he was engaged in, inasmuch as he was a perfect islander, and fulfilled to a little Barclay's observation upon us in the Euphormio, "*Angli sua suosque impense mirantur, cæteras nationes despectui habent.*" Of course, which is a practice not uncommon to weak minds, he proceeded upon principles diametrically opposite to those of his predecessor, sir Thomas Roe, who was a man of a solid and enterprising genius; whilst Vane, on the other hand, was of a haughty and teasing temper. *Nescivit, quod bene cessit, relinquere*; insolent and national, narrow-minded, and prejudiced to the highest degree. Hence it was that Gustavus *hated* him for his prejudices in home affairs, and *despised* him for his weaknesses in foreign ones. He was a navigator, who sailed by no general wind in the ocean of politics, but affected to lie becalmed in the briskest gales; veering a little, or advancing a little, just as the breath blew from the court of Whitehall; which, as it was well known at that time, rarely did more than disturb the surface

* *Cassiodor.* lib. iii. epist. 43.

† Philip Adolphus de Ehrenberg, elected December 29, 1622, died 1631, when Francis Hatzfield was chosen.

‡ November 7, 1631. See his letters in the *Paper-Office*. MSS.

of the water; sufficient to render objects indistinct and muddled, but not forcible enough to purify and make them clear. Roe, by dint of judgment, and without guess-work, knew this politician to a tittle; and though some acrimony may be allowed him, as Vane supplanted him by mean court artifices in the continuance of his embassy to Gustavus, yet in his letter * to the queen of Bohemia he speaks the words of good sense, and manly resentment; for he pronounces Vane *to be a bold undertaker*; by which expression, he means no more than a servile and foolish one. "I know," says he, "he cannot build upon my foundations.—This blow came from Vienna, upon new pretences, that the prosperity of the king of Sweden would make our treaty easy, with respect to the Palatinate, if a man were employed, that would advance *peace*, to which I was esteemed an enemy. I have honour enough in the sincerity of my negotiations, and that God hath blessed me, and made me the instrument; though I boasted not, until another would take my honour of bringing the brave king into Germany †; —which I would rather have *inscribed on my tomb*, than titles dearly bought with the loss of honour."

To comprehend these two ministers' conduct and characters more distinctly, it may not be amiss to observe, that Roe, who had served an apprenticeship in the arts of foreign negotiation, and, consistently with the interests of his own country, had contented the kings of Denmark and Sweden, one the most *experienced* prince in Europe, and the other the most *able*, was a sincere, solid, and sensible man, cool and composed in doubtful matters, but warm, fiery, enterprising, and undismayed in affairs of importance. Such an ambassador was not born under an horoscope that agreed with the temper of the king and his ministers at *that* time, who, as they wanted courage to tread the *open road*, weakly and timor-

* Dated London, November 20, 1631. MS.

† He has said more in other letters to this effect. "I have received the inclosed from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein I have honour enough done me, that I was the agent to bring that brave king into Germany." *To lord Dorchester, Aug. 16, 1631.*

And in another to Mr. Dinely at the Hague, 1631-2, Febr. 24. That he had received from the king of Sweden a present worth £.2,500. with a letter from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein are inserted these remarkable words; "Quæ inter nos mutuis colloquiis & discursibus acta sunt ratione belli a S.R. majestate, domino meo clementissimo, in Germaniam transferendi; cujus auctor & impulsor illustriss vestræ nomine serenissimi regis sui strenuus extitit."

rously

rously pursued the bye one; hating the heroical parts of war so much, that it was common for them, by way of derision, to call Gustavus the *dragoon king**.

Such was the uniform language of the English court: for sir Toby Matthew†, in a letter of March 25, from London, to sir Henry Vane, inserts therein the following passage; "Yesternight I waited at supper on my good lord of Carlisle, your true friend; and there we had sir Jacob Ashley at large. He seems a very worthy gentleman, and a great lover of my lord marquis, of Hamilton, and you: he speaks highly well of the courage and other both intellectual and experimental abilities of the king of Sweden: *but I have heard no wise man say any such thing yet of that prince, as may totally exclude covetousness, und arrogance, and inordinate ambition from him* ‡."

Vane therefore was a person formed expressly by nature to suit the purposes of an administration, which relied wholly upon mean and temporary expedients. Roe was for giving Gustavus considerable sums of money, well knowing he would earn them nobly. Vane professed to withhold all pecuniary assistance, and proposed the transportation of British troops, which the king of Sweden never expected to arrive. Roe, by Oxenstiern's own acknowledgment, brought Gustavus into the empire; Vane, by the uniform tendency of his actions, repined at his glory, and wished him reconveyed to his regions of the north. Roe was esteemed by the king, and beloved by Oxenstiern; the former of which disliked Vane, and the latter shunned him.

This phenomenon of a minister, furnished, as himself owns, with instructions of *hearing* rather than *proposing* ||,

* Letter from the earl of Carlisle to sir Henry Vane. *Paper Office*.

† Sir John Suckling in his *Session of the Poets* has characterized this infant politician to the life. He embraced the religion of the church of Rome about the thirtieth year of his age, and was called from his travels, in 1621, to assist James I. in matters of politics; was knighted for his zeal towards the Spanish match, and attended lord Strafford in Ireland as political director.

‡ With respect to *covetousness*, the king solemnly declared before all his officers, and they were judges of the truth of his assertion, that he had not secreted to himself a single pound, from the commencement of the war till the month of August 1632, but, on the contrary, had expended *de proprio* £. 360,000. sterling, a sum no ways inconsiderable in those days.—As to *arrogance*, except that he confounded with a right sense of indignities from crowned heads, &c. we have proved him in every part of his life to be more condescending and affable than any of his generals.—Lastly, as to *ambition*, posterity must be left in doubt, since he never lived to show what his ultimate views were.

|| The following narrative is extracted from his own dispatches. *Ibid*.

landed at Hamburg in the month of October 1631; and there received the news of the famous victory at Leipzig. As he was comptroller of the king's household, and a member of the privy-council, it was thought proper to invest him with the character of ambassador extraordinary; but by his own accounts, he had no title to the qualification of plenipotentiary. The occasion of sending him took its birth from the wonderful prosperity of Gustavus, and from some letters of his to the king and marquis of Hamilton, relative to that nobleman's expedition.

Vane employed twenty-five days in travelling from Hamburg to Wurtzburg; nor could he well perform the journey in less time, for the roads were difficult and dangerous, and flying parties of *marauders** abounded so in every quarter, that it was necessary for him to provide a large retinue of horsemen, well mounted and completely armed; nor could he dispatch an express to Gustavus or his generals without manifest hazard to the undertaker's life or liberty. He complains in a subsequent letter, the year ensuing, that he could not travel with a smaller retinue than fifty horsemen, nor expend less on the road than twenty pounds each day.

On the seventh of November 1631, he had the honour to be admitted to his first private audience, in which the king told him, That if his master wished to bring about the restitution of the Palatinate sincerely, and with good faith, he must afford him such assistance, as justly merited the appellation of *royal*, and not only supply him with four or five tons of gold†, sums far from being very important to a king of England so nearly concerned, if thoroughly in earnest, but send too, early in the ensuing spring, a body of national troops, amounting at least to 12,000 men: and then, Gustavus added, that he would engage never to sheathe his sword, till the Palatinate should be reconquered, and delivered back to the hands of its lawful possessor.

* According to strict orthography, we ought to write *merodeurs*, and not *marauders*. The truth is, these partisans took their name from a count de Merodé, a brutal and licentious officer in these wars, who was killed in a drunken quarrel by John de Wert. From this man's practice a plunderer and ravisher was surnamed *Merodista* by the Spanish and Italian soldiers, who served then under the emperor: whence came the French word, *marauder*, which the *maréchal de Luxembourg* always spelt *merodeur*. *Réflexions Militaires & Politiques de Santa Cruz*, tom. iii.

† A ton of gold is about £. 9000. sterling.

Having

Having thus explained himself with reference to the restitution of Frederic to his patrimonial inheritances, he made it his request, that the said unfortunate prince should repair immediately to the Swedish army, and march with it into his own dominions; inasmuch as, according to the best information then to be obtained, his subjects still preserved an extraordinary zeal and affection for him.

Vane stood thunderstruck at these proposals, and at length brought forth his excuse and reply with no small difficulty; namely, That his instructions were rather to *hear* what the king had to offer, than to *propose* any thing himself: that he would not fail to advertise his court, and procure an answer with all possible expedition.

Little as this man loved Gustavus, and prejudiced as he was against him, yet in his letters to England, at or near this period, he finds himself obliged to do some justice to that prince's character in the capacity of a soldier; for having observed, that the Swedish army consisted of 12,000 foot, and 8,000 horse, he remarked afterwards, That better men, and better clothed, he never saw: and there was not a sick man, nor boy amongst them. Their king let them live at discretion*: they spared neither friend nor foe; only he did not suffer them to touch the churches, nor molest the catholics in the exercise of their religion. They were so obedient to discipline, that the beat of a drum called them off at any time from plunder; which in truth carries no resemblance to the conduct of troops who lived at discretion, and allowed themselves, or were allowed by their master, to exercise all sorts of outrage and violence without restriction. There still remains an almost incontestable proof, that the king's soldiers rarely or never practised extortions and cruelties, since we rarely find, that even a single straggler was massacred by enraged peasants; or that a town, or province, after their first reduction, ever revolted from him. Sir Henry, on some other occasion, delivers himself in a manner less liable to exception than many of the passages above cited. That "with regard to Gustavus's ac-

* All history contradicts this report. In a comparative sense, the Swedish troops were mild and tractable, whilst the Imperial soldiers were haughty and savage. The military laws of Gustavus are levelled with full force against rapine, extortions and plunder. He removed a favourite general some few days before this happened, for dealing a little too freely with contributions; and hanged two foot soldiers, some days afterwards, for entering a house in Francfort-streets, though they took nothing. So that part of these representations seems to proceed from peevishness and unkindness.

tions and enterprises, all seasons were alike to him, as well as the most difficult achievements seemed to him easy, if he once took them in hand; and as the courage of the soldiers under so daring a leader is great, so is the fear of his enemies, who every day came to serve him: and though other armies are diminished by marching, his increased; so that he was able to supply the towns he took in with garrisons, and obliged them to maintain the same*."

This remark is not the less valuable, though at that time it was common in the mouths of all the officers that served under Gustavus. Monro makes the same observation, and says, "That the king, after marches, assaults, and sieges of forty days duration, found himself at the head of more soldiers when he came to Francfort, than he brought with him from Erfurt, though he crossed the vast Düringer Walt, without losing, as far as appears, a single soldier by desertion."

To return to the negotiation. Vane contented himself to conclude his dispatches with observing, That he thought nothing was to be expected from Gustavus, but what was stipulated: and by no means advised the putting of tons of gold into his hands, but rather the sending over an English army to act in conjunction with the Swedish. He suggested afterwards, "if Charles was resolved to put himself in action, the readiest and cheapest way would be, to send the king of Bohemia *up into Germany*, into Upper Germany, speedily, to make levies; for that he was expected by his subjects with much zeal and devotion, and divers officers came to the ambassadors, meaning the Palatin one as well as himself, to offer their services in his behalf." With this suggestion the Britannic ministry complied, as the king of Bohemia's minister was invested with no powers; for it was a *slight expedient*, and cost them nothing; and thus the negotiation continued both at Francfort and Mentz, diversified with infinite changes, but attended with no one solid event. I shall speak transiently concerning it hereafter, and in such proportion as it may seem to merit; observing only, and for this remark I am indebted to the Swedish and German historians, that the statesmen of Whitehall judged extremely ill, in commanding Vane to impart his instructions to, and act in concert with the marquis of Hamilton; for though the king had a high

* See a subsequent MS. letter in the *Paper Office*.

value

value for that illustrious and enterprising nobleman, and no small obligations to him; yet he could not bear, that a subordinate officer should have an insight into the mysteries of the Swedish cabinet.

We will now resume the military part of our history; and desire the reader to recollect, that we left Tilly at Alvede, where he had assembled hardly more than 8,000 men, out of all those victorious bands which had fought under him at the battle of Leipzig. Thence he wrote to the elector of Cologne, ascribing his late misfortune, first, to the impetuosity of Pappenheim; and, secondly, to want of firmness in the Croatian horse; beseeching him, at the same time, to send a strong reinforcement, in order to raise the spirits of his dejected army. Upon this, the elector sent him a second supply of cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry. Tilly then, having deputed Gronsfelt to protect the banks of the Weser, where George, duke of Lunenburg, and the archbishop of Bremen*, had shown an inclination of espousing the cause of Gustavus, passed his army from the diocese of Paderborn over a bridge of boats at Corvey†, and strengthening his train of artillery with twelve large battering pieces taken from the town of Hamelen, directed his steps to Warburg. Soon afterwards he invaded Hesse, and having joined Aldringer, Fugger, and Mansfelt, advanced, whilst his majesty invested Marienberg, as far as Fulda, in order to succour the bishop of Wurtzburg, and protect the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Triers. In short, this great commander in the present conjuncture hardly knew what steps to take: mortified

* This prelate had adhered firmly to the house of Austria through the former part of the thirty years wars; insomuch that the king of Denmark, by way of revenge, when peace was concluded at Lubec, still kept the isle of Femor to himself, although it was a part of the archbishop's patrimony. When this ecclesiastic began to consider seriously the drift and intentions of the *edict of restitution*; he then saw, without the gift of divination, that archduke Leopold, the emperor's son, would annex the diocese of Bremen to those of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, &c. and allow the true owner a small annual stipend; not so much by way of *acknowledged right*, as under the appearance of an act of compassion. It was upon this account, therefore, that he kept up a correspondence with Gustavus ever since the year 1629, and entered into a private agreement offensive and defensive with the famous Salvius, some months before the battle of Leipzig. (For an abstract of the articles then concluded, see *Clemnitius*, tom. i. p. 214.) This was the true reason, which Burnet knew nothing of, or no way cared to own, why the king intended, *bonâ fide*, to land the British troops at Bremen, in order to protect his new ally from the insults of the Imperialists. *Clemnitz*, *ibid.* where it plainly appears that the marquis of Hamilton contravened the king's intentions.

† This abbey, famous for its convent of Benedictines, stands between the duchy of Brunswic and the bishopric of Paderborn. In its library is the *only manuscript of the annals of Tacitus*.

with

with misfortunes, and piqued to the heart upon having made a shipwreck of one half of his glory, he was quite bewildered in his own ideas, having nothing certain to resolve upon, except it was to regain his character by some service of a desperate nature. This he, manifestly, ought to have attempted; but the Lorrainers did not join him quite so soon as he wished *, and when that junction was formed at Miltenberg, he fell suddenly into a kind of despondency, for he did not like the look of his new assistants.

Here it may be necessary, once for all, to give the reader a clear idea of this romantic expedition of Charles IV. duke of Lorrain, from the beginning to the conclusion. For a mixture of courage and irresolution, hardness to undertake, and inconstancy to execute, he seems to have been the epitome of all mankind in those several passions and qualities. The duke of Bavaria proposed both immediate and remote advantages from introducing this hero, who was his nephew, upon the grand theatre of action. He greatly wanted a support for Tilly, and to re-establish, if possible, the reputation of the league; having an inclination, likewise, to alarm France, with so powerful an armament on her confines; and hoping, by means of free passage through Lorrain, in case success should attend the catholic armies in Germany, to have the power of entering the *three bishoprics*, which had already began to *change their livery*, if I may be allowed to make use of Spanheim's expression on the occasion †. France, of course, took umbrage at the armament which this prince was preparing; and insisted that he should either disband his troops, or declare what they were intended for ‡. Charles, whether according to his first intentions, or not, cannot be said, thought it necessary, however, to pacify so intermeddling and capricious a neighbour; but being allured by the promise of an *electoral bonnet*, for the emperor had privately threatened to proscribe the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, he marched an army of 17,000 well-conditioned men, all furnished with good apparel and arms, in order to support Tilly in his present exigencies. As, on the one hand, his imagination was flattered with the late extinction of one protestant elector; so it was suggested to him by his new allies on the other, that as the promised electorate would make him a principal member of the

* Not till October 17, nine days after Wurtzburg and Mariberg were taken.

† *Memoires d'Eléctrice Palatine*, p. 300.

‡ *Memoires de Beauvau*, 8°. p. 16, &c.

empire;

empire; of course, the whole empire would be obliged to support him against the encroachments of his *most Christian neighbour*: insinuating at the same time, that a prince of Lorraine was really and truly a part of the Germanic body by virtue of an incorporation subsisting, antecedently even to those connections we have above specified. For these reasons, he chose to shelter himself under the wings of the Austrian eagle; and, animated with romantic hopes, passed the Rhine over a bridge of boats at Worms, where the bishop of Wurtzburg made his application to him immediately, and offered all the treasure contained in his capital, upon condition he could succeed in raising the siege. The industry and bravery of the assailants prevented this scheme from taking effect, though Charles made long marches to join Tilly, and restore the spirits of his shattered troops by so considerable a reinforcement as that which he conducted. Aldringer also, in conjunction with Fugger, had hastened with all possible expedition to meet them, leading under his command those veteran troops, which had performed such wonders at the siege of Mantua. The whole three bodies, united, were supposed to make 50,000 men, and their train of artillery was very good. Nevertheless, whether it was that the Imperial troops had not recovered their courage since the battle of Leipzig, or whether the elector of Bavaria, who in fact was generalissimo over the generalissimo, allowed himself to be seduced by St. Etienne the French ambassador, having hampered himself by a clandestine treaty: whether he waited to make a better market with the emperor, and therefore chose not to hazard his troops; or whether orders had been dispatched from Vienna, commanding Tilly to hold himself upon the cautious and defensive part, and run no risques in so critical a conjuncture, all which reasons appear to me more or less probable and cogent, sure it is, that though his Swedish majesty then conducted an army only of about 25,000 effective men, yet nothing considerable was either performed or attempted by the Imperial party. It had the mortification and disgrace to stand gazing aloof, whilst Wurtzburg was first taken, and Mentz afterwards fell a sacrifice: insomuch that the partisans of Wallstein continually cried out, That Gustavus marched, and never fought; and provinces were conquered before couriers could carry news to Vienna that the enemy had entered them.

Some tell us, that this want of courage in the Imperialists, or want of sincerity in the Bavarian, added to the
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the delays, and caution affected by the court of Vienna, so exasperated Charles, that, whilst the troops laid inactive in winter quarters, he posted away to the elector, who was his uncle *, at Munich, with a view to put matters on a better footing; but obtained nothing from him but good words and hospitable entertainment. To add a keener edge to the mortification he then felt, his favourite lieutenant-general, the prince of Phaltzburg, died during this interval; as also M. de Berry, knight of Malta. The former was a natural son of cardinal Lorrain, and having married the amiable Henrietta, Charles's eldest sister, might have possessed the dukedom, if his modesty and equity had not induced him to decline the offer. The latter was Charles's natural son, a young man of great hopes and distinguished bravery.

In addition to these misfortunes, he met with no small disgrace in his return home; for as his army passed the bridge of Straßburg, the inhabitants and peasants fell upon his baggage, plundering and destroying no inconsiderable part of it; and a waggoner took the liberty to whip the duke's horse, assigning this remarkable reason for so doing: *Sir, a person ought to make more haste when he is flying before the great Gustavus †*. In this inglorious retreat he had the unhappiness, some weeks, to be denied entrance into the village of Lichtenau near Nuremberg, where one of his regiments then was in winter quarters. In vain Charles menaced the *corps de garde*; they saluted him with a brisk discharge of their fire-arms, which, though it spared his person, terrified his horse to such a degree, that he fell under his master: they were both some moments exposed, for the garrison continued firing.

If all things are rightly considered, neither he nor his army deserved better usage, nor greater success. They set out, at first, in the style of novices and blusters; insolently boasting to chastise his Swedish majesty, and send him back to his hereditary regions of frost and snow. No troops looked fiercer when they marched undisturbed through neutral dominions: they seemed, likewise, to have a talent for plunder, outrage, violation, and murder. Their ignorance of foreign countries kept pace with their insolence; for, amongst other things, they asked the Germans, *What sort of animal a landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was, and if he was descended from a*

* The elector of Bavaria married Elizabeth princess of Lorrain, Charles's aunt.

† Vittorio Stri; *Memoire Recondite*, tom. vii. p. 446, &c.

good

*good family**. Their extortions too were not trifling; for his Imperial majesty sent commissary general Ossa to join them, and pay them according to agreement; but the misfortune was, the commissary had no money, and the Lorrainers were obliged to feed themselves at the point of their swords. Old Tilly suspected these troops from the first moment he saw them; for they began to lower their note, in proportion as they approached the Swedish army. He therefore placed them, generally, out of the reach of harm; and history assures us, they discovered no resentment on the occasion. When the wary Walloon once left them, the vigilant Swedes soon made their advantage; gave them two violent midnight attacks, and drove them ignominiously out of Franconia to pursue their *route* to the luxurious retreat of Nanci.

Here is a faithful picture of an army undisciplined, immoral, and unpaid; collected from a country of ease, idleness, and extravagance; and plunged, in a moment, into the strict, sharp, and regular service of war. In these cases, the *theory* and *practice* soon corresponded. Vice and neglect of discipline ruin not only the *troops*, but the *cause*. The *troops* are lost through want of vigilance, sobriety, military punctuality, and subordination; and the *cause* is sacrificed by those repeated acts of excess, plunder, and cruelty, which make every peasant an enlisted soldier in the enemy's behalf. Thus, after an expedition of only a few months, and without engaging in a single battle or siege, Charles carried back to Lorrain little more than one moiety of his army. Whereas, if these troops had been intrinsically good, and Tilly could have been supposed to have placed confidence in them, Gustavus might have been extremely embarrassed by superior numbers. There were two reasons for Charles's return, which historians have not penetrated into. Richelieu plainly saw, that he had opened too much of his plan in giving Gustavus uneasy apprehensions about his tampering with Bavaria, for the time was not yet come, that he had conceived a settled jealousy against Sweden, and consequently drew the duke of Lorrain back, partly by good words, and partly by movements, as if he designed to take Moyenvic; which he actually made himself master of soon

* *Soldat Suedois*, 194. This puts me in mind of a learned man, of what country is immaterial, who, thinking he must say something civil to a Bavarian nobleman, asked him very modestly, *If the elector, his Master, kept a coach?* Yes, Sir, replied the man of quality, and 25,000 soldiers to run before it.

after,

after, notwithstanding Merci's obstinate defence *. What inclined Charles still more to return homewards, was his discontent upon Wallstein's promotion; for, in truth, he expected that command himself; and for these reasons, took a cold farewell of his electoral uncle; since all he could obtain from the court of Vienna, was, the separate command of his own army, when joined with Tilly; and the post of lieutenant-general, in case he served under Wallstein.

Thus ended the unsuccessful expedition of the duke of Lorraine, if we except only two remarkable letters, that passed between him and Gustavus; which shall be taken notice of in their chronological order. The king being advanced so far in the conquest of Franconia, published a very sensible manifesto, for it was his custom always to make the pen keep pace with the sword, wherein it was alledged principally, after a full recapitulation of the motives that induced him to enter Germany, that his Swedish majesty expected assistance from all true patriots, catholic as well as protestant, in the reduction of the exorbitant power, and unmerciful tyranny of the house of Austria; concluding also, that the former would withdraw their troops from the emperor's service, conformably to the declaration of the electoral college made at Ratisbon, where all contests with the crown of Sweden were publicly disavowed.—That in consequence of seeing this promise realized, he had engaged with France to separate the interests of the *leaguers* in a private manner from those of the emperor, and live in perfect harmony with the catholic electors and princes: but they, on the other hand, had neglected his representations, and commanded their troops to fight under the Imperial ensigns at the battle of Leipzig.—Influenced by the success of that engagement, he had pursued his enemies into Franconia, with a view to constrain them to comprehend their own interests, and to detach themselves from the court of Vienna.—That he had courteously advertised the bishops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, of his proposing to act towards them in a manner conformable to the strictest laws of humanity and generosity, but that each of these prelates still continued to shew himself a most active and determined opponent of the Swedish interests.—That finally, upon possessing the town and diocese of

* Francis, baron Merci, afterwards proved one of the greatest generals the world ever knew. It is a misfortune in the art of war, that his life was never written.

Wurtz-

Wurtzburg, he had practised no one sort of retaliation, nor exercised any single act of severity; such proceedings being contrary not only to the natural turn of his heart, but to the dictates of his common sense, and the very drift and nature of his plan, which was to relieve, rather than to torment and persecute, his fellow-creatures*."

Some few days after Wurtzburg was taken, the Imperial general and the duke of Lorraine approached Gustavus to nearly on the opposite banks of the Maine, that the king, at the head of a good body of horse and dragoons, crossed the river privately in the night, and defeated four regiments of the enemy's cavalry†. The close neighbourhood of so numerous an hostile army gave Gustavus no small solicitude; his chief consolation consisting only in seeing the river Maine between him and Tilly: and for these reasons he kept an attentive eye on all the known passes above and below Wurtzburg.

That the reader may form some notion of his majesty's vigilance, I shall here remark, that having concluded from very distinct information, that Tilly would attempt to cross the river, both at Wurtzburg and Oxenford, and being in great pain for the preservation of the latter town, distant from the former about sixteen miles, he came in the evening on horseback, attended only by a single groom, to Monro's lodgings, in the most remote part of Wurtzburg, and having ordered his servant to call Monro down from supper, commanded him to draw up Hepburn's brigade, and appoint Hepburn to wait on him in the square before the house with all possible expedition. This little party, consisting only of 800 men, was drawn up and formed without delay, the pikemen and colours being left behind; when the king in an instant ordered Hepburn and Monro to march without giving them time to send either for their horses or servants. Having walked briskly about two miles, the king then imparted his design to Hepburn, and being joined there by an escort of eighty horsemen, continued to march on seven hours without halting, and reached Oxenford before two o'clock that morning. There is something in this march of a very uncommon nature; namely, that a body of infantry should without notice march sixteen miles in a dark night after the autumnal equinox, without having the opportunity of reposing themselves a single hour. The reasons were as urgent on the one side, as the march was extraor-

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 16, &c. *Cbemnitz*, tom. i. 195.

† *Monro's Expedition*, part ii. p. 80, 81.

dinary on the other; for the town and pass were guarded only at that moment by 150 musqueteers, whom the king thought too weak to make any decisive resistance; and hence it was, that the brigade, at its arrival, had not time to take the least refreshment, being ordered to possess the bridge and market-place, and continue under arms till break of day*. Then the king repulsed the enemy with great vigour, and ordering Hepburn to defend himself like a man of honour, with permission to blow up the bridge, and retreat to the head-quarters, in case the service proved desperate, returned with all possible diligence to Wurtzburg, from whence dispatches passed night and day between Hepburn and himself.

It has been observed by an old colonel who served under Gustavus, that he never saw his master's mind so greatly agitated as in this affair of Oxenford: for which, I think, very good reasons may be assigned. It is true, we just before remarked, that the king conducted an army of twenty-five or twenty-six thousand men into Franconia: but it must be remembered that he had to defend a tract of river which extended itself near forty miles; and as one regiment was garrisoned in *this* city, where there was a bridge, and another stationed at *that* pass where there was a ford, Horn being detached with a small army to reduce the diocese of Bamberg, it appears, to me, extremely plain, that the king had not more than eight or ten thousand soldiers in his head-quarters at Wurtzburg, wherewith to oppose the combined army of the league, which amounted at that time to fifty thousand men. Nevertheless the king, who, though he was sensible of danger, never lost his presence of mind, resolved at first fight, with that sort of intuition peculiar to himself and some few great commanders, to remain firm and unmoved at Wurtzburg; and augment his out-parties, if that were possible, rather than call them in to his own assistance.

He thus continued three days in a state of patient perseverance, when Tilly, who now began to think seriously of covering Bavaria, broke up his camp at a minute's warning in the close of the evening; and presented his whole army, by break of day, before Oxenford, under appearance of attacking the town sword in hand; but, for the reason above assigned, not to mention, that the Swedes, by their master's orders, had thrown up some very good temporary fortifications, he only made the preparations and shew of a general

* *Monro's Second Expedition*, p. 23.

storm, and suddenly pursued his intended journey with diligence. The king being soon apprised of the enemy's decampment, began to feel a second uneasiness for the brave Scotch brigade left in Oxenford, and dispatching at the moment a reinforcement of 500 musqueteers to Hepburn, enjoined him to dislodge forthwith, under favour of the darkness, and file along unobserved on the same line with the enemy, so as to occupy the town of Weinheim, a march of about sixteen miles, before Tilly could arrive thither. As the Imperial general laid at that time close to Oxenford, being advanced further than the king imagined, Hepburn used his own discretion, without attempting to move a single step; foreseeing plainly, that an enterprise of such a sort was not to be undertaken with prudence and safety. The king likewise, after a short review of his former thoughts, dispatched a second message to the colonel, thereby requesting him, in case the enemy continued to advance towards Weinheim, to bring his little party to the headquarters at Wurtzburg, where he had intrenched himself upon the same principles, which he formerly adopted in the famous encampment near Werben.

Hepburn's officers and soldiers were all amazed at the king *revoking* his first orders, it being remarked by them, that they had rarely or never known him change a military disposition, after he had once framed it; a certain, and no inconsiderable proof of that prince's uncommon genius in the art of war.

His majesty having received assurances from the cities of Nuremberg, Ulm, Strasburg, and Francfort, determined at length to advance to the last-mentioned place; but the town of Hanau was considered an obstacle, being situated on a pass across the river Kintz, at the distance of about one day's easy march from Francfort. It was necessary first to procure the key of admission, and that was to conquer Hanau; which the Imperialists, about three years before, had blockaded in vain for no less a space than seventeen weeks.

Towards the acquisition of this place Gustavus directed his whole attention, and for these purposes entertained a secret correspondence with Philip Ludowic*, its count, who, being born and educated a protestant, had consented privately, that the garrison should be surprized without blood-

* Others say Philip Maurice; brother to the celebrated AMELIA, land-grave of Hesse-Cassel. He died in 1638, aged thirty-three. *Imhoff, Not. Proc. folio, p. 400.*

shed, it being agreed, that a certain postern-gate should be left open, unknown to Brandeis, who commanded a thousand Imperialists, whom Tilly had formerly squeezed into the town. It is true, the Imperial general pressed hard to introduce four companies more, which, it is thought, he would have swelled to twelve hundred soldiers at least; but the count, who was a person of some consequence, his territory being esteemed one of the most fruitful in those parts of Germany, refused him admittance; for Tilly had by force surprized the town and castle of Babenhäusen, which had been mortgaged to the count by one of his relations.

His majesty gave the conduct of this expedition to lieutenant-colonel Dewbatel*, who had risen to that command from a simple serjeant in the short space of four years. To him were allotted six cornetries of Bauditz's cavalry, and 1500 selected musqueteers, who served on horseback. Dewbatel made a march of fifty miles in four and twenty hours, and crossing the Kintz, according to directions, the city being most accessible on that side, entered the postern-gate with great dexterity, and giving the garrison on that part of Hanau called the old town, a very desperate attack at five in the morning, it being now the first day of November, cut to pieces two companies of Imperial infantry; seized and secured the gate, which parted the old and new town, and made the count, to all outward appearances, a prisoner by force. Brandeis, a captain of infantry, governor of both towns, but residing in the new, would by no means, on the first intelligence, allow the enterprize to be practicable. It appearing to him almost morally impossible for men to have made such an extraordinary march in so short a time. Another circumstance conspired likewise to misguide his judgment. He had unfortunately sent, the day before, to demand a reinforcement from the garrison of Aschaffenberg, and concluded naturally, that these new comers were his own associates. For this reason, when informed of the confusion in the old town, he forbade his officers to take the alarm and sound to arms. At break of day he perceived his error, and prepared to make a vigorous defence, having dispatched one of his domestics, who crossed the town-ditch by swimming, to the town of Steinheim, where was a considerable body of Imperialists†, sufficient in number to give battle to the

* We have spoken of this enterprising officer in a preceding note, and therein expressed our doubts, whether *Dewbatel*, *Tubadel*, *Derwal*, *Tubal*, *Hubalt*, and *Horwbald*, were the same person or not.

† The regiment of Einot, and some companies belonging to other regiments.

Swedes,

Swedes, at the distance only of about sixteen miles. Whether it was that the king's commander had an eye, or not, to this event, thus much is certain, he protested he would agree only to a momentary parley, and took care to give Brandeis, from the town walls, a short interview with the count, who told him artfully, that being a prisoner, he should not take upon him to prescribe what he ought to do; but nevertheless, advised him to make the best terms he could. Upon this the garrison was obliged to surrender at discretion, and resign both colours and arms at the city gate, for Dewbatel told them all conditions must proceed from himself. The officers had their swords returned, and so had the soldiers. According to the usage of that age, as the colours were delivered to the conqueror, their military oath to the emperor was supposed to be void; and of course most of the men enlisted themselves into the Swedish service, excepting about forty papists, and all the officers. Amongst the prisoners was Francis baron de Merci, whom we have mentioned in the expedition of the Lorrainers, then serjeant-major to the regiment of Piccolomini. He had no command, having retired hither, with several other of Tilly's officers, on account of the wounds he had received in the day's service at Leipzig.

In consequence of this spirited undertaking the king preferred Dewbatel to be colonel of his own regiment of guards, in the room of Teüffel, who had been lately killed; and giving him commission to raise two or three new regiments, advanced him likewise to the government of the city he had just surprized. This officer in the end, however, proved very ungrateful to the memory of his patron and master, and left the Swedish service at a time when his assistance was most wanted. With regard to the count de Hanau, who had acceded to the king's party with so good a grace, his majesty made him a present of a signory contiguous to his own territory, in terms so gracious, that the manner of conferring the favour far exceeded the favour itself.

The regal army being now greatly shattered, and a considerable number of native Swedes destroyed, several regiments, with their respective officers, were incorporated into one corps, and called a *Brigade**; which said *brigade*, if complete, consisted of 2016 men†, and carried the colours

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 28, 29.

† Before this period, his majesty allowed seventy-two musqueteers, and fifty-four pikemen to a company, and eight companies to a regiment, which, exclusive of officers, made precisely 1008 common soldiers.

of the oldest colonel. Here the king improved his favourite doctrine of brigades, and formed five of these brigades, in his own army; namely, the brigade of *guards*, the *green*, which Hepburn commanded as senior colonel, the *blue*, the *white*, and the *red*. When a brigade is mentioned in the course of these wars, as it was commonly more or less incomplete, according to the fortune of a campaign, the reader must, at a medium, suppose it to contain about 1800 men. Be that as it will, at this first institution, his majesty's strength was so diminished, that he could only make these incorporated bodies of troops amount, each of them, something more or less, to about 1500 persons. The more entire regiments continued still to be undisturbed; and, as new corps were levying daily in various parts, care was taken to transplant into them the junior colonels from the several brigades.

Some few days before this reformation was made, his majesty cast his eyes on the town of Wertheim, and surprized in it the Italian colonel Piccolomini *, who there lost good part of his regiment. Rottenberg upon the Tauber was taken next, and a body of 9000 Lorrainers were attacked in their retreat homewards,

* Octavio Piccolomini. This gallant young man, whose family at Sienna took its rise from Catharine sister of pope Pius II., proved afterwards a general of great repute. His father was master of the bedchamber to Cosimo, grand duke of Tuscany, and general of his cavalry; and had served with great reputation in the Low Countries, Hungary, Transylvania, and Barbary.

By the original picture I have seen of the son, he was gracefully made, and of a very agreeable countenance. He had the eyes of his country, of the finest sort, bright, piercing, yet not ferocious. He dressed out of the pedantry of the then mode, and has so much the look of a fine gentleman and person of fashion, that it seems to confirm an uncommon letter of Mazarine to him, which the cardinal writes with a politeness which seemed proper to Piccolomini, and tells him, that since it was the fate of war, that the French army should be defeated, he had rather Piccolomini should obtain that honour than any other general in Europe, being certain the prisoners would fall into the hands of a person of distinguished manners and humanity.

He was not only of a robust and healthy constitution, but so very alert and dexterous in the art of horsemanship, that, completely clothed in armour, which in those days was none of the lightest, he could throw himself on the saddle of any common war-horse without touching the stirrup. He personally saved the battle of Lutzen from concluding in a total overthrow. At the head of 1000 cuirassiers completely armed, he made good the very point, where Gustavus in person made the most violent impression. Broken by fresh supplies of the enemy, and reciprocally breaking them, he kept his troops in spirits till the 10th or 11th attack, nor ever departed from the ground, where he had the honour to be first placed, though covered all over with wounds, and three horses had been killed under him. Wal-

homewards, with the loss of Mafon, their commissary-general, whom the Swedes took prisoner, and their military chest. Meanwhile the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel co-operated vigorously with the king at the head of 10,000 men, and kept Gronsfelt in full employment about Paderborn. Rostock at length capitulated, to the great joy of Gustavus. The duke of Mecklenburg and Todt * had besieged and blockaded it a long time: but Virmond the governor made a most obstinate defence, and fought during the whole siege under *red* colours, which in those days was considered as a mark of never listening to an accommodation. At length the citizens and garrison began to mutiny, having lost all hope, after the decision at Leipzig. Nevertheless, Virmond had address enough to procure excellent conditions for himself and soldiers, and saved three thousand two hundred men, who were conveyed to Wolfenbüttele, where, by Mansfelt's orders, he joined Boninghausen. They then all acted against Banier; whilst Oxenstiern advanced to bring the king a reinforcement of 12,000 men; and the elector of Bavaria, on the other hand, astonished at the progress made in Franconia, assembled

stein was so sensible, that such a soldier was in effect an army, that next morning he sent him, as a token of his esteem, from his own private generosity, a present of 1600*l.* sterling. On account of this and other kindnesses he never departed from his gratitude to the generalissimo, nor would he give any connivance to his assassination, though the emperor and his ministers were the contrivers and cause of it. Great as this man was in the subaltern duties of war, his character afterwards did not rise in proportion to his elevation: something more may still be wanting to form the commander in chief. However, we must observe, in honour to his memory, that he generally acted in conjunction with the archduke Leopold, and was often overruled and fettered by him. By peculiar good fortune he survived the thirty years wars, though present in most actions of importance: and not only encounters then, but pitched battles too, were much more frequent, and more bloody than they have been since.

He was thought a person of so much parts and address, as to be sent plenipotentiary to Nuremberg, in order to meet Charles Gustavus, prince Palatine of Sweden, and make good the stipulations entered into at Munster about drawing off the troops, and evacuating the various garrisons in the empire. Never did any work require more extensive knowledge in detail, or greater patience and dexterity. Most of the generals on both sides traversed all advances towards a good understanding; inasmuch as in those days they lived by the sword, and grew rich by the sword to *such a degree*, as, God be praised, has never happened since in the land-service. Yet Piccolomini soon gave the finishing stroke to this imminent and difficult undertaking. He then married Maria Benigna, daughter of the duke of Saxony, and died a year afterwards in the 56th year of his age. *Azioni egregie da generali e da soldati Italiani dall'anno 1600 fino al 1700, 4 Ven. 1742.*

* Todt, Achatius, (Ahaz) descended from a daughter of Eric, the degraded king of Sweden, whose epitaph was the following text of scripture; *Translatum est regnum, et factum, est fratris ejus: a domo constitutum est et.*

bled an army of 20,000 fighting men near Donawert, and offered a garrison to the inhabitants of Ratisbon, which they declined. The people of Augsburg returned the same excuse to Galas.

Having mentioned Rostock, I must just take notice of a strange accident, which happened there in the beginning of this year. One Jacob Vermeyer, a native of Osnabrug, had conceived a mortal hatred against the Imperial colonel Hatzfeld *, for which no reason could be assigned: He artfully concealed his resentment a long time, and insinuated himself into that commander's good opinion, which emboldened him to ask for some employment by way of amanuensis. It happened one day, in the absence of the domestics, as that officer was intent on sorting some papers, that Vermeyer came behind him with an axe, which he procured for the purpose; and, as he was stooping, stunned him with one blow, and then cutting off his head, carried it away in a cloth, hid it in a senator's house, and concealed himself. Being discovered, and questioned why he had committed so horrid a murder, he replied coolly, *that Hatzfeld had deserved it*. More than this not even the torture could extract from him †.

Before we return to Gustavus, it may not be amiss to look for a moment on what was doing by the elector of Saxony ‡: who, at Arnheim's instigation, artfully chose the reduction of Lusatia, which by the way the emperor had given him as his share of protestant plunder about eight years before, and the invasion of Bohemia, for his departments. Having conquered all that he lost in Misnia, he received an extraordinary declaration from his Imperial majesty by colonel Paradeiser; who, to save appearances, had been dispatched to Dresden in a ministerial capacity, and acted under the interposition of Cadretta, the Spanish ambassador then residing at Vienna. Cadretta, to use the language of those times, was, as we suppose, an *Italianized Spaniard*; for this memorial may be considered as an equal mixture of subtle falsehood and high Castilian rhodomontade; since it was hereby declared §, That Tilly had invaded Saxony *without orders* §, for which temerity he should receive a proper reprimand one day or other; as the haste of

* There was another colonel Hatzfeld, who was afterwards a general of some renown.

† *Bracbelii Hist. Nestr. Tem.* p. 270.

‡ *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. part i. p. 149.

§ *Soluti Suedois*, 178, &c.

§ Tilly declares expressly the contrary, in his letter from Halberstadt, which we have published.

that

that man had forced the elector into the arms of a mere *stranger*, who could neither protect his friends, nor destroy his enemies, and upon whose precarious existence the whole fortune of a fatal war depended. That the house of Austria, on the contrary, confided in a strength which was insurmountable; and had resources to boast of that were inexhaustible; renowned likewise, and admired in all ages, for the hereditary character *d'une debonnaireté particulière*. Such are the author's * own words, and sorry I am, that I want an equivalent expression whereby to translate them. The memorial then proceeded as follows; namely, That to evince this latter assertion, more distinct orders were then dispatched to the Imperial commanders in Lusatia, and this was really the fact, namely, to withdraw their troops, and leave the country to the elector's devotion: beseeching him to remember the solemn oath he had taken to the emperor and empire, with a promise subjoined of making all matters easy to the once oppressed and afflicted protestants.

To these declarations the duke of Saxony, with respect to outward appearances, replied boldly and honestly enough. Also to a convention proposed, where Cadretta intended to be present in the character of a mediator, after having given, according to his custom, some good dinners and suppers, he besought colonel Paradeiser to inform the courts of Vienna and Madrid, as follows, That having incurred, than which nothing could be more true, the suspicions and reflections of all good protestants, he had served his Imperial majesty faithfully, and had been rewarded insincerely: That a declaration of this sort ought to have preceded, and not succeeded, the battle of Leipzig: That he knew the wariness of Tilly's old age too well, to suppose him capable of taking so rash a step without positive instructions; since if the victory of that day had once fallen to the share of the Imperial party, Cæsar, and not Cæsar's general, would have claimed the glory of breaking into Misnia, and laying all waste with fire and sword†. That he had joined Gustavus partly through resentment, and partly from a principle of self-preservation; nor was he at liberty to withdraw from him without incurring the imputation of ingratitude: so much the rather, as the accommodation proposed, for which, it must be confessed, Paradeiser appeared to be furnished with full authorities, tended not to the establishment

* Frederic Spanheim, then professor of theology at Geneva.

† *Saldat Suedois*, p. 183—188. *Le Vassor*, tom. vii. p. 60—63.

of an universal peace, but was only calculated to form a private union between the house of Austria and that of Dresden. Nor was he to be informed, that a secret disposition had been projected, whereby it was contrived to transfer the electoral bonnets of Brandenburg and Saxony to other wearers; concluding with this short insinuation, that it was much easier to *despise* Gustavus than to *conquer* him; being a prince alike respectable in his friendships, and formidable in his animosities*.

Nothing could be more pointedly worded than this spirited reply; and yet the Elector and Arnheim had, even *then*, a private inclination to become false to the cause of Sweden.

Meanwhile the prince we are speaking of, having reduced Lusatia, where Tressenbach and Goëtz made but an imperfect resistance, entered Bohemia, and joined with old count Thurn, who was now lieutenant-general to Gustavus, and commanded a little army of Swedes, on some occasions, separate from that of Arnheim, which union inclined the Bohemians to give the elector a more favourable reception; since, at the very instant he invested Prague, the inhabitants opened their gates with great cheerfulness, so that don Balthazar di Maradas, the chief Imperial commander in that kingdom, and count de Michna, first commissary-general, were obliged to escape with all the garrison.

Walstein, previously to this, returned to his palace just before the electoral army approached Prague, and, by the part he acted, smoothed the way for ascending a second time to his master's favour. He exhorted the officers and soldiers to perform their duty like men of honour, told them fine stories of assistance from Hungary and Poland, and threatened severe punishments to such as should behave with remissness or cowardice. At the same time he plainly saw, that the inhabitants were ill-affected towards his master, and that a garrison trebly superior to that at present was not sufficient to defend such an extent of walls. Nevertheless, to support the spirit of his party, he made semblance first to enter into an accommodation with count Thurn, and left Prague under pretence of diverting the siege by concluding a decisive treaty with Saxony; whereas, instead of attempting one project or the other, he pointed his journey

* *Chevnitiuss* de Bello Sueco-German. tom. i. 218. Indeed *the king of snow*, as the Spaniards and Austrians affected to call him, performed his wonders in due time, and plucked the best feathers from the wings of the Imperial eagle:

— gelida rex Suevus ab Arcto
Incumbit, sacramque aquulam melicibus alis
Expulsiat —

to Budweis and not the Saxon camp, having removed privately the whole *cancellaria*, or papers of state.

The elector then took up his residence in this nobleman's palace, and destroyed the chapel called *Bella Victoria*, which had been erected in memory of the battle of Prague*. Count Thurn succeeded Michna in the possession of his own house, which had been confiscated; and caused the heads of his protestant friends, that had been fixed upon the town gates, to be decently buried in the church of the Hussites. I must mention one remarkable circumstance; namely, that the city of Prague was *lost and retaken, changed and received its religion, the selfsame day*, at *eleven years* distance. Thus the marshal Saxe took Prague at nearly an hundred years distance, the *very same day* that his ancestor had taken it. The kingdom soon followed the example of the metropolis, with exception only of Pilsen, Budweis, and Tabor. The proscribed nobility and gentry returned, and took possession of their estates and houses. The goods of such Polish ecclesiastics, as absented themselves, were made a sacrifice to the fury of the populace; which paid also very little respect to the Imperial soldiery. Upon this account Thurn issued a general protection in the name of Gustavus†; and denounced severe punishments against all violators of the public peace. Though the people adored him as the genius of Liberty and their tutelar angel, yet two Imperial privy-counsellors could not escape their resentment, for the multitude had been persecuted and exasperated beyond all imagination since the battle of Prague.

Gustavus now began thoroughly to suspect the elector of Saxony, who had wasted too much time at first setting out, under pretence of punishing his own subjects, and amused himself with feasting and rioting in Walslein's palace, when he ought to have been cased in armour, at the head of his forces, in the middle of Austria. The vigilant Croats missed little of taking him prisoner, whilst he was idle enough, in the hurry of an important campaign, to amuse himself with stag-hunting; upon which interruption, in order to enjoy his sports and Baccharah wine with greater security, he retired nearer home, as far as Leütmeritz, leaving the conduct of the army to Arnheim, who gained some advantage over the Imperialists near Limburg, and placing Hofkirck, an Austrian baron, with a strong garrison at Prague. Thus ended an expedition, more famous for the effusion of wine, than of human blood.

* *Mercuré François*, tom. xvii. part ii. 123.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. 204, &c.

While

While the elector of Saxony was thus employed, we will consider, for a moment, the operations of the Swedish and Imperial forces in other parts. Horn laid near Bamberg, between Gustavus and Tilly, in order to cover his master's flanks, and watch the motions of the latter. Banier, Todt, Hamilton, Leslie, the dukes of Mechlenburg and Lunenberg, not to mention the troops of Bremen, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and the chancellor Oxenstiern, who indeed was now marching to escort the queen and join the king, all commanded little separate armies in the northern and north-east parts of Germany, and were opposed in their turns by no less persons than Pappenheim, Tieffenbach, Goëtz, Gronsfelt, Boninghausen, Mansfelt, and others. To enter into an abstract only of their proceedings would make a multiplicity of wars, which the reader's mind could hardly comprehend; the king having at that time eight or nine separate armies on foot, each of them in full employment against an equal number of enemies; independent of efforts made on both sides in Ssabria, where old sir Patrick Ruthven, and the duke of Wirtemberg, opposed the elder Montecuculi, and commissary Offa.

Midst the confusion and tumult of wars, the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, who, not to degenerate from the character of his father, was always a secret well-wisher to the courts of Vienna and Mentz, and found no small advantage in playing so artful a game, made proposals of accommodation betwixt all the contending parties then in the empire. Himself and the margrave of Culmbach were to be appointed the representatives on the protestant side, and the archduke Leopold and the duke of Neuburg were to act the same parts in the catholic interests; but the whole project soon vanished into air. At the same time the English ambassador *, then residing at Vienna, sent his secretary, Richard Hurst, to London, accompanied by a Capuchin friar, with instructions to make fresh proposals concerning the restitution of the Palatinate. Couriers also were dispatched upon the same errand to Madrid and Brussels. From all these proceedings nothing resulted, except that the English laughers had their jest, and said, that "the emperor could not be extremely warm in his circumstances, when he was obliged to employ a plenipotentiary who was not master of a single shirt †."

At this time her Swedish majesty arrived at Stetin; and the duke of Pomerania, with great politeness, paid his compli-

* Sir Robert Anstruther.

† *Memoires d'Elisbice Palatine.*

ments

ments to her immediately, and besought her to stay one day, and honour with her presence a comedy and *ballet*, which he had appointed for her amusement. She answered like the illustrious consort of the Great Gustavus; *that the state of the times required prayers and public humiliations more than interludes and bergamascos**. That in the midst of his festivities, she should be reflecting on the dangers which her husband was hourly exposed to, and consequently be alone and absent, although surrounded by crowded theatres. Matters of public honour and ceremony being thus abruptly, but civilly decided, the duke made her majesty a present of a rich casket, and several valuable pictures in miniature; and the queen, not to be wanting in magnificence, sent him back a vase and basin of massy gold: and to exceed him, if possible, in politeness, sent the duchess a fine coach and six horses, that were most beautifully dappled. From Stetin she passed on to Berlin, the place of her nativity, and thence to Dresden.

We will now return to Gustavus, who, till the town of Hanau was taken, had great doubts what steps to pursue: nor were his perplexities quite removed when Dewbattel conquered it; for though he had his choice of two routes, either to Nuremberg or Francfort, in the districts round the former of which lay the temporal princes, and in the latter, the three spiritual electors, yet he could not easily determine which part of the alternative to embrace. Tilly well foresaw, that each of these plans would occur to the king, for great generals want no intelligence, whereby to be informed of the nicer operations of a campaign, and therefore of course, when Gustavus approached Nuremberg, he, in consequence of that motion, filed off to Francfort; and when he perceived, that the king declined advancing to the former place, passed him by a forced march in the night, and placed his army directly in the road to the latter†. In this dilemma, where the sword might not so conveniently take effect, for the Imperial general was extremely cautious and wary, the king applied himself a second or third time to the arts of negotiation, and at length procured a final ratification of the treaty, which had been long agitating, on his side at least, with the patricians of Nuremberg, whereby he gave his honour to relieve them or perish, in case Tilly should besiege them.

His peace of mind being thus recovered, and all greater difficulties quieted, he appointed Axel Lilly to be governor

* That is to say, *masques à la façon de Bergame*, a town in Italy. The word occurs both in Shakespeare and Johnson.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 20, &c.

of Wurtzburg, and leaving Horn as general, *by deputation*, in the circle of Franconia, embarked Torstenfon on the Maine with all his artillery, and marched his army in two columns, on either side of the river, as far as Aschaffenberg, himself leading *that* division, which marched next to Tilly. The body of troops he then conducted amounted only to 7000 infantry, and 4000 horse. He had few native Swedes with him, having sent the major part to Horn, Banier, Leslie*, Todt, and his other generals. Never army made a quieter march in an hostile country, for Horn was encamped at Bamberg betwixt his master and Tilly; so that one would have imagined the king was making a procession in his own dominions, at the head of his subjects; insomuch, that an old colonel in the Swedish service has declared, that the five days' march under Gustavus from Wurtzburg to Aschaffenberg, had more the aspect of a journey of pleasure than a military expedition.

At Aschaffenberg, where the elector of Mentz had one of the finest palaces in the empire, was expected, on account of the wealth therein contained, a sort of resistance by no means contemptible; particularly as the garrison consisted of one regiment of Tilly's old Burgundians, and twice the number of electoral forces; but they all dislodged under the protection of the night, and Banier's regiment of infantry was made the garrison.

The town of Steinheim was next taken by force, and 600 soldiers, who made two-thirds of the garrison, entered into the Swedish service. His majesty made a compliment of the castle and demesnes round it to the count de Hanau's mother, unto whose family they antiently belonged: and this act of generosity so attached that nobleman, who was no inconsiderable protestant prince, having five earldoms, and about 700 villages, under him†, that he, and the seventeen counts of Veteravia‡, some of whom were Lutherans, and some Calvinists, entered into a public treaty§ with Gustavus;—made over to him all their passes and fortresses; agreed to pay a contingent of £. 2500. a month during the wars, and recal such subjects as then served under

* Sir Alexander; an old Scottish general, governor of Stralsund when Gustavus entered Germany.

† *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 35.

‡ Some of these families had more earldoms than one, as the Nassaus, Waldecks, Solmes's, Isenbergs, &c.

§ It was not signed till the Swedish army arrived at Francfort, and consisted of a long preamble by way of manifesto, and eleven distinct articles that had been mutually exchanged.

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the emperor. They even had the boldness to assert, in their counterpart of articles given to Gustavus, that this prince was compelled by mere force of conscience to enter Germany; and that the house of Austria aimed at nothing less than universal tyranny over the minds and liberties of mankind; having seized the territories of the said contractors, purely to shew what, and how much, arbitrary power can effect, either with or without reason, and bestowed patrimonial inheritances, that were never forfeited, upon a set of *new* men, who till that time were hardly known to the empire.

From Steiuheim the king advanced to Hanau, where he only stopped, to the great mortification of the magistrates; and then causing all his drums to beat, marched seven miles farther that night, till he reached Offenbach-castle, situate at no great distance from Francfort. Here he rested one day, having sent the count de Solmes before to prepare his admission. The magistrates then entreated Gustavus to consider their oaths to the emperor, and not only leave their town in a state of neutrality, but pay some regard to their annual fairs, which were the chief means of their subsistence. The king replied, *That the tacit compact of their obligation to his Imperial majesty had been already violated; that the word neutrality conveyed an odious sound to his ears; and that he was shocked to be informed by them, that their fairs had more weight with them than their liberty, and their consciences, since they considered things more in a private light as tradesmen and merchants, than in a public light as members of the world and Christians**. Upon this the commissioners interceded for time to consider and consult the elector of Mentz, their ecclesiastical sovereign; but the king, who seized all incidents in their flight by him, cut them short by observing, and here he raised his voice a little with a tone of authority, *That he could easily excuse them from taking so much trouble: for being master of Aschaffenberg, their prince's place of residence, there was no elector of Mentz, except Gustavus; and that he would give them a more plenary and effectual absolution in government matters than the aforesaid prelate could pretend to do†*.

Upon this the magistrates consented without delay, in the names of themselves, and the people, not only to take an oath of fidelity, but to allow the Swedish army ingress and egress, and admit 600 soldiers into Saxenhausen, a pleasing and elegant part of the suburbs, divided from the city by a large bridge.

* *Le Soldat Suédois*, p. 266.

† *Ibidem*.

As this town might, in one respect, be considered the most renowned city in Germany, it being a common saying, That "he who possesses Francfort a year and a day is master of the empire," the king, in order to make his public entrance and procession with greater solemnity, passed through it, riding all the way with his head uncovered; bowing to the better sort of people as they saluted him, and speaking courteously to the merchants, tradesmen, and populace*. This cavalcade was preceded by fifty-six pieces of artillery, the more heavy cannon being carried down the Maine in boats, and then followed seventy-four ensigns of foot, and forty-five cornetries of horse. The whole ceremony being performed with slowness and regularity, a larger body of forces than this could not march through the town in one day; and of course, to preserve the greater decorum, the next morning twenty-six more troops of cavalry closed the procession. All of them together, according to the best calculation I can make, not including the corps that guarded the artillery along the river, amounted to about 14,000 effective men: some of which the king had gleaned up in the short space since he left Wurtzburg. Only two soldiers, in their march from Wurtzburg, quitted the army for a moment in order to pilfer; and both were condemned, by martial law, to suffer death the next day.

The magistracy fitted up the Imperial palace of Braunfels† to receive the king, who dined there the very day he entered the town, making choice of the same room where the emperor eats at his coronation. When they pressed him to sleep there the ensuing night, as the place of residence during his stay, he declined the request, and courteously told them, *That he could repose himself contentedly in the open fields, and desired no other apartments than what his pioneers made for him; adding, that the body of an army could not subsist without its head; and that he was obliged to take his chance in common with*

* It was usually his custom to discourse with all the town's people, that flocked round him, and ask them a thousand little questions, that meant nothing but affability. He disliked flattery and compliments; and when those, who affected the courtly and polite style, accosted him in such language, he generally desired them with a smile, to reserve that sort of discourse for her majesty and her maids of honour.

† Gustavus, who afterwards lodged there, was so delighted with it, that he asked his generals one day, if they saw any defect in it? When they returned their answer in the negative, he replied gravely, *that he perceived one, which quite dissatisfied him; for as the palace was not built upon wheels, he could not possibly conceive to roll it to the sea-shore of the Baltic, and thence transport it to the city of Stockholm.*

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the meanest soldier that served under him *. This was at that time nothing more nor less than a political pretext. It was his intention, with the most profound secrecy, to invest the strong town of Hoëchst; which he surrounded by ten o'clock that evening, as it was at no great distance from Francfort, and made himself master of it the day succeeding. For this reason, it was under pretence of doing himself and the city an honour, that he marched his forces through the town, and made them stand to their arms at the opposite gate till night came on, and then, without giving the neighbourhood the least apprehensions, conducted them unexpectedly to the walls of Hoëchst.

It was here that George, the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, though others, it must be confessed, suppose the place to be Steinheim, which appears to me not so probable, sent a message of proposals, by one of the gentlemen of his bed-chamber, to the king; who being somewhat displeased at an application so devoid of ceremony, asked Swabach, for that was the person's name, not without a certain degree of warmth, *if his master thought it beneath him to make a visit in person* ? Upon this, the landgrave, whose character we have touched upon in a preceding paragraph, posted away to Francfort, where his majesty, who by this time was returned thither, took the opportunity to insinuate, during the course of a repast, *That it might have proved more prudent for him to have joined the other protestant princes, who entered into the Leipsic confederation, and trusted to a manly and spirited resolution, than thus to have played a separate clandestine game, and lent an ear to the vain and illusory promises of the court of Vienna* †. The landgrave was one of those men who have always *more last words* to say, so that by shifting backwards and forwards, reasoning and confirming his reasonings over and over, with abundance of reservations, excuses, subtleties, palliations, and promises, &c., he tormented Gustavus to such a degree, that the latter, merely for the sake of holding this Proteus in any shape, who happened to be son-in-law to the elector of Saxony, a prince, who then required to be dexterously managed ‡, consented to allow him a sort of neutrality, and absolved him from paying the common military contingent, which all other contracting powers had agreed to furnish. In consequence of this, the landgrave assigned to the Swedes the strong castle of Russelheim, in much the same manner as has been mentioned before with regard to

* *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 269.

† *Ibid.* p. 272.

‡ *Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis*, l. iii. p. 54.

Custrin and Spandau, and ceded to his majesty free possession of all the forts and passages in his territories*.

At Francfort, a more explicit sort of personage joined Gustavus, who for one day had made a second journey to Hoëchst, in order to return God thanks for his victories without the interruption of a crowd of spectators; and that was William, landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; who conducted with him all the troops he could conveniently spare, amounting perhaps in the whole to about 6000 foot, and 3000 horse. This prince had not been inactive whilst Tilly attempted to raise the siege of Marienberg: for during that interval he made himself master of Minden and Goëtingen, and advanced thence into the Palatinate, where he surprized the town of Vacha.

A treaty being now signed betwixt his majesty and the people of Francfort†, great care was immediately taken of the trade and commerce of this famous city; for the king published an order with relation to the two annual fairs, wherein he allowed an impartial toleration of religion to all mankind, granting the merchants of every sect and persuasion, Jews as well as Christians, free unmolested passage for themselves and their goods, and signifying the same under pain of the highest displeasure to all his commanders. He confirmed it next year by a second edict, giving his generals to understand, in their several districts, that if any travellers were plundered, or their effects detained by force, they themselves should be answerable for the loss in their own persons‡. Hence it happened, in consequence of this extraordinary care and generosity, that the city of Francfort, for the space of three years, engrossed great part of the *wealth* and *substance* of the four upper circles in the German empire.

The possession of a town like Francfort, without the loss of a single person, produced congratulations and compliments to his majesty from all quarters; and upon this occasion, some of those court-sycophants, who are always buzzing in royal ears, told him with a foolish countenance of admiration, that he resembled Alexander the Great, not only in the greatness, but in the rapidity of his conquests; adding moreover, with a particular emphasis, that he possessed, or had at his devotion, the two places, where the Imperial crown was kept, and where the emperor received his consecration. Upon this the king, who often dealt in the ironical style, replied

* *Chemnit.* tom. i. p. 200.

† *Ibid.* p. 202.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 205.

gravely,

gravely, and without seeming to be affected, *That hitherto, God be praised, he had not been ambitious, like the destructive and ravaging heroes of antiquity; but contented himself with that diminutive spot, which lies wedged in between the Rhine and the Baltic*.*

Whilst things went on thus peaceably at Francfort, Tilly ravaged the marquisate of Anspach, and found in and near the capital abundance of arms, and a considerable number of excellent horses. In this irruption, the very tombs and vaults of the reigning family were plundered; nor was the *cordon* of diamonds spared, which decorated the body of the old general, who, though he had commanded against the emperor at the battle of Prague, yet afterwards, by means of his recantation, merited better terms from the troops of the house of Austria. Tilly thence sent the administrator of Magdeburg, whom he had carried round the empire, as a trophy ever since the storming of Magdeburg, to Ingolstadt; and here the coldness between him and Pappenheim, to whose impetuosity he attributed the ill success at Leipzig, proceeded to such disgust and disagreement, that the latter thought fit to retire with a separate army into Westphalia, and left the siege of Nuremberg to Tilly, who hoped thereby to draw Gustavus from the banks of the Rhine; but the patricians of Nuremberg had raised a little army in their own defence, and received a count de Solmes as governor on the part of Sweden. The Imperial general summoned the magistrates to surrender their city in his master's name, and demanded £.15,000. by way of contribution. The only answer made, consisted of a brisk discharge of artillery, so that one of the cannon-balls pierced the horse-litter where Tilly sat. Being partly disappointed at such a resistance, for the town had lately given Aldringer assurances of fidelity and loyalty, and partly chagrined, as a prisoner in the Swedish interests had set fire to his magazine of powder, he found himself obliged to direct his intentions to some second object; or, in other words, to dispose his troops into winter-quarters; part filing off towards Bohemia to watch the Saxons, and the rest being dispersed through the Upper Palatinate. As far as we can now discover, he had no apparent reasons for his resolution, excepting that he hoped, as a report was then spread of Wallstein's being recalled, to throw the king upon *that* general's hands, and entice him far off from the metropolis of his friend and patron, the duke of Bavaria. If this was the real intention, for

* *Fred. Spanheim, Soldat Suecicus, p. 275.*

many think he feared to engage the king in a second pitched battle*, it proved afterwards to be either ill contrived or unfortunate; for it gave Gustavus an idea of entering into Bavaria, part of which by this movement was left naked and defenceless, some weeks sooner than he first proposed. Indeed, from the beginning to the end of this affair, he shewed himself to be no way puzzled with Tilly's shifting; well aware that Wallstein could perform but little till the spring ensuing. Of course, the instant he received the news that Nuremberg was invested, he dispatched the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel with his army to watch Tilly's motions; declaring solemnly he would himself march to raise the siege in case there appeared any occasion; and the moment the Imperial forces decamped towards Bohemia and the Higher Palatinate, he formed the scheme of crossing the Danube in those places where it was weakly defended.

It is now high time to observe, that the loss of the battle of Leipzig had given the emperor inexpressible uneasiness, as it had ruined the rich harvests of twelve the most prosperous, though not the most glorious, campaigns, that are to be met with in history. Upon reviewing what had preceded, he found himself without resource of men and money. Many of the veteran legions, which in the course of *one* war are hardly ever to be replaced, had been carelessly and wantonly disbanded; and his torrent of successes had been uninterrupted to such a degree, that none of his ministers thought it necessary to lay up provision of wealth in the exchequer. The civil and military officers lived by plunder, extortion, and confiscation, and arrogantly concluded that their incomes could never be exhausted.

Prodigies and omens, according to the interpretation of those times, increased the horrors of a superstitious prince. The eruption of Mount Vesuvius, which chanced to happen soon after the battle of Leipzig, put all Europe into a new consternation†. A woman was delivered of a strange monster near Vienna; and one of the emperor's counsellors of state dropt down dead at his feet, as they were discoursing about a tower‡, which had been erected as a trophy to his

* *Galeazzo Guilio*, part i. l. 2. 4°. Bologn. 1641.

† Nani, *Historia Veneta*, tom. viii.

‡ The inscription was,

TROPHEUM
DEO VICTORI OPT. MAX.
IN MEMORIAM B. VIRG. MARIE, SS. IGNATII,
ET FRANCISCI XAVERII,
FERDINAND. II. IMPERAT.
MDC.XXVII.

The tower belonged to the Jesuits new college at Prague.

glory;

glory; and, besides prodigies, Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, was attempting to negotiate a separate treaty with France. Upon this, he began to talk in a new style to Anstruther, the English ambassador, about the restitution of the Palatinate; paid his court to Gustavus, by means of the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt; made applications to the elector of Saxony, through the interposition of the Spanish ambassador: and dispatching, lastly, the baron Curtius with fresh proposals to the court of Versailles, ordered him to express himself in a very different style from what the court of Furstenberg had formerly used, after the reduction of Mantua. Gabriel Oxenstiern, the Swedish plenipotentiary, was much better received; for France knew how to distinguish between the pretended interests of religion, and the real advantages of the house of Austria*.

In the next place, the emperor reformed all the offices of his court, and abolished those that were superfluous. He reduced the number of the noblemen of his bedchamber from twenty-nine to six; and humbly requested contributions from all the princes of his own house, as also from the princes and states of Italy, and the pope. The king of Spain and the king of Hungary, in conjunction with his consort, furnished him each with £.150,000. The grand duke of Tuscany subscribed very generously; but when the Hungarian cardinal Pasman† was sent to make an essay on the pope's purse, the holy father‡, artfully enough, refused to receive a *cardinal* as an *ambassador*; and insisted moreover, that the present war could not be considered a *war of religion*. Pasman replied, like a man of probity, ability, and spirit; for he was not only a profound politician, but, which was then rare, as well as now, a politician that led an exemplary and irreproachable life; and of course the public paid great regard to all he said and did. He told the pope in so many words, That he valued himself on having spirit enough to engage in *secular matters*, when they were so *nearly connected* with his duty as a *Christian*; and justified himself with so much firmness, that Urban immediately granted him an audience; sagaciously foreseeing, that it was less

* *Memoires d'Eléonore Palatine*, &c. 306.

† Archbishop of Gran, or Strigonium. Some say his family name was Harrach, and that he was brother-in-law to Wallstein. The baron de Rabatta, who paid his visit to the other Italian princes, attended him.—*Le Vassor*, tom. vii. 110.

‡ Urban VIII. who had been nuncio to Clement VIII. in France, and held Lewis XIII. at the baptismal font.

dangerous to *hear* his arguments, than to reject them *unheard*. In consequence of this, the unsuccessful prelate had only the empty satisfaction to protest aloud to all mankind, "That the holy and infallible father had extracted more notions of doctrines from *Tacitus* and *Machiavel*, than from the *Evangelists* and the *Apostles*."

The emperor then condescended to ask supplies from his own subjects. Cardinal Ditrichstein * subscribed eight thousand pounds; the prince of Eggenberg † fifty thousand; count Michna sixteen thousand; the bishop of Vienna ‡ thirteen thousand; and Stralendorf §, vice-chancellor of the empire, nine thousand pounds.

As Tilly grew old, and was neglected by the army; as he was unsuccessful in his last great campaign, and devoted besides to the Bavarian interests; one supreme commander was wanted, to make some counterpoise at least, against the powerful good fortune of Gustavus. The Spanish faction proposed Ferdinand, king of Hungary, the emperor's son; who had married the infanta, sister of Philip IV. and had patronized and strengthened the interests of Madrid at the court of Vienna. The German party recommended Walstein, as a general of great experience and unbounded generosity; for which reason he was peculiarly happy in levying troops at the shortest notice, that could be imagined. Indeed, if we except Pappenheim, Tilly being supposed to be out of the question, there was no alternative of choice: and Pappenheim, to give him his due, despised courtiers, court applications, and court intrigues. He wanted to be *illustrious*, but not *rich*. *Glory* was his *object*, and *that* he procured by the point of his sword. Of course, in all this caballing, and all these distresses, not unhappily perhaps even for Gustavus, HE was neither recommended by a single person, nor even thought of; yet, deriving his reputation *only* from *himself*,

* Francis, cardinal and prince of Ditrichstein, bishop of Olmutz, protector of the hereditary dominions, commissary general and plenipotentiary-governor of Moravia, &c. See more in a preceding note.

† John, duke of Cromau, and prince of Eggenberg; one of the fourteen cabinet counsellors, director of the council, knight of the order of the Golden Fleece, hereditary *maréchal* of both the Austrias, &c. &c. *Court Kalendar of Vienna*, 1632. It was he who advised the Mantuan war. *Paganino Gaudenzio*; *Singularità delle guerre di Germania*, 171.

‡ Antony, prince and abbot of Crembs-Munster, privy-counsellor, and director of the privy-council. He had great grants out of the forfeited lands in Franconia.

§ Peter Henry, baron, privy-counsellor, vice-president of the aulic council, &c. &c.

he

he never once murmured or remonstrated; never once entertained a thought of resigning, or quitting the service; but quietly, patiently, and steadily, performed his duty; and died, as he lived, a faithful subject, an inferior commander, but a HERO. How little do princes know their true friends! Had it not been for Pappenheim, it is probable, the emperor had been dethroned, and wandered round the world like a poor proscribed elector Palatine. Pappenheim always knew this, and yet served him. I say he *knew* it, as appears from the dying message he sent to Walstein.

Charles of Lorrain wished, without success, for Walstein's employment, as we observed before; and count Furstenberg, who had served under Tilly, amused himself with the hope of being chosen a sort of generalissimo, by the help of his kinsman of the same name, who was then president in the cabinet of the king of Hungary; for he aspired to no other post than to be military counsellor and director to that prince; but, miscarrying in this project, he resigned his commission and retired from affairs.

The Spaniards were much startled with the thoughts of Walstein's recall; for they formerly, jointly with the elector of Bavaria, had contrived his disgrace: nevertheless, like good courtiers, they submitted with seeming complacency; and, to dissemble better their consciousness of past affronts, made him a compliment of the *order* of the Golden Fleece; for they knew the spirit of the man, and his vindictive temper. They saw likewise, that Ferdinand was young and inexperienced, and that he could not make a campaign without vast expence.

To pay court still further to the generalissimo, who loved no foreign troops except Italians, whose quickness of parts he admired, and whose connexions with their respective princes he knew to be inconsiderable, they made him an offer, by the capuchin Zuïroga, to pay annually £.100,000. into the military chest, by way of equivalent for a body of forces, that were to have marched from the Low Countries*; which alternative he thought fit to embrace. Thus ended this cabal of faction; and most readers will be apt to imagine, that the German party prevailed by mere superiority of reason. Perhaps neither *their* representations, nor *those* of the Spaniards, determined the important affair in question; for it is probable, the emperor gave the preference to Walstein purposely on account of a favourable horoscope, which his astrologer had erected for that general: and the rather,

* *Le Vassor*, tom. vii. 135.

because it is well known, he was very unwilling to humble himself before a subject, and submit to ask his pardon*.

Upon this, Maximilian, count Walstein, master of the horse to the king of Hungary, who was the general's nephew and favourite; the baron de Questenberg†, privy-counsellor and aulic-chancellor, who had been, and still continued his patron at court; and the prince of Eggenberg, were all dispatched to him with full authorities to make him an offer of the principal command, and a salary of £.100,000. a year‡. Walstein was then at his palace at Znaïm in Moravia, the Saxons having dislodged him from his fine places of residence at Prague, and in Silesia. He coldly declined a visit to Vienna, pretending humility, and protesting the title of *his highness*, as duke of Mechlenburg, would offend his ears; since it would be a sensible mortification to him, to be treated upon the footing of a prince of the empire. This was mere grimace and affectation; for few people were desirous of giving him the title, and many contested it.

He then entertained them with a tedious homily on the instability of human greatness, the charms and advantages of retirement and self-recollection, and the vanity of ambition. He lamented the ill success of his master's arms, and inveighed bitterly against his own personal enemies; observing, haughtily enough, that if he undertook to remedy all the blunders of Tilly, and the elector of Bavaria, he should justly merit to have his name fixed, by way of infamy, to every gibbet in the empire. Adding, that the emperor had cut off his right-arm, and now wanted to fight a duel hand to hand with the Great Gustavus. He nevertheless condescended, under the name of the king of Hungary§, and not otherwise, to undertake the command for three

* *Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis*, fol. p. 58.

† The very person, who formerly carried him his dismissal, when he had been cashiered by the intrigues of the diet at Ratisbon. He was a minister of parts, and acquitted himself very ably in his embassy to England, after the death of Gustavus.

‡ *Le Soldat Suédois*, 298. *Mercuré Franc.* tom. xviii. p. 94. Strictly speaking, the sum amounted to 108,000*l.* *per annum*; but it was agreed to pay him 9000*l.* or 100,000 florins, at the end of each month. This salary carries with it the shew of a very high and haughty demand; yet whoever coolly considers the proposals, which this man makes the emperor in the next page, and under which his Imperial majesty thought fit to acquiesce, will not be startled at the sight of a stipend so very extraordinary at its first appearance.

§ This prince took the supreme command of the army upon him after Walstein's death, and succeeded his father to the Imperial throne, in 1637, under the title of Ferdinand III.

months;

months; and at length seeming to be fatigued, and over-persuaded by the solicitation of his friends, accepted the employ, as a sort of *perpetual dictatorship*; the terms of which, considering them to proceed from a disgraced subject to the first monarch in Europe, are such perhaps as can be hardly *equalled* in history. He was to be *Spanish* and *Imperial* generalissimo in Germany, and sole master in concluding a *peace*—His Imperial majesty, and the king of Hungary his son, were restricted *never* to enter the camp;—and his *rewards* were to be given him, either in the lands he conquered, or in the hereditary dominions;—all confiscations were to be at his *disposal*, and that without the *concurrence* of the *chamber of Spires*, or the *Imperial council*—He was to *grant* protections, passports, and pardons, without *dependency*—His demands for provisions and money, were always to be *answered*;—and, in case of a *retreat*, the *hereditary dominions* were to be open for the reception of his army*. All this could hardly have been granted, except the court of Vienna had resolved to murder him when their turn was served.

He then, in his letter to the emperor, told him, after having paused nearly six weeks, on the proposals that had been made him, namely, from the beginning of November till the middle of December, that, for his own part, he had been over-persuaded into compliance, and sacrificed his private judgment to the partiality and affection of prince Eggenberg; indirectly reminding his master, that his actions, whether more or less meritorious, had not been repaid with any proportionate acknowledgments or remunerations†; and that with respect to himself, he felt great unwillingness to hazard his person, his quiet, and his honour, a second time; adding further, that his principal wish was, to see a good peace soon established; and far from any vanity of conducting great armies, and making a figure in future history, he chose rather to collect this body of troops, and then resign the command into the hands of the king of Hungary. In short, which is a case not very common, he bore his prosperity with much greater philosophy and dissimulation, than he did his adversity; though

* See *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 242.

† This was talking in a high style; for in a few years, from a simple gentleman and page, he had been created generalissimo of the Imperial forces, duke of Fridland, Sagan, and Glogau, with rich donations in land, and the power of coining money, in gold as well as silver; and invested, lastly, with a principality of the empire, whose revenue, in times of peace, might amount to 100,000*l.* a year.

in the latter he had acquitted himself to the admiration of all courtiers and politicians.

His proposals to the ministry for supplies of money were magnificent and extravagant like himself. He demanded three millions for raising, equipping, and maintaining an army of 70,000 men. He proposed to have five regiments of Walloon cuirassiers completely armed; and had another project, of levying ten regiments of Cossacks: but this scheme, if I remember right, never took place. However, except I am much mistaken, Uladisläus, king of Poland, made a promise of sending such a supply to the Imperial army.

About this time a report was current, that when the emperor lamented to him, that he could not raise a sufficient number of forces, wherewith to oppose Gustavus in the full career of his prosperity; he asked his Imperial majesty, how many men he desired to levy? The quantity of troops wished for, being specified; Walslein replied, with great vivacity, *Let me beseech you, Cesar, to raise just double that number: it is true you cannot maintain 50,000 fresh men; but 100,000 fresh men will support themselves in the enemies' countries* *. Be this as it may, he requested in the last place, and that favour had not been granted in the preceding part of the war, that twelve regiments should be quartered in Moravia, fourteen in Silesia, six in Upper Austria, as many in the Lower, and the rest in Bohemia: for the empire was devoured from one end to the other; and his intent was, that his men and his horses should be supported and maintained in good heart and high spirits. Never did a subject open a campaign with such powers and advantages; and as he knew, that great numbers of Imperial officers and soldiers served under Gustavus, he published a placard to announce a general amnesty; and that all of them should be received by him with open arms. Upon this the emperor invited him to make his appearance at the public diet, that he might in person receive a confirmation and sanction of his new command from the electors and princes of the empire, there assembled; in reply to which proposal, Walslein alledged, that he wanted no countenance but from his own master; and then, to preserve decencies a little, made a visit for a month, under pretence of ill health †, to the famous *Caroliſque* baths ‡ near Egra.

The

* *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques* de Santa Cruz, tom. iv. p. 7.

† *Itinerarium Thomæ Carve*, &c. tom. i. § 1. We shall speak more of this scarce book in a succeeding note.

‡ *Carlsbad*; in Latin *Thermæ Carolinæ*. These waters are esteemed to be some

The Spaniards expressed transports of joy, having taken a little time to digest their chagrin and resentments, upon this recall of Walftein: for the same natural acuteness and subtilty, which made them in the preceding century the inventors and finishers of *scholastic* learning, rendered them likewise in this age the masters of civil artifice and negotiation; since in truth they in some respect governed England, France, Germany, and all Europe. Even the elector of Bavaria affected to put on a good countenance, in order to conceal a very afflicted heart.

Upon this, Walftein caressed all the officers of note, that had served under him; as Gallas, whom he had made his deputy or lieutenant-general, Montecuculi the elder, Tieffenbach, against whom he felt some disgust. Baltazar di Maradas, Holk, Piccolomini, Terfca * his brother-in-law, and Isolani general of the Croats; giving them commissions to levy a considerable body of fresh forces, and to recall all those, if possible, who had quitted the Imperial ensigns; and appointing Znaïm in Moravia for the general place of rendezvous. He then furnished the above-named officers with large sums of money out of his own coffers; and in three months time got together 30,000 approved troops, most of them veteran soldiers, with a good train of artillery: for although he was remarkably severe in his punishments, yet the men of service were all ambitious to act under him, for he rewarded with a bounty rarely to be met with in a sovereign prince. By way of displaying the extent of his power upon his re-establishment, he made some alterations, till then unheard of, amongst the subordinate generals, who before that time were very few; one only being allotted to each particular army, and therefore, without consulting the emperor or Imperial ministry, he created at once four generals of artillery, and eight serjeant-major-generals *di battaglia*; which latter officers, as we shall mention them upon various occasions, had command over all colonels, were invested with the power of raising recruits, and disposed and ranged the troops in the day of battle †.

It

some of the best in Europe, both externally and internally. They were discovered anno 1370, in the reign of Charles IV. by means of a little spaniel, who, as he was pursuing his game, burnt his feet in crossing the source, and howled exceedingly. The accommodations there for strangers are very passable, the country round romantic, and the provisions excellent.

* So the Latin and Italian writers call him; but his true name was Tertzky, and such name we shall give him, in the subsequent part of this story.

† *Hist. dellę Guerre di Ferd. II, &c.* by Galeazzo Gualdo, p. 59.

It may be advisable now to say something, more at large, concerning the life and conduct of this extraordinary phenomenon, previous to the time our period of history commences. Sarrafin, it is true, in a very spirited essay *, performed a part of this task for me, about a century ago; but as I have found nothing amongst my materials, whereby to corroborate the better half of what he asserts, it is my duty to consider him in the character of a lively writer, whose principal view was to surprize and astonish the reader. Of course it is probable, if I may be allowed to indulge a private thought, and hazard a slight conjecture, that he, who was at that period a French resident in Germany †, proceeded upon the groundwork hereafter mentioned. At the time this general's disgrace was contriving at the diet of Ratisbon, 1630, there was a little pamphlet ‡ handed about by the Spanish, French, and Bavarian faction, whether published or not, I want authority to say, which contained an exaggerated detail of Walstein's life and actions; of his estates, buildings, and equipage; of his humours, and severities; extravagancies, and profusions. As this essay was compiled chiefly *ad invidiam*, with a view to promote the intrigues of a party; it is natural to conclude, that though it contained many striking truths, yet it overcharged matters in various instances. Wherefore under this class may be placed the following assertions in Sarrafin, De Prade, and others, that his palace was built on the ruins of an hundred houses, and was the most magnificent structure that belonged to a subject: that the stable surpassed all description: that each horse, as the *Inamorato*, the *Orlando*, the *Belladonna*, the *Spetzafferro*, &c. had a rack and manger of polished steel; that the stalls were divided by intercolumniations of Bohemian marble ||; and that behind each horse was placed its picture painted in full proportion by the best Italian and German masters: that Walstein had ordered an officer to be put to death for appearing at his levee with *jingling spurs*, and hung a valet de chambre for presuming to wake him without directions §.

* *La Conspiration de Walstein.*

† This appears from the MS. papers of Sir Thomas Roe, who corresponded with him.

‡ See a *Relation of the diet of Ratisbon*, in the year 1630, faithfully translated out of the Latin printed copy, with marginal notes, 4°. London, 1632, containing ten pages.

|| The Bohemian marble equals, if not exceeds, any sort that is now found; of which the curious, who pass through Tuscany, may see a proof in the chapel of St. Laurence.

§ He only struck him. *Galeazzo Gualdo*, 42.

If the palace of Walftein, now at Prague, be the place in question, it is nothing more than a nobleman's fine house; nor were the offices and gardens uncommonly extensive, even at that time, for a person of Walftein's rank and fortunes. The countess of Walftein very politely allowed the author to examine all the apartments, where nothing struck him of the extraordinary kind, either in the size of the rooms, or in their number, or magnificence. The stables are good, and that is all: and as to the pictures of the horses, the most knowing persons at Prague appeared to have heard less of them than the enquirer.

Probably, the original palace might be ruined, or granted away to some other family upon the general's disgrace; though, if I mistake not, the prince of Furstenberg once told me, that Walftein's land possessions, at least, were permitted to descend to his successors; and that his wife, born countess of Walftein, enjoyed a very considerable part of her ancestor's estates*. Nevertheless, Carve, who saw this place in the days of its owner's prosperity, tells us, that the saloon was furnished with excellent paintings, and the cabinet most richly carved and gilt. In the antichamber stood fifty guards, all cloathed in one sumptuous uniform; and more immediately round the general's person attended daily six barons and six knights, as likewise threescore pages, the sons of gentlemen, who strove to place them in the way of fortune: for these young people were all instructed in the manners of a court, and the military exercises. At the innermost door of the antichamber were placed four persons in the character of gentlemen-ushers, who asked the title, quality, and business of visitants, and introduced them accordingly. Ten halberdiers constantly made the tour of the district round the palace; for Walftein was as impatient of noise as any humorist that hath ever been represented upon a public theatre. Whenever he made a journey, which was usually on matters of business, for he loved solitude, he affected to be attended by fifty coaches, drawn by six horses; and as many waggons carried his plate, and the equipage of his tents and kitchens. He had moreover ten glass coaches of state, which fifty grooms attended, each mounted on a fine steed, and leading another†. These horses were all lodged, at

* Nearly fifteen thousand pounds a year.

† I have seen myself a certain *con-commissary*, and the reader, who knows the empire, may easily guess *where*, whose brother then acted as a *negotiant*, ride out for a single mile to take the air, attended by an empty coach and six, two running footmen, and six grooms, each leading a fine horse: which, all things considered, makes Walftein's affectation less extraordinary.

Prague,

Prague, in one magnificent stable, adorned with marble mangers, into each of which a *jet d'eau* conveyed clear water at pleasure. The garden was large, and elegantly decorated with statues, fountains, and fish-ponds. In the midst of it stood a large aviary, inclosed above and round with an arabesque fret-work of gilt wire. His table likewise was served magnificently; and the writers of that age mention one *uncommon* piece of pomp attending it, namely, that he had clean cloths and napkins curiously folded and impressed at every fresh repast. He erected a second palace at Gedsin, upon the same principle with that at Prague, except that it was adorned with a large park, which afforded range to 300 horses, a tower being erected in the middle, where a groom always lodged, who summoned them morning and evening with the sound of a bugle-horn to come to the stables to be cleaned, and eat their food. He purposed to have performed greater wonders still at the castle of Sagan, had not death prevented him*.

With respect to Walfstein's education and life †, what appears to me confirmed by good authority is, that he was born the son of a Bohemian knight, and educated a protestant. He was of a spirited and turbulent disposition from his childhood, and mortally hated all literature and private tutors. Upon this, his father placed him as a companion with the children of the marquis of Burgau, son of Ferdinand, arch-duke of Austria. Here he stayed some years, and minded religious matters no more than classical ones; for sitting one day at a sermon preached in the family, the chapel being at the top of the house, he dropped asleep, and tumbled out at a window, which had been opened on account of the violent heat: but receiving no sort of harm from so stupendous a fall, he, who from his childhood was singular in all things, took occasion from this event to conform immediately to the popish religion. He then made the tour of France, Holland, England, and Italy, and fixed at Padua, fully convinced of the expediency and advantages of learning. Here he applied himself to classical and historical erudition with infinite assiduity, making judicial astrology his recreation and amusement. Previous to this, he had studied at Altdorf near Nuremberg, where a new prison had been erected for offending students; and the rector of the university, *in terrorem*, had given orders, that it should take its name from the party who should first be confined therein. Walfstein's impetuosity soon made him a delinquent, and, as the

* *Itinerarium Thomæ Carve*, tom. i. p. 90, &c.

† *Vita Walfsteinii ex Italic. Galeacii Gualdo*, 8^o. Rostoch, 1668.

beadles

beadles were conducting him into this apartment, he made a stop at the entrance under some pretence; kicked a little spaniel, that belonged to him, into the room, and shut the door; "Now, gentlemen, said he, the prison must take the dog's name, and not Wallstein's." Returning home from his travels, more ambitious than rich, he paid his addresses to a Bohemian widow advanced in years, but an heiress in her own right, and with a good fortune; for Bohemia, next to England, makes the best provision for the fair sex of any country in the world. At length, getting the better of a rival greatly superior to himself in birth and wealth, he had the good success to marry her; but having no children, jealousies ensued, and our adventurer was supposed to suffer considerably from the effects of a philtre, which the incensed lady contrived to give him. Nevertheless, at her death he found himself master, without exception, of her whole fortune, which was a very considerable one; and in the Venetian war he raised a regiment at his own expence, and carried it to the service of the archduke, where he behaved with great reputation, and was created a baron by the emperor. He was then made governor of Moravia, and being accused of having received bribes, and acting in a very arbitrary manner, procured his peace at court by a timely sacrifice of six-dollars in abundance to the ministry*. The protestant party fixed their eyes, principally, upon him at the first breaking out of the Bohemian troubles; but he attached himself immoveably to the interests of the house of Austria, and underwent a confiscation of his goods and estates in Bohemia; where, some assure us, he performed a notable piece of service to the emperor by pure chance; for having raised a company of cuirassiers at his own expence, he happened to enter Prague just at the instant when count Thurn and an armed band of nobility forced their way into the palace, where they proposed terms of very hard digestion to the viceroy, the prince of Lichtenstein; and the count particularly, at the end of his remonstrance, pointed with his right hand to the hilt of the sword, which hung by his side: but upon hearing the sudden trampling of horses, he and his followers supposed themselves to be betrayed, and betook themselves to flight. Wallstein then marched 5000 Moravians to join Bucquoy, the Im-

* He was cited to Vienna, it is thought, by the prince of Lichtenstein, then viceroy of Bohemia: and count Nogarofa, first colonel under him, used to declare, that he refunded ten thousand pounds on this occasion. *Arnoldi Vita Wallensteinii*, p. 31.

perial general; but they all deserted him upon being informed what measures their countrymen had taken at home in defence of their liberties. However, Walstein posted on to Vienna with the military chest: and upon this the Moravians seized the cardinal Ditrichstein, who was then amongst them, by way of pledge. Some authors likewise observe, that at the beginning of these civil discords and dissensions, he made his master an offer of levying a body of 30,000 men at his own expence, upon condition, that he was made a general*. This account can hardly be looked upon as true. Nevertheless, it is certain, that in 1621, he defeated a part of Gabriel Bethlem's cavalry in Moravia, and being accused a second time at court, restored himself into favour by the same means he practised before, and cultivated the good graces of count Harrach †, one of the Austrian prime-ministers and grand marechal of the court, with so much address, that he espoused his daughter with an immense fortune: which was nevertheless exceeded by her beauty, piety, and virtue. It was he alone, who made the peace of Lubec, thereby reconciling the emperor and king of Denmark: which great event, in case a Gustavus had not existed, might have erected the house of Austria into an universal monarchy: and, on this account, he was created duke of Fridland and Sagan, and received afterwards the investiture of the duchy of Mechlenburg. From this moment he rose apace in military command, and succeeded the marquis of Montenegro on his dismissal. What relates to him from that period, has, and will appear, in the course of this history, except only the affair of his assassination, which happened two years after the death of Gustavus.

It is remarkable of Walstein, that he rose upon no man's ruin; and as to treason, supposing there was any, most people imagine he cast himself down the precipice, merely because he discovered his destruction to be inevitable; and with regard to his first disgrace at Ratibon, it was partly owing to the private contrivances of cardinal Klesel, who, on being recalled from exile, concerned himself in no other political matter ‡.

Walstein,

* At that time the post of a field-general was very great: for the commander of one army had under him only a lieutenant-general, who was probably serjeant-major *di battaglia*, and general of artillery, and then came the colonels.

† Leonard Charles; who was also hereditary master of the horse for Lower Austria. *Court Calendar of Vienna*, 1632.

‡ This cardinal, as we have observed elsewhere, was bishop of Vienna, prime-minister, and favourite to the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias,

but

Walstein, though bred in courts, detested all court promises and compliments; often insisting, that rewards magnificently bestowed, and discipline, by which he meant punishments, severely kept up and observed, were the only machines requisite to keep an army in order and credit. It was a maxim also with him, that a commander in chief should never familiarize himself with his generals: and for this reason, without being an humorist in the present case, as some have represented him, but purely to keep his officers at something more than a respectful distance, he affected to eat alone, and professed a sort of natural antipathy to noise: in-somuch, that his generals and colonels, when they went to his levee, silenced the music of their spurs, large jingling rowels being then in use, by the application of a bit of silk twist, in order to pay court to their commander's singularity.

He loved to be obeyed in the meanest trifle: and having signified one day, that he preferred a plain red scarf to any other, an inferior officer, upon hearing the report, took off a very rich scarf, embroidered with gold, and trampled it that moment in the dirt. Walstein sent for him forthwith, and made him a colonel. Nevertheless, he had some severities and particularities, that bordered upon madness: for when any person made a noise, he used to cry, *Hang that brute*; and discarded an horse-officer for appearing in his presence-chamber without his boots.

He had a magnificence and generosity beyond whatever appeared in any subject. He sent Piccolomini £.1600. the day after the battle of Lutzen: and as Isolani, with his Croats, had harassed Gustavus extremely in his camp near Nuremberg, he made him a present of £.600. and a fine Spanish horse. When an officer had performed any remarkable service, it was customary for the commissary-general to give him an entertainment, and there was a sort of honorary wine allowed by the government, or the commander in chief, on the occasion. After this repast at count Michna's, for he was then commissary-general, cards and dice were produced, and Isolani lost all his money. Walstein heard of it, and sent him, whilst he continued in company, £.300. more; which so astonished the Croatian commander, that he vowed he would never gamble from that moment, and hastened directly to the general's tent to return his thanks.

At

but displaced by Ferdinand. He was recalled some years before his death; but declined all concern with state affairs, except in the instance here alluded to. Gregory XIV. passed an ample justification in his favour, which was one of the last acts he signed, having had his cause under deliberation four years. He died in 1630, aged 77.

At that instant advice came in, that a Swedish convoy was marching from Wurtzburg. Ifolani, without orders, for he knew Walfstein loved to be anticipated upon such occasions, leaped on his horse, which waited at the tent door, conducted a body of troops, that stood always in readiness, and beat the enemy.

When Peroni, the manager of his family, hired Battista Seni at Vienna to be his *astrologer extraordinary*, and agreed with him for a pension of seven pounds ten shillings a month, Walfstein told him, with a countenance of anger, that he was not to exercise his Florentine economy under his roof, and particularly towards men of letters. He then ordered Seni sixty pounds for the expence of his journey, which was only forty miles, allowed him ever afterwards a coach and six horses, and paid him his annual salary of three hundred and fifty pounds beforehand.

He maintained the subordination of discipline with religious exactness, and degraded more inferior officers than one for slight degrees of negligence; so that the higher sort found themselves obliged to study his looks as well as his words, for he affected taciturnity upon all occasions, except essential ones. He copied Scipio in rewards, and Hannibal in punishments: he loved spirit in a military man, even at a time when it was culpable to shew it, and released a Walloon captain, who chose rather to die by a manly resistance, than submit to bodily chastisement. The story in a few words was thus. This officer conducted the part of an escort which attended Walfstein, but riding to see something out of the high road, the general ordered a person superior in command to strike him; upon which the Walloon drew his sword, and attacked him and his servants. Walfstein then with a nod put a stop to all further proceedings; and as he discovered so high a spirit in the delinquent, not only forgave him, but made him a present of £.200.*

As to his religion, he had abjured *one*, and practised the *other*, as the catholics thought, very imperfectly: for he disliked many ceremonies in the popish church, and detested the jesuits above all men, constantly insinuating, that persecution ought ever to give place to civil prudence. He loved the splendor of a magnificent table, but restrained himself to strict moderation both in eating and drinking. With respect to the fair sex, he never indulged any unlawful amours: nor was *that* the fashion of military men in the age I am speaking of. Indeed the service was so sharp, and so uninterrupted, that there was no time for them, nor was it customary then for officers to spend the winter season luxuri-

* *Galeazzo Gualdo*, p. 43.

ously in their own metropolis. We read but of two commanders in the Imperial and Swedish service, who kept their paramours, and those were Holk and Coningsmarc; which latter durst not have done so, till many years after the death of Gustavus. Nor did two men ever more mistake themselves in the talents of gallantry; for Holk was disfigured with the loss of an eye, and Coningsmarc was ugly beyond description. Now it is plain their brother generals envied them not these sort of pleasures, but rather considered such intercourses as beneath the attention of an able and vigilant officer: for when Coningsmarc quarrelled with the *maréchal de Guébriant*, and separated his forces from him in a very abrupt and rude manner, the *maréchal* said aloud, at the head of his troops, "Let him go—I wish him and his whores a good journey—I want the assistance of no such heroes as himself;—but let him take his army of strumpets with him."

We find * in *Walstein* the same disapprobation on a like occasion. For when he was at Prague or Znaïm, one of his generals, supposed to be Holk, sent him a letter to request the favour of passing a few days with him; to whom *Walstein*, understanding that Holk's mistress bore him company, returned this short message; "That he and his lady would be pleased to point their course to his other palace at *Gedsin*; for as he was erecting a fine edifice there, and purposed to people the village adjoining, he thought that place in Bohemia the most proper for them, and most agreeable to their inclinations."

We may observe further with regard to *Walstein*, that he allowed no precedence of quality throughout the army, not even in princes; but ordered each officer to take his place according to the military rank and station then subsisting. He knew the value of good *intelligence*, and never spared his purse upon that head: insomuch that *Chiesa*, one of his favourite colonels, tells us, that he had observed him more than once appropriate a thousand pounds a month to such purposes: and hence it was, that he apprized the emperor minutely of Gustavus's invasion, when the Austrian and Spanish politicians had never once dreamt of such a visit. He loved an enemy, if he was a brave man; and on this account himself walked at *Pappenheim's* funeral procession.

* *Hist. du maréchal de Guébriant*, par Jean de Labreur, fol. Par. 1684. The same author wrote the curious *voyage* of Madam the *maréchale Guébriant*, ambassadress extraordinary and plenipotentiary into Poland, 4^o. Par. 1643.

That he had arrogance is not to be disputed; for he once declared, that he would scourge Gustavus out of Germany: nor was it uncommon for him to reject a colonel, who brought to him the Imperial recommendation in his pocket. When some sycophants, a set of men he mortally hated, attempted to ruin an officer, who had forgot to return him thanks for a commission lately bestowed, his answer was, That "the poor man is so overcome with gratitude, that he has not power to return his acknowledgments."

He was rather successful, than great or inventive in the art of war, and much better qualified to raise and sustain an army, in which talents he was admirable, than to conduct it scientifically in the day of battle. He fought upon the Low-Country principles, of ranging men in great square masses, but placed much confidence in the size and number of his field-artillery. His character, for personal courage, has been depreciated by some, because he sat in a horse-litter during the important decision at Lutzen; but it is probable a fit of the gout compelled him to appear in that situation. Some likewise have impeached him of cruelty, and alledge as a proof the courts-martial, which he held at Prague after the defeat above mentioned. But the generality of writers are inclined to conjecture, that the philtre which his first wife gave him, discomposed his intellects to a certain degree. However that may be, true it is, Gustavus always considered him as disturbed in his intellects: and this perhaps may account for his boasting to take Stralsund, "though it hung from heaven by an adamantine chain;" and for the extraordinary answer likewise, which he gave an officer, who told him, by mistake, that the king of Sweden had stormed an old castle* thought to be inaccessible, which made a part of his camp near Nuremberg; "Sir," said he, abruptly, "the Supreme Being cannot take that castle:" a profaneness of expression, which nothing would have allowed me to insert here, had it not been my purpose to suggest that Wallstein approached very near the verge of madness.

As he rarely spoke in company, but kept his attention fixed on other men's discourse, Sarrafin has given him the character of being at once *penetrating and impenetrable*; which is a pretty antithesis, but not founded on truth, in regard to Wallstein, who had the *pensieri stretti*, but not the *sciolti visi*. Gustavus, Oxenstiern, and Richelieu, were bold and open; Wallstein, Gondemar, and Mazarin, were reserved and shy; for they had not parts to be great! and when true greatness is

* Altenberg.

wanting,

wanting, then low cunning must shuffle and distribute the cards as well as it can.

To give the finishing hand to this digression: the Imperial general, after the death of Gustavus, grew so powerful, that the court of Vienna from that moment determined to put an end to his authority, or his existence; and after reflecting two years, decided at length in favour of an *assassination*, attended with circumstances so extraordinary, that it has been represented on public theatres in more countries than one*. To bring the story into a shorter compass, I must observe, as I have suggested before, that when Wallstein found his ruin unavoidable, he tried to secure himself by the fidelity of his soldiers, and made distant attempts, as some say, to feel the pulses of the Swedes and Saxons: for the emperor and his ministers had raised him *so high*, and were so much *obliged to him*, that they had no expedient remaining, as *politicians*, but to *kill him*. To enter into the whole point minutely would demand a distinct work; for no part of history is less known than the supposed defection and treason of Wallstein; since the accounts are so various, the repugnancies so manifest, and the methods of acting on his side so absurd and hazardous, that no man can pronounce any thing with the least degree of certainty on *that side* of the question, except, in case there was a real intention to rebel, any original writings are preserved in the archives of Vienna and Dresden. Such papers, after all my enquiries, I never could hear of. M. Baron de Firmian put Carve's † book into my hands as the only real assistance that could be given me; and I asked this favour of him with some earnestness, because my friend M. de Voltaire has declared, "that the conspiracy of Wallstein is received as

* There is an English tragedy on the subject. No plot, I know of, falls so well within the compass of the *three unities*, as the death of Wallstein.

† The title of this work is as follows: *Itinerarium R. D. THOMÆ CARVE, Tripperariensis, Sacellani majoris in fortissima juxta ac nobilissima legione Domini Colonelis D. Walteri DEVEROUX, sub sacra Cæsaria maiestate stipendia merentis; cum historia facti Butleri, Gordon, Lesly & aliorum. Impensis auctoris, Mogunt. 1639 and 1641. Tom. ii. 12°.*

This curious and very scarce book was first shown me at Vienna, and then given me, by Charles, baron de FIRMIAN, nephew to the late archbishop of Salzburg, aulic counsellor, &c. and Imperial minister now in Spain; to which excellent person, who, without flattery, may be pronounced one of the best historians in the empire, I acknowledge myself in this, and many other respects, to have singular obligations.—I saw another work of Carve's at Vienna, entitled, *Lyra, seu Anacephalosis Hibernica, in qua de origine, nomine, moribus gentis Hibernice tractatur; nec non annales Hibernia ab anno 1148 ad 1650. Viennæ, 4°. 1664, and Sultzbaci, 4°. 1666.*

an historical fact, and yet the world hath been long ignorant of what kind it was."

That Walstein was of a violent and overbearing temper is very certain. It is plain also, that he thought himself disrespected and ill used*, after the death of Gustavus; for then the house of Austria did not much want him. It seems probable likewise that he intended to continue generalissimo against his *master's will*, but it no where appears that he had thoughts of *injuring him*; for, could that have been proved, a legal decapitation would have been more decent, and full as effectual.

Carve cooks up a treaty in form between Walstein and the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg†; but the point is, how he came by it; for there is neither date, nor signature. We suppose therefore that what he has amassed together, was the common language of the court-party at that time.

As the report of Walstein's disgrace was whispered abroad more or less in every place, it may be true, that the major part of his officers sent a protest to him against his resignation; and Carve says that Leslie and three colonels carried it. In this paper it was declared, that they would justify his non-resignation at the expence of their lives and fortunes; and though such an action would have been criminal in another country, yet it must be remembered, that when Walstein accepted the post of generalissimo, he insisted, and the emperor agreed, that all the army should take an oath of fidelity and obedience to him. In confirmation of which there is a remarkable passage on the occasion in the emperor's letter to the army, dated Jan, 24, 1634:

"Having been informed, says he, that some of our principal commanders *gave into proposals and concessions somewhat farther than became them*, yet, as we easily perceive, that they were induced so to do by flattering promises, and a false conception of things, we of course graciously pardon them, as also every thing which *by chance* they may have done either against us or our authority; two persons only excepted, whom we shall examine and punish."

Who these two persons were, appears not from history. It is probable they were a couple of Walstein's friends in the cabinet or aulic council; for we find each military officer of note still continued in his employment.

* Amongst other things Walstein had asked the title of count for his friend colonel Illo, but was peremptorily refused.

† Any proof of this sort would have laid the foundation of a justifiable process in terms of law.

We will now endeavour to trace our story somewhat nearer its source: taking Carve's account to be in many respects the most authentic; for he was chaplain to Devoreux who killed Walftein. Nevertheless his whole narrative must be read with caution, for it was natural in him, from his *religion* as well as *private obligations*, to favour the house of Austria and her agents, and therefore it is that I have followed some historians that are less prejudiced than Carve; the whole of what they say amounting to this.

It being determined at Vienna, to make Walftein a sacrifice, care was taken to sound the inclinations of the generals. Galas and Piccolomini, both Italians, and officers of repute then serving under him, refused, the first gently, and the other peremptorily, to have any hand in so unsoldierlike an action; but the former, as I observed, expressed a sort of acquiescence, in case *other* persons might be found who would undertake the task; and of course withdrew from his general under various pretences.

It was now high time for the Imperial ministry to ruffle Walftein's temper, in order to force him into some acts of extravagance. Of course a snare was spread for him, and that not unartfully*; for the emperor commanded him, under pretence of favouring the hereditary dominions, as the power of the Swedes was considerably weakened, and as the elector of Saxony began to waver in his friendship towards them, to dispatch a small army against duke Bernard, near Passau, and appropriate 6000 chosen cavalry, to act under the cardinal infant in the Low-Countries; than which no scheme could be better calculated, either with a view to weaken Walftein's hands, or facilitate the assassination that was then projected. The Imperial general *now comprehended*, what before he *suspected only*; but, dissembling his more private thoughts, contented himself with exclaiming, that his abilities as a soldier were called in question; and that his poor troops would be harassed and starved; which affected the colonels that were with him, so deeply, especially such as were his friends and favourites, that they made him an offer, as we observed before, of *not* deserting him, under any affront or disgrace. This happened at Pilsen, Jan. 12, 1634.

Walftein then, for some secret reasons preferring Egra†, made a visit to it in the Christmas holidays; and as he

* *Brachetii Hist. nostr. Temp.* p. 309.

† *M. de Voltaire*, in his *Annals of the Empire*, tom. ii. says, Walftein resided at Egra; but he only slept there one night.

always confided more in foreigners than native Germans, ordered colonel James Butler, not him who behaved so well at Francfort upon the Oder, to attend him with an escort of horse and infantry, all Irish. John Gordon at that time commanded the garrison of Egra, an officer in whom Walstein placed no small confidence, as he had raised him from a private foot soldier *, and made him lieutenant-colonel of his brother's †, Tertzky's regiment; and in conjunction with Gordon, Leslie, who served in the capacity of watch-master general ‡, acted in the same regiment.

By this time Walstein began to feel great uneasiness; for Galas, who had engaged to bring Aldringer with him from Vienna, was not arrived; Piccolomini and Coloredo had both absented themselves upon various reasons or pretences; and therefore, before he left Pilsen he sent for Gordon and Leslie separately, in order to fix them more in his interests. Here it must be observed, that Leslie had received some private intelligence from Vienna, relating to the storm that then hung over Walstein's head: but kept the affair in his own breast §.

Leslie now being better instructed, and hoping to penetrate farther into the general's designs, received with no small satisfaction a message from Walstein, with an invitation to visit him at Pilsen; but, after having travelled nine miles, he met his general coming to Egra in his horse-litter according to custom; and escorted by colonel James Butler, with 50 horsemen and 200 infantry, all of Butler's Irish regiment of dragoons. Walstein saluted Leslie in the most cordial manner, and after a little private discourse sent him back to Egra to prepare things for his reception.

As Walstein travelled slowly and with no small solemnity, Leslie returned, and, bringing Gordon with him, conducted

* *Puffendorf*, p. 139.—Gordon, says Paganino Gaudentio, might have answered the proposals of the Imperial ministry more nobly, and more honestly, in the words of Grillon, colonel of the guards to Henry III. who, being requested to murder the duke of Guise, replied frankly, that he was a soldier of honour, and would never imbrue his hands in the blood of a person from whom he had received many signal benefits. *Le Singolarita delle Guerre di Germania*, 4^o. 1640.

“Gordon” (says Carve) “was *nobilissima prosapia oriundus*. He had many relations of his own name in the Imperial service: e.g. one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, one watch-master, &c.” *Itin.* tom. i. p. 56.

† Tertzky and Walstein married two daughters of count Harrach.

‡ M. de Voltaire calls him *Lacy*, which is a common French negligence in spelling proper names; and by mistake makes him captain of the guard to Walstein. (*Annales d'Empire*, tom. ii.)

§ *Itinerarium*, tom. i. p. 95.

their

their general to his lodgings; where being asked to stay, they conversed an hour or more with Walsstein, who then unbosomed himself, and complained with some acrimony of his ill-usage. In consequence thereof, Leslie, who seemed to answer for Gordon and Butler, told him, that all the world, and especially strangers, had partaken of his liberalities; that he had left his country to advance his fortunes; and that upon supposition his oath to the emperor was rendered void, he would serve a second master with like fidelity*. Meanwhile, Butler felt some surprize within himself at this discourse; and as they walked from the general's apartments to the castle, dropped some random hints in Walsstein's favour, for he suspected both his friends, as they were rigid protestants; to which Gordon replied with some emotion, and as being governor of the town, he was then the principal person amongst them; "You, gentlemen, may do as you please; but death itself shall never alienate me from my duty and affection to the emperor:" upon which, Butler produced a letter from Galas, wherein his Imperial majesty authorised all his officers to withdraw their *allegiance* † from Walsstein.

The conspirators having thus understood each other, determined to destroy their general without delay. It was first resolved to poison ‡, or send him and his associates prisoners to Vienna; but immediate death was then considered as a more effectual way of going to work§. Upon this, Gordon was pitched upon to give a public supper in the castle, it being then the festival days succeeding Christmas; and Butler was desired to bring Walsstein's four favourites, namely, the colonels Tertzky, Illo, Kinsky, and Nieman, which latter was the general's secretary. As the castle was a fortification within a fortification, no place could be more convenient for the perpetration of such an action; and Gordon took care, not only to fill it, more or less, with such soldiers as he could best confide in, but, after the close of the evening, conveyed secretly into the castle, by a postern gate, captain Walter Devoreux, and watch-master Robert Geraldine, at the head of fifteen men, selected for so desperate

* *Carve*, ut supra.

† This particular expression was made use of, because all the generals, officers, and soldiers, had taken an oath to Walsstein, by the emperor's orders, when he was invested the second time with the supreme command.

‡ *Carve*, tom. i. p. 103.

§ Mutarunt tunc paulo post id consilii, statueruntque jurati omnes morte plectere: ut totum malum simul tolleretur. *Ibid.* The same author owns afterwards, that Butler acknowledged to the garrison and his own regiment, that the fact was committed JUSSU CÆSARIS.

an enterprise*; whilst captain Edmond Burk, with an hundred soldiers, was ordered to keep the streets quiet. This had no suspicious appearance, for Walslein above all things hated noise. Burk at the same time had private instructions to crush any mutiny or insurrection in its infancy; in case the soldiers should resent the deaths either of their general, or colonel; for Tertzky's whole regiment of dragoons laid then in the town. Burk well knew what he was to do, but it is probable his soldiers did not: for if any one man had betrayed the conspiracy to Walslein, whose generosity, to say the least of it, was equal, if not superior to that of an emperor, the general himself might not only have escaped, but destroyed all the conspirators, and perhaps the house of Austria likewise. Burk, through a sort of soldierlike punctiliousness, right or wrong, kept his promise inviolable, as also the secret with which he was intrusted.

In the course of the desert, at about half an hour after ten, Gordon, or Leslie, proposed the health of the elector of Saxony; upon which, the better to conceal their intentions, Butler professed to be greatly surprized, and declared he would drink to no man's prosperity, who was an enemy to *Cæsar*. On a sudden the conversation grew loud and vehement, which being agreed upon as a signal to Devoreux and Geraldine, in an instant two doors opened on either side of the room, and Devoreux and Geraldine entered; the latter with a partisan in his hand, and the former with a sword, attended each by seven or eight soldiers, who had their swords drawn. *Long live Ferdinand the second!* cried Devoreux, *And long prosper the house of Austria!* replied Geraldine. Butler, Gordon, and Leslie, seized the candles, and held them aloft. The table then was overturned in a moment, whilst Illo had presence of mind to fly to his sword, which hung up against the wall; but in reaching it, was pierced through the body, and expired with it undrawn in his hand. Tertzky was equally brave, and more fortunate; for, seizing his sword, which hung up in the same manner, he planted himself in a corner, maintained the combat so long till he killed three of the assailants, the idea of his being invulnerable † greatly

* Walslein, as generalissimo, had issued out the watch-word of the night; but to carry on their purposes the better, the conspirators changed it with respect to their party.

† Some historians give Tertzky's resistance to Illo, and Illo's to Tertzky; but the character agrees best with Tertzky, who, on account of his presence of mind, and intrepidity, was reputed to be *geforn*. *Bertius de Bellis Germanis*, 4^o. 545. Having mentioned this popular error of the age more than once,

greatly dismaying them, and in the pauses of his defence, for he fought like an enraged lion, besought the soldiers, *to desist for a moment, and he would "undertake, hand to hand, Gordon and Leslie ;"* for Butler appeared to him to be honest ; "*after that, gentlemen, you are a great many in number, and have full power and liberty to kill me. But, Gordon, said he, looking sternly on him, "is this the way of giving your friends a supper ?*" Kintky resisted manfully, but unsuccessfully. Nieman made an effort to escape, but was seized in the attempt. He begged hard for his life, and desired to be considered in the character of an amanuensis, rather than a soldier ; but the conspirators had no ears for such distinctions. A duke of Lerida was mortally wounded by Tertzky in the conflict, whom we suppose to have been a young volunteer in the emperor's army †.

In an instant, Devoreux, to whom the honour of murdering Walstein had been allotted, to use Carve's words, having broken his sword in the late rencounter, snatched a partisan from one of the soldiers, and taking with him thirty fresh men, which had been concealed for that purpose, flew directly to the general's lodgings ; when, just as he entered the porch, a musquet, which belonged to one of his followers, happened to go off, but gave no alarm to the domestics within. Knocking abruptly at the outward door, the porter admitted him ; but knowing his master's delicacy in regard to noise, bid him take care what he did ; "*Friend, said Devoreux, this is a time for noise, and not for sleeping :*" and upon that, all his soldiers rushed in after him. He then hastened

once, it may not be unentertaining just to observe, how the invulnerability here spoken of was obtained ; and to what degree the incantation extended. The party, requiring to be *frozen*, procured a magician to mark his body with talismanical signatures ; and whenever any immediate danger was expected to approach, swallowed four paper pills, containing each an enchanted verse, of which the tutelary effects lasted six times the same number of hours. During that period, neither ball, nor sword, &c. entered the flesh ; and the contusions being touched by a penknife, and squeezed, healed themselves immediately.

Nor did the death of Tertzky disprove the belief of his being *gefrorn* ; for, said the wise maintainers of that doctrine, as he came to a *friendly* entertainment, he had no need to swallow a dose of paper labels by way of precaution.

M. de Voltaire, contrary to all history, tells us, that Walstein's friends were *strangled*. Ann. d'Emp. tom. ii.

* These two officers were protestants. *Ab orthodoxa dissentientes fide.* CARVE.

† *Merc. Fran.*

‡ Carve says, that amongst all these people who had an hand in Walstein's death, &c. and whom he calls *gloria socias*, there was no German nor Italian, and only one Spaniard ; whom we suppose to be the young duke here mentioned. How he happened to be one of the party, seems to be accounted for in the *Military Essay*.

up

up the staircase, and finding the door fastened, for Walfstein, who had heard the musquet, and the confusion below, had doubly bolted it, demanded where the gentleman of the bedchamber was, who kept the key? but that person not appearing, he knocked rudely at the door with great fury and noise*. Meanwhile, the report of what happened had reached the neighbouring apartments, where Tertzky's and Illo's wives were lodged, who made the streets resound with their shrieks and lamentations; and therefore whilst Devoreux remained in suspense at the chamber-door, Walfstein examined the windows in hopes to escape; but soon recollected the depth to be such, that it was impossible for him to save his life by an attempt of that nature. He then put his head twice out of the casement, and cried aloud, "Is no man my friend? Will no one assist me?" Upon which, Devoreux, growing impatient, knocked thrice, but received no answer. He then commanded his soldiers, who made five attempts without success, to burst the door; but applying himself to the task with them, and directing his strength just against the lock, he flung it into the room with great vehemence.

As Walfstein's gentleman of the bedchamber was retired, it is concluded that the general had composed himself to rest, and was alarmed by the noise. When the assassins broke in, he stood in his night-gown and shirt near a table; and, which is very remarkable, had neither sword nor pistols with him; which looks as if he was not conscious of any rebellion, or feared a design against his life. He trusted to human gratitude and promises, but in the event found them mere chimeras. The worst which he thought could befall him, was to be sent a state-prisoner to Vienna; for had he entertained any suspicions, he had Tertzky's favourite regiment of dragoons then in the town. On the contrary, he had not a sentinel at the door of his lodgings, though at all other times he used to mount a guard of an hundred men; nay, what is more, he had hardly a servant about his person. Thus he fulfilled the old Latin saying, *Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat*; or, as it is more elegantly expressed by a poet of our country;

For those whom Heaven for ruin hath design'd,
It fits for fate, and first destroys the mind.

DRYDEN.

When Devoreux broke into the chamber, he accosted him abruptly thus; *Are not you the betrayer of the emperor, and the*

* The author of the *Mercure François* says, that Butler attended below.

empire?

empire? To which no answer was returned. He then made him an offer of a few moments to say his prayers; but Walstein extended his arms in order to open his naked breast, and received Devoreux's partisan through his heart; having not spoken one word from first to last, and expiring with a groan which terrified all the accomplices that stood round. Ferdinand II. who was really his murderer, ordered 3000 masses to be said for his soul, and thus the tragedy ended.

The actors in it were rewarded as follows: Butler and Devoreux hastened immediately to Vienna. The emperor was at church. I suppose the service was just over; though Carve does not mention that circumstance. Upon seeing Butler, he cried out, *Deus conserve et benedicat dilectum nobis caput, Butlerum nostrum*. He then carried the two officers into his palace, and ordered the archbishop of Vienna, who had performed divine service that morning, to place a magnificent gold chain on Butler's neck, and add thereto his benediction. Next he gave him his medal, saying at the same time, "You shall wear this in memory of an emperor, whom you preserved from ruin, as well as all his family." He then created him a count; gave him the gold key of the bedchamber, and large confiscated demesnes in Bohemia*.—Another gold chain was bestowed on captain Devoreux; besides other ample rewards; which, to preserve a little, a very little decency, were kept secret†.

* We have spoken of this officer and his brother in the storming of Francfort upon the Oder, vol. i. and have observed there, that the king of Sweden, probably for just reasons, had a personal hatred to him. He enjoyed his countship, and the large confiscations made over to him, not above one year after Walstein's death: for Carve left Ireland in August 1634, as appears by the Apostolic vicar's testimonial, and having wandered over Poland, Bohemia, and great part of Germany, found our James Butler dead in the dutchy of Wirtemberg. Carve, by the way, was sent for from Ireland, to be made chaplain to Butler's regiment.

Butler bequeathed a part of his riches as follows: Those *pious* riches, says Carve, *quas requissimo Marte mascula sua manu acquiserat*. He left a memorial of 20 pounds value to Lumormain, the emperor's confessor; 3,300*l.* to the Irish and Scottish college at Prague; 500*l.* to be distributed to Irish students then resident there; 1000*l.* to his sister; and 150*l.* to Walter Devoreux, who killed Walstein. His widow, whom he left very rich, carried his body into Bohemia, being guarded by a troop of dragoons; and buried him there with great pomp. *Ilin. ut supra, tom. i. c. 7.*

† What appears from history is, that he was immediately made a lieutenant-colonel, and afterwards a colonel; he had also the gold key of the bedchamber given him. When he was created a colonel, he appointed Carve chaplain to his regiment; and hence it is supposed, that Carve knew more of Walstein's death than any other writer. I find Devoreux alive in 1638, by the testimonial he gave this chaplain when he returned to Ireland, and whom he had raised at last to be chaplain-general to all the English, Scottish, and Irish forces in the Imperial service. *Ilin. tom. ii. p. 354.*

To

To Leslie were given large estates in Hungary and Stiria; and Gordon had a good part of Tertzky's estate, which was a very great one. Each captain had two thousand pounds and upwards paid him down in ready money. The inferior officers and soldiers were rewarded in proportion.

An epitaph was handed about on the occasion, which has its merit. It was a French production, and came from the pen of Sarrafin, or father Joseph, the famous negotiator.

*Vitam privatam odit animus regius,
Magnanimus ardua molitur :
Ambitionis nec meta, nec regressus,
Aut percundum, aut regnandum :
Non judicanda eventu, quæ ratione acta sunt ;
ACTIONES SUNT VIRTUTIS, EVENTUS FORTUNÆ.
Justum erat ut Sceptrum regium quæreret,
Qui Casarem dedit.
Quod fecit, licet,
Quia fecit, ut regnaret.
Casarem cadentem crexit Walstein,
Cæsar erectus prosternit Walstein,
Qui in adversis socium habuit, in prosperis servum non sustinet :
Voluit perdere, quem non potuit remunerari :
Nimium meritum odium peperit :
Dum victoriam alteri parat,
Invidiam sibi struxit ;
Gloriam dedit Imperio, Imperium sibi ruinam.
Vitam, opes, amicos pro Cæsare toties exposuit :
Vitam, opes, amicos Cæsar semel abstulit :
Vita cessat, Fama durat.
Quis nescit tua virtute partum, auctum, firmatum Imperium ?
Nihil aliud injustum fecisti,
Nisi quod ingrato nimium fideliter serviebas.*

In short, Walstein was a composition of the great and little ; these two words decide his character. His naked body, and the bodies of his four colonels, were carried in a dung-cart through the principal streets of Egra with all manner of insults, and then thrown into a ditch*.

I may by this time perhaps obtain the reader's permission to return to his majesty at Francfort ; who, paying but slight regard to the severe beginning of winter, crossed the Maine the first day of December, and made himself master of several important places in the Palatinate, which the Spanish garri-

* *Continuatio Lauræ Austriacæ*, p. 36. fol.

sons cautiously evacuated, at the very rumour of his approach: so that in three days he conquered that romantic tract of mountains called the Bergstraß, extending, more or less, from Darmstadt to Heidelberg; which town, at that time, it was his purpose to besiege, and then restore the Lower Palatinate to its unhappy owner: the former intention he told Vane, and, I believe, without dissimulation*; yet his prudence would not allow him to leave Oppenheim, and its strong fortress † behind him; as the Spaniards were then masters of the river, and could pour forces upon him on either side. Therefore, all on a sudden he turned short, and directed his course to Oppenheim, betwixt which and him the Rhine was, as also the fortress above named, defended by a garrison of 1000 men, and protected by deep fosses, and good fortifications. The cannon in the town took effect cross the river, and raked the flanks of the assailants of the fort in more places than one; and as Hepburn and Monro were sitting together at supper, a ball of twenty-two pounds weight passed betwixt their shoulders, in the midst of their conversation, but hurt neither to a considerable degree, for its force, though sufficient to kill a man, was nearly spent. It is remarkable, that Gustavus would employ neither general nor engineer to take a survey either of the town or fort; the passage of the Rhine being of great consequence to him, but, on the contrary, examined every thing with his own eyes, and discharged, in his own person, the duty of a common corporal, or a peasant: yet the king made only a feint of crossing the Rhine at this place, having privately provided himself with boats at Gernsheim, a small town about five miles to the southwards. He was determined to perform this adventurous exploit at all hazards, by way of giving reputation to his troops, and spreading terror amongst his enemies; knowing likewise, that Tilly was too far off to obstruct his project in any shape; and wisely foreseeing, that on the completion of this event both Oppenheim and the fort must fall of course, as also the whole Lower Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz. The fort surrendered the next day, and Oppenheim, being first petarded, was taken sword in hand. Nine hundred Italian soldiers threw down their arms, and asked for quarter. As the *first* circumstance absolved them from their allegiance to the emperor, the king made a

* Spanheim, who wrote from the archives of the Palatine-court, always supposes Gustavus to be sincere, concerning the restitution of the elector to his patrimonial dominions. *Mem. de Louis Julianes*, 4^o. 306, &c.

† Stern-Sconce. N. B. Great part of this account was communicated to England by capt. Matham, who then served under Hepburn.

present

present of them to Hepburn, in order to refit his broken brigade; but these birds of passage, not liking the severity of a German winter, and Swedish campaign, all took their flight to a warmer region at the approach of spring.

His majesty then had the curiosity and ambition to cross the Rhine, first in a small wherry, in order to reconnoitre, in person, the shore opposite to him, being attended only by four persons*; but the Spanish sentries soon forced him to retire, and postpone his more general embarkation till the next morning. He then pushed over 300 men under the conduct of count Brahé, in one large boat, that the Spaniards had sunk, and which an honest fisherman, whom he rewarded very bountifully, had discovered to him; and some few minutes afterwards, transported the same number in another boat of equal size, all picked soldiers, draughted from the regiments of Ramsay, Spense, and lord Reay. This body of troops, being all infantry, with the king at their head, seized a hedge, which happened to run parallel to the banks of the river, and by the help of this natural intrenchment, defended themselves with amazing intrepidity, in spite of all the efforts of a thousand horse and dragoons. It is true, the king acknowledged more than once, that he found it a disagreeable piece of service, to oppose cavalry and musqueteers on horseback with half the number of infantry, and expressed some uneasiness to his officers upon that occasion: nevertheless, he pursued his point with astonishing firmness; nor had he lost once inch of ground, when a reinforcement arrived, which soon brought the affair to a decision. In consequence of this he commanded public prayers throughout his army†; and ordered a triumphal column to be erected, as a memorial of his crossing the Rhine. It was sixty feet high, raised on a square of rustic work, and crowned at top with a statue of the Swedish lion. Here, an ingenious Italian author, in his *Singularities of the Thirty Years Wars*‡, prefers Gustavus to all the Roman generals; since *the former*, says he, in the space of two campaigns, crossed the Elbe, the Oder, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Lech; whereas the *latter* never had power to pass over the two rivers first mentioned; nor could they penetrate into Pomerania, much less to the shores of the Baltic ocean.

Being now arrived in the Palatinate, the king, say some historians, told the elector very gallantly, That he considered himself as a man of chivalry, and despised the re-

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 203.

† *Heylmanni Leo Arctotus*, 4^o. p. 47. *Schefferi Memorab.* 99. 124.

‡ *Le Singularita della Guerre di Germania*, p. 177.

sentments of Austria and Spain, whilst he employed his troops in restoring an *injured princess*, meaning the *electress*, to her dominions, after a banishment of the same duration with the siege of Troy. Let historians assert what they please, it is more probable that Gustavus made this speech on some other occasion; for at the present period, there appears to us an anachronism therein; for that prince did not arrive till eight weeks afterwards, and paid his first visit to Gustavus, at Mentz, on the tenth of February, 1632. Indeed, honest Monro * clears up the whole difficulty; for he tells us, the king made this declaration to the English and Scots officers, the evening after he crossed the Rhine, in order to animate them with a fresh zeal for their countrywoman's, the queen of Bohemia's service.

Stockstadt and Worms being next taken, concerning the chronology of which I am not perfectly assured, as accounts differ, and Oppenheim, as the king predicted, and the fort, that belonged to it; his majesty then marched directly to Mentz, which he had blocked up, on the Francfort side, by the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel's army, and a little navy of boats stationed on the Rhine. Here Don Philip de Sylva, the Spanish general in those parts, having thrown the overplus of the country garrisons into Frankendale, placed himself at the head of 2000 select men, in behalf of the elector, Anselm Casimir, who, being a prince of foresight, had contrived, at that time, to make a visit to his brother, at Cologn. Gustavus lost many soldiers in the beginning of the siege, and the Spaniards made a shew of the old Castilian resistance. This town was invested in the midst of as severe a winter as had almost ever been known: the landgrave discharged his duty very briskly on the opposite shore, and some batteries, which the king contrived to erect on a platform of boats in the river, annoyed the besieged from a quarter, where they had no apprehensions of being molested; insomuch, that a general assault being once prepared, don Philip, in spite of his boast to fix the pillar of limits to Gustavus's progress, found himself on a sudden much puzzled, and surrendered upon terms not extremely honourable; for the troops obliged themselves to serve no more against the crown of Sweden. In truth, this governor perceived at first glance, that Gustavus had not served his apprenticeship in the Low-Country wars, the practice of which was the model of military perfection, in the Spanish and Austrian services; but that he had other resources, other inventions, and a quite different sort of con-

* Part ii. p. 93.

duct,

duct, both in sieges and battles. Of course, he repented now of the speech he had made the elector, who asked him, if 2000 soldiers were sufficient to defend the town against Gustavus? "Sir," said he, "by that timorous question I know you to be a churchman; I have men enough to repulse three kings of Sweden."

Next day*, which made the king complete thirty-seven years of age, his majesty entered the town in great pomp, and set apart the Friday ensuing for a general act of thanksgiving. As the severity of the cold was scarcely to be borne, he reposed his infantry, by turns, within the town-walls till the beginning of March; nor would he so much as hear of don Sylva's capitulation, till he had promised for himself and garrison to do no mischief, either at their departure, or before it. Thus Gustavus subdued the electorate of Mentz, and two thirds of the Lower Palatinate, at one stroke; which amazing rapidity of conquests, here and elsewhere, forced a very solid historian † to break out into the seeming raptures of a rhetorician; although it is certain, that he contained himself within the strict bounds of truth: "The king," says Nani, "turned his motions towards Upper Germany, where, making a tour of pleasure, rather than a campaign, he rendered himself master of all Franconia, and the adjacent countries: insomuch, that *Fame*, according to most men's judgments, required more time to publish his progress, than he employed in subduing provinces."

Great store of provisions was found in Mentz, besides 80 pieces of artillery, and 600 quintals of powder. The inhabitants paid about £.8000. by way of freeing themselves from military plunder; and the elector's fine library was bestowed, by the king, on chancellor Oxenstiern, who intended it as a present to the university of ‡, but it was lost unfortunately in crossing the Baltic§. His majesty treated the ecclesiastics with great lenity, but forced the *spirituality* of the Jews, as it was then called, to contribute near £.3000. towards defraying the expences of the siege. He incurred some danger by approaching too near the walls; for one of his pages was killed by a mulquet-ball, as he presented a let-

* Wednesday, December 14. Others make his birth-day the 9th.

† *Hist. della Repubblica Venetta*, libr. vii. 466.

‡ My account says Academiæ Arrhusiensis, yet still one is at a loss to know what university this could be; since, in the times of Gustavus, we recollect none in Sweden, except Upsal and Dorpt. There is a town, named in Latin *Arrēsa*, which corresponds with the adjective *Arrhusiensis*, and which the Swedes call *Westeröahs*, but no university is to be found there. *Mém. communicated*.

§ *Heylmanni Leo Arctōūs*, 4^o. p. 44.

ter into his hands; upon which De Pau, the Dutch minister, who then happened to be standing by, took the opportunity, to advise his majesty to be more careful of a life so valuable. *My lord ambassador*, said Gustavus, *towns are not taken by drawing diagrams in a private lodging; and if the school-master is absent, the children will be tempted to close their books: and besides, Sir, no king, hitherto, has ever been killed by a cannon-ball**. Colonel Axel Lily†, an officer of good repute, was let's fortunate. He came only to receive his master's commands, in some other parts of Germany, and as he was sitting at supper with Hepburn, and remarking to some friends, that he had no peculiar business in a place, which happened to be exposed to the fury of one of the town-batteries, a cannon-ball pierced the tent that instant, and carried away one of his knees: but the king made him amends, as far as he could, by heaping on him military employments to so considerable a value, that honest Monro‡ complains of Axel Lily's very singular good fortune, and that with an air of envy and peevishness.

The king then strengthened Mentz, in a manner equally expeditious and surprizing; for he drew lines round some hills that commanded the city, and having joined them to the old fortifications, rendered that space capable of containing an army of 20,000 men||. In the next place, he fixed two bridges over the two rivers. *That* across the Rhine, consisted of sixty-one arches, raised on huge flat-bottomed boats, and at the extremity of it he traced out and fortified another camp, large enough to contain 10,000 soldiers; and *that* which passed over the Main, rested on great piles, for a considerable space, at either end, and was then built upon fifteen large boats, in that point where the current ran extremely strong; and on the angle, formed by the confluence of the rivers, was erected a royal fort with six bulwarks, which commanded the navigation of either stream; and gave laws besides to the landgraviate of Darmstadt, and the countries adjoining§.

Here the king, for the first time, opened all the splendor of a magnificent court, which was rendered brilliant by the

* *Bertius de Bell. German.* 320.

† The author of the *Mercure François & De Prade* do him the honour to call him M. De Lisse.

‡ *Expeditions*, part ii. p. 95.

|| The famous engraver, Matthew Merian, about this time published an elevation, or what is called a bird's-eye view, of the town and bridge, as well as of the old and new fortifications.

§ *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 31. fol.

appearance of five sovereign German princes, who came to treat with him, or depended upon him for their well being : nor must we forget, that political business intermingled itself with courtly pomp ; for you might have beheld here, at the same period, twelve or thirteen foreign ministers and ambassadors ; not dispatched hither by way of compliment, but intrusted, each and all of them, with transactions of the utmost importance. Such, amongst others, were sir Robert Anstruther, who came to render an account of his negotiation at Vienna, and Vane, from England ; De Brezé, and De Charnacé, in behalf of France ; De Pau, and many more in the same character, whom we shall consider, more or less, in proportion to their business ; and lastly, arrived the queen of Sweden*, the Riks-chancellor Oxenstiern, and the king of Bohemia †.

Anstruther, who had been formerly resident at Copenhagen, and then ambassador to the diet of Ratisbon ‡, from whence he had passed on to Vienna, in order to solicit the restitution of the Palatinate, which, after the Swedes entered the empire, ought to have been redemanded by the English, sword in hand, had nothing to impart to Gustavus, but what provoked and raised his indignation ||. For this minister had been instructed, at Whitehall, to use the most tender, the most pacific, and the most humiliating expressions ; being commanded not to solicit an act of justice, but to request a favour from pure, free, gratuitous benignity. Indeed, his condescensions and applications were so mean and plaintive, that it is probable the emperor might have inclined an ear, and the rather as Gustavus began to be formidable to the house of Austria, if it had been in his power to have restored the Palatinate, *under certain restrictions*, to its antient possessor. Great Britain, by the tampering of fruitless negotiations, pacific interruptions, temporary compliances, and idle expedients, had played the game out of its hands ; and what the poet has remarked, on the mangled

* Jan. 10, 1632.

† Feb. 10, 1632.

‡ The diet of Ratisbon began in June, 1630, but on what day we cannot precisely ascertain, there being an error of calculation in the *Mercurie François*, (tom. xvi. pag. 233, &c.) Wednesday, June 29, being placed for Wednesday, June 19. Nor is it sure, whether the author computed by the new style, or the old : nevertheless, the diet certainly ended the 3d of Nov. O. S. next ensuing ; and then Anstruther removed to Vienna, and delivered the speech we here allude to, which is preserved at full length in the APPENDIX, Art. XV.

|| *Lotichius*, tom. i. p. 913, 914. *Memoires d'Eléonore Palatine*, p. 302.

body of Deiphobus, might be applied with greater justice, to the disfigured and dismembered Palatinate:

— *Laniatum corpore toto,
Deiphobum vidi, lacerum crudeliter ora;
Ora manusque ambas, populataque tempora raptis
Auribus, & truncos inhonesto vulnere nares;
Vix adeo agnovi pavitantem, & dira tegentem
Supplicia.*— Virg. *Æneid.* lib. vi. l. 494.

Not to mention how the dominions of the lawful owner had been doled out in lesser parcels, the infants of Spain laid claim to the Lower Palatinate; and the electors of Bavaria, and Mentz, possessed the higher. So that Anstruther found just that reception, which a weak man merits, who undertakes to discharge a foolish commission.

The next person, who made his appearance on this public theatre, was the marquis De Brezé, ambassador extraordinary from the French king; concerning whom it may be worth while to remark, that he was more a man of good fortune, than a negotiator; for he had the advantage to marry Richelieu's sister, and commanded the king's own regiment of guards; being, likewise, a councillor of state, marechal de camp in the French armies, and governor of Saumur. The occasion of his embassy into Germany, where De Charliacé then was, arose from a deputation the catholic princes of the empire had sent to Louis XIII. to recommend to him the cause of their religion; and implore him not to favour the protestant interests, which were then become too predominant. Of course, it was urged by the prelate, who undertook the employment, with whom co-operated all the secret enemies of Richelieu, and the several ministers dispatched to Vienna by the catholic princes*, that Gustavus had determined to extirpate the Romish religion, from its very lowermost roots; that he entertained a private correspondence with all protestants, in the various parts of Europe; that he had an eye indirectly to France and Italy, as well as to the territories of Bavaria, the catholic electors, and the house of Austria. Wherefore else did he omit, for a season, to undertake his principal enemy, the emperor, in his hereditary dominions, and transfer the seat of action to the Upper Rhine?

Insinuations of this sort startled a mind inclined to bigotry; and of course Louis gave some indications of being

* *Bernard, Hist. de Louis XIII. liv. xv.*

alarmed: but Richelieu soon raised him, at least for a short space, beyond a state of fluctuation and timidity, and assured the German bishop, that the king his master had the best intentions imaginable towards the catholic religion; and that he, the cardinal, should constantly support and cherish them with indefatigable zeal. On the other hand, he took care to inform him, from the plentitude of his own power and knowledge, that the king of Sweden had no object in view, but the house of Austria; from whence the princes of the league might detach themselves, in case they maintained an *exact neutrality*: but if, on the contrary, they supplied the emperor, tacitly or clandestinely, with men and money, allowing likewise to his troops quarters and passage, it was then natural for a man of spirit, like Gustavus, to molest and attack his adversaries. Nevertheless, far from being difficult, added he, it is easy too, not only to support the Romish religion, but give it the predominance also in the empire, and that independently of the enormous power of Ferdinand, which increases itself day by day: so that catholics and protestants are all alike interested to repress the boundless ambition of the house of Austria*.

Upon this, the bishop of Wurtzburg, whom Louis received so very graciously as to allow him to be *covered*, returned to his constituents, silenced at least, but neither satisfied, nor convinced; and they, for their parts, still continued to cast a wishful eye towards the interposition of France, which threw out allurements for them without number; whilst Gustavus, who then had no misgiving with regard to *that* power, appeared, as was really the truth, to suspect nothing. Therefore, upon the same views they dispatched at or near this time, the bishop of Osnaburg to the infantia of Brussels; but as this prelate, who understood heraldry better than church affairs, or political matters, valued himself greatly on his birth and station, it was his misfortune to visit a court which then happened to be *genealogically* mad; so that the Spaniards, instead of giving him the compellation of *highness*, which he expected, considered him rather as a poor suppliant. He therefore returned unsuccessful, and as thoroughly displeased as the Polish ambassador, whom we lately mentioned on the same occasion.

France, after the bishop of Wurtzburg retired into Germany, had many reasons, beside *such* as her own historians chuse to mention, for interfering, more or less, with the affairs of the empire, and the progress of Gus-

* *Le Vasser*, tom. vii. p. 75.

tavus. It was one thing to see the emperor *humbled*, and quite another thing to see him *destroyed*. Some check given to the house of Austria appeared highly desirable; and the unbounded rapidity of a certain protestant prince's conquests seemed to portend a second and more formidable house of Austria. But the passage of the Rhine, of which France was *jealous* beyond description, was considered a symptom, that menaced her very dissolution; and upon that event, even Richelieu grew alarmed, and conceived not only a disinclination to the Swedish cause, but a mortal jealousy against the king himself. Of course, means were to be found, and such was Gustavus's temper, that it was absolutely necessary to keep these means a secret, whereby to divert, or check the successes of our northern hero;—to withdraw the elector of Bavaria from his attachments to the Imperial interests, and make him a precarious and dependent being on the court of Versailles; and, lastly, to admit, as lying nearer to her, the three ecclesiastical electors under the wings of her all-healing influence; ever bearing in memory, how dexterously she had swallowed the *delicious* morsel of three adjacent bishoprics*, on a like occasion, in the preceding century.

Of course, the cardinal, in order to divert the conquests of Gustavus, always insinuated an opinion tinged with some wrong advice, whenever an opening presented itself; and the better to check the rapidity of his progresses, he took care to pay the stipulated *subsidy* at great distances of time, and in small proportions.

To these delays, occasioned by jealousy, other circumstances helped to contribute; for the elector of Bavaria, at certain times, considered the house of Austria as overpowerful; and of course he, as well as his catholic electoral brethren, looked upon France, in case of extreme danger, as a sort of protection against the emperor. Allurements were thrown out to them, in abundance, by the French minister; and no dexterity of private negotiation was once omitted. At length a private treaty was concluded† between the Courts of Versailles and Munich, about the time Gustavus alarmed the empire by storming sword in hand the strong and important town of Francfort on the Oder.

As the transaction hitherto has hardly been taken notice of in history, that a secret negotiation had been carried on, previous to this treaty, more than a year and a half,

* Metz, Toule, and Verdun.

† Signed at Munich, by the elector, May 8, 1631. APPEND. ART. XXII. and by Louis XIII. May 30, 1631, at Fontainebleau.

betwixt Louis XIII. and Maximilian of Bavaria; conducted on the side of France, who appears to be the projector, by cardinal Bagni,* a friend and confidant of Richelieu; and managed, in behalf of the electoral interests, by one Joëcher, who was considered by his master, not only as a well-read *jus-publicist*, but as an artful statesman. This private intercourse had lasted from the middle of October, 1629, till the end of December, the same year. So that Richelieu played a deep game in the empire before Gustavus landed in Pomerania; and it is remarkable, that Joëcher afterwards signed the very treaty of 1631, which we are now considering. As this politician was a principal manager in the publication of the *Anhaltine Cancellaria* taken by the Austrians in the battle of Prague †, whereby much injury was done to the elector Palatine, king of Bohemia. Ruldorf, who was that prince's minister both in England and the empire, took the liberty, by way of reprisal, to exhibit to the public the original letters, and preliminary agreements, that passed between Bagni and Joëcher, and made the *Cancellaria Bavaria* ‡ not only a counterpart to the *Cancellaria Anhaltina*, but a sort of supplement to the *Vindiciæ Palatinæ*: which work may be considered as a masterpiece in point of method, beautiful Latinity, and a clear arrangement of facts and arguments.

Thus matters stood till the beginning of May, 1631; when Maximilian, the most politic prince in Germany, found himself upon the point of being reduced to a situation, that required all his parts and address. On one hand Gustavus was approaching to the southward; and on the other hand, he, Maximilian, was to make friends at Paris and Vienna, and, if possible, overreach them *both*. He had

* To this illustrious politician, Gabriel Naudé pretends to address his famous work, entitled, *Considerations politiques sur les Coups d'Etat*; though, in truth, he composed it at the request of M. d'Emery, superintendent of the finances, Bagni being dead at the time this treatise was published: which, except a few printed copies distributed to private friends, made its first appearance in Holland, 1667, and has since arrived to the 12th edition, if not further.

† In the Library at Munich is preserved a military and political journal of all extraordinary transactions, from the first beginning of the thirty years' wars, till the period here mentioned; written by the prince of Anhalt, a general of high repute in the army of the union, and considered, till this moment, by the Bavarians, a valuable MS. as indeed it is. There is no question but it was taken in the defeat on the *white mountain*, near Prague, 1620.

‡ Added, by way of appendix, to the *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ*, fol. 1640, *sine loco*.

engaged

engaged too deeply with the emperor, to retreat openly; nor did he care to lose *that delicious morsel*, the Upper Palatinate: yet, at the same time, he saw himself on the edge of a precipice, and that only France, in case of a very probable accident, the invasion of Bavaria, could support him from falling. This treaty, between Louis and Maximilian, was of the defensive nature only, and determinable at the end of eight years: their reciprocal engagements were, not to succour their respective enemies in any manner; but, on the contrary, to furnish troops to each other, in proportion as the hereditary or acquired dominions of either party, should happen to be attacked*. Nani indeed tell us, and Puffendorf† confirms the account, that France engaged to fix the Imperial diadem, in case of a vacancy, on the head of Maximilian; but this does not appear upon the face of the treaty itself, and of course must have been contained in some separate article mutually ratified and interchanged as a distinct convention; which is not unlikely, from the following words: *Quandoquidem ex urgentissimis causis necessarium est, ut hæc amicitia & defensio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Baviaræ conclusa, nulli pateat, sed secretissima maneant, &c.*—Nevertheless, the whole agreement either way was diametrically contrary to what had been stipulated between his Christian majesty and Gustavus at the treaty of Berewalt. And this was the private mystery, that induced France to persuade the king of Sweden to sign a *neutrality of fourteen days* some time afterwards with the elector of Bavaria, and the other heads of the catholic league; a breach of faith, which Gustavus resented extremely, though just then he did not comprehend the intricate motives upon which De Brezé's negotiation was founded.

All these artifices could not however overcome the bold good sense and honest policy of Gustavus, since Bavaria reaped no fruits from the abovementioned treaty: for, when the crisis came, *she* durst not dismember herself from the house of Austria; inasmuch as France talked two languages, in proportion as the danger was remote, or as it approached nearer; notwithstanding Maximilian had engaged to supply 3000 foot, and 1000 horse, or the equivalent expence in ready money, in case France was attacked in her hereditary do-

* See the original treaty in the APPENDIX, Art. XXII.

† *Dissert. sur les alliances entre la France & la Suède*, 12°. 1709. This, which I take to be one of Puffendorf's best performances, is as just a satire upon the interfering and intermeddling temper of France, as can be perused: it was written originally in Latin.

miaions, or in her conquered ones : and Louis had artticed to support Maximilian in his electoral dignity, against all invaders ; and maintain him, not only in his original possessions, but in his *new* conquests ; furnishing a contingent of 9000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. Hence it happened, that when Kutner the Bavarian envoy, upon the nearer approach of the Swedes, made a requisition of the troops which France had stipulated to produce, Richelieu, who knew how to distinguish as well as Maximilian, for they were both schoolmen in the art of politica, pronounced with a firm and decisive air,—That the convention, betwixt France and Bavaria, was *purely defensive*, and regarded only the house of Austria, and not the crown of Sweden : for as Tilly, added he, detaches troops from the army of the league, against the elector of Saxony, without the consent or privacy of *my* master ; of course, his most Christian majesty is not obliged to extricate the prince you serve from the perplexities and embarrassment into which his imprudence has plunged him.

Upon the whole, it seems astonishing to many, that the cardinal should have allowed his master to have concluded with Bavaria, upon any terms, an agreement so directly opposite to the interests of his great ally the king of Sweden, and so destructive of the Palatine's pretensions, which Gustavus was determined to support, upon the principles of a man of honour, and a Christian : and, indeed, in general it may suffice to say, that the whole tribe of French historians seems to chew upon this treaty, in order to swallow it, as if it was something of a very unpalatable taste. But Richelieu * wanted, at all hazards, having first secured the

* The life of this statesman has been so often written, that I shall only subjoin a short note concerning him, which may contain some few things, that are not to be found in every history.

This man's birth, and education, promised nothing ; but he had the secret of introducing himself into favour, even against the inclination of the prince that raised him. He had the power of tears, equal to Cromwell ; and preferred war, merely because men had not then time to scrutinize his actions, and form cabals against him. It may be said of him, that he saved and united France, supported Italy, checked and betrayed Sweden, plunged Germany and England into confusion, and weakened Spain ; being an instrument of Providence, says a discerning and acute Italian, Battista Nani, allowed to exist for the glory of his own country, and the ruin of Europe in general.

He is supposed, by many, in his early days, to have written a satire against the constable Des Luynes ; drawing a parallel between him and the constable De Luna, a Spaniard : which his enemies afterwards took care to reprint, *mutatis mutandis*, and applied to himself ; but the true author of this invective was Le Sieur Chaintreau.

He

the duke of Bavaria, to preclude the emperor from the power of sending troops to disturb the siege of Moyenvic; and desired likewise, but with all due dissimulation and secrecy, to counterwork Gustavus, and clog the rapidity of his conquests; for the passage of the Rhine, if God had pleased to prolong his Swedish majesty's life, must have broken all the schemes of that minister, who never foresaw that matters could proceed so far; and must likewise have checked and humbled France to *such* a degree, that we might have felt the good effects of it to this very moment.

De Brezé proposed in general, with great appearance of friendship, an amicable accommodation with the duke of Bavaria, and the other princes of the catholic league, under the form of *neutrality*; which was to subsist according to the duration agreed upon: but the answer made him was, that indisputable proof could be produced of the insincerity of these persons; who, in truth, intended nothing but to protract time; collect their forces; and procure fresh and more advantageous terms from the court of Vienna. The French minister, still continuing to urge this grand scheme of a preliminary pacification *, ventured at length to assure Gustavus, that in case he and his friends thought fit to accept the terms proposed, and might happen afterwards to be assaulted by the troops of the house of Austria, or the catholic league, then his master should pay the subsidies stipulated at Bercwald, in such manner and proportions, as the king and French ambassadors should, at the present conjuncture, agree on; upon condition his Swedish majesty, at the same time engaged to support France by retaliation of hostilities against the emperor and his associates, upon supposition they directed their arms to the prejudice of the former †.

He is believed, by many, to have left behind him a *civil and military plan*, which France follows, more or less, to this hour. When he had gained Alsatia, he was heard to say, that he had extended the French dominions, as far to the eastward, as could be supposed maintainable; and protected them with a fine natural fossé, called the Rhine; foretelling, at the same time, that the armies of his nation could rarely prosper in the empire; which effects might arise from the coldness of the country, and the difficulty of retreating; from the change of white bread to black, and light pleasant wines, for wretched small-beer. The English army suffered in a similar manner under the marquis of Hamilton, and perished of the same malady, which their ancestors underwent at the battle of Cressli, but with less glory; for the disaster sprung not from such local causes as we have already assigned, but from an immoderate affection for *new bony*.

* *Chemnit. tom. ii. p. 227.*

† *Ibid. tom. ii. p. 227.*

Gustavus

Gustavus soon perceived some fallacy, but could not precisely unravel it. He foresaw, in general, the result of the three artifices above mentioned; and had some apprehensions from the politic Isabella, who was making great preparations towards some expedition in the Low Countries. His own uncommon good sense reminded him too, that the terms proposed were over advantageous, on the protestant side, to be deemed real; yet, out of pure politeness to the French king, and in order to convince Europe of his pacific and generous intentions, he sketched out to De Brezé a *slight plan** of what he proposed; namely, That the Imperialists, and princes of the league should invade no country which has not been hitherto the seat of war; and that he would resign into the hands of the duke of Bavaria such places as he had conquered in the Lower Palatinate, till an amicable adjustment could be settled between that prince and the king of Bohemia; and that he would restore to the elector of Triers all the towns he had made himself master of in his dominions, excepting Spire. But then, continued he, I must exclude the bishop of Bamberg from all participation of these concessions; for that prelate has amused me dishonourably, and deceived me basely. He then subjoined, with respect to the houses of Austria and Bavaria, that not only the hereditary dominions of Sweden, but the provinces acquired by the Swedes in the German war, must be alike comprehended in every subsequent and general system of pacification; as also each degree and branch of interest that could be supposed to bear a reference to his good ally, the elector of Saxony—That all usurpations made upon the protestants in Lower Saxony, from the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles in 1618, should be restored back to them, with full reparation of losses, and discharge of arrears—That the emperor and princes of the catholic league should give a discharge to all soldiers that had been forced from their native territories; and give up eleven or twelve thousand prisoners which were at present artfully incorporated, in small parcels, among their troops—That no temptations should be made use of, to allure them back into the Imperial service—That the king's conquests should remain in his own hands, till a final decision could be agreed on—That communication and free commerce should be opened between all countries then

* As this memorable fragment is not preserved in the *east collections of treaties*, we have spoken of it more at large than had otherwise appeared to be necessary.

engaged

engaged in hostilities; and prisoners dismissed on either side without ransom*.

In addition to all which, the king had the wonderful consideration; as well as quickness of thought, to make terms in express words for the unfortunate administrator of Magdeburg, who was then a prisoner: but that prince had so little trust in his protector, and such unsettled notions of the protestant religion, that he destroyed Gustavus's generous efforts in his behalf, by making himself a convert, at, or near this period, to the church of Rome †.

France was made arbitress of this general pacification, and avenger of frauds on either side. Whilst the king reasoned upon a substantial, and universal peace, the Bavarian minister presented him a paper, in his master's hand-writing, which related only to a *neutrality* for himself and associates, as a sort of preliminary; drawn up and worded in such a manner, as required a resignation of all conquered countries on the part of Gustavus, to be voided, *ipso facto*, upon

* *Chemnit.* tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

I have seen a second account of this plan, which, though equally spirited and sensible, differs from the present in many respects. If the reader please, it shall be laid before him in my own words, selected from another part of my history, in the first MS. draught of it.

As no attempts and efforts were spared, from various quarters, to induce the king to give a general peace to the emperor and the catholic leaguers, it is reported, though I do not presume to recite this paragraph upon indisputable authority, that Gustavus delivered to De Brezé and the German ministers a rough sketch of the following particulars.

“That the Imperial edict, touching the restitution of the *Bona Ecclesiastica*, should be retracted. That persecution should be abolished, and free exercise of religion granted to all men. That Bohemia, and the annexed provinces, should be advanced to their pristine situation, and the banished protestants reinstated in their antient possessions. That the elector Palatine should be restored to his patrimony and dignities, and that the duke of Bavaria should make restitution of the electoral title. That the town of Augsburg should be permitted to return to its former liberty, and manner of government. That the jesuits, as public incendiaries, and enemies to the repose of mankind, should be banished the empire, and their possessions transferred to the religious of other orders. That the monasteries forcibly seized, in the duchy of Wirtemberg, should be reassigned to the disposition of the prince. That the members of the cathedral church should be half papists, and half protestants. And, lastly, that his Majesty of Sweden should be chosen king of the Romans, by way of acknowledgment for the cares and dangers he had passed through, in procuring peace and liberty to the empire.” The reader may find a third copy of this plan in the *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. p. 62. It consists of fifteen articles, and has the appearance of being genuine. In truth, all the copies seem to be modifications of the same general design, drawn up at different times, and retouched in various places. *Soldat. Sued.* p. 375, &c.

† *Chemnit.* tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

signing

signing the articles. This put the king out of all temper, and matters hung in suspense for about a fortnight: which produced to the emperor and duke of Bavaria a part of those advantages they proposed to reap, by creating momentary intervals from business, and imperceptible delays.

During this short pause of negotiation with respect to Bavaria more particularly, other persons made their appearance on this political theatre; but before we enter into an exact detail of their several important and interesting transactions, it may be worth while to observe, that at this time the most renowned of all statesmen, the high-chancellor Oxenstiern, came to Mentz to receive his master's orders, and bear a part with him in the fatigues of business. This great man, whom, on account of his wisdom and sagacity, one supposes to be aged, was but eleven years older than Gustavus. He had the advantage to be descended from one of the best families in Sweden; but greater still was the advantage when I inform the reader, that he was a minister of the king's own finding out, and of his own forming. He was, at one and the same time, both statesman and general; in which latter capacity he chiefly acted, after his sovereign had entered Germany; for he conducted a small separate army in Polish Prussia. When political and civil matters began to multiply on the king's hands, as well as military operations, he was commanded to reside at Erfurt, in the old Roman capacity of *regulus ab exercitu*, to which place he conducted the queen of Sweden at the head of his troops; and then afterwards appeared at Mentz, not having seen his royal master during the space of ten months and upwards. It cannot be said, that the king absolutely wanted this great man's advice, by way of instruction, which will appear from what shall be related in their first interview; yet still he had uncommon occasions for his assistance, having more political business to execute than any single person could well perform; and purposing likewise, which was something more, to negotiate only a few days at Mentz and Francfort, and then shew the Germans, for the first time, what mighty things might be brought about in a winter's campaign.

Instead of drawing Oxenstiern's character, which, according to custom, I shall leave the reader to combine from various parts of the present history, it may suffice to observe, that the French themselves, even to this day, give him the preference to Richelieu; and, as to other nations, they have never supposed him to have had any rival in political reputation. This, indeed, is saying the whole that can be said, in a single period: nevertheless, it may not be disagreeable

to relate some things concerning him, which are not common, and some things likewise, which appear to me entirely new.

After the king's death, it may justly be said, that Oxenstierna had half the affairs of Europe upon his hands, till the conclusion of the peace at Munster, which made a period of sixteen years duration. He induced the protestant princes of Upper Germany to subscribe to the treaty of Heilbrun in 1633, conformably to a plan his master had sketched out a few months before his death; and this was the grand foundation of an union, which subsisted, more or less, till the conclusion of the wars. In 1635, he held a conference with Richelieu at Compeigne*. These great men knew each other too well, and of course agreed in a moment; for the cardinal trembled at the thoughts of attempting to overreach a statesman, whom he found endued with talents far superior to his own; and moreover, they had each of them in the main the same parts to act, the same inclinations, and the same interests.

His answer to the Polish ambassadors, at the treaty of Stumbsdorf†, shewed great good breeding, presence of mind, and a turn for severity. The high-chancellor of Poland, at his first entrance into the chamber, where a triangular table was placed in order to avoid precedence in sitting, began thus: *Ut a nobis incipiat humanitas, precamur vobis, domini Sveci, BONUM diem*; to whom Oxenstierna replied with great liveliness, *Et nos, ut non simus ingrati, precamur vobis idem BONUM mentem!*

It was his private opinion, that Sweden ought to have no farther concerns with France in the course of the war, than in receiving good pensions from her: and when affairs were reduced to the lowest ebb after the fatal defeat of Nordlingen, he still kept firm to this doctrine, but artfully concealed it; well foreseeing that France would prescribe him laws, and wrest Alsatia out of his hands by little and little, whenever she joined the Swedes with a large military force. Nevertheless, the reformed council that acted with him, nine of the twelve being native Germans, soon allowed themselves to be dazzled with the gratuities and promises which Richelieu the French minister scattered plentifully among them; and thus our statesman was at length compelled to resign Philipsburg to

* From that time he always took pleasure to tell the French, that the dried salmon of the Baltic, recommended by a well-tasted poivrade, greatly excelled the *superb bisques*, which he had the honour to partake of at the cardinal's table.

† Anno 1635.

the

the house of Bourbon, which he did with inconceivable reluctance, and after a thousand delays of his own creating. He then sent his son*, or nephew†, I am not certain which, into England, to solicit succours: but as he had no letters of credence from her Swedish majesty, the court of London affected not to comprehend how Oxenstiern could *create* ambassadors. The sagacious prime-minister soon perceived this demur to be a mere evasion, and recalled his delegate without giving his mistress Christina the least trouble.

When he sent his son, a young man of great hope; in conjunction with Salvius, to the treaty of Munster, this new negotiator was much dismayed upon considering his want of age and experience, and startled likewise at the gravity of the Spanish plenipotentiaries on the one hand, and the quickness and penetration of the French ministers on the other hand. He therefore petitioned his father by letter, either to recall him, or send him some aged and able director, to which the chancellor replied only in a few words, having briefly touched upon other matters; *Mi Fili, parvo mundus regitur intellectu* ‡.

Here I will just venture to relate another traditional Swedish anecdote. The chancellor had a strong inclination to marry this son, who, by his picture, was not handsome, to queen Christina; but she, who was an original in every sort of caprice, happened to be prepossessed in favour of another nobleman, whose name was Todt; whether son, or not, of the general who served under her father Gustavus, I cannot say. Be that as it will, this private inclination of her's touched old Oxenstiern to the very heart, and of course he took care upon all occasions to traverse her inclinations, disturb her repose, and perplex her affairs in such a manner, that at length he paved the way *remotely* to her future abdication §.

To return to the transactions in Germany: the king received Oxenstiern with great marks of affection and esteem, and having sent his own coach and equipage to meet him, passed whole days with him in the cabiner. This minister, in his journey from Prussia, had held a conference with Arnheim, which, one may venture to pronounce, was managed with uncommon dexterity and ability on either side; for the former was renowned for *artifice*, and the latter, on

* His son was named John, † and his nephew, Bernard. There was also a Gabriel Oxenstiern employed as a minister.

‡ *Memoirs* communicated to the author.

§ *Ibid.*

account of his *solidity*, was supposed to have no superior, except his master.

When Oxenstiern arrived at Mentz, there happened an extraordinary trial of political skill; for the *subject* had a secret inclination to gain and keep the *ascendancy* in point of genius over his *sovereign*. This was an example of *human vanity* which may be pardoned; but one thing must be observed, incidentally, to the advantage of Gustavus; namely, that the minister had weighed the difficulty proposed, and turned it, and stated it to himself in every light for three months successively; whereas the king appears to be attacked altogether by surprise, and yet returned an unpremeditated answer with a force of reason irresistible.

To understand this curious piece of history better, it may not be amiss to advertise the reader, that it appeared an *error* to most generals and politicians in those days, that Gustavus; immediately after the battle of Leipzig, should point his course to the banks of the Rhine, and not have marched directly into the hereditary dominions of the house of Austria, and so on to the metropolis. It was the same fault, alleged they, which Hannibal committed after the battle of Cannæ *. The great Oxenstiern was of this opinion †; for the moment the king allowed him to converse in private, *Sire*, said he, *I should have been much better pleased to have paid my duty to you at Vienna, than at Mentz ‡*. His majesty, who pierced into the drift of this speech with a single glance, told the chancellor coolly, notwithstanding his natural haughtiness of temper, for he knew the person he spoke to had parts enough to judge of things, and receive conviction: *That for his own part he had weighed matters with great exactness, and that only superficial appearances appeared against him*. I know my men, continued he, in the elector of Saxony, and Arnheim his generalissimo: the one is irresolute, and does not love me; the other is insincere, and mortally hates me. They may do very well to keep the protestant spirit alive in Bohemia and the incorporated provinces, where all that I can expect from them, is, that they should produce a sort of revolution, which may serve to administer force against the Imperial troops, till Providence allows me to give a second and more decisive stroke in some signal engagement. But change the scene; suppose the elector on the banks of the Rhine, and I in Austria or Bohemia. The whole state of the question is then entirely

* *Vittoria Siri*; *Memoire Recondite*. Tom. vii. 350—52.

† In the same sentiment is the ingenious author of the *Histoire politique du Siècle*, à Londr. 4°. 1757.

‡ *Le Vassor*, tom. vii.

altered;

altered; for there is not a protestant prince in all the district where the elector of Saxony now commands; so that, in case of any infidelity, he can engage no one power to follow his example. Here he would be in the very centre of all the princes and states who entered into the confederacy at Leipsic: and he and Arnheim, who leads him blindfolded, and is a better jesuit than a soldier, are both timid enough to submit meekly if they are defeated; and self-interested enough to sell me and my cause, in exchange for some good acquisition, in case the enemy should obtain any eminent success.* In either part of which alternative, the princes of the union would naturally copy the conduct of the first protestant power in Germany; and upon this elector's defection, I, being in Bohemia, Moravia, or Austria, how is a retreat to be conducted from thence to the Baltic, the only resource that would be left me, with Walsstein in my rear, and Arnheim in my front?—No, Sir, in the game Gustavus is to play, he must be AMONG the protestant princes himself, and must be the FIRST man among them too.

Oxenstiern, struck with conviction, stood for some moments astonished, and never afterwards made the least reply: for though he had revolved this subject in his mind from September till December, yet he plainly saw, that Gustavus was not only a better warrior, but a greater politician than himself; since a momentary decision, in a critical point like this, is greatly superior to a long series of negotiations, where there are frequent opportunities of revising and retouching, and where things in their own fluctuating nature often help out themselves. It was this circumstance, probably, that made Nani break forth into the following political rapture, *Stando le sue virtu consolidate et unite, non si poteva discernere se alla militare peritia o alla civile attribuerfi dovesse la palma* *. Upon a like occasion, the most sensible, candid, and correct Caraffa expresses himself as follows; *Parem Gustavo Suecia nullum, reliquis orbis paucos dabit* †

The next person who made his appearance, was, the baron de Sclavata, in behalf of the elector Palatine, to make that prince's compliments to Gustavus on account of his extraordinary successes, and solicit some provisional agreement, with reference to the reconquering of the Lower Palatinate. Him the king received with uncommon testimonies of humanity and courtesy, and ordered Hor-

* *Hist. Ven.* lib. ix.

† *Caraffa Coment. de Germ. Sacra Restaurata*, 12°. Col. Agrip. 1639, p. 479.

neck,

neck, one of his colonels, to return with him to the Hague, where Frederic then was, instructed in what manner to settle several preliminary difficulties, and commanded to request the elector to hasten to the Swedish camp with all possible expedition: *for, said the king, I am determined to restore that unfortunate prince to his possessions and dignities: but let me beseech him first to make sure of England, who must advance some money, as well as discharge some old arrears**.

This step gave the most lively terrors to the duke of Bavaria, and induced him, probably, to forget his convention with France, and adhere to the emperor without reserve; and the rather, as his new acquisition, the Upper Palatinate, appeared to be intended for the first sacrifice; and as Gustavus treated his adversary with all that respect and ceremony, that could be supposed due to a king of Bohemia.

The duke of Neuburg attempted next to obtain a neutrality, building much on the interest of his brother Augustus, who served under the king, and had the good fortune to be a favourite: but as this prince had permitted the Imperial army to retreat through his dominions, Augustus knew Gustavus too well to venture to apply. The duke thought him insincere, being conscious he had injured him in fulfilling his father's will, and therefore petitioned humbly to appear in person; but the king denied him†.

The deputies of the elector of Triers‡ were treated in their turn with a higher degree of just resentment, for this prince had maintained avowed hostilities against Sweden. Some of his troops had taken the castle of Moltzberg by surprise, and others had killed young count Solmes and all his companions. The elector accompanied the negotiation of his deputies with a letter to the king, conceived in terms of haughtiness and indifference, alluding likewise to certain promises, which some persons had made to a nameless power. Upon which Gustavus gave Stock, chief of the deputation, and one of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber to the elector, the following answer unpremeditated; *That his master's letter was a sort of petition presented to him sword in hand: that he knew well enough what was meant by insinuations of promises and engagements; and that understanding his own business without a tutor, and what France had a right to expect from him, and what she had not, he should fulfil his inclinations in the*

* *Le Soldat Suedois.*

† *Ibid.* 354.

‡ *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, part ii. p. 20.

‡ Philip Christopher de Sottern. He was also bishop of Spire.

manner he thought best, and bring some visitants into the electorate who would expect good cheer and warm lodgings.*

He then granted certain conditions of neutrality to Ferdinand elector of Cologne, brother to the duke of Bavaria; the terms whereof were extremely rigid, but as things then stood, it was thought expedient to admit them; for the protestants were to enjoy free exercise of religion and commerce; no supplies were to be allowed the emperor, and the catholic league; the diocese was to be open to the troops of Sweden; and agents on the king's part were to reside in the metropolis, in order to see all the articles justly performed.

At other intervals from more important business care was taken to cultivate all subordinate collateral interests; for by this time the states of Lower Saxony, and the Hanse Towns, in consequence of the conclusions agreed upon at Leipzig, had determined to raise 12,000 men under the conduct of George duke of Lunenburg; and the rather as they had some reason to hope, though that hope was built only on outward appearances, that a good understanding had been established between the kings of Denmark and Sweden.

Now whoever considers attentively all these various transactions of politics, great in their consequences, various in their nature, extensive in their operations, and referring likewise not only to that incoherent mass of interests the Germanic body, but to France and England, and all the powerful states in Europe, will, I may venture to say, find it difficult to convince themselves, that the whole of this vast work was fully examined, and effectually adjusted within the compass of a *single fortnight*, and something more. Nor was the king even then unmindful of military matters, nor did he consume the holidays of Christmas in riotings and festivals; but, on the contrary, repaired the fortifications of Mentz, issued orders for raising new regiments, and kept the face of a campaign in the parts round him under his own inspection; whilst the good discipline, the temperance, the decent and religious deportment of his soldiers charmed not only the catholics in general, but even the jesuits, who made panegyrics upon them in the pulpit: but whether through gratitude or necessity is more than I shall take upon me to determine.

The king next made himself master of the castle of Königsstein near Francfort, which, after a fortress of the same name in Saxony, Hohentweil in Suabia, and Harman-

* F. Spanheim, 358. *Historical or Authentic Relation*, tom. ii.

stein * in the electorate of Triers, seems to me to have been as strongly situated by nature, as it is possible to imagine. No sooner had his majesty entered Koeningstein, but a representation was made to him by the counts of Stolberg, that the electors of Mentz in 1581 † had usurped this strong place from them, and that it was a part of their lawful patrimony: upon which, without any remonstrance, excuse, delay, or explanation, he restored it to them, reserving to himself nothing more than all the artillery and stores of war. Pappenheim and colonel Cronenberg had made this fortress their favourite magazine, where they reposed their military acquisitions; which said plunder, as it belonged to *brave men*, the king bestowed generously on the *most courageous persons* he could discover among his officers and soldiers; and thus made a fine compliment both to enemies and friends. Indeed, it is highly probable, that his regard for Pappenheim was so great, that if he had not dexterously hit upon this expedient, he would have contrived means to have restored his effects to him by some uncommon kind of warlike gallantry.

Nor had the landgrave of Hesse been idle during the preceding summer and autumn; for having cleared his own country of Imperialists, he made irruptions into Westphalia, and the abbacy of Fulda. As he joined the Swedes with 12,000 men, and did good service at the siege of Mentz, his majesty purposed to make use of his troops in order to raise the siege of Nuremberg; but finding the alarm false, after a march of three days, allowed him to return to the protection of his own dominions, and extend his little conquests near home.

As to Tilly, we left him passing along in full march by the town of Oxenfurt ‡, whilst Gustavus Horn, with an army of 8000 men, attended his motions in the bishopric of Bamberg, and kept alive only a defensive war. Upon this, Tilly, general of the league, invested Nuremberg; but as the king had thrown 3000 troops into the town, with a good governor, and a considerable number of experienced engineers, so that the garrison, in conjunction with the burghers and neighbouring peasants, made 10,000 effective soldiers, he soon found himself obliged to desist from his enterprises, having lost Schlavata, a colonel of Croates in one attack, and upwards of 500 private men. Soon after-

* It is called by the Germans Ehrenbreitstein.

† Geographie Universelle de *Hübner*, tom. v. 435.

‡ November 6.

wards one of his magazines blew up at Schwabach*, containing twelve hundred quintals of powder, upon which he said, with a deep sigh, "That fortune at length had thought fit to desert him." Dividing his army therefore not unskilfully into two parts, if retreating towards Bavaria may be called an act of true judgment, he commanded Cratz and Aldringer to observe the motions of Horn near Bamberg and the Upper Palatinate: and retired himself to Nordlingen, having first had an interview with his electoral master, in order to guard the dukedom of Bavaria from all invasions on the part of Gustavus, who, as he supposed, intended to make his irruption on the Wirtemberg side, because he had many well-wishers in that territory, and abundance of sincere assistants. Meanwhile the subtle elector of Bavaria convened a diet of catholic leaguers at Ingolstadt†; and having concerted measures with De Charnacé, St. Etienne, De Lisle, and other French ministers and agents then at Munich, formed the project of obtaining, by means of France, a short *armistice* from Gustavus, and in the interim dispatched his chancellor to Vienna in order to conclude a fresh bargain there, by which he might be enabled to desert France the moment he could acquire all the advantages which she had the power of procuring for him.

As to Lower Saxony and Westphalia, the dukes of Mecklenburg and general Todt invested Wismar, where colonel Graham made several furious sallies, but at length surrendered upon condition, that a month's space should be allowed him to consult Tieffenbach on the occasion. After Graham had evacuated the place, Todt found him guilty of breach of articles in various instances, and being so fortunate as to overtake him on his journey, gave his troops a total overthrow, and detained him prisoner till he could receive his majesty's orders. Graham, the Imperial colonel, offered £.2000. for his ransom, but could not obtain it. Todt then joined the archbishop of Bremen, who brought him a reinforcement of five incomplete regiments, which made, in the whole, it is probable, about 2000 men.

As to Banier's operations in these parts, we have spoken already under the article of the marquis of Hamilton's campaign: but when Pappenheim perceived that Lunenberg and Todt had joined the Swedish general, he,

* There is a type in printing, called the Schwabach character, there being in this town formerly a famous foundery for casting letters.

† December 12, 1631.

made several forced marches, in which part of military conduct he had no equal, and with great dexterity escaped from them.

The Saxons found but slight resistance in Bohemia, and if Arnheim had acted the sincere and honest part, he ought to have marched directly into Moravia, which the king advised him to do by letter, where he might have disturbed and ruined all Wallstein's new recruits, cantoned in that duchy. Wallstein, on the other hand, thinned the Saxon army, by offering all deserters double pay, and the same rank they possessed among their friends. Tieffenbach spared no pains to levy soldiers in Hungary, but there was no money to put them in motion; and without that previous *viaticum*, neither man nor horse could find the use of their limbs. Upon this account a national diet was convened, but the states declared they could produce neither soldiers nor ducats, fearing the incursions of the Turks on the one hand, and the warlike preparations of Ragotzki on the other hand; insisting also on the privilege of not being obliged to defend their sovereign out of the limits of their country; and adding moreover, which shewed they spared no pains to find excuses, "That there had always been a good understanding between the crowns of Hungary and Sweden." Nor was this unlikely, considering the sea and a thousand miles of *terra firma* were spread between them.

Wallstein, to the infinite mortification of the house of Austria, quartered all his troops in the hereditary dominions, excepting only a circle of twelve miles round Vienna. Merodé was then dispatched into the Low Countries to levy 5000 cuirassiers, and Dhona made a journey into Poland in quest of the Cossacks. A second attempt too was levelled against the virtue of the elector of Saxony; and as his kinsman Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, who had served the emperor both in Poland and Italy, was thought to be the most proper solicitor that could be found, he was authorised, say various authors*, to resign his employ upon some pretended disgust, and undertake this negotiation in the best manner he could. Arnheim durst not venture to set his master to sale upon so abrupt an application: and indeed the affairs of Sweden at that time were too prosperous to allow the general and minister, for Arnheim united both

* We speak this with certain precautions, because Francis Albert's character, with reference to the death of Gustavus, demands to be considered with uncommon impartiality, as well as exactness.

these characters in his own person, to embark in a measure so extremely hazardous.

We now come to the conclusion of the year 1631, which, from the feast of St. John Baptist, the day Gustavus landed, to the eve of the new year, may be considered as a period the most fruitful in events of any campaign that is to be found in modern history. The king in six months space had traversed from Stralsund and the mouth of the Elbe to the Upper Rhine, or in effect was master of Germany from the shore of the Baltic ocean almost to the lake of Constance; which in truth made an extent of country not much inferior to the whole kingdom of France. To recite the circumstantial progress of his conquests would carry with it more the appearance of a tedious elaborate index than of an instructive or amusing history; for it would exceed the catalogue of ships in Homer; and who has Homer's secret of making such a minute detail agreeable? since the king in his own person, not including the transactions of his generals in other places, had conquered all the principal cities and fortresses in Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony and Mecklenburg; subdued, more or less, the four circles of Franconia, Suabia, and the two Rhines; chased the elector of Mentz out of his country; reduced the whole Lower Palatinate, and proposed to open the ensuing campaign, which was to commence on new year's day, by an irruption into Bavaria. Louis XIII. as well as the elector of Bavaria, stood both thunderstruck at the rapidity of these conquests; and Italy too began to tremble at the astonishing progress of this new Alaric, as the pope said, who was ready to set his foot upon the staircase of the Alps. Yet whatever the merits of the cause might be, an humane and compassionate writer cannot but lament the miseries and sufferings of mankind, as well as the effusion of blood upon this occasion; since it is highly probable, if we comprehend the havock made by pestilence, famine, and other accidents, that near half a million of people were supposed to lose their lives in Germany only, in the course of this single year 1631.

The new year had hardly began a few minutes, when duke Bernard surprized the important town of Manheim with extraordinary address: for ordering 500 horsemen to approach the city gates at midnight in full gallop, they pretended to be Imperialists, who had been broken to pieces in an engagement with the Swedes, and that their enemies in the very instant were pressing at their heels. The gate was immediately opened on such a representation, and the Swedes entering pell-mell made a dreadful slaughter among the Spaniards. Yet the garrison soon recovered their terror,
and

and made no contemptible resistance; but in the interim, duke Bernard scaled the walls, and poured in a fresh supply of assailants on all sides. Maravalla the governor was taken prisoner, and having paid his ransom, returned to his superiors with all the punctuality of a good Castilian; nevertheless his head was publicly struck off at Heidelberg; and indeed there was something truly pitiable in his case, for an inferior officer had opened the town gate without his knowledge.

Frankendal and Heidelberg were then slightly blockaded; and as to Spire, perceiving with what alacrity the Swedes conquered towns, it prudently thought fit to enter into an accommodation some few days before Manheim was surprized.

During this tumult of business, his majesty could neither digest nor forget the needles and petulant interference of the duke of Lorraine, who had marched a considerable army to Tilly's assistance. He therefore dispatched a letter *, the substance of which, together with the answer the duke returned to it, may prove perhaps no ways unentertaining to the more curious part of my readers. He there tells Charles, whom he calls his *kinsman and thrice dear friend*, *That he omitted writing to him, whilst he marched in armour at the head of his Lorrainers, for fear such a politeness might be misconstrued into timidity: but as he was now reposing himself in his own dominions, he thought it but reasonable to suggest to him, that being a prince independent, and unfettered with connexions and obligations, it seemed to him extremely strange, that he should carry hostilities into a climate hardly known to him, and embroil himself in quarrels, that did not concern him, merely out of enthusiastic gullantry and gaiety of spirits, without any motives deducible either from religion, or other valuable considerations:—subjoining, at the same time, that it was impossible for him to be ignorant of the justice of the Swedish cause, and of the atrocious violence of the enemy; of the tender humanity, moderation and liberty of conscience he had shewn the catholics; and of the extraordinary concessions he had made the chieftains of the league, with a view to establish peace and Christian benevolence through the empire; and that he desired, as he now approached the frontiers of Lorraine, the favour of being made acquainted with his present and ulterior determinations; and that explicitly, without any reserve, subterfuge and exception, since a categorical answer of this nature would determine the next step he proposed to take †.*

* Riccius de Bellis German. 345, 346.

† This letter bears date from Mentz, December 29, 1631.

Charles, who was squeezed, if one may so say, into a dilemma between Sweden and France, considered this proposal as a providential deliverance, and replied in a transport of joy—

That he was charmed with the honour of receiving a letter from so illustrious and great a king, beseeching him to assure himself, that though appearances were against him, and he might justly seem to merit some reproof for presuming to enter into the lists of combat with so renowned a warrior; yet all this proceeded from the laudable ambition of desiring to emulate his majesty's valour, and that he never once conceived an unkind or ungenerous thought concerning him; and consequently hoped he should incur no blame for attempting to assist the unfortunate and distressed, since that very principle made one distinguishing point of view in his majesty's character. That, for his own part, he thought it neither safe nor honest to refuse to satisfy the emperor's requests, and give activity to the treaties that had long subsisted between the courts of Vienna and Nanci, especially when solemnly called upon to fulfil his own engagements, and those of his family: and that, besides all this, he had been well informed from indisputable authority, that some steps had been taken in the assembly at Leipzig, prejudicial to his honour, and the tranquillity of his subjects. For these reasons, as the war admitted of no alternative, he thought it baseness to postpone, and generosity to begin it:—nevertheless, he embraced the offer of his majesty's friendship with all possible gratitude and respect, and so much the rather, as the progress of the Swedish arms portended no destruction to the catholic religion. Of course he should refuse no proposal, provided it was compatible, as he well foresaw it would be, with the justice and reputation of a prince, whom he respected beyond expression, and who had done him the honour to acknowledge him for a relation*.

This letter wanted neither sagacity, politeness, address, nor dissimulation. Gustavus was politician enough to take it in part of sufficient payment, and the rather, as France requested him so to do: for which the reason shall be assigned immediately. This procedure was highly gracious in Gustavus, for his army breathed such a spirit of revenge against the duke of Lorrain's troops, on account of the incredible ravages and outrages they had committed in

* Nanci, Jan. 21, 1632. *Mercuré François*, tom. xviii. 144—5.

Germany,

Germany, that some regiments quartered near Worms, who expected orders for making an irruption every moment, had procured colours, where a man was represented cloven in two with the stroke of an axe, and a body of soldiers, with lighted torches in their hands, marching against the word LORRAIN, which was written in large letters opposite to them *.

The real reason of Charles's complaisance was owing purely to the treaty of Vic†, which he had signed with France just one and twenty days before he answered the king's letter. By this agreement, several articles were crammed down his throat of very difficult digestion; for he was to renounce the interests of the emperor, Spain, and the catholic league ‡, and make no future treaty without the consent of France; who, on the other hand, obliged herself to assist him upon condition only, that his dominions were attacked; and took care to insert a clause, that free passage should be granted to the French army, whenever it was thought expedient to march troops into Germany.

About this time the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt renewed his solicitations for the public tranquillity, being in truth a secret pensioner to the court of Vienna, and the king had condescension enough to write to the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg on the subject, as also to the magistrates of Lubec, that being the principal of the Hanse towns, and to several princes and states: well knowing at the same time, that it was only wasting a little ink and paper for the sake of decorum; since from the beginning to the end he amused himself by styling the landgrave *pacificator general of the holy Roman empire*, and calling his money, which he laid down at cards and dice not very willingly, by no other name than *Targent d'appointement*; alluding thereby to his private communication with the house of Austria §.

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* Spanheim's *Soklat Suedoia*, p. 370.

† Voyez le *Recueil des Traitez de confederation & d'alliance entre la couronne de France & les princes et etats étrangers depuis l'an MDCLXXI. jusqu'à présent MDCLXXII.* Sine loco. 12°.

‡ This was contained in a secret article, signed six days afterwards.

§ To understand the secret history of the landgrave's conduct better, who had lately married a young daughter of the elector of Saxony, we must look more nearly into the transactions of that age; and then we shall find, that the elector Palatine, about the time of the battle of Prague, had conveyed two signories to this prince by way of securing them to his own use; but when Frederic grew unfortunate, the landgrave claimed them as his own proper possessions, and upon this, Mansfelt invaded his country, and detained him a prisoner; but procuring his liberty in a few days, and perceiving the house of Austria to be all-powerful, he obtained a grant from the emperor,

An event of a more serious nature now presented itself; for his majesty was informed from authority worth listening to, that half a dozen jesuits at Augsbourg had bound themselves by solemn oaths and execrations to assassinate him: and what confirmed men in belief of this horrid conspiracy was, that a Flemish priest had been found near his bed-chamber, late in the evening, with a poniard in his bosom. Gustavus replied only to the remonstrances and representations of his friends, by assuring them, *That a king, circumstanced and employed as he was, must not lock himself up in a box:—that wicked men could not always effect what they wished to perform:—that Providence was more to be relied upon than regiments of guards:—that God knew how far and how long he should be pleased to employ him, and in the event would raise up others more able and more active than himself; for the Supreme Being,* continued he, *would never make his work depend on one breath, or one person* *. This was the substance of all his answers upon similar occasions; so that when his ministers and generals pressed him one day in particular to look more watchfully round him, and place proper guards about his person, he replied abruptly, and somewhat peevishly, *that they took great pains to teach him to distrust in God* †.

Gustavus in his private hours of reflection, was not thoroughly pleased with Richelieu's duplicity in reference to the late treaty agreed upon between France and Bavaria; and perceiving plainly that the cardinal, and the cardinal's director, father Joseph, had formed a scheme of reducing him to a piece of French mechanism, signified to Louis XIII. that he desired a *private conference* with him concerning matters of the most extraordinary importance, and of course dispatched Horn to Metz upon that errand.—Louis, naturally timid, and endued with very moderate parts, trembled at the thoughts of managing an important conference with a king, who talked several languages with uncommon energy and propriety, and whose superior genius rendered him absolutely a master both in the field and cabinet. Upon this the marquis de Brezé, now returned for fresh instructions, as he had not been able to effect any general pacification to the advantage of France, was dispatched a second time ambassador to Mentz with a pompous equipage, attended by numbers of the young French nobility. Gustavus entertained

peror, not only of these two districts, but of several lands in Veteravia, which belonged to the counts of Solms, Isenberg and Lovenstein, who all served under Frederic. Secretary Fowler's Life of Sir G. Douglas, fol. 223.

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 374, &c.

† *Le Vasser*, tom. vii. 192.

entertained him and his attendants most magnificently. Excuses then for declining the interview proposed were made in abundance, and all grounded upon the French king's infirm and delicate state of health: But, Sire, said the marquis, approach but a little towards Lorrain, and cardinal Richelieu shall meet you at the place appointed. *Monsieur l'ambassadeur*, replied his majesty, with a tone of decision, *all kings are equal: my predecessors have never given place to the kings of France. If your master thinks fit to dispatch the CARDINAL half way, I will send some of MY PEOPLE to treat with him**. Nevertheless, it was the French maxim at that time to talk to Gustavus in a very high style, which, considering his spirit and temper, shewed want of address and common good sense in that political nation: for de Charnacé, the other ambassador, on some like occasion, namely, on demanding the armistice†, gave him one day, in order to check the rapidity of his conquests towards Alsatia, a full detail of the immense number, as the world then computed, of his master's troops. "Sir," said Gustavus, "*I own your king has abundance of soldiers; but indulge me only in one day's march before him, and I will give him the meeting at Paris; and save him the trouble of conducting an army by long journeys into Germany‡*". It was then objected, that his majesty had violated his engagements with France in crossing the Rhine, a point of great uneasiness to the French nation beyond all dispute: to which he replied likewise with an air of coldness, *That the most Christian king had given him an equal disgust in delaying to pay the Swedish stipend. A French army and mine, continued he, can never compose the disorders of Germany. Leave then to me the correction in the empire of all that is amiss; and if the king your master be in good earnest, let him turn his arms against Spain, and make a diversion in favour of the general cause§*. Upon this the cardinal and the capuchin || began to consider Gustavus not only as the greatest conqueror in the world, but as a person superior to all common efforts of political artifice; and their king on his part fearing a second interview might be proposed, retired from Metz to Paris with the precipitation of a monarch who had been defeated in battle. Yet willing to effect something of the low kind, rather than miscarry totally, and concluding little expedients, the baffled statesman's momentary cordials, to be better than nothings; De Brezé at length, being dis-

* *Le Vassor*, tom. vii. 102.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. 61.

‡ *Le Vassor*, tom. vii. p. 103. *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. 61, 62.

§ *Idem. ibid.* part ii. 61, 62.

|| Father Joseph.

appointed

appointed in his grand scheme of an universal peace, or at least, a general truce, contrived in the last resource, conjointly with the several ministers of the princes of the league, to extort from the king a sort of *armistice* * for fourteen days, which Gustavus granted, partly to avoid being taxed, and partly with a view of exhibiting to the public some manifest proof of his pacific inclinations: in both which points he justified his good temper and benevolence at the expence of his victories. *For Pappenheim either knew not of the truce, or never regarded it; the infanta Isabella found an opportunity to march her troops to the assistance of the league; the duke of Bavaria gained time to circumvent Gustavus and Louis too, by driving a fresh conclusive bargain at Vienna; and France found means, during this interval, to give new laws to Lorrain, and adopt the elector of Triers under her own protection;—* A long catalogue of advantages all gained in a **FORTNIGHT** from the king's generosity and magnificence of temper! advantages fruitful of dark and mischievous events; contrived by artifice, executed with insincerity, and extorted from a brave and benevolent prince, who regarded duplicity so much the less, as he had parts and spirit to make his enemies repay him for such ungenerous conduct with a double proportion of interest! Nevertheless, a statesman or general, blessed with but one half of Gustavus's abilities, must have been destroyed by such a combination of falsehood, as well as total violation of all public good faith.

In order to bring about this mighty project of an armistice, De Charnacé received instructions to leave Munich, and act in concert at Mentz with De Brezé: but some few days before he quitted the former place, he made an attempt (being then as false to Bavaria as he proved the next fortnight to Sweden) to persuade Maximilian, that he, of all princes, ought to permit Gustavus to extend his conquests as far as possible; since, in case the house of Austria should be ruined, the Imperial diadem would be transferred of course from the family of Vienna to that of Bavaria. He then played the rhetorician upon Walstein's (the elector's mortal enemy) being raised to the supreme command; but Maximilian was too old a politician to allow himself to be over-reached by French eloquence; nor could he bear the thoughts of relinquishing that delicious acquisition the Upper Palatinate. He therefore kept firm at all hazards to the Imperial cause, as did also his brotlier, the elector of Cologne.

* For the original of this treaty see the **APPENDIX**, Art. XXV. As likewise the subscription of the French ambassadors, *ibid.* Art. XXVI. *First Edition*, 4^o.

No sooner had De Charnacé arrived at Mentz, but he began to ruffle the king's temper with those unaccountable sallies of vivacity which seem natural to Frenchmen, and to say truth, this minister was invested with a double portion of them; since at the very time he was to solicit a favour, and that of no common nature, he could not help throwing out some lively invectives on the presumption of the Swedes for taking the liberty to cross the Rhine. The king, who had been tired above measure with these insolent impertinencies, and felt himself exasperated to the quick at France's assuming the perpetual pre-eminence, gave him to understand very concisely once for all *, *That if his Christian majesty was offended, he could not help it; and that whoever forced him back, must take the pains to effect that work sword in hand.*—*That he was geographer enough to know his way to Paris as well as Vienna, and that his soldiers would relish Champaign and Burgundy, as well as Rhenish or Moselle.* Therefore, for these reasons, he humbly conceived a king of France would not affect to imitate that power, who alone can say, HITHERTO SHALT THOU GO, AND NO FURTHER. He well knew France to be not so formidable as she then affected to appear. Her army at most amounted to little more than 50,000 soldiers: nor did the revenues exceed forty-five millions of livres. Commerce was regarded with a careless eye, and the police greatly neglected.

The two French ambassadors, being thus humbled into a sort of real or pretended modesty, implored the king at all events to grant an armistice for a single fortnight, which Gustavus allowed with great reluctance, much against his own private judgment, merely to prevent importunity. For, sir, said he to De Brezé, *the princes of the league are insincere. I have made them offers more than once of living with them on a friendly footing, provided only, that they contributed a moderate sum towards the subsistence of my soldiers; but instead of accepting these terms upon principles of honour and honesty, they have created both delays and obstructions, which fully convince me, that they want only to amuse me and gain time.* Witness the deliberations and resolutions lately taken at Landshut and Ingoldstadt: whence it appears, that the bishop of Wurtzburg and the Bavarian ministers talked one thing at Metz, and that their constituents perform quite another thing in Germany. Read these letters, sir, and then suppose yourself to be better instructed.

What the substance of these intercepted letters was, appears not from Le Vassor, whom I am copying, but one †,

* *Monro's Expedition*, part ii. 100.

† *Chebnitz*, tom. i. p. 228.

if

if I remember right, was addressed from the duke of Bavaria to Pappenheim, wherein he charged him to undertake *immediately* the reduction of Westphalia, inclosing a bill of credit on Cologne for £.9000. which sum he engaged to see repaid at Augsbourg. Nevertheless, before the cessation of arms could be obtained, Gustavus proposed, once more, the plan of a *neutrality*, as it was then called; or rather a short system of preliminaries, all tending to a general pacification*; which he charged the ambassadors and ministers to transmit to their respective courts for confirmation, inasmuch as he and France had agreed concerning them. Of these we have already given the reader *two* different transcripts, and referred him to a *third*, in the preamble of which there is one passage worth notice; namely, that this armistice was granted purely out of regard to the earnest intercessions of the most Christian king†.

As to the armistice itself, I have seen only two translations of it, the one in English, and the other in French, both made public the year that it was signed; to the former of which I have referred my reader in the *Appendix*; and with respect to the plans of pacification mentioned by me, I conclude upon reviewing the matter, that they were only subsequent explanations of the king's meaning, dispatched by him to the parties concerned, or to the Swedish ministers residing with them. Be that as it will, these are all signal proofs of his majesty's sincerity and good faith, which will appear still in a stronger light, if we consider the instructions conveyed by him on the occasion to Gustavus Horn, and, as it seems to me highly probable, to all his generals; namely, that the *armistice* was granted out of pure indulgence to the court of France; and that a positive answer to the proposals of pacification was to be returned in the space of a fortnight from the princes therein interested. It was agreed, that Pappenheim should evacuate Westphalia, and the archbishopric of Magdeburg; and that the troops belonging to the elector of Bavaria and the catholic league should be withdrawn likewise from Bohemia: all acts of hostility being supposed to cease on either side, and power reserved to retaliate injuries with injuries: yet nevertheless under this restriction, that blockades and sieges already begun should proceed in the same manner as if no cessation of arms had been agreed on‡.

As

* See pag. 72, 73.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 62.

‡ Letter to Gustavus Horn, dated at Höchst. The author of the *Merc. Franc. says* Mentz. See APPENDIX, Art. XXVII. January 10, 1651-2.

That

As this letter to Horn bears date from Höchst, Jan. 10, it is probable the king had ratified the agreement the day before, or that very morning at Mentz, and was advanced thus far on his road, in order to meet the queen at Hanau, whom he found there, to his highest satisfaction, the self-same evening. Her majesty made her public entrance in a manner not void of magnificence, being accompanied by the young princefs of Brandenburg, her sister, and escorted by numbers of noblemen, and 1200 horse, commanded by old Ruthven. The king received her at the entrance of count Hanau's palace. Never meeting, after a long separation of twenty months, was more affectionate and tender; for they knew well each other's merit*. Eleanora flew to him with a transport of joy that is not to be described, and throwing her arms round his waist, *Now, fir*, said she, *the Great Gustavus is at length taken prisoner!* Which † particular sort of expression was so much applauded by the public, and passed so frequently from mouth to mouth, till acquiring fresh variations in travelling from Germany to England, it was at length reported by the London news-writer, that the king of Sweden was literally and *bonâ fide* an Imperial prisoner: which, it is probable, gave no great dissatisfaction to the English ministry. The king made his consort a present of jewels to a very considerable value.

This heroine had left the pleasures of Stockholm, in order to share the fatigues of war with her husband, and brought with her no contemptible supply of soldiers‡, artillery, and money. Nor was she in the least disinclined to an extraordinary accident, which befell her in the first minutes of her embarkation; for one of her principal ships, surnamed the *VASA*, by way of distinction, sunk directly to the bottom about half a league from shore, merely through some fault in the construction: since the sea in that place had no rocks, nor was there wind enough to ruffle its surface§.

During this momentary repose at Hanau, advice came that Pappenheim paid no regard to the cessation of arms: upon

That very evening, being Tuesday, the king met the queen at Hanau. *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 68.

* Fu incontrata (la regina) & raccolta da i popoli e dalle milizie con applauso, & pompa veramente regale, ma si caramente dal re suo consorte, che ne stupirono i circostanti, in vedendo da petto di tanta fortezza uscir così traborchevoli le tenerezze, e lusinghe de i più suiscerati amanti. *P. Pomo*. libr. ii. 57.

† *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. 68.

‡ Of these, 4000 were destined to join the marquis of Hamilton, and the residue, 4000 more, were conducted by Oxenstierna to reinforce the king.

§ *Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gent.* 8°. p. 20.

upon which the king, being determined to chastise him, ordered several regiments to file off from Francfort, and advanced in person immediately as far as Guelenhausen, twenty-four miles in his way to Westphalia. The queen would not desert him, but hearing there that the danger he apprehended was blown over, returned to Francfort. In violation of the truce, the Spahiards had crossed the Moselle, and the infant's troops were in full march towards the Palatinate; the duke of Bavaria made preparations for renewing the war with double diligence; the elector of Triers behaved with duplicity; and the duke of Neuburg allowed Tilly to take possession of his metropolis. Thus, whilst they all effected mischief, in greater or lesser degrees, the king, like an honest and punctual soldier, gained nothing but an inactive interval for the refreshment of his army.

During this interim, the elector of Bavaria not only refitted his shattered troops, but found his opportunity of extorting higher advantages from the Austrian necessities, inasmuch as the emperor had long balanced between restoring Walsstein, or breaking with Maximilian. At length he and his ministry, upon mature deliberation, thought proper to leave the first difficulty to work its own way, and pay an exorbitant price for the assistance of the last named prince: which retardment of glory, though only ideal, redoubled Walsstein's hatred against Bavaria.

The elector, perceiving France could not influence Gustavus in greater matters, and discovering likewise the violent inclination of that prince to restore the Palatinate to his hereditary dominions, dispatched Donnerberg, his chapcellow, to Vienna; and bidding adieu to the interposition of France, at once, gave him authority to make the best market he could with the Imperial ministry, who received him with open arms*.

Donnerberg protested, that though his master might want means, yet that he never wanted good intentions to the house of Austria, since he had refused the kingship of the Romans, which Richelieu offered him†; but that Sweden had almost overturned his system, by that terrible shock, the defeat of Leipsic; and that the Infanta had besought him to take no adventurous step, till the catholic princes had recovered themselves from their terror. He frankly owned, that the clandestine elevation of Wal-

* Galeazzo Gualdo, part i. l. 3.

† Bernardi; Hist. de Louis XIII. lib. xv. fol. Par. 1648.

stein*; his investiture with so much power; and reposing such undue confidence in a subject, had a little disconcerted him in the articles of friendship and fidelity; and the more, as *that* general had been removed at his instances and solicitations.—Nevertheless, he privately hoped, that the emperor had been forced into these measures by pure necessity, and that Walsstein would never presume, when he opened the campaign, to march into Bavaria, or canton his troops in that electorate. Of course, as the possession of the Palatinates began now to appear precarious, he thought it consistent with the emperor's prudence and equity, to *transfer* the Upper Austria† to him provisionally, not only as an indemnification for his past expences, but as a sort of equivalent for the Palatinates, which Gustavus was determined to wrest out of his hands. Upon these terms he made his Imperial majesty an offer of all his services, having previously raised the ban, and arrier-ban of Bavaria for that very purpose; fortified and guarded the banks of the Lech and Danube; and placed good garrisons in all the fortresses and cities on that side of his country‡.

These proposals were a cordial of comfort to the Imperial ministry; yet the assignation of Upper Austria, by way of pledge or mortgage, was a sort of nauseous drop mixed with the composition, which rendered it to a certain degree unpalatable.

Their answer was, that the emperor would content his old ally not only in this instance, but in realizing also some promises of the same nature, which he had made before. That Walsstein in effect forced his own way; that the necessity of the conjuncture was his only patron, since no other man could collect an army at so short a notice, and when the emergency of affairs was so very critical. However, care had been taken, that all competitions and jealousies should be removed; and that the elector of Bavaria should receive neither affront, neglect, or injury from him. Walsstein hearing what part Maximilian had acted with regard to him, grew so enraged, that he made no secret of his future intentions.

* He does not name him in the memorial, but mentions only the elevation of a certain person.

† There are reasons to suspect it was rather that part of Upper Austria called Ober Ens, or *supra Anisum*, which had been mortgaged to the duke at the beginning of the Bohemian wars, and resumed upon the cession made him of the Higher Palatinate.

‡ *Fred. Spanheim*, p. 380.

During the continuance of this truce, France, who always cast a languishing eye on the western banks of the Rhine, laid the ground-plot of a new machination against Sweden, by drawing the elector of Triers more immediately under her protection; and dispatched the count de Brullon expressly into Germany upon that errand: of which we shall speak more distinctly, when we come to the actual signing of the treaty. As Gustavus was of a temper equally prudent and inflammable, of course he entered into this act of patronage with wonderful slowness and timidity; for Richelieu knew the interposition to be of a very delicate cast, since if he had soured, or ruffled Gustavus too abruptly, he foresaw, that the Spanish party would have extracted great advantage from such an inadvertency, and kindled up a misunderstanding betwixt the two crowns. It sufficed therefore for the present, that the elector published a memorial * concerning the cessation of hostilities during the truce, which the Spanish troops despised, and the members of his own chapter rejected.

Richelieu then changed his attack, and tampered ingeniously with the city of Strasburg, a sort of game that was played afterwards with more success in regard to Brisac; sparing no pains to induce the magistrates to place themselves under the protection of France. An old burgo-master, who, from principles of good sense, and a true zeal for the welfare of the public, found himself more inclinable to embrace the patronage of Sweden, checked the French emissaries in their proposals, and begged his fellow-magistrates to call to mind a case like their own with reference to the three cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. This remonstrance confounded the whole project; and for these reasons, Gustavus, thoroughly affected with the preference these Strasburgers shewed him, always opposed a deaf ear to Richelieu, when he besought him to give his parole of honour, not to enter Alsatia. The truth is, the French minister stood in awe of Gustavus, and wisely dissembled a disgust which he had not courage either to explain or vindicate.

About the same time, Gonsalvo de Cordoua, who commanded the Spanish army in the Palatinate, was sent ambassador to Paris, to make remonstrances against the protection which Lewis XIII. afforded the protestants, whereby the catholic cause was greatly injured. But Richelieu resumed the old tone, and told him, that the present war was

* The original letter, dated from Hermanstein (Ehrenbreitstein) Jan. 14, 1651-2, is preserved in the *Swedish Intelligence*. Part ii. 69.

political,

political, and not religious: of course all persons were left at full liberty to embrace that party which most favoured their private inclinations, or conduced most to their interests. Upon this, Gonsalvo returned thoroughly dissatisfied, and refused a present the king offered him, of a sword richly garnished with diamonds*.

We observed before, that the troops under this general's command had violated the terms upon which the armistice was founded; for Isabella's 10,000 Walloons had reached the Lower Palatinate by long marches from the Low Countries, having crossed the Moselle during the continuance of the truce, and then the combined Spanish army ventured to pass the Rhine near Spires, which the Rhingrave opposed very valiantly. That brave officer met little short of a defeat, by disregarding the repeated advices given him of the enemy's approach; and if captain Hume, at the head of four troops of horse, had not resisted the united efforts of the whole Spanish army for half an hour, matters had taken a turn exceedingly untoward. This confirms a doctrine, that can be never too much inculcated into military men, that an undue degree of courage, when it borders upon a neglect of danger, is as fatal to the service as downright cowardice.

Enraged at such notorious breaches of compact, not only here, but on the side of Pappenheim, Maximilian, the elec-

* A ridiculous circumstance once happened to this commander, who had been lieutenant-general to Spinola, and governor of Milan. In the campaign of 1621, it was his intention to possess a little walled village in the Palatinate, called Ogeisheim; and of course he dispatched an officer, at the head of a body of troops, upon that errand. On the first alarm, nine-tenths of the inhabitants removed to Mannheim, except about twenty insignificant people, and a poor shepherd, who, besides being a brave fellow, was a man of humour. The shepherd in good time fastened the gates, let down the draw-bridge, and made a wonderful shew of resistance. A trumpeter accosted the town in form; upon which the few inhabitants, that remained, made their escape through a postern gate, and left only the shepherd and his shepherds big with child. This unaccountable peasant, in the style of representative of the garrison, gave audience from the walls to the military herald, and made his bargain of capitulation inch by inch; contracting at the same time for the preservation of estate, and the free exercise of the protestant religion. Let the reader judge what surprize the Spaniards felt, when they entered the village; yet the droll preserved the muscles of his countenance inflexible, and some weeks afterwards, when his wife laid in, desired the great Gonsalva to be *sponsor*, which honour the pompous Castilian, for the jest's sake, could not decline, and on the contrary sent her some very handsome presents.—This account, says an historian of veracity, (*F. Spanheim. Mem. d'Eleor Palat.*) might appear to posterity to border a little on the romantic, if its notoriety had not been a circumstance indisputable at the time it happened.

tors of Triers and Cologne, the duke of Neuburg, and France itself, as will appear immediately, his majesty returned post-haste to Francfort, and having first dispatched Monro with a body of infantry, for the Rhingrave had only horse, placed himself at the head of a small army, in order to give battle to these faithless invaders. The terror of the name of Gustavus soon compelled them to repass both the Rhine and Moselle; nor did they think themselves in safety till they had reached the duchy of Luxemburg.

At length, namely, on the twenty-fourth of Jannary, the armistice expired, and many attempts were made by Richelieu to protract it eight days longer: but Gustavus, who had been thoroughly mortified and disgusted, though he justly foresaw and predicted all its ill consequences, replied peremptorily, *he had made that sacrifice to France, and was too good a politician to venture upon a second experiment of the same nature.* Upon this, De Charnacé, De Brezé, and St. Etienne, learned to act a more decent and more cautious part; and when they teased and besought the king to entertain a moment's patience, he not only gave them a positive refusal, but told them moreover, that nothing should ever induce him to give up Mentz, Bamberg, and Wurtzburg. *I must keep the whip in my own hands, continued he, in order to regulate and chastise the duplicity of your good ecclesiastical friends and allies*.*

The truth was, the French for some months past had grown very uneasy at Gustavus's victories, and being conscious of a private treaty with the elector of Bavaria, proposed not only a *neutrality*, but an *armistice*, and the *continuation* of the armistice, by way of feeling his Swedish majesty's pulse, and retarding the rapidity of his conquests. At the same time, they paved the way to a separate agreement with the elector of Triers, and assembled a considerable body of troops near Metz, under pretence of suppressing an insurrection formed by the duke of Orleans, giving out in the interim, by their private emissaries, that this force was intended to prescribe laws to the conquests of the Swedes. To retard matters more, care was taken to pay the subsidy very slowly, and imperfectly: and what confirms the truth of these assertions yet further, is, that the French court could not conceal its joy, when the news arrived of Gustavus's death.

The war was now revived with double spirit on the part of Sweden, and plans for new operations were dispatched to

* *Le Vassir*, tom. vii. 104.

Banier, who opposed Pappenheim in Westphalia; to Horn, who faced Tilly in the diocese of Bamberg; to Arnheim and Thurn, who acted against Don Baltazar and Tieffenbach in Bohemia and Moravia; also to the dukes of Mecklenburg and Lunenburg, Todt, Ruthven, duke William of Weimar, and others, who all commanded separate armies. As to the marquis of Hamilton, he was then at Francfort in company with Vane the English ambassador.

About this time, it is the custom of English historians to represent Gustavus as dictating in a very high tone, and acting in the character of a person elated with success. Any one may easily see, that he had real reasons to alter his style, without incurring the imputation of vain-glory and haughtiness; for he plainly discovered that Charles, in spite of all the prosperity that attended the Swedish arms, had a diffidence, or a disinclination to engage himself in any treaty that breathed spirit and magnanimity. Upon his unhappy coolness Gustavus touched gently, but feelingly, in his letter which gave an account of the battle of Leipzig.

Part of Vane's instructions were not quite palatable to his Swedish majesty, for he had orders to reconcile him with the king of Denmark, upon some conditions that were not compatible with the temper of a man so jealous of his honour, as the former was known to be. It is true, Vane had a commission likewise to enter into closer connexions with Sweden; but either this commission was clogged with private restrictions, or the ambassador wanted parts and courage to seize the proffered opportunity. He was commanded likewise to consult Hamilton previously to all difficulties and emergencies, which was giving an insight and power to an inferior general, which did not agree with Gustavus's doctrine of subordination. Vane paid his first visit to that prince at Francfort*, where Gustavus told him without ceremony, as Vane's commission related chiefly to the restitution of the Palatinate, that he could give no distinct answer upon the subject, till a league was previously concluded betwixt him and the elector Palatine, which was to be the basis of a subsequent alliance between Charles and himself; to which Vane, who declared he was invested with full powers, signified an inclination to assent. To that point Gustavus replied, that as he was tender of promising one iota more than he could perform, it would be highly necessary to bring France into the system: nevertheless, without depending up-

* We have proved elsewhere, from Vane's own papers, that this meeting was first at Wurtzburg.

on success in that particular, he would at all events discharge the duties of a man of honour, and reserve to himself the glory of executing something beyond what he promised. Nor was this a piece of state artifice, or political parade, as time afterwards fully discovered *. Hereupon, says Mr. Guthrie, who, bating some few trifling inaccuracies, has given us the best account of this transaction, Gustavus added, That Charles had been too slow in sending him, Vane, and that if he had sent him *before he had concluded the treaty with France, he would have been at liberty to have fallen upon Bavaria* †. The ambassador answered, I make use of the words of his own dispatch with Charles, "For our coming too late there, was no fault to be justly imputed to us; for had his majesty of Sweden demanded reasonable conditions, the alliance had been concluded: but leagues and business of so great importance could not but have slow motions; yet he besought his majesty of Swedeland, to give him leave to commemorate the proceedings of his master towards him, since his majesty's coming into Germany, viz. That he had permitted him to make as many levies of his subjects as he had desired; that he had since sent the marquis of Hamilton to him with a royal assistance, and so opportunely, as it could not be denied, but that the marquis landed his army at a seasonable time, to the amusement of the emperor and the encouragement of the confederate protestant princes, as it appeared by the effects that followed thereupon, by the speedy uniting of their arms under his command. And that though his Swedish majesty, next under God, was the only immediate instrument to whom the glory of this great revolution was to be attributed; yet it could not be denied, but that the subjects of Great Britain had done him great and remarkable service both

* In confirmation of this assertion, of which many proofs are produced dispersedly in the course of our history, I shall subjoin one authority more on the faith of MSS. extracted from a letter of Mr. John Dinely, at the Hague, to Sir Thomas Roe, bearing date Feb. 24, 1632-3, "The chancellor (of Sweden) your friend, hath assured her majesty, (the queen of Bohemia) "that his glorious master had never other meaning but to restore it (the Palatinate); no more hath he;" namely Oxenstiern, who faithfully endeavoured to fill up the outlines of the plan which Gustavus left him.

† Here must be some mistake, for no new treaty had been made with France since that of Bernwilt, Jan. 13, 1630-1; so that the king could only mean, that during the existence of the truce, and upon supposition it tended to a general pacification, he was not at liberty to attack Bavaria, which enjoyed the Upper Palatinate; nor could Gustavus be supposed to allude to the treaty France had concluded with Bavaria, May 8, 1631, since the moment the truce expired, he turned his arms against the elector.

in

in these and his former wars; and that these were neither to be concealed nor forgotten, nor the real assistance now sent unto him."

His majesty of Sweden acknowledged, that the king of Great Britain had proceeded with him as a friend; that he was a wise and virtuous prince; that none could wish more prosperity to his person and affairs than he did; and that he would do his best to assist him, in the business of the Palatinate; but he would then have him follow his advice; that he had too long depended upon the Spanish treaty, which was a fault, and had been greatly prejudicial; and that nothing was to be expected from them but words. The ambassador replied, If that were a fault, it behoved him to be wary in his negotiation, not to make an alliance, that might be disadvantageous to his master, either in honour or judgment; and that whatsoever should be the event, he doubted not but that God would bless both his councils and his actions. His majesty of Sweden replied, That for the present he could not stipulate to make war with the elector of Bavaria, though he intended not to let him escape; for that it could not but be of great advantage, if he could secure the catholics, which he was in a fair way to effect; for, according to his articles delivered to *Charnassy* *, the electors of Trier and Cologne had accepted the neutrality. The ambassador asked, Whether his majesty had received any act of their own? He said no; but the marquis of *Preßay* † had assured him thereof; that he had not yet heard of Bavaria, neither could he yet say any thing thereunto, until either Charnassy or Horn, whom he had sent into France, were returned.

His majesty of Sweden then said, He would make him two propositions; which were, he would either oblige himself to restore to the king of Bohemia what the Spaniard held, and treat with France and Bavaria for the restitution of what he possesses; which if he would not restore, he would then undertake a war with him: so the king would enter into an alliance with him against the Spaniards, if he should attack him in any of his dominions.

Gustavus at the same time added, That in order to do things effectually, he expected Charles to furnish twelve thousand men, his contingency of troops, and twenty-five thousand pounds a month in money to maintain them.

* De Charnacé.

† De Brezé.

Those were very high demands, and Vane was appointed to treat further with Horn, *the chancellor of Sweden* *. But when the conferences opened, the Swedish minister made the following high demands :

1. That the Palgrave should hold his country as a donative of the king of Sweden.
2. That he should make no martial levies without the Swedes' consent.
3. That during this war he should furnish the Swedes with so many thousand men upon his own pay.
4. That two of his chiefest towns should stand cautionaries for the performing of covenants.
5. That he should make no league nor article with any other prince without the Swedes' consent.

Those proposals were thought by Vane to be absurd, and as haughty as the terms, that had been proposed to the king of Bohemia by the emperor himself. Hamilton, who was present at all the conferences, had made him sensible of the reluctance which Gustavus had to suffer the British auxiliaries to march into the Palatinate, or into any of the territories that were well-affectioned to the king of Bohemia. Charles and the king of Bohemia were sensible of the same thing, and from the haughty manner in which Gustavus treated, they more than suspected that he intended to make himself master of Germany, or at least to give law to all the princes of the empire. But to bring matters to an issue, Vane proposed, that Hamilton should have the complement of Swedish soldiers that had been first stipulated him ; that they should be paid with English money, and augmented with a new body of troops from Great Britain, so as to make a strong army, which Hamilton was to lead into the Palatinate. Had Gustavus really meant as disinterestedly for the king of Bohemia as he professed, he would have embraced this proposal ; but, instead of that, he treated it with disdain, and ordered the negotiation to be broken off.

Thus far Mr. Guthrie : but as to the latter part of his assertions, care has been taken to obviate them elsewhere. Indeed his Britannic majesty mistook his interests in entering into any negotiations about the Palatinate with the house of Austria ; for in the first place, the court of Vienna had no intentions ever to come to an accommodation ; and in the

* Horn was a Swedish general, and Oxenstiern chancellor of Sweden ; but as Horn made the treaty of Bernwalt, and was sent afterwards ambassador to Metz, he is mistaken for a civil officer.

second place, the hereditary dominions of the elector had been doled out in so many parcels, that it was hardly possible to repossess them by an act of resumption, and then restore them to their antient owner. The tree was felled; the elector of Bavaria had seized the timber part, and every other catholic neighbour faggoted up as much of the branches as he could ransack together, for his own use. So that the emperor, especially as Gustavus was now powerful in Germany, could not possibly *redemand* with decency *what* he had *given*, or *recall*, with any appearance of justice, what he had *fold*. Therefore, says Spanheim *, who wrote from his heart upon this subject, and to whom I am indebted for the idea of the picture I am now drawing, the court of London judged extremely ill, in hoping to wrest the Palatinate from so many interested persons by remonstrances or embassies; “A suit of armour made of parchment records will not keep off the stroke of a musquet ball.”

On the other hand, the catholic princes pretended only, in a sort of ironical way, to have their alternative of eighty years in the church possessions: and the Imperial ministry suggested, in imitation of what was once said to Metellus, that the voice of law could not be heard amongst the clashing of arms, and that there was no antidote against the will of a Cæsar.

I have seen some other accounts, which inform us, that Vane pressed Gustavus somewhat abruptly and indelicately on the subject of the restitution of the Palatinate, telling him, that he had given his royal promise to complete that event; which assertion Vane proved oddly enough: “For, Sire,” said he, “you declared positively, on your first entrance into Germany, that you would reinstate all the oppressed and injured protestant princes; of whom the elector Palatine is first, not only in dignity, but in misfortunes.” This logic of Vane was built upon the interpretation of a *manifesto* only; and a *manifesto*, in general, is a sort of rhetorical nosegay, which kings now and then, for variety sake, present the public with, having at the same time *other* designs in view, in order to amuse their fellow-creatures, or mislead or lull them into inattention: for this anthology in politics is the

—*Lucus & ara Dianæ,*

Et properantis aquæ per amænos ambitus agros.

Nevertheless, Gustavus had no duplicity upon this occasion; and as he both loved and pitied the unfortunate prince in

* *Mem. d'Eleâr. Palat.* p. 302.

question,

question, allowed Vane's conclusion to be honestly, though not logically deducible; and promised to effect the restitution of the Palatinate, upon condition his Britannic majesty would maintain an army in Germany, of 8000 foot and 3000 horse; to which the ambassador replied, very indiscreetly, That his master did not chuse to make a purchase at a higher price than the thing was worth.

Gustavus still maintained a secret affection for the unfortunate elector, and solicited the French king to act with him in restoring to his dominions an oppressed and proscribed prince, whose ancestors had supported Henry IV. against the enemies of the house of Bourbon: proposing likewise, at the same time, *that* notable expedient of augmenting the *number* of the electoral college; which masterly stroke of politics was thought so necessary, as to be carried afterwards into execution at the congress of Munster. Louis durst not presume to advance a single step, being dismayed by the effects of *the* clandestine treaty which his minister had thought fit to conclude with the duke of Bavaria. Things being thus circumstanced, Gustavus took Frederic upon his own hands, and made his friends a promise of reinstating him, upon condition he indulged his Lutheran subjects in the free exercise of their religion, and considered himself as attached and obliged *only* to the crown of Sweden: giving him however to understand, at the same time, that an affair of this sort required dexterity and management in him, Gustavus; and that his promise depended eventually upon a variety of circumstances; so that the terms it was conceived in were only general and indefinite; however, his majesty was sincerely in earnest, and that was sufficient.

As Sclavata, the king of Bohemia's minister, had long before this time reached Holland, and informed his master, that Gustavus expected to see him with great impatience, Frederic, having returned thanks to the states in full council, and requested the continuance of their generous protection to his wife and children, undertook his journey to Francfort forthwith, accompanied by the states-general to the gates of the Hague, by the prince of Orange as far as Wesel; and by lord Craven on to Francfort. The Dutch government, at parting, made him a present suitable to his high rank, and the nature of his expedition. An escort of 2500 horse and foot convoyed him to the territories of Hesse Cassel, and the landgrave's troops conducted him to Francfort, where he arrived February the tenth, with a retinue of forty coaches, some were sent by Gustavus in order to do him honour, and seventy domestics on horseback. He saluted the king and queen
next

next morning at Hoëchst, the unfortunate place where Tilly defeated Christian duke of Brunswic, and returned with them to Francfort the same day, where Gustavus gave him a magnificent entertainment; oftentimes allowing him *precedency**, under pretence that he was both a *king* and *elector*†; and he and his consort always addressed their discourse to him with the appellation of *your majesty*; a respect the young landgrave of Darmstadt once omitting, whose father had been no good neighbour to Frederic, the king of Sweden rebuked him with no small degree of asperity‡.—Notwithstanding all these affectionate offices, he still took care to touch upon the subject we have lately mentioned, and obtained a promise from Frederic, whose mind was strongly prepossessed in favour of Calvinism, to grant free exercise of religion in the Palatinate to all such as made profession of the opinions of Luther. Yet the joy of this prince, who seemed to be born only to prove unfortunate, was soon diminished by an accident, or as some suppose a piece of villany; for the castle of Heidelberg§, his former place of residence, and the antient seat of his predecessors, was suddenly damaged by a violent fire, and the fine front thereof entirely destroyed. The Spanish garrison seemed pleased with the misfortune, and stood with folded arms contemplating its ruin. This circumstance was so much the more afflicting to the elector Palatine, as he had spent vast sums upon it, which any one will soon acknowledge, when he knows the rock on which the building is erected. He perfected likewise, with immense expence, the fortifications of Mannheim, begun by his father, Frederic IV.

Gustavus had been vigilant enough the preceding year, to dispatch the chevalier Rache first to Venice, where he succeeded well||; next to Genoa; and then to the thirteen cantons of Switzerland, concerning which embassy we have spoken at large elsewhere. The emperor set himself earnestly to traverse this negotiation, and wrote to the respective sovereignties of each state, making them protestations and promises in abundance. He caused the archduke Leopold to write another letter, in substance the same with his own,

* *Mercurie François* en l'an 1631, p. 163.

† *Bertius de Bellis Germanicis*. ‡ *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 76.

§ During the war of the succession, in 1693, this structure was entirely destroyed, and the town ruined. The very tombs of the electors were not spared; of all which and preceding devastations, melancholy marks still remain. The country round it is a terrestrial paradise.

|| *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. 176.

and

and full of politeness and civility*; and then deputed Arnoldin, counsellor of state, and first secretary, *à secretis*, to Walsstein; who sent him directly into Poland, in order to levy the little army of Cossacks formerly mentioned. The Polanders trembled to think of opposing Gustavus a second time; and though they favoured the Imperial cause greatly in their private inclinations as catholics, yet the request was passed by without notice. Some few noblemen made a levy of a company or two clandestinely, and nothing more. Isolani succeeded better in raising 8000 fresh Croats; a set of troops Gustavus hated mortally, on account of the ravages and cruelties committed by them; and as they spared nothing, he usually allowed them no quarter, and received none from them. The emperor then finished the holidays by confiscating the duchies of Jagernsdorf and Troppau, and bestowing them on the prince of Lichtenstein†.

It was now determined, that Pappenheim should act at the head of a flying army of 18,000 men‡; and to forward this project, the elector of Bavaria sent him £. 15,000. As that prince had now made his final political decision with respect to France, De Charnacé and St. Etienne retired from Munich, each desirous to see his master first; each dissatisfied with his negotiation, and well prepared to accuse his coadjutor. In short, these gentlemen of *pacification* were so enraged with each other, that a challenge passed between them.

In the next place, the deputies of the elector of Cologne made fresh proposals of accommodation; but Oxenstiern received them with an air of roughness, and proposed conditions to them, that were not to be digested. Nevertheless, De Pau, ambassador from the states-general, met with a favourable audience from the king, who dispatched Oxenstiern immediately to the Hague to facilitate matters, and dispose them to ripen into some perfection.

New misunderstandings broke forth on the side of Poland, with reference to the truce concluded in 1629, between that kingdom and Sweden; upon which the king appointed Russel, one of his privy-counsellors, his ambassador, and gave him a letter both to Sigismond, and the states of the realm, who received this minister very coldly, till at

* *Mercure Suisse* de Fred. Spanheim, p. 21.

† This is confirmed by the author of the *Memoirs* of the House of Brandenburg.

‡ *Saggi d'Historia del Pietra Poma*. lib. ii. p. 55. quarto.

length the matter was amicably composed by the interposition of the English ambassador *. This gave his majesty great ease, for he less feared the interposition of any power than that of Poland; and to convince the public that he omitted no negotiation, of probable success, even at the greatest distance, he dispatched an agent to George Ragotzki, prince of Transylvania, in order to create a fresh irruption into Hungary †; than which no proceeding, *ad hominem*, could be more justifiable, as the emperor, two years before, had sent Arnheim with an army into Poland to assist Sigismund against the Swedes.

Though the campaign of the year 1631 had lasted, on the side of Gustavus particularly, till Christmas, yet the troops had hardly common breathing-space allowed them to recover their fatigues, if we except the short fortnight's interval of cessation from hostilities. The king actually took the field in February, and Wallstein on his side began to make appearance of doing the same; for having collected all his officers together, he found his regiments fully complete, and ready to march. The emperor sent eighty very large cannon from the arsenal at Vienna, and seventeen more large pieces were conveyed to him from Breslau and Lignitz.—Couriers passed and repassed every moment between Bohemia and Austria; and Wallstein, who loved to rhodomontade, dropped insinuations to make people believe, that they brought him money. The military satirists, who have a dry laconic sort of wit peculiar to themselves, said, That they rather moved too nimbly and too frequently for men employed in that capacity ‡.

Commissions were now issued for levying fresh troops in behalf of Sweden; and Christian, the third son of Charles, count

* *Historical Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 2—7, &c.

† *Ibid.* p. 27.

‡ Others report the *bon mot* thus, "Qu'il ne falloit pas s'ebahir, s'ils alloient viste, parceque leur charge n'estoit pas grande." *Mercure François*, tom. xviii. p. 125. *Soldat Suedois*, p. 351. N. B. At and near this period there is one thing very remarkable; that the famous *Mercure François* and the *Soldat Suedois* both use the selfsame words to the amount of a considerable number of pages. Now each work, in the parts relative to the present period, made its appearance the same year, 1633; yet there are reasons to conclude, that the *Soldat Suedois* is the incontestable original, as it was composed by Frederic Spanheim, then professor of theology at Geneva, one of the best historians of that age, at the request of the Swedish ambassador to the Swiss cantons, whom I suppose to be the chevalier de Rache, a person of great parts and address; who knew the interior of Gustavus's affairs almost as well as Oxenstiern himself. This circumstance reflects no great honour on that *cradle of French history*, the *Mercure*; which, when compared with the German, English, Italian, and Scottish relations, appears

count Palatine of Birkenfeld, being newly created general of horse, had orders to form an army in the marquisate of Baden, and the district round Strasburg, in which town Frederic, margrave of Baden-Dourlach, was attempting to bring a negotiation with the inhabitants to conclusion. A treaty was then signed with the deputies of the administrator of Wirtemberg, whom the king reproved with some little asperity, for renouncing the *conclusions* at Leipzig on the first approach of the Imperialists. Orders were then given to raise a second body of troops in Suabia, where Ossa commanded on the emperor's side, and extend the Swedish influence to the source of the Danube; which put the Switzers into no small consternation, though the duke de Rohan, and the chevalier de Rache, at length explained away and pacified their fears.

By the middle of February his majesty opened the campaign with the siege of Creutznach in the Palatinate, a small town defended with one of the strongest castles, in point of situation, that was to be found in Germany. The peasants had so great an affection for the king's service, that they levelled the roads of their own accord for the approach of his army, and procured him constant intelligence. The garrison consisted of 600 veteran Germans, Walloons, and Burgundians. The fortifications rose one above another in such a manner, on the lower side, that Gustavus called them, being greatly surprized when he contemplated, them, *the devil's works**; and one half-moon in particular he named *the devil's head*. For these reasons he made his approach on the other side, having sent to Mentz for some new arguments to persuade the garrison to listen to reason, and lodged lieutenant-colonel Douglas all night near the walls, at the head of 300 Scots, who had performed so well at the storming of Oppenheim.

Gustavus took a survey of the castle, but approached so near, that his brave generals, out of pure respect, gave him the

to be superficial, defective, and erroneous in numberless instances. Of course it has been our care to select sparingly from it, except when it is supported with collateral confirmations; and we heartily wish, that father Bougéant in his elegant history, as to style and method, had made it the *companion* of his researches, but not the *guide*. Yet in justice we must acknowledge, that the judicious Le Barre took great precautions; for he examined more than twenty times, *THREE* books, with his own eyes, and whatever he relates may be depended on with safety; whereas Bougéant, in the military, and commonly historical parts, consulted only the *Mercur*, *Lotichius*, and *Puffendorf*. Two of these works were not the *best*, and the third is extremely *partial*, *verbose*, and *frivolous*.

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 77.

the honour of precedence. An huge stone hurled from the wall fell little short of putting an end to his curiosity; and a person, who stood next to him, was shot through the brain with a musquet ball*. Soon afterwards, being dissatisfied with what he could discover, and the more so, as he was naturally short-sighted, he went out privately, and calling to him a serjeant, whom he knew perfectly well, as he did half the men that served under him, *Fellow soldier*, said he, *clamber up, and take a just view of yonder work; here are forty pieces of gold to make you happy afterwards*†.

The serjeant performed his business, and returned unhurt; yet Gustavus could not rest contented with his account, but mounting the steep of the hill, extended himself flat on the ground, to take a view of the fortifications, and made the soldier lie by him. Even then he could not command the works as he desired; so dismissing the serjeant, he clambered still higher alone; then returning to his army, declared, with a voice of cheerfulness, *Now will I be master of yonder castle by five o'clock to-morrow evening*.

Next morning was sprung a mine, which opened a small but very steep entrance, full of loose rocks, and difficult of ascent. A general storm was ordered, and colonel Winckle was to command. The English volunteers composed the van; and lord Craven, who was then very young, lieutenant-colonel Talbot, and Mr. Masham, marched at the head. As the difficulties of ascending were almost insurmountable, the assailants were repulsed in their first attempt, which put Gustavus into a transport of rage; yet at the same time he took particular notice of lord Craven's gallant behaviour, and, with a smile, patted him on the shoulder, and bid him return to the attack, which he did, at the head of all the troops. The contest lasted two hours, and was very sharp and obstinate, for the besieged behaved with incredible resolution. At length a German officer, though the Burgundians and Walloons opposed him strenuously in what he was going to do, mentioned aloud the words *quarter and surrender*; and Craven, who was the very foremost man, seized this incident with a lucky presence of mind, and giving him his hand thereupon, the firing ceased. It must be remarked, for the honour of the Swedish discipline, that though the

* *Galeazzo Gualdo* confounds this story, and the king's answer thereupon, with a similar accident which happened at the siege of Mentz. Libr. iii. p. 81.

† Many particulars relating to this siege were transmitted from Germany by Sir Jacob Astley, who afterwards defended Reading against the parliament forces.

town

town was taken by storm, the soldiers never once broke their order, or presumed to open the door of a single inhabitant; which when the townsmen saw, they recovered immediately from their terror; besought the officers and private men to enter their houses and refresh themselves; and poured forth acclamations of joy upon being restored to their lawful master, the elector Palatine. Gustavus being piqued at the slaughter which the obstinate defence of this town had caused amongst his men, for it had resisted him a whole fortnight, he obliged the garrison to march out *without* their colours, and not to serve against him for six months on the *eastern* side of the Moselle. *If*, said he, *you find me on the western banks*, whither by the way he proposed to march, *do your worst, and spare me not* *. The loss in the king's little army, for he conducted only a small detachment, was by no means inconsiderable as to private men: but the death of colonel Halle chagrined him much †, having lost his brother or kinsman, an excellent commander, in the battle of Leipzig. Not one of the English officers escaped without wounds: lord Craven received the push of a pike in his thigh; sir Francis Vane, brother to the earl of Westmoreland, was shot in the hip-bone; Masham was hurt by a large stone and a firebrand; and Talbot was killed, standing next man to lord Craven. Colonel Alexander Ramsay, an officer become grey in the Swedish service, was appointed governor; but not being able to execute the charge, for he lay ill at Wurtzburg of the wounds he received there, his majesty gave, *pro tempore*, this important post to Ramsay's lieutenant-colonel, George Douglas ‡, concerning whose conduct, with reference to his master, something will be said hereafter. The garrison, however, as a testimony of their bravery, were permitted to depart with their arms. A thousand loads of corn, and five hundred hogheads of Rhenish wine, were found in the castle. During this siege the king sent for one of his colonels in a great hurry; the officer returned his duty to his sovereign, and said he would wait on him the moment his barber had finished. On his arrival, Gustavus told him, with a little tincture of acrimony, *That he would make an excellent cavalier to conduct a campaign against the ladies: whilst you shave*, Sir, said he, *with good fortune, I can take a town* §.

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 82.

† *Heylmanni Leo Arctous*, p. 47.

‡ This account reconciles the seeming contradictions between the *Swedish Intelligencer* and *Fowler's Life of Douglas*, fol. Lond. 1656. p. 216.

§ *Gabazzo Gualdo*, p. 82, libr. ii.

About this time, or rather a few days before, the important town of Ulm consented to receive a Swedish garrison of 1200 men; and sir Patrick Ruthven, the eldest Scottish colonel in rank and service*, was appointed governor, and by uncommon vigilance, suppressed two conspiracies in their infancy. He was a favourite with his master, for different reasons. He always behaved gallantly in the field; and when the king wanted to regale ministers and officers of the adverse party, in order to extract secrets from them in their cheerful hours, he made Ruthven field-marshal of the bottles and glasses, as he could drink immeasurably, and preserve his understanding to the last†.

The king next commanded his troops to invest Baccharah, but when the trumpeter summoned Paul Bredangle, the Spanish governor, to surrender, he made him a present of a dollar, and a bottle of that excellent wine for which the place is so famous, returning him many thanks for the honour that was done him. Yet in the event, having lost the town by storm, he was obliged to capitulate for the castle, and duke Bernard allowed him his sword and horse. As to the men, they all embraced the Swedish party, excepting

* His majesty never liked any general turned of sixty; and when sir Patrick Ruthven arrived towards that age, he made him governor of Ulm, by way of a reputable sinecure.

† I have a very gallant letter by me from this officer to the earl of Northumberland, who had traduced the reputation of a young gentlewoman, whom Ruthven esteemed, and libelled the whole Scottish kingdom in some poetical invective; but as upon a nearer examination I find this letter to have appeared in print, it may suffice to extract the following passages:

"It is probable your lordship dares do *any* thing, but *that* which is good and just.—Think not to bear down these matters by greatness, or denial;—nor flatter yourself to pass invisible in your courses, like another Gyges.—It was never known before, that to refuse Northumberland's unlawful lust was a crime for a gentlewoman.—As for me and my countrymen, know, my lord, that such *blows* as come in *rhyme*, are too weak either to reach or harm us.—Sorry I am, that the north must now see how long it hath been mistaken in Northumberland's spirit; and yet who would not commend your wisdom in chusing such a safe course, to wrong a *woman*, and a *prisoner*: the *one* of which *cannot* and the *other* by nature and quality of the place *may* not, right his own wrong? Wherefore, setting aside the most honourable order of the garter, and professing whatsoever is here said is no ways intended to the nobility and gentry of England in general;—I do only in regard of *your* person affirm, that whatsoever in these *infamous* verses is contained, is *utterly false and untrue*; and that yourself hath dealt most *dishonourably*, *unworthily*, and *basely*; and this I will *ever* maintain. If these words sound harshly in your lordship's ears, blame yourself.—Forgetting yourself, you have taught others how to *dishonour* you; and remember, that though *nobility* maketh *difference* of persons, yet *injury* acknowledgeth *none*. Patrick Ruthven." [MS. in the *dissemble* collection.]

only one company*. The king then published a programme†, in order to procure free transportation of goods to the Easter-fair held at Francfort, and excused the merchants from paying duties in those territories that were occupied by his own troops, taking care, at the same time, to secure all public roads within the limits of his conquests from civil inspectors and military robbers; and, lastly, to protect Franconia both from France and the ecclesiastical electors, he planned out and fortified a city according to his own principles, on the confluence of the Rhine and the Maine, which he called *Gustavusburg*; but the common soldiers always named it *The Priest's Scourge*; because it gave laws to the three ecclesiastical electors, and the neighbouring prelates‡.

This campaign, one of the greatest perhaps the world has ever seen, all circumstances rightly and duly considered, was opened with immense preparations, as times then stood, on either side; for Gustavus and his allies produced 100,000 foot and 40,000 horse, and the Imperialists and princes of the catholic league were prepared to bring into the field a greater number of forces.

Walstein, perhaps from unwillingness, was not yet ready to act, but Tilly had assembled his army at Nördlingen, and thence dispatched two detachments, one into Suabia, and one into Bohemia. Impatient to be revenged of the disgrace received at Leipzig, he determined to fall upon Horn, who lay encamped at Bamberg; the bishop of which place attended the catholic army, and made no ceremony of cloathing himself in armour like a common cavalier.

The Swedish general had taken this town by composition just a month before, and lodged a sufficient force therein, had his soldiers not indulged too much in the pleasures of a rich and plentiful city. The inhabitants formed a conspiracy, which was debated afterwards with great secrecy in the town-hall, and the substance of their resolutions communicated to the garrisons of Forcheim and Cronach, who conveyed privately some bands of armed men to the assistance of the Bambergers. At the point of time agreed, one general insurrection broke out all in an instant; but Horn, who laid encamped not far from the walls, hearing the explosion of musquets and other noises, rushed immediately into the city at the head of a regiment or two,

* *Lotichius*; tom. i. 1010. *Heylmanni* Leo Arflovius, p. 43.

† *Lotichius*; ibid. 1016.

‡ *Galeazzo Gualdo*, libr. ii. 78.

and

and soon terrified the conspirators into obedience. This brave and good man, who copied his master in every virtue, had such an absolute dominion over his passions, even in the transports of sudden resentment and indignation, that he commanded his troops, who in their fury had killed nearly twenty inhabitants, to grant full and unconditional quarter to all the citizens; and as the people of better condition had retired to the public market-place in a body, he gave them all their lives, though most of them were then in arms, without terms, and without hesitation. Nor did he allow his soldiers, if we except the college of the Jesuits, which made him no proposals, to plunder a single church or monastery, though the clergy had been particularly active in this conspiracy. This may be considered as more extraordinary, since he knew the king disliked the bishop of Bamberg more than any prelate in the whole German empire; but judging well, as was his custom, and coolly in all things, he concluded, that abstinence from bloodshed, and a moderate contribution, by way of compensation for past offences, were proceedings much more conducive to his master's service, as well as his honour, than any resentments or retaliation could possibly be; and therefore, with great dexterity of good sense, he affected rather to fix the foundations of the crime on the intemperance and negligence of the Swedish garrison, which tempted the inhabitants into a rebellion*.

Tilly approached Bamberg at the head of 16,000 men: Horn had only 10,000 or 12,000. The former, by a sort of concealed march, advanced near the Swedes before they were apprized of his motions; nevertheless, Horn on the first notice made the round of the trenches, for his army lay partly in the town, and partly in the fields near it. The intrenchments he had begun to throw up were of vast extent, for Bamberg, not being surrounded with walls, is called the largest village in Germany. He then ordered Bauditz's regiment to be drawn up as a corps de reserve in one part of the city; but the lieutenant-colonel, misunderstanding the orders that were sent him, marched directly into the fields, and fell into an ambuscade. The retreat of this regiment gave the alarm to that of count Solmes, and as the latter was composed of new raised men, they soon gave way before 2000 Imperialists, who charged them under the command of Cratz and Farenbach, at the head of the old regiment of Cronenberg's cavalry. Horn had now no resource,

* *Bertius de Bellis German*, p. 154, &c.

except to retire and secure the bridge; but Farenbach's division pressed so hard upon his heels, that they entered the head of the bridge pell-mell with Horn's people; and if Horn had not valiantly repulsed them in the suburbs, with such few scattered troops as he could collect together, the day had been lost; for the old regiments, in whom he placed his only confidence, had not yet formed themselves in the town; and, fortunately for him, the gross of the catholic army had a march of half a mile still to perform. Tilly, who had experience enough not to let slip so favourable an opportunity, dispatched, in a sort of gallop, the flower of his cavalry to secure the bridge; but Horn had contrived in the space of twenty minutes to blow up a part of it; and barricado the remainder; so that the residuc of the day was employed in a continued discharge of musquetry. However, towards evening the Imperialists brought two pieces of cannon to act against the temporary fortifications raised by the Swedes, which determined Horn to retire, after he had embarked his baggage, artillery, and ammunition on the river Maine. Himself, at the head of Bauditzen's regiment of horse, secured the rear, and crossing the Maine at Eltman, he broke that bridge behind him, as also another, which he passed at Halstadt. He then wrote the king a very sensible letter *, informing him, how he had declared previously in a council of war, that a naked town of such vast extent was no ways defensible: and that he had been disappointed of the reinforcement which duke William of Weimar had engaged to bring him, on which he reposed his greatest confidence. He then gave an ample narrative of the whole transaction, which, bating the suppression of a slight circumstance or two that made against him, corresponds exactly with all my other accounts, and of course due regard has been paid to it. The king, who considered a well-managed retreat to be a better proof of military genius on some occasions, than even a victory, sat down highly contented with the prudence and dexterity of his lieutenant-general.

This slight disgrace, which Gustavus used to call a mere *cadeau*, was the first the Swedish army had undergone since its entrance into Germany. This misfortune may be attributed to various causes, such as misunderstanding the general's message, the cowardice as well as negligence of Solmes's regiment, for, not being used to labour, they had omitted to fortify their station with any entrenchments;

* Dated from Geltersheim, March 7, 1631-2.

whereas,

whereas, on the contrary, the other soldiers in the Swedish service were accustomed to be their own pioneers; and Horn, though otherwise an excellent officer, and remarkably cautious, seems in this instance partly blameable, as he neglected to furnish himself with better intelligence. Yet, many excuses may be offered in his extenuation. The commanders in those days had the disposal of no money for secret services, and the genius and turn of war dealt more in surprizes and ambuscade than it has since.—The Swedes lost about 600 men in the engagement and retreat, and about 500 were taken prisoners. Count Solmes received a musquet ball in his foot, and died of the fever it occasioned some weeks afterwards.

Tilly entered Bamberg the next morning, and dispatched the cavalry of Breda's and d'Espagni's regiments, and the whole corps of Croats, after the fugitives. They destroyed and picked up a considerable number of stragglers on the road; but Horn contended hard for every disputable inch of ground, and made them sensible more than once, that he was only marching, not flying from Tilly.

The elector of Bavaria, than whom nobody judged better in their own affairs, had private reasons to be mortified even at this success of his general, for he feared lest an attack of so brisk a nature might exasperate Gustavus, and induce him to cross the Danube, and pay a visit to Munich, by way of retaliation. Horn, impatient of revenging himself, had the dexterity to procure intelligence, that a large body of Imperialists were secure in their quarters, at half a league from Bamberg. Marching therefore, by night, at the head of his cavalry, and conducted by a peasant through a large wood, he almost ruined the two horse regiments of Plancard and young Merodé, which latter officer was glad to make his escape with nothing on but his drawers. Four companies avoided the ill fate of their comrades, being ordered out an hour before to escort a convoy. The Croats dislodged on the first attack; nevertheless, one part of them threw themselves into a churchyard which was walled round, and as Horn had no musqueteers with him, he found it impossible to force them. Tilly now moved forwards with all his army, in order to bring matters to a general battle; but Horn disposed his troops in such a manner, that the wary Walloon did not think proper to engage him*.

His

* This great man, whom Gustavus used to call *his right arm*, kept alive the glory of Sweden till after the peace of Munster. His very enemies admired

His majesty, impatient of the slight disgrace which had thus befallen his lieutenant-general, grew impatient to give
Tilly

admired him, for his extraordinary clemency to the perfidious town of Bamberg, and for his tenderness and humanity to the Romish clergy; inasmuch that the writers of that party give him the character of *merciful, quamvis hereticae superstitionis cultor*. He was an exact disciplinarian, and kept up the strictest religion amongst his troops.

At the siege of Biberach near Ulm, 1634, he had been extremely ill used by the governor, who had held out till resistance was a sort of madness. All things being prepared for a general storm, the fury of which it was imagined nothing could resist, a trumpeter made an offer of capitulating; but Horn enraged beyond measure declared peremptorily, he would sacrifice the commander and his garrison to their obstinacy. In that instant a crowd of young women of condition issued out of the town; one seized his stirrup, the others fell down on their knees, weeping and filling the air with their lamentations. Horn soon discovered signs of emotion, and, changing in a moment the severity of his countenance into a look of graciousness, mildly desired, that one would be pleased to represent the requests of the whole body. Upon this a young lady, bolder than the rest, took the legation upon her, and told him in that broken interrupted eloquence, which nature inspires upon these occasions, That they asked for the preservation of their honour, and the lives of their innocent relations. His answer was to this effect: "I lay my indignation, my resentments, my injuries, and revenge, at your feet. Tell that blockhead and brute of a governor, colonel Strahloltz, I respect your tears, as much as I despise his sword. Let him send a trumpeter to me, and receive conditions. Heaven knows, I thankfully embrace the opportunity of saving the lives of the innocent, instead of massacring a herd of barbarian soldiers" [*Bertius de Bellis Germanicis*, p. 558, &c.]—Nevertheless, he disbanded the garrison, and would not allow it to march out with any one mark of military honour.

Benédiction was poured upon him in abundance, and it is probable the fair sex made this effort upon his resolution, as it was well known he had married Oxentien's daughter, one of the most beautiful and virtuous women in Sweden, and that he and his wife had been a pattern of conjugal constancy and affection. He lost this excellent creature, and two children, all whom died of the plague, in the year 1631, and, what is more remarkable, held her in his arms for several hours till the very moment she expired. He then transported her body to Sweden in a silver coffin, and, though a young man, never forgot her so far as to venture upon second nuptials. [*Monro's Exped.* Part ii. 29.]

He pushed the Swedish arms as far as the town of Constance, the siege of which did him great honour; but never shewed himself a greater man, than at the council of war preceeding the fatal battle of Nordlingen, 1634: and though the duke of Weimar, in a transport of youthful rage, dropped some insinuations, which proved he did not then distinguish between calmness and courage in a brother general, yet Horn neither gave him an unkind look, nor a severe answer, but submitted patiently to the opinions of the younger and more impetuous officers, behaved like a lion in the day of action, led his men on to fifteen several attacks, in order to possess three half moons in the enemy's intrenchments, staid upon the field almost the last man, and in co-operation with Cratz effected the orderly retreat of the Swedish army, which otherwise must have been massacred without redemption. This generous conduct pierced duke Bernard to the very soul: for, after the battle was over, he tore his hair and beat his breast, like a person distracted:

Tilly the decisive blow; not but that a diversion of such a nature was at this time disagreeable to him: for having embarked his artillery on the Rhine, he had fixed his thoughts upon besieging Cologne, a place at that time meanly fortified and thinly garrisoned, but abounding in wealth; inasmuch as the whole nobility and gentry round had there deposited all their riches and valuable moveables*. The king was piqued likewise at the elector's† conduct, who had tried all collusions with him in a treaty lately proposed between them‡: which indeed was not unlikely to happen; for

I, said he, am the ignorant soldier, and Horn is the wise man.—Where is the brave and experienced camp-master general?—Alas, he is a prisoner, he is a prisoner!—and fortune has cruelly relieved me, to be walking about the world in full liberty.

The Imperialists carried Horn directly to the king of Hungary's tent, where the cardinal infant then was. He politely made an offer to kneel and kiss their hands; they both raised him, and told him they would accept the mark of his esteem, if he would perform the compliment standing. The king said he could not but congratulate himself upon overcoming, by any accident, the bravest and best man in the Swedish service: to which the general modestly replied, That fortune had been kind to him in the midst of her severity, by consigning him to such generous hands. He then retired to a tent appropriated for him, where the principal Imperial commanders paid him a visit of ceremony. Yet, in spite of these civilities, the house of Austria knew his merit too well to release him on a sudden, but kept him prisoner upon parole for eight years only. He was at length exchanged against John de Wert, whom the French had taken. Horn went directly to Paris, to return thanks to the king, who treated him most magnificently, and made him a present of a sword set with diamonds, valued at 2000*l*.

A genius like Horn could not live idle during a long imprisonment, for he composed in his solitude a *Treatise on the Duties of a complete and perfect General*. [Schefferi Memorab. Suecicæ Gentis, p. 49.] I had once hopes of procuring a transcript of this MS. which, whenever it chanced to be published, if the MS. mentioned to me proves the same, for it was only said by a German professor, that it was written by one of Gustavus's principal generals, may prove the most scientific book in the art of war.

Had Oxenstiern listened to the advice of this commander, who flew to him at Frankfurt on the occasion, it is probable the Swedes had not lost the alliance of the elector of Saxony; for that prince could not bear, that the duke de Weimar, descended from the right Saxon line, which Charles V. had displaced, should be a general in chief, and prescribe laws to him.

I shall observe, lastly, that it was always Horn's custom to mark the countenance of his men before an engagement, those near him with his naked eye, and those more remote by the help of a pocket-glass; and if he discovered any marks of irresolution in their looks, he always marched them up briskly against the enemy; alleging as a reason, that this manoeuvre gave a flow to their spirits, and infused into them a certain idea of superiority; a practice the late earl of Peterborough always copied in his Spanish campaigns, as he himself assured me, and from the same motive.

* *Brachetii Hist. nostr. temporum*, 277.

† Ferdinand; bishop of Paderborn.

‡ The plan of it is still preserved. It consisted of eleven articles; in some of which great care is taken of the protestant interests.

for that prelate, besides being strongly attached to his brother the duke of Bavaria, possessed with him the arts of dissimulation, sagacity, and intrigue, in a high degree. Of course, he had negotiated more or less with Gustavus ever since he advanced into Franconia; yet at the same time contrived the embassy which the bishop of Wurtzburg undertook to execute in France. No man was more zealous in promoting the *edict of restitution*, yet after the battle of Leipzig it was customary for him to say, "How inconsistent is *that* Imperial decree, which purposed to recover cloisters at the expence of bishopricks!" In a word, he was the first man who discovered Pappenheim's genius, and that alone shows his discernment.

Gustavus now, contrary to his original intentions, was obliged to spare him. In spite therefore of wintry torments and miry roads, he marched from Francfort to Aschaffenberg, and at length joined Horn at Gelderheim, where the combined armies amounted to 30,000 effective soldiers. Expecting, still, fresh reinforcements from the several bodies of men that acted under Banier and others, he made a visit to Wurtzburg, in company with the elector Palatine, and returned, next morning, to Kitzingen*, where he had established the general rendezvous of all his troops, cantoned in that neighbourhood.

Tilly, alarmed at these indications of a sharp campaign, apprised, likewise, that Wallstein was determined to *sacrifice* him; and that his master, the elector of Bavaria, was much dissatisfied with his late enterprise, made the best retreat he could through the Palatinate, draining all the garrisons as he passed along, in order to cover the frontiers of Bavaria with the whole force he could possibly collect. Gustavus, on the other hand, apprehensive that Wallstein might be obliged, contrary to his inclination and intentions, to form a junction with Tilly's army, determined to incapacitate the latter as soon as possible; and the rather, because Tilly began to distrust his men and his own fortune. This slight misfortune, which had befallen Horn, compelled the king not only to make a forced march, and succour his general, but induced him likewise, by imperceptible degrees, to make an irruption into Bavaria somewhat sooner than he first intended, and broke the project he had formed of besieging Cologne, investing Heidelberg

* The bishop of Wurtzburg, five years before, seized this town and signory, during the minority of the margrave of Anspach; and that prelate and his successors have had the dexterity to retain them ever since.

and

and purging the Lower Palatinate of all the Spanish forces. It remained, therefore, only for him to give the command of the army, which was to act on the Upper Rhine, to Christian count Palatine of Birkenfeld, and duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar; but these two officers greatly injured the common cause by their misunderstandings and jealousies; inso-much that Oxenstiern, supreme director in those parts, positively declared it was more expedient to entrust great military employs to men of moderate rank and parentage; since princes and persons of very noble extraction, overlooking reproof, and considering themselves as a sort of beings placed beyond the reach of soldierlike enquiries, executed just so much of the orders given them, as suited their own humours and interests.

Maximilian, perceiving the tempest to direct its course against Bavaria, once had a mind to dispatch his orders to Tilly, and command him to retire into Bohemia or Austria, which consequently would draw the war after him into the hereditary dominions. This would certainly have proved his best policy; for Walstein, upon resuming the command, must then have acted vigorously and in earnest. But the elector wanted courage, or quickness of determination, though far from being deficient in either respect, to make this *masterly diversion*, conscious of being himself the firebrand that had kindled up this dreadful blaze of war, and fearing to dismantle his own frontiers, and leave them naked to the revenge of the protestants, who considered him as the prime cause of their miseries. Ferdinand too, who had reason to be displeased with Bavarian duplicity, was perhaps not sorry to see Walstein lie by, and have the power to give his troops a moment's refreshment: and Walstein, on the other hand, was not dissatisfied to behold the two men he mortally hated, hard pressed by a victorious monarch. He therefore positively refused to join Tilly, under pretext, that his army was not yet in condition to take the field, and alledging, by way of excuse, that Gustavus would harass out and consume the Imperial forces, whose duty it was to contest the passage of so many disputable rivers as protect Bavaria on that side:—and indeed few countries in Europe are better fortified with running waters, than the electorate is in those parts through which Gustavus was obliged to make his irruption.

Thus his majesty pursued Tilly step by step, and succeeded him more times than once in the same bed, at the distance only of four and twenty hours. The city of Nuremberg, which had been always generously true to the protestant cause,

cause, received him with open arms*; entertained him sumptuously; and presented him with a pair of silver globes of a considerable size, which taught him to carry on the war, not so much in a geographical sense, for there the king wanted no lights, as in a military one, for their insides were filled with new-coined ducats; and as the Germans always love the *allusive* and *emblematical*, the concealed meaning of the present was, that the terrestrial globe implied conquest on earth, and the celestial one a crown of glory hereafter in heaven; a conception not unworthy of the very best Italian poets.

As the Imperialists had it in their power to have taken Nuremberg by storm or siege, it was thought a great omission in them to leave a town of such wealth and consequence open and defenceless to the king of Sweden. The truth of the case stood thus: Walstein was too far off, and wanted besides to embroil matters in that part of the empire; and the elector and Tilly were so alarmed that they could not spare a single man from the defence of Bavaria.

Willburg castle was directly in his majesty's way. It was so situated, had he been fortunate enough to have conquered it, as to have been highly serviceable not only to the Swedes, but to all the protestant powers in the circle of Franconia. For these reasons, the elector, some weeks before, had commanded Tilly to secure this strong pass and fortress, which he easily effected by terrifying the lawful owner, the margravine of Anspach, and her children, who maintained it only with a few soldiers and their own domestics. The king, in the most cautious and best-guarded terms, demanded this place in behalf of its natural and legal possessor; and assured the governor, he might hope for the most punctual good usage that could be imagined, with regard to his father's lands and castle, which laid just by. No arguments could prevail on a young military enthusiast of the name of Pappenheim, and only son to that general†. He very respectfully

* *Historical or Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 39.

† Though most historians call this young man Pappenheim's son, yet they have not been aware of a certain chronological difficulty. Pappenheim's first wife, Ludmilla, countess of Colorath, brought him only one child, named Wolfgang Adam, and he was born in 1618. By his second wife, Anna Elizabetha, countess of Oettingen, he had no offspring. Therefore, by this account, the young man here mentioned could be little more than thirteen years old: which makes me suspect, that the person in question was a nephew of the general. That there lurks some concealed mistake, is plain, because other historians call him young Tilly, whereas that commander was never married.

respectfully sent his majesty word, *That the ruins of Wilburg-castle should be his monument.* Gustavus believed him on his father's account, and for the first time took the answer of a governor of a town in part of payment.

Banier, during this delay of two days, invested Neuburg, the residence of the duke who bears that title; but having summoned the commander, and received a positive refusal, he marched away without loss of time. Gustavus made himself very merry with the conduct of his general, and asked him, *if he thought to take a city by a paltry epistle**† Nevertheless, the town was soon afterwards evacuated voluntarily by Tilly's troops. His majesty had reason to be afflicted, for he was not really angry, at Banier's disappointment. He in truth, was not strong enough to besiege Neuburg in form, nor was there time to spare, because the possession of it, at that juncture, would have given free entrance into Bavaria, and saved the passage of the Lech.

As the sharpness of this winter, which happened to be uncommonly severe, gave no check to the operations of war, so of course it put no stop to the briskness of negotiating and intriguing. Cardinal Palman, to whom Wallstein was nearly related by marriage, crossed the Alps to make a second effort in Italy, charged with an abundance of invectives, and prepared to harangue on the stupendous progress of our protestant hero, who, to use the orator's own words, was determined to extirpate the whole catholic religion; tear up the very foundation of the sacred see; and invade Italy itself in the character of another Attila. It was suggested likewise, that the king of Spain had neglected Italy, the Low Countries, and both the Indies, in order to support the catholic religion; so that its subversion, in case such an unfortunate event should ever take place, must be attributed only to the lukewarmness and inattention of Christ's viceregent†. Under this ambassador extraordinary, acted, likewise, as resident ambassador, and not *pro tempore*, the duke de Savelli; dispatched by the emperor on the same errand, and now fulfilling Gustavus's prediction, that

Pappenheim's son, in the year 1647, was shot through the arm and heart in a duel, by general Goltz, whom he challenged at Colloredo's table, for speaking disrespectfully of his friend, serjeant-major-general Sperreüter. Coloredo placed guards at the town-gates, to prevent any ill consequence, for no duel could be fought in a camp, or where the commander in chief resided, but the combatants conveyed themselves down the ramparts, and sent their horses privately into the fields. Christopher count Wallstein, and colonel Schevaliski, were their seconds. *Waffenbergii Florus* Germ. p. 800.

* *Suedisch Intelligencer*, part ii. 140.

† *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 243.

that he would become the flashed doublet better than the cuirass. With both these the Spanish minister concurred vigorously; and Borgia, who, if I mistake not, was then cardinal-secretary, gave them all the assistance in his power; for the court of Madrid had lately purchased his friendship by bestowing on him the archbishopric of Seville, a slight retaining fee, which amounted to something more than £.30,000. a year. Eleven Spanish and Italian cardinals attended the Austrian ambassadors to the Vatican on the day of audience, but the Pope would not allow them to be present. After a full discussion of arguments on either side, it appeared, that the opinions of the conclave were divided; which enraged the Spanish faction to such a degree, that Pasman took the liberty to give vent to his passions in an oration equally furious and unguarded. The Pope, who was secretly inclinable to the opposite side of the question, felt himself hurt to hear his conduct so severely scrutinized in public assembly by a cardinal; and told Pasman in reply, that the emperor fairly merited all the difficulties that had befallen him, having wasted both his treasures and his troops by carrying an unjust war into Italy: otherwise, he might have chastised Gustavus at his own leisure, and upon his own terms. That stories of Alarics and Attilas might serve very well to embellish a romance; and as for the irruptions of Goths and Vandals, without going back to Procopius and other antient historians, he could suggest an instance of more recent date to the house of Austria, that happened only in the preceding century; during the fury of which, all Italy was desolated, and Rome itself sacked and plundered. He observed likewise, that the processions of Charles V. in Spain, where liberty was the pretext, whilst the knife was held to his throat, had added solemn mockery to determined injustice; and convinced mankind, that ambition passed precipitately over all bounds; and that the barbarians of the north were not the only enemies of Christ's church*, That for his own part, he knew his duty, and took care to perform it; and for these reasons did not greatly relish any invectives against his conduct and government; and added lastly, which appears to be a very extraordinary effort of indignation, That the *protestant Vijigoth*, to carry on Pasman's allusion, shewed less spirit of persecution than the *catholic Casar*, since the wars of Gustavus affected neither the consciences of men,

* *Fr. Spanheim, Soldat Sued. 342.*

nor the altars of the Supreme Being; and that fewer outrages, and acts of rapine and cruelty, had been committed since the battle of Leipfic, than had been perpetrated in Italy, at and after the siege of Mantua. Thence recurring to his own conduct, he remarked briefly, That to traduce his administration was easy; to arraign, and convict it, extremely difficult.

The holy father having thus disburthened his mind, by giving vent to his private opinions, frankly made an offer of some pecuniary assistance to the emperor, though much inferior to what the court of Vienna expected. However he excused himself by setting forth the enormous expences in which the Mantuan war had involved him; and this being too true, the Imperial party made no attempts to invalidate his assertion. Nevertheless, for decency's sake, he thought fit to make up the deficiency of money by spiritual bounty, and of course appointed an universal jubilee, made a procession in person to the churches of St. Peter, and St. John de Lateran, and published a brief, wherein he exhorted all catholic princes to extirpate heresy, and unite in the bond of friendship against the common enemy. The Imperial deputies declared roundly, that this sort of paper-credit would neither wage war, nor pay the soldiery *.

Antony baron de Rabata, governor of Gradisca, counsellor and chamberlain to the emperor, had been dispatched to the princes and republics of Italy on the same errand, and under the patronage of Vienna and Madrid: but the Doge and senate of Venice gave him fine speeches instead of subsidies, alledging, as the Pope had urged before, that the Mantuan war had entirely discomposed the state of their finances; so that the two goddesses of the Megarensians, which then presided in the Venetian government, namely, *Poverty* and *Impossibility*, restrained them absolutely from imparting any supplies to his Imperial majesty. The latent truth was, the republic had entered into a good understanding with Gustavus some months before †. The common-wealths of Genoa and Lucca held the same language: nevertheless, the grand duke of Tuscany, allured with the hopes of being created king of Etruria ‡, made a promise of actual assistances, proportionate to his circumstances, though perhaps not adequate to the necessities of his friends; and the duke of Modena engaged likewise to send some troops,

* *Fr. Spanheim, Soldat Sued. 344.*

† *Cheimitii Bellum Sueco Germanicum, tom. i. 244.*

‡ *Idem. Ibid.*

or conduct them himself. When Rabata made his entrance into Mantua, the populace rose with an intention to murder him. The duke composed the tumult with great moderation, and pointing in dumb show to the ruins occasioned by the last siege, gave the ambassador to understand that all he could hope was to retreat in safety.

Meanwhile Gustavus, as Tilly had retired from the Upper Palatinate into Bavaria, and broken down all the bridges on the Danube, from Rayne to Neuburg, except only that of Donawert, over which he passed his army, foreseeing wisely, that a young enthusiast, like Pappenheim, might create some untoward check in the progress of his affairs, resolved at once to leave Willburg-castle to the chance of accidents *, and invest Donawert with all possible expedition, as Tilly was then labouring to erect a formidable fortification on a little hill near the town. So that if by an extraordinary effort he had not prevented this work from advancing to any tolerable degree of perfection, it is probable, in case of receiving a repulse, he must have marched seventy miles to Ulm, no road being passable for the main army, at that season, but by way of Nordlingen, in order to have crossed the Danube at the place first mentioned. Donawert therefore was of great consequence to the king, not barely in point of proximity, but as the passage has ever been considered the key of admission into that part of Suabia which leads to Bavaria, across the Lech. Of course, having reviewed his army, and received duke William of Weimar's reinforcement, he advanced thirty miles, from Willburg to Donawert, in a day and a half, and contrived to take the town and cloister of Kayfersheim, a rich abbey of Cisterians, as he passed along.

Rodolphus duke of Saxe Lauenberg, the same who had rescued Tilly at the battle of Leipzig, commanded the garrison, then in Donawert, consisting of 1200 regular foot, a body of trained-bands, and some companies of Cronenberg's dragoons. His majesty having made himself master of an important outwork, to the north-east, from whence the defendants retired into the town by means of a concealed gallery, dispatched a trumpeter to summon the governor to capitulate. He returned only this short answer, That the king, better than any person living, knew the duty of a set of men, who had nothing to rely on but honour and the

* The king left a garrison at Weissenberg, which stands about a mile from Willburg, under the command of colonel Sperreüter, to prevent young Pappenheim's incursions.

point of the sword: and that he had no tribute to pay his majesty, except in gunpowder*. Upon this, both parties performed their respective business with great earnestness. The garrison made a very furious sally, and one company of Cronenberg's men penetrated half through the Swedish lines. In repulsing this sally, the commanding officer, a Scotlman, behaved ill; but Gustavus pardoned him at the intercession of his countrymen, having first degraded him. The battery, consisting of twenty huge pieces of cannon, which the king raised on the north-east side, only shivered the bridge sideways, without performing such execution as was first expected; two circumstances which induced him, at Hepburn's suggestion, to consider the situation of the town with more attention. Observing to the westward an angle of ground formed by the influx of the Wernitz into the Danube, which angle commanded the bridge that crossed the latter river, and leads to Bavaria, for Donawert stands on the northern bank; he, without delay, gave Hepburn orders to march his own brigade five miles up the Wernitz, where was the bridge of Hasfort, and then descending along the opposite shore, to post his men in the angle of confluence after such a manner, as to command the Danube-bridge by his field-pieces, and even his musquetry; which position made it difficult for the besieged either to escape or receive succours. Hepburn, who took with him lord Craven, Maffam, and all the English volunteers, conducted his men, in silence, to the place appointed, and lodged them a little after midnight along the garden-walls, ditches, and hedges, flanking the passage across the river. The governor, perceiving himself invested on every side, grew inwardly discontented, and wished to capitulate; Tilly at that time not being able to raise the siege. However, as he was not satisfied with the thoughts of surrendering upon dishonorable terms, he conceived a sudden resolution, as the breach to the north-east was now rendered assaultable, to pass the bridge on the king's side at break of day the next morning, in despite of all the Swedish musquetry and artillery. This design however got wind, for the Swedes overheard a hurry in the town, and the loading of baggage-waggons about midnight. The duke, it is true, passed the bridge, but saved only a handful of men, for the fire that he sustained was very severe. The residue of the gar-

* *Swed. Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 135—138. *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 254.

rison,

ison, having first made an unsuccessful sally at the Wernitz-gate, attempted to cross the bridge on Hepburn's side, who gave them also a soldierlike reception. Nevertheless, they cleared their passage at all events, and contrived to break the bridge behind them in an imperfect manner, and barricadoed the town-gate with numberless loads of dung, the removal of which cost the Swedes so much time, that the rear of the garrison secured their escape, losing however upon the whole not less than 500 men. Meanwhile the king stormed the town walls and Leathern-tower [*Lederthor*] sword in hand; and as many baggage-waggons stood laden in the streets, it was with great difficulty he could restrain his soldiers from pillaging them, and the whole city; which, according to the usage of war, was looked upon in the right of fair plunder. The king then secured the north banks of the Danube as far as Ulm.

Thus the town of Donawert was besieged and taken in forty-eight hours, though strongly garrisoned, and situated on a steep hill; and the loss was considered the more ominous, as it happened to fall into the hands of the Swedes on the elector of Bavaria's birthday. This city, once Imperial, had been placed under the ban of the empire in 1606, and at length regained its civil and religious liberties, by the means of the great protestant deliverer, Gustavus. Solmes's regiment of infantry, which had behaved so ill in the late action at Bamberg, was placed there by way of garrison; for the king did not chuse to trust that body of troops in the day of battle. He then returned Hepburn public thanks, for suggesting the idea of crossing the Wernitz, and for executing his plan with such judgment and valour.

No sooner was the town of Donawert taken, but the king ordered this officer to throw up a strong half-moon, and intrench his brigade at the foot of the bridge, next Bavaria; and then dispatched the Bohemian baron Cochtitzki, at the head of some chosen cavalry and dragoons, to pursue the fugitives. His majesty reposed himself at Donawert four days, partly to prepare matters for the great incident now approaching, and partly to restore and new fortify this important passage, as a safe and secure key of retreat, in case of disappointments or disasters. Yet the bulk of the army was not idle; for such as did not act the part of engineers, pioneers, and mechanics, made incursions into Swabia, where many towns of consequence, some of which belonged to the emperor, were all taken sword in hand; as Guntzburg, the capital of the Burgau, the rich abbey of Elchingen, Gundel-
fingen,

Eugen, Lauingen, Hochstadt*, Dillingen, where the bishop of Augsburg usually resides, and Kirchberg; besides a strong castle on the banks of the Lech, called, if I mistake not, Oberndorf, belonging to the rich family of the Fuggers. In this enterprise Hepburn commanded; and though the place was well supplied and strongly fortified, yet the garrison was seized with a sudden panic, and mostly perished in attempting to escape.

During this interval of repose, as matters now began to wear a very serious aspect, a trumpeter was sent blindfolded to the king, with orders to solicit letters of safe-conduct for the French ambassador then residing at Munich. At first Gustavus gave him a positive refusal; but knowing his own firmness, and determined not to suffer his generosity to be abused a second time, he at length consented. This ambassador was named St. Etienne. Nature had given him a plentiful portion of national vivacity; and it is probable, likewise, he presumed too much upon being nearly related to father Joseph, who held a correspondence with Gustavus and Oxenstiern. One day he had the confidence to tell the king, that if he did not spare the catholic princes, his most Christian majesty would be obliged to march an army into Germany, in order to support them; since they had all expressed an earnest desire to shelter themselves under the protection of France. *Agreed*, replied Gustavus, thoroughly exasperated; *nevertheless, the king, your master, may spare himself the trouble of a long journey into Germany: let him only express a desire to make a campaign against me, and I will treat him with a battle under the walls of his own metropolis.*

France and her ministry still persisted to interfere under one pretext or other; and therefore some few days after these conferences†, a treaty‡ was proposed between Louis XIII. and the elector of Triers, by virtue of which the former engaged, not only to assist the said elector against all his enemies, but oblige the Swedes to evacuate the electorate of Triers and bishopric of Spire, which belonged likewise to this prelate. In order thoroughly to understand an affair so intricate, it may not be amiss to remind the reader, that France had long languished

* There are many towns of this name in Germany; but here the duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene gained a complete victory over the French and Bavarians, Aug. 13, 1704.

† April 9, 1632, at Ehrenbreitstein, otherwise Hermanstein.

‡ See the APPENDIX, Art. XXVIII. First Edition, 4^o.

to receive this electorate under her patronage, and for this purpose had dispatched the count de Brullon to Triers, just to sow the seeds of those future incidents, which La Saludie* was now commanded to bring to maturity.

Indeed the elector, out of fervent zeal for the interests of the catholic league, had reduced himself into a very precarious as well as dangerous situation; for the Spaniards possessed Coblentz, and most of the strong places in his dominions; and though Gustavus, at the intercession of France, during the negotiation of the truce, had generously restored to him the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, yet that monarch, now, enraged to the heart at the barbarous murder of a young count Solmes, cut to pieces, together with his followers, by a party of electoral troops, made no scruple to declare, in the transports of his resentment, that he would dislodge the elector in person from his castle, then supposed to be impregnable. Dismayed and astonished at these menaces, the elector remained some days in a state of irresolution; when at length the French minister revived his spirits, by advising him to address a letter to Gustavus, wherein, far from discovering signs of fear, or demeaning himself by abject humiliations, it was his interest to throw out some indirect, but intelligible insinuations, with reference to the interposition and protection of a certain power behind the scene†. What reception these representations found with Gustavus, and what sort of answer he returned to them, has been already mentioned. It may be enough to observe, that the king's reply was of such a nature, as threw the elector into the greatest perplexities, and obliged him to offer Richelieu a piece of blank paper, with authority to write upon it what conditions he pleased. How far the cardinal either presumed, or intended to go, cannot well be ascertained; for that he dreaded Gustavus is a circumstance known beyond contradiction; nevertheless, he thought he had an opening to effect somewhat, and conceived an hope of availing himself more or less from the elector's terrors. This expectation was purely chimerical; for France, during the life of Gustavus, never once overreached, or extorted any advantage from him, except by importuning his good nature and his generosity; which, considering Richelieu's abilities, is saying as much as needs be said in behalf of our hero.

Thus, all that resulted from a connexion so extremely hazardous and delicate, was only this, that the elector pub-

* Louis de Briançon de la Saludie, maître de camp et plenipotentiaire, &c.

† Hist. de *le Vafför*, tom. vii. 148.

lished a manifesto to justify his conduct for placing himself under the protection of France: and indeed one may see the style of Versailles branch itself out like so many political veins through the whole surface of the composition. The cardinal, besides obtaining that the castle of Ehrenbreitstein should be put into the hands of a French garrison, had still some views behind a counter-scene, which he hoped to unfold one time or other; for he knew Gustavus not to be *immortal*, and then expected, if he survived him, to take the cards into his own hands. Though this foundation may seem at first to be merely chance-work; yet it was laid deeply underground and out of sight. France, from the event which resulted from this, has ever had the same sort of expectancies in view. In the present case, and from such a seemingly narrow ground-plot, it has raised the superstructure of Alsace, Lorraine, &c.

Having so often mentioned the two electors of Cologn and Triers, it may seem surprizing, that such little notice has hitherto been taken of the third ecclesiastical elector, the archbishop of Mentz. The truth was, the king had disarmed this prelate by taking possession of most of his territories; so that it no where appears that France considered him as an object worthy to be inveigled or cajoled; nor did she solicit his assistance in the great plan relating to a neutrality.

It is probable too, that Richelieu looked upon him, not only as an enthusiast and bigot, but as a devoted friend to the courts of Vienna and Munich; and thus much is certain, that the elector, finding himself in such ill plight after the loss of his capital, wished extremely to behold a general pacification, and of his own free motive requested the emperor to permit him to lay some plan of that nature before Gustavus*, who returned him such conditions, as we have formerly mentioned in the two rough draughts, that were transmitted to the perusal of all the catholic potentates then concerned.

By the taking of Donawert, and securing a free passage over the Danube, Tilly soon perceived his Swedish majesty's real intentions against Bavaria; and therefore, with all possible expedition, broke down a second bridge, then in his power, which crossed that river between Neuburg and Rayne, and destroyed likewise a third bridge which leads over the Lech, at a small distance from the latter town. On the possession of this important entrance into Bavaria, the king

* *Vittorio Siri*; *Memoire reconditte*, tom. vii. page 457, 458.

had set his mind, from the very instant he crossed the Danube at Donawert, and dispatched the flower of his dragoons and commanded musqueteers to take a position there, for he had escaped the perilous undertaking of forcing his passage across the Lech. Tilly knew too well the extraordinary consequence of this inlet to Munich, and, as he had the power in his hands, prevented the enterprise on the part of the king, to whom this consolation remained, that he had not lost a single moment in attempting to make good what he had projected*. Tilly then cantoned his troops in lesser and greater divisions, all along the Bavarian side, between the Lech and the Aach, from Rayne to Augsborg, both which places he garrisoned, and extended himself in good order on the banks opposite the Swedes for the space of sixteen miles. Foreseeing principally where his majesty would make the grand attempt, he erected some huge batteries, and intrenched the larger part of his chosen and veteran soldiery.

His majesty's first attempt was to repair the bridge, that had been fresh broken down near Rayne; but this undertaking, through the intervention of some unforeseen difficulties, was rejected almost in the same moment it was conceived. Thence bending his course towards Augsborg, he employed many hours, attended only by a friend or two, in contemplating the approaches to the river, and the circumstances of landing, and making a lodgment, as well as forming an attack on the side opposite to him; finding at length, to his own mortification, as well as Tilly's honour, that the old general had erected his batteries, and intrenched his men precisely over-against that segment of a circle, in the middle part of whose arch it was resolved to throw over a bridge. Here a new obstruction appeared; for the king foresaw, at first glance, from the torrent-like rapidity of the stream, and height and inequality of its banks, that his own portable bridges could be made use of with no great prospect of success. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of his army, he made one experiment, which verified his conjectures with too much truth. Having therefore intrenched his men under the protection of a strong parapet along the bank, and fixed his more general encampment behind them near Northeim, he erected three batteries, consisting of seventy-two huge pieces of cannon†, one in the center of the

* *Burgi Mars Sueco Germ.* 171. 24°. Leod. 1633.

† *Santa Cruz* remarks, with admiration, that Gustavus passed the Lech by generalship; for having, says he, erected a battery of seventy,

the segment, and the two others at the extremities of the arch; which latter position gave him great advantages over his adversaries; for their artillery could be raised only on a straight line, and that of the Swedes half-flanked them, and raked them sideways, when the grand engagement came on. Thus, during an uninterrupted cannonade of four days duration, the king brought his new scheme to tolerable perfection. At a little village called Obernsdorf, situated in a concealed and sheltered valley at the distance of about half a mile from the place intended to be crossed, he employed all his artificers to build a fabric, on a principle of his own invention, adapted to the nature of the river; and as the case was urgent, as well as important, found himself compelled to pull down all the gentlemen's houses, farms, and villages round him, in order to procure an addition of useful and solid timber. Meanwhile at the hazard of his life, for the fire of artillery and musquetry never ceased on Tilly's side, he employed himself every hour, in examining the banks, slopes, and winding of the stream; and spared neither money nor preferments, to gain intelligence of the variation of depth in that part of the channel where he intended to pass.


There are few rivers of the same size, whose passage appears so difficult as that of the Lech. I speak this from ocular observation. It takes its rise in the country of the Grisons, and, at the time of year when the king crossed it, partakes more of the nature of a torrent than of the river, for it is swollen with melted snow-waters from its very source. It measures forty yards across at the point, between Rayne and Thierhaupten, where the bridge was erected, and the bank on the Swedish side was about eleven feet higher than the bank opposite; where for a small space the ground was tolerably firm, and then declined gently into a morass knee-deep in slime and water, on the right-hand hardly passable, and guarded on the left, where the soil rose a little, with thick beds of osiers. This morass being once cleared, nor was the passage long, the land mounted with an easy ascent to Tilly's intrenchments.

But the construction and fixing of the bridge appeared more difficult to his majesty than the fighting part. He greatly disliked the inequality of the banks in respect of height, which

[seventy-two] large pieces of cannon over against the main body of the Imperialists, and thundered upon them several hours, he crossed the river at a place unexpected, and intrenched himself before he could be observed, *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques, traduites de l'Espagnol de M. le Marq. de Santa Cruz de Marzenado, tom. ii. 238.*

which rendered a bridge of boats or pontoons highly inconvenient, if not entirely useless: and he likewise knew, that the bed of the river was a sort of cone inverted: which intelligence he procured by various artifices, one in particular extremely curious; nevertheless, I shall decline relating it, having some doubts concerning the authenticity of the narrative*.

Being now informed, in some degree, of the depth and shape of the channel, he contrived, in the next place, a set of treffels of various heights, and with unequal feet; their form in general, as here represented.



These were firmly secured to strong piles, driven deep into the bottom of the river. The planks then were spread over the whole, and well fastened.

To lay this bridge in sight of an intrenched army of equal force, and better supplied with large artillery, was a second difficulty still remaining, which demanded, at one and the same time, feints and illusions of all sorts, precautions, and activity, as well as prudence and intrepidity.

Of course the king posted 1000 commanded musqueteers behind a parapet of mould and turf on each side of the intended bridge, who, to prevent Tilly's people from approaching to procure intelligence of what was contriving, maintained an uninterrupted fire day and night. He then opened two large batteries at convenient distance from the point where he proposed to cross the river, and from these furiously thundered on the Bavarian camp without intermission. Nor was his artillery idle in other places; it was only contracted in its extent, and divided into smaller parcels.

Meanwhile, to augment the confusion and perplex the eye-sight, he ordered little fires to be kindled in pits near the batteries, which were constantly fed with smoky combustibles of pitch and green wood.

Tilly suspected something, but knew not what; nor did he cease to flatter himself, at intervals, in case the erection of a bridge was supposed to be practicable, that the king would

* It is to be seen in the *Memoirs of a Cavalier*, 8vo. Printed at Leeds, in Yorkshire, about the year 1740.

hardly presume to cross a river; clear a morass; and ascend a hill; under the eyes of an intrenched army of equal force, and supported with a train of artillery as considerable as his own, or more so.

To form a better judgment of the catholic general's situation, it may be convenient to observe, that the ground on Tilly's side, bating a small swampy tract of soil, rose by degrees to a moderate hill, covered here and there with shrubs and large thorn trees; and about midway between the foot of the hill and Tilly's main body were intrenched two considerable corps of infantry in a line parallel to the royal camp. Behind them crept a little rivulet in form of a bow, the bent part towards the Swedes, within which the artillery was planted. Its effects were felt on the opposite side of the Lech. After that succeeded a wood, which skirted up to a considerable height; in the front of which, the shrubby part being cleared in certain spaces, and the timber-trees felled, and interlaced by way of defence in front and flank, were posted six bodies of chosen infantry, amounting to about 8000 men. The residue of the foot was disposed judiciously here and there; and the horse, on a more remote line, formed two wings at a distance on either side, in like manner as the Swedish cavalry was disposed, each of these parties being removed out of the reach of cannon-shot.

The king had some misgivings with reference to the enterprise he had determined to undertake*; and therefore, which was a sort of practice he rarely dealt in, convened all his generals to a council of war, in order to collect their several opinions. Horn, most ready to execute, as well as most cautious to resolve, of any commander in the Swedish service, made strong remonstrances against attempting to pass the Lech; and the major part of the superior officers concurred with him: for he urged the difficulties both of the banks and bed of the river, and represented the force and quantity of Tilly's battering artillery. He remarked, in the next place, that a repulse or defeat would raise the drooping spirits of the Bavarians, and bring Wallstein on the back of the Swedes, in a country full of rivers, where it was next to impossible, at one pass or other, to decline a battle; and therefore proposed, with all due deference and submission, to secure and fortify the frontier towns, both in the Upper Palatinate and Bohemia, till that period shamefully neglected by the elector of Saxony.—By

* *Vittorio Siri*; *Memoire reconditte*, tom. vii. p. 459—461. *Le Vasseur*, tom. vii. 163, 164.

these means it would not lie in Walstein's power to force the king's troops into a decisive engagement. He remarked further, that the Imperial generalissimo, whose immense preparations, not yet advanced to a state of maturity, were, in the end, likely to become extremely formidable, ought to be crushed first.—Wherefore upon the whole, it appeared best to him, to march directly into Moravia, and destroy the present and future hopes of the house of Austria all at once*.

Whoever understands the characters of men, and state of history at this period, will be inclined, probably, to think with me, that the drift of these reasonings seems to proceed upon the same principle, which Oxenstiern, Horn's father-in-law, urged to Gustavus, when he entered Franconia instead of Bohemia.

The king loved Horn, whose great talents he honoured, as well as his integrity, and heard him patiently; but at length replied, with a good deal of fire, *That the enterprise was less difficult than appeared at first sight: and that the very best veteran troops that ever existed, had always some misgivings after a total overthrow. Fortune, said he, is the guardian-angel to men of heroic resolution;—and Donauwert is a sure retreat in case of disaster.——Nor let it ever be said, that Gustavus declined any enemy, who fled before him;—since a delay, precaution or digression of that nature would be instructing, and enabling an old and experienced general to reinforce and re-establish an army, ill provided for, at the present juncture, and extremely weakened. Walstein likewise is removed from us at a great distance, and has many lessons still to infuse into his soldiers.——In a word, let us cross this barrier, mistakenly supposed to be impassable. Behold, the expected land of plenty lies open to us! A land, which has carefully been nurtured in peace and wealth for twelve continued years, whilst the whole Germanic empire has been more than once ravaged and devoured from one end to the other†.*

Thus the king gave his opinion, or rather part of his opinion, as a man of spirit, without entering into the discussions of a philosopher. Indeed it is probable he saw the thing in lights which Horn did not; or embraced his own scheme from a high persuasion of success; and the rather, as the undertaking was compendious, enterprising, and full of glory; it being a maxim with him, as well as Pappenheim, *That it was possible to execute many achievements in war, merely because the generality of mankind supposed them impracticable.*

* *Le Féfor*, tom. vii. p. 163.

† *Bertius de Bellis German.* p. 324. *Siri Mem. Rec.* tom. vii. 459.

Putting

Putting these considerations out of the question, whoever has had opportunities to observe the rapidity of this river at the time of the *vernal equinox**, as was my fortune, and takes notice of the steepness and inequality of its banks; the irregularity of the channel-depth; the exposure of the bridge in front and flanks; the intrenchments and batteries on the opposite side; the continued slope of ground rising immediately from the Bavarian bank to the forest trees that crowned the whole; not to mention a morass knee-deep in ooze and water, must, I think, confess, that this was the most *daring*, as well as *brightest* action in the military life of Gustavus, and such as has never yet been surpassed by any general, antient or modern.

And now, Thursday morning, April the 5th, whilst the balls of the side-batteries, which stood at the extremities of a bow, for such figure the Lech there formed, met in an angle, and tore every thing to pieces at 150 yards distance, the king, under favour of a smoke and fire inexpressible, passed over, after frequent attempts, in two boats which he had procured, some chosen engineers, pioneers, and soldiers, who made a lodgment; and, what was of still greater consequence, threw up several mounds of earth; one to protect the mouth of the bridge from the direct fire of Tilly's ordnance, and two side parapets to guard its flanks from such batteries as he might occasionally erect upon a change of circumstances. To encourage these first undertakers, he made each man a present of about thirty shillings English.

Previous matters being thus adjusted, all hands united to fix the bridge, and when the morning began to grow tolerably bright, Tilly beheld this astonishing attempt, but at the same time knew not how to counterwork it. To dislodge these new comers appeared impossible, on account of the unmerciful fire of the Swedish batteries; and it was foreseen too, that such an undertaking must have brought on, by degrees, one general carnage. It remained therefore only for him to raise two batteries against the sides of the bridge; and here appeared a new inconveniency; for not to mention the parapets, which the Swedes had cast up, the bank on the Bavarian side, though inferior in height to that on the Swedish, yet at the same time rose higher than the morass beneath it, and obstructed the aim of the gunners, as well as the passage of their balls.

* This river, at the vernal equinox, without the falling of great rains, is swollen very much by the melting of snow on the Alps; but if rains happen to fall, which was the case in April 1632, its waters then rise in a great degree.

On these accounts Tilly chose rather to undertake the defensive part, and having given orders to erect an half-moon in front, commanded his pioneers to deepen and widen the lines of his intrenchments, and employed all other hands he could spare, in hewing down a breast-work of large trees, interlacing them one with another, and sharpening the branches near the trunk into a sort of *chevaux de frise*. So that when the king heard the noise of the saws and axes, he directed all his gunners to give them in the wood one general salutation from the whole train of artillery by way of morning-compliment.

In the space of a few hours the machinery of the bridge was fixed, the surface planked and roughened, and the sides guarded: which happened to be effected the more speedily, as the king's Finlanders could all exercise the business of carpenters, as in their native country each man was his own mechanic.

It was the king's first care to relieve the pioneers and soldiers across the river; and then the colonels Wrangel * and Gassion had the honour to pass the bridge at the head of such a body of troops as was supposed to be necessary. Part of them filled the new intrenchment, and the rest, being all commanded musqueteers, lined the other bed on the left hand, where they performed wonders in the heat of the conflict. When Gustavus contemplated the bridge, and ground on either side, he declared in a whisper to some of the generals, that stood near him, *That he would compound for a victory at the expense of one thousand excellent soldiers*†.

Yet though he felt for his brave associates, he discovered no dismay with respect to himself; but, on the contrary, continued on the foot of the bridge for *six* and *thirty* hours, without intermission. Meanwhile Tilly erected two new batteries near the banks of the river, in order to enfilade the flanks of the bridge; but though the theory was good, the executive part proved ineffectual.

During this interval, his majesty conveyed one half of his army, cavalry as well as infantry, across the Lech, though many good officers, friends as well as enemies, had publicly declared, that the enterprise was not feasible, at the head of a fewer body of troops than one hundred thousand‡. Upon this, Tilly commanded the flower of his forces to give

* Charles Gustavus Wrangel afterwards commanded the Swedish army which entered Bavaria, Anno 1646, in conjunction with Turenne.

† *Swedish Intelligence* says 2000, part ii. 147.

‡ *Heylmanni Leo Artibus*.

the

the Swedes battle before they could form, and no less a person than Aldringer undertook the employment. Part likewise of the dragoons that served under Aldringer received orders from the generalissimo to pass between the oser bed and the king's cavalry, with full directions to possess the mouth of the bridge at all hazards, and preclude reinforcements one way, and the power of retreating another.

When Aldringer, then general of the artillery, descended the hill, he found the Swedish discipline to be such, that the troops could form by the beat of a drum. He hoped likewise, that their ardour might have pushed them on to have given him the meeting half way. There, however, the king imposed his negative, expecting wonders from the two new raised batteries, which were erected not only as a feint to conceal the construction of the bridge, but with the express view to cut through and through the Bavarians obliquely, whenever the great conflict should begin.

Aldringer conducted the attack without dismay: but the fire, especially from the two batteries, was so fierce and uninterrupted, that it was impossible for the dispute to hold long. Some of the cavalry made a desperate effort to seize the bridge, according to instructions; but attempting to file between the grofs of the Swedish forces and the bed of osiers, which Tilly supposed to have been a vacant space left open by inadvertency, they received such continued volleys from the musqueteers concealed therein, that, in spite of all their endeavours, they were broken immediately. His majesty was not literally in this action; his prudence kept the ascendancy over his vivacity; and therefore with great coolness he planted himself at the foot of the bridge, on the Bavarian side, partly to give the troops their instructions with precision, as they passed over; and partly to take care, that not a single Swede, who had already crossed the river, should attempt to retreat.

Aldringer still pressed on, the second time, with a resolution, bordering upon downright rashness; but a cannon-ball grazed upon his temples, and he was removed senseless off the field of battle. This stroke was the more fatal, as it ever afterwards discomposed the best head-piece, for memorials and invectives, then in the empire*.

Now came the great Tilly's inevitable hour. He perceived, that no man could replace Aldringer except himself, and descending from the wood with a fresh body of his old

* *Le Blanc*: Hist. de Bavière, tom. iv. p. 374. 12°. A Par. 1680.
Burgun-

Burgundians, renewed the attack, in a manner well becoming his last efforts; for whenever a regiment gave way, he seized the colours, and advanced towards the enemy*; nor could the troops desert an aged general, who had been victorious in thirty-six pitched battles and signal engagements, and who carried the marks of more than fifty campaigns in his own person. In a less space than twenty minutes, he received a stroke on the knee from a falconet shot†, which weighed about three pounds; and swooning away several times, from the agony of the fracture, as well as contusion, was removed out of the battle to Ingolstadt, in the elector's own coach. To augment the general consternation, two considerable parties of Finland horse, impatient to see their brethren engaged on the opposite banks, plunged into the river like men possessed, and crossed it by swimming; upon which event, joined to the former, and the rather, as evening began to approach, the Bavarian forces broke away imperceptibly, and the Swedes having gained and secured their passage, remained in their own station, without advancing, by order of the king; who contented himself, at the close of the evening, to march over the bridge, at the head of his own regiment of guards, and pass the night on the Bavarian side.

All this time his electoral highness continued over-cautiously in the wood, at some distance from the sharpness of the fire. Though generalissimo of the troops, he durst not take the command upon him, but posted away to Ingolstadt somewhat unbecomingly, and left good part of the troops, especially cavalry that laid remote, and who knew nothing of their general's misfortune, to shift for themselves. It brings to mind a parallel passage in history: When Justinian was wounded, and obliged to be carried from the walls of Constantinople, the emperor retired, and the whole garrison lost its courage. Yet this did not happen at the battle of Lutzen, where every Swedish colonel was in part a general, and one half of the common soldiers deserved to be colonels; and all of whom fought more furiously, merely because their king was dead.

* *Burgi Mars Sueco* Germ. p. 175.

† *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri*. 4^o. 372.—*Bongean*, and the author of the *Annals of the Empire*, whom I will not suppose to be M. de V. give him this wound in the retreat, whereas the Swedes never pursued him. [Tom. i. p. 237.] Bongean says likewise, that Gustavus employed *three* days in constructing and erecting the bridge, instead of *two*; since by the diary it appears, that he began it April 3, and crossed it on the 5th, early in the morning.

Thus

Thus ended the battle of the Lech, though the king as yet knew nothing of Tilly's misfortune. With regard to this transaction, it may be remarked, that the armies on either side were nearly equal, as were the trains likewise of battering artillery; for the king had seventy-two large pieces of cannon, and Tilly seventy: but, in point of management, the Swedish engineers were greatly superior; and it was in this respect that Torstenson, then general of the ordnance, gained that great reputation, which he maintained afterwards in every other branch of military knowledge. So that the more clear-sighted in the art of war ascribe this victory to three co-operating causes; *one*, the result of good sense, and *two*, the product of invention and genius. Under the former head, they consider the extraordinary *celerity* wherewith the king performed his business; and under the latter, his superior abilities in point of *gunnery*, and the *construction* of a bridge made precisely for the river Lech, and no other. Nor was it uncommon at that time for learned men to observe, that the passage of the Lech was far superior to that of the Granic; and that Gustavus's architecture in the channel of the river was more difficult to execute than that of Julius Cæsar across the Rhine; inasmuch as the one, even after the discovery of cannon, effected in two days, what the other could hardly perform in the space of ten; and certain it is, that the intervention of artillery, to say the least of it, may be demonstrated to counterbalance that difference of breadth, which is to be found in the two rivers, the Lech and the Rhine.

The action lasted about six hours, but was much sharper than that at Leipsic. What numbers the king lost has never appeared, yet from the nature of circumstances he could not suffer so much as the army of the league; because, as Tilly intrenched himself behind a large number of forest trees, he lost many men in one uninterrupted cannonade of six and thirty hours duration, merely from the flying shivers and splinters of the timber. All that we know is, that a count Merodé, and several brave officers were killed and wounded; and one thousand Bavarians left dead on the spot.

Upon the whole, from all that appears at this distance, Tilly would have done better, provided such conduct had not disheartened his followers, to have left the bridge and passage free to his Swedish majesty, without contesting them*: for, had he spared himself his descent from the

* *Monro's Exped.* ii. p. 120.

eminence,

eminence, enlarged and deepened his lines, interlacing them well with the forest-trees that stood before him, (there being no passage for the king to file along by the banks of the river, without running an extreme risk in flank) and fixed his batteries so, as to have played only on the Swedes, when they drew near his intrenchments, where it was not practicable to transport their heavy artillery, or bring it to act; it is more than probable, that Gustavus must have suffered greatly, or been obliged to have crossed the river in some second place. In the part where the Swedes must thereby have been constrained to attack, they could only have advanced with two regiments in front, while Tilly had room to oppose them with just three times a superior number. This, it is thought, was Tilly's private and reserved opinion: but as the junior officers had conceived a notion, that his personal courage declined with his riper days, and half expired on the arrival of old age, than which nothing could be more false, he was forced to affect, both now and at Leipzig, a certain gallantry and sprightliness of valour, not quite reconcilable to his more mature judgment. Considering the petulant fervour, and sarcastic insinuations from the younger part of military people, it might not be ill-judged for all commanders in chief to leave the field of action, when they have once reached their grand climacteric; for the old courser will make an effort right or wrong when the *spur* of honour is applied to his *flank*, and his abilities, sprightliness, and activity are called in question.

To return from the present digression. When the king saw the difficulties I have just described, he frankly told his generals, who crowded round him, *That he considered the passage of the Lech as a better day's service than the performance at Leipzig**; and when cardinal Pasman, the Imperial ambassador extraordinary, at Rome, heard the news, he said coolly, "The curtain has dropped and the play is over:" which, whether it related to the downfall of popery, or the house of Austria, at this distance, cannot be specified.

The king, as we observed before, rested all night at the foot of the bridge, and next morning, there were reasons to think that the enemy had dislodged; but before any certainty in that particular could be procured, Hepburn received instructions to conduct the remaining part of the infantry over the bridge, in order to introduce a second and more obstinate engagement; during which interim one Forbes, a Scots captain, at the head of thirty musqueteers,

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 147.

was sent to examine the position of the Bavarians. He found two horse sentries at the edge of the wood, and no more. Being sent to the king, and interrogated by him, they positively declared, that they never heard a single syllable concerning the departure of their companions. A part of the royal army pursued the fugitives to the walls of Rayne, and stormed the town sword in hand. Here it was first learnt, that Tilly was wounded desperately, if not mortally.

This victory of the Lech alarmed one half of Europe, and astonished the other. France, who had rejoiced to see the house of Austria humbled to a certain degree, began now to conceive fresh uneasiness, both from fear and jealousy; so much that Louis XIII. told Soranzo the Venetian ambassador, upon receiving an account of the passage of the Lech, That the powers interested in desiring to see a *partial reduction* of the house of Austria had hitherto conscientiously offered up their most sincere wishes for the prosperity of the Swedish arms; but then, continued he, no human being could ever conceive, that matters should have advanced with such amazing rapidity, and to such extraordinary lengths. Inform, therefore, the senate, that means must be devised, whereby to check this impetuous Visigoth in the career of his victories, which may prove, in the conclusion, as fatal to us as to the emperor and the elector of Bavaria. If this be true with respect to France, the house of Austria had still stronger reasons to take the alarm; for she depended on one single man, and that was Walstein; and the duke of Bavaria, who, when the war was removed from his frontiers, had despised or deceived every power with whom he negotiated, began now to feel the sharpest disquietudes, upon three several accounts. He had neglected to oppose his whole force against the king's crossing the Lech, for a part of his army was stationed near Ratibon: he apprehended the death of his admired general every moment; and beheld Gustavus penetrating, by full marches, into the very vital parts of his dominions. England fell into the *national folly* of leaving the continent to take care of itself; so that the conduct of an Elizabeth, and the maxims of Burleigh, Cecil, and Walsingham, passed for the reveries of politicians, who had not considered their mother-country as an island. The elector of Saxony disliked the prosperity of Sweden from the very beginning. The king of Denmark entertained certain self-interested views, which shall be specified forthwith. The states-general traversed Gustavus in the late negotiation with

with the town of Cologne; and the prince of Orange, under various pretences, kept an army of observation on the frontiers of their dominions.

Gustavus beheld all these jealousies, counter-operations, and pretended friendships, with a countenance undismayed, and without making any remonstrances or recriminations. He one day did remark, in great confidence, to a friend, whom he trusted, *That he now perceived he had pushed his conquests too far, and given umbrage, as well as disquietude, to certain potentates. It may be difficult, continued he, to preserve the acquisitions I have made to the southwards; so that of course the more prudent part will be to confine myself within the northern regions of Germany, and erect a kingdom, if that be possible, of which the Baltic shall form the centre.* This account we owe to that impenetrable, as well as all-penetrating statesman the abbé Siri*, who affects to have assisted at every conference in the character of a political ubiquitarian; but for my own part, from a cool examination of future facts, I have some mistrust with regard to the authenticity of the present anecdote, since the king, far from retrieving the supposed mistake, marched on to Ingolstadt, and then to Munich, with the very words recent upon his lips. Nor was this any new idea wherewith to surprize his majesty's understanding; as appears from the answer he gave to Oxenstiern, as long before as the preceding Christmas.

France seems first to have discovered the hook of Gustavus approaching her lips, and pretending only to nibble, and play round it, without swallowing, hoped to see its point blunted, if not disarmed, by some accident or other.

To co-operate with these views, she threw Bavaria in his way, as a rugged rock concealed under water; and that attempt not succeeding, placed the elector of Triers there as a sort of entangling weed: which latter effort served to create some slight embarrassment; for a perplexing treaty was signed at Ehrenbreitstein, four days after the passage of the Lech †, whereby she engaged to support the said prelate against all opponents, and oblige the Swedes, which was still more, to evacuate the electorate, as well as the diocese of Spire.

In less than a fortnight from this period, the king had likewise some further misgivings with reference to the conduct of Christian king of Denmark, whom the Imperial and

* *Vittorio Siri*; *Memoire reconditte*, tom. vii. p. 464, &c. and p. 546.

† April 9, 1632. APPENDIX, Art. XXVIII.

Spanish ministry tried to allure into their interests by all sorts of temptations. The Infanta, in some degree, almost overreached and ensnared that politic prince : for under pretence of making him the compliment of proposing conditions to Gustavus with regard to a general peace, she in effect made him a person interested, in case his Swedish majesty should not listen to an accommodation ; for she left the plan of reconciliation partly, if not entirely, to his management. Gustavus had sagacity enough to desire earnestly to avert this blow, but for prudent reasons, not caring to send a minister in forin on that errand, gave private instructions to one of his generals *, in whom he could confide, who was going by chance into Holstein to raise recruits, to make his court to King Christian, and endeavour to penetrate into his intentions ; commanding him to give his Danish majesty, in an indirect way, to understand, that by speedily engaging in this protestant war, he might secure to his children the possession of those bishoprics which the emperor had usurped by virtue of the peace at Lubec. Christian felt the force of this argument, but at the same time could not dissipate the terrors which the severe usage of the house of Austria, joined with his own misfortunes in the late war, had infused into him. Nevertheless, he dispatched two senators to Gustavus, with instructions to assure him, That he was deeply penetrated with a just sense of this protestant enterprise ; but that the oath he had taken at the *pacification* of Lubec, had unfortunately tied his hands,——That he participated, with Gustavus, in all his conquests ; and would never impede their progress in any shape ;—but at the same time presumed, gently, to remind him, that, as the success of war is often periodical, even under the direction of the ablest commander, it would highly become so just and generous a prince to give a solid and glorious peace to Germany : to effect which, he was ready to make a tender of his best services, by way of mediator or arbitrator. To this proposal Gustavus replied, *That his present passion and ultimate object was to procure peace to the distressed and proscribed protestants, which in truth could only be effected by a new and strict union between all the princes and states professing the reformed religion. Our enemies, observed he, are insincere ; and seek only to create advantageous delays. Intercourses, arbitrations, and negotiations, will produce nothing but remorse and disappointment. The house of Austria must be reduced to such a point, as not to be able to interfere a second time.*

* Bauditzen.

If therefore the king your master will labour sincerely to bring about this union among the protestants, and join me in the prosecution of so good a work, whereby each party shall become mutual guaranty for the protection of the whole;—If he will only thus think once with me, I will answer with my life that we impose silence on the house of Austria.*

Christian liked the doctrine, but begged to be excused from putting it in practice: nevertheless, from that day secretly wished prosperity to the arms of Sweden; and dexterously extricated himself by little and little from the snare which the artful Isabella had spread under his feet.

Gustavus having secured the town of Rayne, and dispatched Horn to pursue Tilly, shaped his course directly to Augsberg, making himself master of the town and cloisters of Thierhaupten, and likewise of Friedberg as he passed along. In this march he refused to listen to any proposals of neutrality on the part of the duke of Neuburg, being dissatisfied with that prince's former duplicity. Sir, said he to the deputy, *Your master's acts have been contradictory; not contented to deceive me, he has had the dissingenuousness to promise much, and perform nothing; whilst, on the contrary, he has allowed passage and free retreat to the enemy's army, supplied them with artillery from his own arsenal, and fired on the trumpeter who approached his capital in amicable form, in order to deliver a letter from me to him. But Providence has now indulged me with the means of prescribing those terms, which formerly I ventured only to recommend. In a word, Sir, you are like your master, and your master is like you: for you are both dissemblers, to say no worse of you †.*

It is not difficult to conceive the astonishment of the duke's deputy, who continued motionless for some time like a person thunderstruck. He at length withdrew, and then recovering his presence of mind, renewed his applications by the interposition of prince Augustus, who was younger brother to his master, and a sort of favourite with Gustavus. The king's answer was very short; *Give the duke of Neuburg to understand, that his future actions must prove the commentary upon his doctrines: and in the meanwhile, by way of a preliminary, let him dispatch to my army two hundred thousand loaves, and three hundred tons of beer ‡.* About this time the Bavarians quitted Neuburg as indefensible, having first removed their artillery, and broken down one arch of the bridge for fear of pursuit; and upon this the Swedish colonel

* Vide *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 264, &c.

† *Ibid.* 258. *Swedish Intelligence*, part ii. 151, 152.

‡ *Soldat Sweden's*, 485, &c.

Landſperg was ordered to take poſſeſſion of it, repair the bridge, and then defend the city like a man of honour.

Thus, in three days, the king reached from the paſſage of the Lech to the town of Augſburg, coaſting along the Bavarian banks of the river with the main of his army; but conveying his heavy artillery on the Suabian ſide; for it was thought by all intelligent perſons, that the new bridge could not ſupport the weight of horſes, carriages, and ordnance.

The rich and magnificent city of Augſburg lies ten miles to the ſouth-weſt of Donawert. It is ſituated in Suabia, and has two bridges acroſs the Lech. Its famous *confeſſion* will render it illuſtrious throughout all ages of the Chriſtian church; and it is probable the king, in the idea, that *the law firſt proceeded from Sion*, conſidered it as the Jeruſalem of his German Paleſtine; ſparing no pains, and omitting no attempts to make himſelf maſter of this reſpectable ſanctuary; and the rather, as the Auguſtin profeſſion had been totally interdicted therein; the whole body of Lutherans diſarmed; and the proteſtant magiſtrates replaced by freſh ones of the catholic perſuaſion. Colonel Breda at that time commanded the gariſon, which had been increaſed by different reinforcements to the amount of 4500 men. Still there was great reaſon to fear an inſurrection from the numerous proteſtants within the walls.

When the royal army had advanced to Lechaufen, a ſmall town within two miles of Augſburg, the Imperial governor broke down the bridge; but the Swedes erected two others, the former above and the latter below the city. Guſtavus then brought forward his approaches on either ſide of the river, whiſt Torſtenſon gave new proofs of his uncommon ſkill in the management of his artillery. The king, grieved to ſee the havock he intended to make amongſt the fine edifices, diſpatched a letter to the magiſtrates, requeſting them to diſmiſs the gariſon, and preſerve ſo magnificent a city from the deſtruction of a furious cannonade. The anſwer returned him was alike polite and amicable; ſince it was there remarked, that the troops, which poſſeſſed the town, had been obtruded on them, and that if the Swedes had firſt preſented themſelves, they ſhould have been received with preference.—That to bid the Imperialiſts depart, amounted in effect to nothing; of courſe it appeared to them moſt expedient for his majeſty to introduce ſome negotiation with the commander of the gariſon.

Upon this, Horn, as it is ſuppoſed with his maſter's priority, wrote a very friendly letter to Breda the governor; and

having represented the imprudence, and other unavoidable consequences, of an unprofitable resistance, proposed himself as an amicable mediator between his Swedish majesty and the garrison. Breda, foreseeing no relief, as Tilly was dying, and Aldringer disabled, at length capitulated. Five hundred of his soldiers took service under the king, and the rest were conveyed to Landsberg. Count Holloch, a Palatine nobleman, was appointed governor, at the head of 3000 cavalry and infantry; and young Oxenstiern, out of respect to his father the *chancellor*, was declared commander of the militia.

In the capitulation, the king gave Breda to understand, that at Augsberg no exceptions must be proposed in regard to popery; and then at the request of the inhabitants, who besought him to honour them with a visit, made a triumphal entrance, attended by all the princes, generals, and foreign ambassadors then in his camp, but escorted only by a few chosen troops, in order to prevent confusion and plunder; so that the residue of the army was not allowed to pass the barrier of the city gates.

In this town, the birth-place, if one may so speak, of the evangelical religion *, his majesty thought it incumbent on him to behave with all possible humility, sweetness, and moderation; yet, at the same time, without injuring or discrediting the Roman catholics in any respect, restored the Augustan confession to its original lustre, which greatly piqued the elector of Saxony, who considered himself as first protestant prince in Germany †, and consigned the whole government of the town into the hands of the Lutherans and the reformed ‡. On his entering the city gate, he dismounted and walked directly to St. Agnes church, where the Lutheran service was performed with great decency; the 103d Psalm sung, accompanied by a peal of organs; and Fabricius, the king's own chaplain, delivered a sermon on the following text, Psalm xii. verse 5, 6. *Now for the comfortless troubles sake of the needy, and because of the deep sighing*

* The *confession* was presented here to Charles V. in the year 1530, and is commonly called the *Augsburg* or *Augustine* confession: to which we may add the *Pacificatorium* concluded here in 1555. The town does not depend in any shape upon the bishop, though he has a palace therein. The reigning differences between the papists and protestants were greatly harmonized at the peace of Munster; for by a partition-settlement the employes of government were equally divided, as well as the votes in public council; where twenty-two magistrates are of the Romish persuasion, and a like number of the evangelical and reformed.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctovis, 4^o. p. 55.

‡ *Historical or Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 64—66.

of the poor, I will up, saith the Lord, and will help every one from him that sweleth against him, and will set him at rest. From the church, the procellion advanced, on horseback, to a large square called the Wine-market, where he commanded the inhabitants, which was thought to be a very extraordinary step, not only at Vienna and Munich, but at Dresden, Paris, Copenhagen, Whitehall, and the Hague, to take the oaths* of allegiance and fidelity to the crown of Sweden, without mention of its allies and associates†: confirming afterwards the charter of the citizens to them, without inserting or expunging any thing. Here, amongst the acknowledgments from the magistrates and civilities on the part of the king, one of that venerable body took the liberty to tell him, "That the Swedish troops appeared to him irresistible." The king, so far as much as the compliment seemed to carry no immediate connexion with the conversation preceding, requested him to explain the reasons whereon he grounded that opinion: *Is it, said he, on account of the number, or the valour, or the good fortune of my soldiers?* "No, Sire," replied the magistrate, "but," pointing to a company of guards drawn up before the apartment where his majesty was to dine‡, "Who could have imagined, that a set of men so decent and well behaved in times of capitulation, could have been those very persons, whom we have seen so resolute and intrepid in the field of action §?"

During two days residence here, an uncommon adventure happened to Gassion. A rich citizen with whom he lodged, was so much affected with his courtesy and politeness, that he made him an offer of a beautiful daughter in marriage with a very considerable dowry. His majesty, midst all the cares and tumults of war, allowed not such a trifling circumstance to escape his notice, and gave the young Frenchman several hints, to make him content: but Gassion was too much of a military enthusiast to embrace the proposal; and it is probable Gustavus liked him never the worse for making a sacrifice of love to glory; since not many days

* *Histoire Politique du Siècle*, 4°. Lond. 1757.

† The express oath is to be seen in the *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 158.

‡ In the palace of Fugger. This family, originally of Augsburg, is perhaps the most considerable that ever was raised by merchandize. The emperor, Maximilian I. ennobled it, and made the Fuggers counts, who immediately purchased large estates between Augsburg and Ulm. Not many years ago, there were fifteen counts of this family, who all possessed distinct signories.

§ *Hist. du maréchal Gassion*, [par Mich. le Pure,] tom. i. p. 63.

afterwards he offered him any command in his own guards, saying aloud in German to the officers round him, *That Gasson's corps should be surnamed the pillow regiment, because when that was near him, he could sleep in security* *.

His majesty having now derived great advantages from the submission of the Augsburgers, performed an action worthy of himself on leaving their city; for, considering the merit, as well as long services, of old Ruthven, who defended Ulm, the royal magazine, as well as intended place of retreat in case of accidents, he gave him a grant of the earldom of Kirchberg, supposed worth at least eighteen hundred pounds a year, clear of contribution to the service of the war†, and belonged, if I mistake not, to a count Fugger, who was governor of the town, but acted subordinately to Breda, when that officer threw himself into it by Tilly's orders, some days before the king arrived. The king, retracing the footsteps of his former march, advanced to Aicha‡, where he was met by duke Albert of Bavaria, second brother of the elector, who begged a neutrality for himself, his family, and estate, under pretence, that he had never concerned himself in the present wars. No discussion was made of the truth of these allegations, for the contrary was well understood to be true: but the answer returned was neither ill applied nor void of spirit; namely, *that Louisa Juliana, the dowager electress Palatine, and Elizabeth, then lawful queen of Bohemia, and her children, had not interfered in the affairs of the Palatinate; yet their possessions had been confiscated, and they compelled, under the disgrace of a proscription, to beg a subsistence in foreign countries*§. Upon this duke Albert retired to Saltzburg, and joined the electress of Bavaria, who had withdrawn herself thither.

It was hoped by the Imperialists, that Augsbourg would hurt the Swedish troops as much as Capua injured the army of Hannibal; but the king wisely obviated these inconveniences, by staying there only two days, and encamping his soldiers without the walls. He had moreover two great enterprises to execute, on returning from Augsbourg||, having his eyes fixed not only upon Ingolstadt, but on Ratibon; both which schemes he proposed to effect by breaking down one of the two bridges across the Danube. Tilly had

* *Hist. du maréchal Gasson*, [par Mich. le Pure.] tom. i. p. 63.

† *Monro*, Expedition, ii. p. 120.

‡ Some authors and map makers call this place Waho. It must not be confounded with Aichtadt.

§ *Swedish Intelligencer*, part. ii. p. 159.

|| *Bracholii Hist.* n. str. temp. p. 289.

parts enough to foresee what so great a genius in the art of war would attempt to execute, and intreated the elector, almost with his dying breath, to spare no precautions with respect to the preservation of Ratibon and Ingolstadt*. And thus the king's project, however well conceived, was rendered abortive.

Far from being dismayed with such disappointment, his majesty directed his whole thoughts against Ingolstadt singly. This town, then considered one of the strongest places in the empire, was of course esteemed the principal bulwark of Bavaria, and had formerly, during the reign of Charles V. rendered fruitless all the efforts of the Smalcaldic party. It lies half way between Donawert and Ratibon, and young Tilly†, whom the old man recommended to be governor, had three large chosen regiments under his command. It was one of those fortifications, which the warriors surname *la pucelle*, and maintained that character in respect to sieges, for Farenbach only betrayed it afterwards, till the Austrians took it by capitulation in the year 1742.

This town belongs to the elector, though it does not stand on the Bavarian side of the Danube. It was protected on that quarter where the Swedes approached it by two or three winding rivulets, whose bridges, by some accident had been neglected to be broken down, as likewise by a very troublesome morass. One large bridge crosses the Danube, and another passes athwart the town. At the foot of the former, called, if my accounts mislead me not, the *gallows bridge*, were two outworks, extremely well fortified, and hardly possible to be taken by storm; so that it is probable the king expected some assistance from a treacherous part of the garrison, and the rather, as the seeds of Farenbach's and Cratz's conspiracy were then supposed to be sown, though at that time nothing discovered itself to the advantage of the Swedes. Nevertheless, the king made his troops approach nearer the walls, on first investing the town, than in all probability he would have done, if he had not expected something of this kind. What is still more, the elector of Bavaria laid encamped with all his troops on the opposite banks of the Danube, so that each army could discover the other's motions without the help of a glass.

* *Bertius* de Bellis German.

† Many historians, as *Le Vassur*, *de Serres*, &c. call this young man Tilly's son, but that general lived and died unmarried; and it was remarked of him, as well by enemies as friends, that he never indulged in any illicit amour. He was probably his nephew. What became of him after this period, no where appears.

The lines being now finished, and the batteries erected, a sudden and alarming accident befel the king. As he was riding about on his favourite palfrey to make observations, and the shortness of his eyesight always carried him too near the danger, a cannon ball well aimed, and weighing at least fourteen pounds, struck the mare full in the flank, so near the king's leg, that the flesh was ruffled, and overturned her more times than one. The same ball, in the rapidity of its passage, knocked down Gassion, who stood nearly on a line just before his master, without touching him. It was the opinion of all the by-standers, that the king was crushed with the fury of the stroke, for he lay covered in dirt and blood, and rolled over twice or thrice after he received the blow. Gassion, half recovering his senses, ran to him, but one of the king's equerries had raised him from his trance. *How, said the king, was it possible for the enemy to hit me? I conceived myself to be out of danger.* In an instant all his generals crowded round him, and conjured him earnestly to retire; but he mounted a fresh steed, and kept the field.

By this escape, his majesty had the good fortune still to verify his old observation, that no king had ever been killed by a cannon ball; yet this destiny was reserved afterwards for one of his successors*.

I have read somewhere, but cannot at present recollect in what author, a different account of this accident; namely, that there was an old culverin in Ingolstadt of immeasurable length, which rarely missed its object at a great distance, and had performed wonders against the protestants in the Smalcaldic wars. Now it is supposed by this relator, that the king received his stroke from this very piece of ordnance; which might be done easier, as he rode a little white† mare, that rendered his person more distinguishable.

In the evening, when he returned to his tent, all his generals, assembled in a body, besought him, in the most earnest terms, to take more care of a life so valuable. As he

* Charles XII.

† It is surprising to me that historians should differ so much about the colour of this mare. One says she was milk white, another avers her to be dark grey, and a third variegates her with white and black spots like a tiger; whereas the said animal was dug up and stuffed just after the accident, and preserved in the arsenal of Ingolstadt, for the edification of all travellers, memoir writers, and historiographers. For my own part, I never saw her; and must leave this important doubt in the same state that I find it. But be the matter as it will, it was certainly ill judged in the king, to ride a creature of so particular a colour.

had often received representations upon this subject, he returned them an answer, which I suppose to have been in some respect premeditated; and for that reason insert it, having recited, in the course of my history, so many replies which arose casually from the incidents before him. The answer was to this effect, *That the cannon ball which had approached him so nearly, not to mention various accidents of a similar, though less dangerous nature, and thirteen wounds he had received besides, admonished him plainly of his mortality; and that he had no more title to plead exemption from death, than the meanest soldier that served under him; since neither crowns nor victories could secure any human being from this general law of nature. That he had no part to take, except resigning himself to God's providence; and nothing to bequeath his comrades in war, but a firm assurance, that the justice of the cause wherein they were engaged, had other assistance in store, besides the precarious existence of ONE GUSTAVUS*.* Indeed, added he, there is a circumstance, that afflicts me greatly: some have given a sinister interpretation to all my actions, and others have attempted to tarnish my reputation, by basely insinuating, that the only objects of his Swedish majesty are fresh acquisitions of wealth and power. But the Supreme Being knows, in that respect, the sincerity of my soul; and my hope is, that he will inspire me with grace to confound the envy and calumny of the public.—The sums advanced by me, the debts discharged by me, my past conduct and future intentions, may, in the long run, convince the most perverse and blind, that the only object of my expedition was the re-establishment of Germanic liberty†.

Either Tilly made an inexpressible fire from the redoubts next the bridge, or the day gave appearances of proving unlucky; for soon after the king's disaster, another cannon ball carried off half the head of Christopher, the young margrave of Baden Durlach, as he was discoursing with some officers in his tent. The whole body of Swedish generals was rendered inconsolable by this misfortune, for his courage was of the clearest and most distinguished sort. His aged father's‡ answer, upon receiving the news a few minutes after the accident happened, has something in it

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 498. *Merc. Franc.* en l'an 1632, p. 229.

† *Hist. de Louis XIII. par le Vassr.* Tom. vii. 175, 176.

‡ In 1622, this brave old man fought the battle of Wimpfen, against Tilly and Gonzalvo di Cordova, being lieutenant general to the Princes of the union. He then served his Danish majesty, and being obliged to leave his troops in 1626, made his escape in a small boat. Afterwards he lived, with variety of fortune, the life of an exile, having been proscribed by the emperor.

highly

highly worthy to be remembered; *I am a father*, said he to those who came to condole with him, *but am a Christian likewise*.—*My son belonged to God, by a prior right than he belonged to me. Happily, he died like a prince, and like a soldier*.—*Complaints are only to be made about those children who live with infamy, and die like cowards. I have loved nothing, but with a firm resolution to resign it up on demand, except it be my conscience, and my liberty*.—*As the first stroke of cannon proved favourable to the only support of the protestant cause, I have reason to digest the ill effects of the second, and, upon extended views, rather rejoice than lament, at the conclusion of this extraordinary day* *. When the king considered both the old man, and the young man, it is reported, that he shed tears on the occasion †.

At almost the same instant that the prince was killed, the unfortunate Tilly expired in Ingolstadt: and as the son and father, for reasons needless to be recited, hated that general, and were reciprocally hated by him, his majesty could not help remarking, *how fatal one place and minute had proved to two such inveterate enemies* ‡. The king likewise had no personal affection to Tilly, disliking him much on account of the cruelties he exercised at Magdeburg, and never truly forgetting, that in one of his applications to him, he had styled him *cavalier* instead of king. Yet on this occasion, justice and nature gained the ascendant over disgust and pique; *Alas!* said he, *the honourable old Tilly is now no more* §.

No soldier ever died in greater torture. The elector of Bavaria sat constantly by his bedside, and it is reported, that Tilly spoke to him in the following manner: "Your highness may remember, that in the middle and advanced stages of life, I have had enough of reputation, and glory in abundance. Oh, that instead of surviving my fame, I had expired in the great day of Leipzig! It had been for your advantage and my honour—Two things I must leave on your highness's mind, by way of dying advice; never break your alliance with the emperor; and make Cratz commander of your army. That officer has courage to serve you, fidelity to content you, and parts to assist you. He will conduct your troops with reputation, and, as he knows Wallstein, will traverse his designs. Necess-

* *Mercurie Francois* en l'an 1632, p. 230. *Hist. or Auth. Relat.* fol. torn. ii. 67.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctous, p. 56. ‡ *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 161.

§ *Mour's* Second Expedition, p. 118. *Adelsreiter Ann. Bav.* part iii. p. 257.

sity requires you should act the dissembler, and submit to the extravagancies of that insolent man: for, except you can allure him to join you with the Imperial army, Gustavus will enter Bavaria; and when he will relinquish it, heaven only knows.—Not being conscious I have ever used your highness ill in the command of your armies, I shall ask no forgiveness; contented and thankful to die, as you honour me with your attention in my last moments, of which very few now remain upon my hands.—Let me beseech you, therefore, out of pure compassion to leave me; and as I have an account to render for human failings, transgressions, and errors, permit me, after having justified myself in your opinion, to make my peace with God*.” He then kissed the hand of the elector, who retired in tears.

Thus died John Tschzerclas, count de Tilly, of whom we have spoken so much, not only through the course of the wars, but in a distinct note, that it may suffice to observe, he had passed through every stage of military life, from a foot soldier to the post of generalissimo. It is noticed by some that he blamed Pappenheim in his last moments†; and it is remarked by all writers, that he never indulged himself in wine or women. Yet, beyond all contradiction, he was over zealous, or, in other words, too great a bigot, in his own religion: and the cruelties exercised at Magdeburg, considering the temperate and virtuous life he led, seem to me an indelible blot upon his character. So that one is at little loss to assign a motive for *what* no reasonable being can produce a justification! *The court of Wallstein*, as the language then ran, received the news of his death with visible marks of satisfaction. He was born of Walloon parents, and not very nobly descended: but created count by the emperor, with the title of *illustrissimo*. He bequeathed the rich diamond ring, which the infant Isabella gave him, to the holy Virgin of Oettingen, and left £.10,000. to the veteran bands that had served under him, especially the four regiments of infantry, which had made such great efforts in the wood after the battle of Leipzig was lost. Thus this illustrious chieftain experienced his own prophecy concerning war, which he had uttered formerly at Ratibon.

His majesty employed eight days in beleaguering and attacking Ingolstadt, which, in respect to sieges, may be considered as the sharpest service during the whole course of

* *Bertius de bellis Germanicis.* † *Heymanni Leo Arctiois*, 4^o. p. 54.

the thirty years wars. Though wounded in making the first dispositions for possessing two redoubts sword in hand, yet nothing abated the keenness of his valour, notwithstanding the defendants had the command of reinforcements in abundance; for the elector of Bavaria lay with his army under the town walls on the other side of the Danube; so that the king was obliged to leave a body of troops all night, for fear of a sally, which he had reason to expect, drawn up in order of battle, within reach not only of the enemies great guns, but of their musquetry. Never soldiers supported a cool slaughter with more patience, or in better order; though the valiant Monro confesses, in the honesty of his heart, That it was the longest night, for an eighteenth of April, that he ever saw*; and, what was more disagreeable, the Swedes thought it mere waste of powder and ball to fire a gun. Monro lost twelve men in one company by a single cannon shot; and more than three hundred brave fellows were left dead upon the ground, where they had stood a few moments before.

Next evening a thousand *commanded* musqueteers were ordered to attack the principal of the two redoubts sword in hand; his majesty attending the enterprise in person. The Swedes, having made incredible efforts, cleared the ditch, and entered the half-moon: but as young Tilly wanted no supply of hands, for by means of the bridge he could have marched not only the garrison, but the whole Bavarian army against the assailants, his majesty found himself obliged, in common prudence, to found a retreat. All, perhaps, that could be wanted by him, was to gain the redoubts and destroy the bridge, for then the electoral forces had not power to enter their own country; but this, for reasons assigned, appeared to be an undertaking too difficult, as well as too dangerous. Therefore, all on a sudden he raised the siege, for which great stroke of self-denial, the continuator of Foresti applauds him with rapture; leaving Bauer to conduct the rear of his army, which repulsed the pursuing garrison with great coolness and judgment. Nothing now remained for the inhabitants, but to dig up the king's pal-frey, which had been concealed in the earth near his tent; and having carefully stuffed, deposited it in their arsenal. Upon the whole, the citizens of Ingolstadt were more polite to a four-footed beast, than the people of Breda were to the *boat*, by which their town was surprized; for the latter having dragged it round the streets, and

* *Expedit.* ii. p. 120.

scourged

scourged it severely, hung it up in their stadthouse as a public trophy.

It was during this siege, which I could not observe without breaking in upon my narrative, that the elector of Bavaria made a fresh attempt towards a reconciliation, greatly alarmed with the apprehensions of losing Ingolstadt, and fearing to draw the war into the bowels of his own country. This artful prince had *three* views in the present negotiation. He wanted to create delays; seize some fortunate incident, which might casually present itself; or sow the seeds of misunderstanding between the kings of France and Sweden; but Gustavus pierced through the thin veil of artifice at a single glance. Under the influence however of Munich-politics, St. Etienne made a visit to the royal camp; where the king, for certain reasons, chose to receive his proposals in the presence of his Bohemian majesty, and several princes and generals. There the French minister told him, with an air of confidence,—That the elector, who had the strongest inclination imaginable towards a peace, had disapproved of Tilly's enterprise with respect to Bamberg, and employed himself that very instant in devising expedients, whereby to pave the way for the king's admission into Bavaria:—but Gustavus interrupted him point-blank in this preamble, and, told him, *totidem verbis*, *That he was not a person to be amused and misled by mere sounds.* Sir, said he, *the king your master may have excellent intentions; and if so, they bear no conformity to the language you make use of. But as to the elector of Bavaria, he seeks only to create delays and interruptions; he is a sort of prince, who keeps in his wardrobe a set of upper garments of various hues; and changes them according to his interests; wearing black one day, white a second day, and mixed colours a third;—but always concealing the Burgundian cross next his heart. If it be his sincere desire to be well received in our court, let him produce himself in one form without change; let him open the gates of Ingolstadt, disband his army, refund his extortions, restore the Palatinate, reform what is past, and give good security for all which is to come*.*

St. Etienne stood astonished, to find the king as clear-sighted and determined in the cabinet as in the field of action; and whilst he ransacked his brain to devise some answer, either solid or plausible, Gustavus resumed the discourse, adding, *That he had intercepted a letter, of very recent date, wherein the emperor had promised to send Walstein into Bavaria at the head of 50,000, men. With all my heart,* continued he; *the*

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 303. *Hist. or Auth. Relat.* tom. ii. 66.

elector

elector will have signal opportunities to shew his hospitality, and abundance of guests to entertain, friends as well as enemies, who want not for good appetites, and quick digestion. For my own part, I intend to prove an expensive visitant.*

As the French negotiator had erred before in point of decorum, he now made a second false step through pure inadvertency; for he obliquely insinuated, That his most Christian majesty had a formidable army not far removed from the empire, and might, in all probability, greatly disrelish the rejection of proposals from the duke of Bavaria. This was touching the king's temper in the only vulnerable part: his eyes assumed a fierceness in an instant, and he accosted St. Etienne, as one who did not merit to be considered as a private gentleman: *Say no more*, continued he, *I pardon thy ignorance: thou knowest neither thy master nor me. When thou makest such advances, bring me an authority signed by the king's own hand; and when thou actest for an unfortunate prince, like the elector of Bavaria, behave thyself with humility. The familiar freedoms of thy nation are sometimes overlooked, and sometimes despised; but in the present case, they are INSUPPORTABLE. Know, that I am OFFENDED and VICTORIOUS†.*

By this time the elector of Bavaria had made an irruption into the Upper Palatinate, in order to cause a diversion in favour of his own dominions, and impede the enemy from marching on, directly, to Munich. Gustavus well considered this movement, and entered the heart of Bavaria notwithstanding; foreseeing wisely, that if he followed the duke, who shaped his course towards Bohemia, Walstein and he might then be obliged to unite their forces by express injunctions from the Court of Vienna, and that the two combined armies might overpower him by dint of numbers. He therefore adhered inflexibly to his first idea, knowing that he should thereby force the elector back; and foreseeing too that Walstein, from a principle of private animosity, would not digress to a point so far removed from him, as the capital of the electorate.

Leaving Ingolstadt, therefore, he marched to Gysenfelt, where the whole army paid the honours of sepulture to the young margrave, making two discharges of all their musquetry and artillery. Next day he conducted his troops to Moßberg, a long stretch of twenty miles; and thence detached Horn and Hepburn, at the head of 8000 horse and foot, to besiege Landshut, a small beautiful town, situated on

* *Le Vassor*, tom. vii. p. 169.

† *Ibid.*

the conflux of the Iser and Ampter, and usually styled the *pupil* of Bavaria's eye. When these officers arrived, their prospect of success appeared unpromising; for 1300 Bavarian dragoons threw themselves unexpectedly into the place, having made a march that day of six and thirty miles; but when they beheld a large column of Swedish infantry advance, they changed countenance, crossed the Iser, and broke down the bridge. Next morning, Horn sent a messenger into the town, first by way of spy, and secondly, with the power of performing the part of a negotiator with the inhabitants; but the fellow found all the houses locked and barricadoed, nor could he procure the sight of any human being, even through a casement. Upon this, Horn commanded all his troops to advance, and raised a sharp contribution of £. 15,000. by his master's orders; for this place had undertaken to levy and maintain six troops of horse at its own expence during the whole course of the wars. Hence it was, that the sum demanded was paid with cheerfulness, and a reconciling fee of £. 300. * was advanced gratuitously to the general.

Next morning his majesty arrived. When the citizens presented him the town keys upon their knees, he said to them, *Rise, it is your duty to worship God, and not me* †. He then made a visit to the palace, or as some call it, the castle, which he surveyed with great pleasure and attention, as it had been considered, at least by the Germans, in the light of a masterpiece in Italian architecture. Being suddenly seized with a sort of fainting fit, he was obliged to repose himself on a bench in the streets for some time. He then mounted his horse in order to leave the town; but on his arrival at the Jewish-gate, found himself obliged to take shelter there; for a tempest of thunder and lightning arose, which, for violence cannot well be described. That being over, he said to Horn, *Go back, and free the inhabitants from their incertitude* ‡; for as yet he had given them no assurances of pardon.

His majesty then returned to Mosberg, and advancing thence to Freylingen, laid the city and diocese under contribution, halting onwards with great dispatch to Munich, upon receiving intelligence, which proved not afterwards true, that Walstein began to move towards the Upper Palatinate; and choosing therefore to secure the capital of

* One account says 3000l. but the additional cypher appears to me a typographical error.

† *Heymanni* Leo Arctou's, 4^o. p. 58.

‡ *Ibid.* 58, 59.

Bavaria before any other notable diversion could be effected elsewhere. Here St. Etienne again interfered, and requested leave to negotiate a good capitulation with the inhabitants of Munich, but wasted so much time in frivolous proposals and delays, that the king suspected him and marched on. Alarmed a little at such compendious and vigorous proceedings, St. Etienne intreated his majesty to stifle the resentments of himself and army, and not lay the town in ruins : to which was answered with an air of frankness, *That if the magistracy submitted readily and with a good grace, care should be taken, that no man should suffer with respect to life, liberty, or religion.* The French minister soon conveyed this intelligence to the inhabitants, who, correspondently to his majesty's gracious proposition, paid their court to him on the road ; but in imitation of their master, endeavoured to amuse him with long and artful preliminaries, which had the fate to be rejected almost as soon as proposed. At length it was agreed to make him an offer of £.36,000. by way of exempting the town from plunder : but the king insisted upon receiving one third more ; in which demand it was thought prudent to acquiesce. He next day entered the town at the head of three regiments only, accompanied by the king of Bohemia and several other great personages. The two kings took up their residence in the electoral palace. The garrison received very generous usage ; for though the Swedish horse occupied all the passes throughout the country, yet it was allowed to retire in safety, without the ceremony of a capitulation.

Munich is a large and beautiful city, surrounded with vast plains, extremely fertile, and as finely watered as any in Europe. Maximilian, the then elector, had erected there a magnificent palace, adorned with pictures, painted by the greatest Flemish and Italian masters. Gustavus did not remove a single piece, which is more than can be said of some succeeding conquerors. Charles I. of England, as we observed before, had an inclination to perform, what a great general practised afterwards* ; but the strictness of Gustavus's morals, in conjunction with the nobleness of his temper, would not allow such sort of plunder, though sanctified with the excuses of *con gusto et con l'amore*. There was indeed a chimney-piece of rich marble, which struck the king's fancy ; inasmuch, that he declared, between *jest* and *earnest*, that he had a sort of inclination to transport it to Stockholm. It did not, however, answer my expectations, when I had

* *Geographie Universelle*, tom. v. 192.

had an opportunity to examine it, which made me conclude, that our hero's excellence consisted more in *military* than *civil* architecture. He was likewise greatly pleased with the good taste and modesty of the monument erected to the memory of William V. which, instead of being decorated with plump weeping angels, scythes, hour-glasses, thanks, and skulls, consisted only of a well-proportioned tomb, surmounted with a crucifix.

As to plate, jewels, and other valuable moveables, the Swedes found none in the palace; every thing portable and precious, paintings excepted, being removed to Saltzburg; to which city the elector and electress had retired with duke Albert their brother. Thus the *family*, that had disturbed the peace of Germany for twelve years, proscribed the persons, or confiscated the possessions, of half the protestant princes, and made almost every village the seat of devastation, at the expence of the lives of more than a million of people, was now obliged to leave its own abode, and labouring under a necessity, almost as disagreeable as lying beneath the ban of the empire, compelled to seek food and refuge in another prince's territories like wanderers and exiles.

When Gustavus entered the town, many of his principal officers persuaded him to plunder this palace, as it belonged to the grand fomentor of all disturbances, and commit it to the flames. His answer was, *My good friends, let us not imitate our ancestors of confusion, the Goths and Vandals, who, by destroying every thing that belonged to the fine arts, have delivered down to posterity their barbarity and want of taste, as a sort of proverb and bye-word of contempt.** Whatever some authors may assert to the contrary, it appears, from the least disputable authorities, that the elector Palatine discovered a very manly and Christian spirit; for though his Bavarian kinsman had plundered and depopulated all his dominions, stormed Heidelberg, ransacked the palace, and transported the famous library to Rome; he discovered no joy upon contemplating this reverse of fortune, nor touched a single cabinet, bronze, or picture; and at dinner Gustavus told him, with a view undoubtedly to his future re-establishment, *that he might soon expect to eat at Heidelberg, as he could now make a repast at Munich.*

As the king entered this city without bloodshed, he made a present of about five shillings English to all the soldiers then in his army; and as the inhabitants received him with

* *Le Vassor*; Hist. de Louis XIII. tom. vii. p. 177.

a cheerful countenance, forgave them that *third* part of the contribution which he had lately demanded. No civilities were spared by him of the ingratiating kind : he shook one man by the hand, called a second by his name, and ordered a third to put on his hat ; and with a view to familiarize himself to the eyesight of the populace, it was his custom to marshal his soldiers every morning with the assiduity of a simple colonel ; nor was it unusual with him to dismount various times in one review, take a musquet from the hands of the lowest probationer, and teach him the several postures and motions. Here he shewed the Bavarians, by way of unusual spectacle, the art of firing in *platoons*, which we have observed elsewhere to be his own invention, as also another method he had of giving fire upon a new principle in *ambuscades*.

On the festival of Holy-Thursday, his majesty ordered, for the first time at Munich, the protestant service to be performed in the castle, as likewise a sermon to be preached on account of his late prosperous enterprise, and made choice of the singing Psalms *himself*. In the afternoon he went to see the popish manner of celebrating the ascension. Thence, attended by two companions, he paid a visit to the Jesuits college, where the rector pronounced a very magnificent piece of oratory, to which the king replied extempore, in a manner less turgid, and more laconic ; and as he had been witness, that day, to the celebration of mass, took occasion therefrom to enter into a syllogistical discussion of transubstantiation and communion *jub unâ* ; which dispute, say some, concluded with more good manners than real utility.

Others again maintain, that he took Gallion, and another officer with him, purely to entertain the major part of the Jesuits in discourse, and made a digression from the theological parts of the conversation, till at length the reverend fathers gave him some intimations *with reference to the train of artillery* which the elector had caused to be concealed. On neither point is it in my power to pronounce with certainty. All we know is, he behaved with great friendship to the Romish ecclesiastics in general, and, amongst others, treated the Capuchins with visible marks of distinction : which was supposed to be done out of compliment to father Joseph, who kept a private correspondence with him and the other protestant princes. It is moreover thoroughly well known, that he *allowed* mass to be publicly celebrated during his whole residence in this city ; and when a zealous Capuchin exhorted him to embrace the religion of Rome, he heard him

him with patience, and by his countenance appeared to be in no degree offended, making allowances for the probable goodness of his intentions. He then distributed money to the populace, and ordered alms to be given to the sick and indigent. Yet all this humanity, intermixed with politeness, could not secure to him what he greatly wished to possess; namely, some secreted manuscripts that had been unjustly taken from the library at Heidelberg.

Now it was that the Danish ambassador, whom we have lately mentioned, made a second offer of his master's services, in the character of a mediator, between Gustavus and the emperor: but the former saw through the artifice, having reason to doubt his northern neighbour's sincerity, and observing, at the first glance, that such a proposal served only to gain time, roundly told him, that he could take no step of such extraordinary consequence, without consulting and procuring the assent of those powers who had called him from the depths of the north into Germany.

St. Etienne took this opportunity to renew his solicitations in behalf of Bavaria; but the king continued immovable upon that subject, and gave him no answers but what consisted of sharp invectives, conceived in general and indistinct terms.

It was matter of surprize with his majesty to find the arsenal of Munich entirely disarmed of cannon, which, some months before, it was well known to be the best supplied of any in Germany. It is true he found the carriages, but the artillery was all dismounted. At length, having received some private intelligence concerning the matter, he set himself, the next day, according to his own phrase, to *unbury the dead*; and breaking up the pavement, where no marks of concealment were visible, discovered in large vaults beneath, one hundred and forty pieces of field and battering ordnance, twelve of which were very fine ones, of uncommon shape and workmanship, which the elector used to style, if the profaneness of the expression may be pardoned, the *twelve apostles*. Three other pieces were found, so very large, that it was not possible to remove them to any considerable distance; and on many of them were to be seen the arms of Brunswick, Denmark, and the Palatinate; and in the undermost of them all, surnamed *die sau**, was discovered a cartridge more powerful in war than can-

* In English, the female wild swine, an emblem of fury. The torrent of that ravaging river the *Saana* signifies *die sau*, and is so called by the natives.

nons themselves, for it contained 15,000 Hungarian ducats. Abundance of regimentals, were likewise found; wherewith the king cloathed a considerable part of his army. He now made a short excursion from Munich, in order to chastise the Bavarian peasants, who had massacred his soldiers, and mangled and tortured them in the most cruel manner. It must not be dissembled that the licentiousness of the Swedes had administered no small provocation, much to their master's displeasure; for the best disciplined troops are apt to grow insolent and barbarous, when it is their fortune to overrun a rich country, without opposition.

Whilst the king was employed in checking the insurrection of the peasants, Cratz, in his absence, attacked Munich without success*. He then made a detachment of 2000 infantry and Cronenberg's regiment of horse, and rendered himself master of Weissenburg, were, through some misapprehension, supposed to be intentional, the articles of capitulation were violated by the Bavarians, and 800 Swedish infantry, and 200 horse put to the sword. The king wrote a sharp letter, to the elector, on the conduct of his general, threatening retaliation at Munich; but it was only a threat, for he never performed it; and demanded Cratz in person to be delivered up to his justice.

Flushed with this slight success at Weissenburg, the elector of Bavaria returned from Saltzburg to Ratisbon†, and prevailed on the magistrates, as well as Salis the governor, to admit some companies of infantry by way of garrison, who, under pretence of being reviewed, marched out of town on Sunday morning during the time of divine service, discharging a certain number of musquet-shots as a sort of signal.

* *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 72.

† A most agreeable city, with a magnificent bridge across the Danube, which in the Gothic taste may be pronounced to be an extremely fine one. The diet of the empire has been usually held here, having received no interruption from 1662 to 1742: when Charles VII. being chosen emperor, and making war against the house of Austria, convened the diet, at Francfort upon the Maine, which, on the election of Francis I. was referred to Ratisbon.

Few places can be more instructive to a traveller, who goes abroad to improve his mind, rather than his eyes or ears. There he may have access to men of understanding, deputed not only from every state and principality in Germany, but from courts of great consequence beyond the limits of the empire: and thus within a circle of inconsiderable circumference he may learn from the best instructors the maxims, policy, forms of government, military force, commerce, &c. of various nations, especially the northern.

Upon

Upon this Cratz*, who was a sort of generalissimo in Tilly's room, and who was concealed hard by, rushed into the city at

* John Philip, count de Scharpfenstein. I cannot pass by this strange phenomenon of a warrior without subjoining a note, whose history extends beyond the death of the king of Sweden: and indeed Cratz's life was a series of bravery, misfortune, and ill-management. He was an officer of long service, and gave the favourable turn to the battle of Prague in 1620, [*Ephemeris Expedit. in Bohem.* p. 99.] for which reason he was created a count by the emperor. It was his maxim never to quit the field of action; and thus it was his unhappiness to be taken prisoner at the battle of Leipzig. It was not in the elector of Bavaria's power to make him generalissimo over the army of the league, conformably to Tilly's dying advice; for upon that promotion Walstein threatened to abandon him to the resentments of the Swedes without remorse. Upon this Cratz retired, but his master conjured him to return; made him governor of Ingoldstadt; and promised him the post of captain general in three months. Walstein and he had quarrelled, originally, many years before this period, about a lady. When Cratz came back to his duty, he gave the former a piece of intelligence relating to the enemy, formed upon his own ocular observation. Walstein called an aid de camp, and bid him mount on horseback, and see if the circumstances were truly related; upon which Cratz challenged him without ceremony, and told him he would make his sword speak plainer than his tongue.

The duke de Weimar, or, as some say Gustavus Horn*, thought this a sufficient reason to tempt the Bavarian commander into the Swedish service, and upon an exchange of prisoners sent an officer of parts to try his virtue, disguised in the habit of a trumpeter. This negotiator soon found an opportunity of looking, as if he had something to impart in private. Cratz complied, and having heard his proposal unconcernedly, asked him with a smile, *if the duke would make him bishop of Aichstadt?* Nothing more passed, the officer took the inuendo, and retired.

Some days afterwards, having waited a little for fear of suspicion, the same person returned in the same dress, making Cratz an offer of the post of camp-master-general in the Swedish army. In return Cratz agreed to give duke Bernard an opportunity, by night, of seizing Ingoldstadt, the key of admission into Bavaria, for Gustavus's successors had not the vanity of aspiring to cross the Lech a second time, and to this purpose dispatched the better part of his garrison on some chimerical errand, giving out likewise, that a body of Aldringer's men had orders to replace these soldiers at Ingoldstadt; for the Swedes were to come at midnight, and personate this little army. But as stratagems and disappointments are not uncommon in the military profession, duke Bernard and his detachment missed their way, and arrived under the walls a few minutes after day-break. Cratz boldly pronounced this body of troops to be Aldringer's regiments, and ordered the town-gates to be opened; but an officer discovered the Swedish colours, which the troops had brought with them, proposing to enter Ingoldstadt in the night, and perceiving a trumpeter in the first rank, whom Cratz had dispatched that night to Aldringer upon other business, and whom the Swedes had taken prisoner, and made use of as a guide, he immediately comprehended something, and gave the alarm of treachery. Upon this the Swedes returned thoroughly disappointed, and the governor apprehended it was high time to shift the scene. Walstein soon discovered this perfidy,

* Galeazzo Gualdo.

at the head of 2000 foot, and 500 cavalry; and, what was still more imprudent, allowed his soldiers to commit most outrageous

and dispatched a courier to advertise the elector to arrest Cratz, and ordered Aldringer likewise to seize him, if by chance he passed through Ratisbon. Cratz, who told the officers of his garrison he was going to Vienna in order to lay his commission at the emperor's feet, reached Ratisbon just before the second mentioned express arrived, and had paid a visit to Aldringer, if an officer had not informed him, that that general had devoted the evening to a banquet of festivity, and for certain reasons would be better pleased not to be interrupted. At that instant Cratz's steward informed him, by letter, that five companies of infantry had taken up their quarters upon his estate, which tempted him to mount his horse immediately, in order to dispossess them; but an express from a friend at Ratisbon overtook him on the road, and told him Aldringer had seized his equipage and baggage, and dispatched fifty cavaliers to bring him back dead or alive. Uncertain what to do, he pushed on for Poland, through the northern parts of Bohemia, those parts being less crowded with Wallstein's soldiers. In the prosecution of this journey he met an Imperial commander, and they both knew each other very well, returning from making enquiries after him by Wallstein's orders. The officer applied immediately to a Polish nobleman to lend him some vassals in order to pursue and take the offender; but the Polisher told him, It did not become a *prince like himself* to act the part of a sbirroo or a constable. Cratz then reached Cracow, but to his great mortification the king was absent. He then sent an explanation of his conduct to Vienna, and made proposals of reconciliation; but Wallstein was all-powerful in the cabinet there, and no answer was vouchsafed him. After many wanderings from place to place, he at length found his way to the Swedish army, and conformed to the Lutheran religion; joining duke Bernard the night before the fatal battle of Nordlingen; which gave that prince too much joy, that he embraced him, and thanked him in the presence of all his officers. Nevertheless, he joined with Horn in the council of war, and pronounced the dispositions of the ensuing day to be rash and hazardous.

In that transaction he repelled the Imperialists in their very first fortunate impression, and killed Aklobrandini, grand prior of Malta, with his own hand, and to his infinite regret; for he was the nearest and dearest to him of all his friends; but in the hurry of the action he did not recollect him. Duke Bernard staid on the field as long as he could, without incurring the suspicion of being thought a madman, and at length consented, with tears in his eyes, to a retreat; and as Cratz had fought all day with 1600 Swedes against 4000 Imperialists, he implored him by an aid de camp to consult his safety, and retire immediately. His answer was, that he would secure the retreat of the army, and have the honour to follow him by and by. There he fought on till not a single soldier was left at his elbow, and mixing with the enemy's troops, walked up and down the field, being unharmed long before, with his sword and pistols in his hand, intermixing with a few inferior officers and soldiers, their language and his being the same. At length he was left almost alone, and one Fontana, a Croatian captain, contemplating him for some moments, for he was a fine figure, and a person unknown to him, whispered him in the ear, with an oath, that he would make an excellent prisoner. This man had certain reasons to suspect something; for whilst all the troops a few minutes before had expressed a transport of joy for the victory, Cratz appeared remarkably grave and thoughtful. Cratz, who supposed Fontana by his air to be a French officer, told him

outrageous disorders. The elector then joined the garrison with all his forces, and gave directions for new fortifications in various parts. As Ratibon has always been considered in the Germanic system a sort of sacred *Peculiar*, many people looked upon this enterprise as a very bold and hazardous one. The court of Vienna was startled at it, and the magistracy preferred a complaint, of the violation of systematical rights, to the emperor, who, as he feared to irritate the elector at this juncture, requested him, by means of the most lively representations, to behave himself with great caution and lenity upon the occasion.

During this interval, Ossa, the Imperial commissary, newly created general, who had the superintendency of affairs in Alsatia, Tyrol, and the circle of Suabia, besieged Biberach with an army of 7000 men, composed out of the archduke's old corps, the Lorrain troops, and those that had served against Mantua. His majesty soon determined to raise the siege, and dispatching 8000 men to that effect, overtook them, himself, near the river Iser, having thrown a bridge over it, and appointed, before his departure, the valiant Hepburn to be governor of Munich. Ossa, on the king's approach, retired to Lindau and the lake of Constance. He lost many troops before the town, and, to his particular mortification,

him instantly, in that language, he would give him 5000*l.* to contrive his escape, and a colonel's commission in the enemy's army. The Croatian took him at his word, and demanded his pistols and sword by way of military submission. Cratz delivered the former, but insisted that a gentleman should never resign his sword; which punctilio of delicacy in all probability cost him his head. For as they moved along, in order to recover the rear of the Swedish army, a thought struck Fontana, that his own colonel had been killed by a prisoner, who had promised him a large recompence. Upon this he shaped his way to the Imperial camp, and meeting a flying party of Swedes, who knew their general, and made an attempt to rescue him, he cried out aloud for help, and a squadron of Lorrainers who recollected Cratz at first sight, flew to his assistance. His friends thought fit to desert him upon this fresh onset, and thus he became an easy prisoner; for the horse Fontana had given him was so fatigued that it could hardly move.

Being carried to the duke of Lorrain's tent, that prince told him peevishly and haughtily enough, that he would teach such commanders as him how to traduce a duke of Lorrain to the French king. To which Cratz answered, That his highness laboured under some mistake; for since he did not own the accusation, it was plain he had not deserved it, it being his custom to say more to men's faces than in their absence.

The king of Hungary had the curiosity to make him a visit incognito, and ordered his sword, which the duke of Lorrain had taken from him, to be restored. Bernard of Saxe Weimar offered the payment of any sum to discharge his ransom, or proposed to exchange the bishop of Wurzburg against him, a prelate and prince of far greater consequence than the prisoner. But the court of Vienna, or rather Wallstein, continued inflexible, and brought him to death, as he justly merited, on a public scaffold.

was repulsed chiefly by the women, who not only exhorted their husbands to behave courageously, but carried ammunition from place to place, and threw down fragments of stone from the walls on the assailants.

By this time the resentments of Wallstein, who had rank before the elector of Bavaria in the military commission, began to exasperate, as well as endanger affairs overmuch; for the court of Vienna did not care to see that prince humbled to the dust, and yet dreaded the consequences of an irruption from Gustavus in the central parts of the hereditary dominions. At length the generalissimo, who affected to be without a master and above direction, found himself obliged, through common decency, though with infinite reluctance, to take the field in the beginning of April, and leaving the elector and Tilly, which latter was then living, to become a prey to the conqueror, employed himself upon more easy operations against the Saxons; namely, the reduction of Bohemia. The elector of Saxony, flushed with the success gained at the battle of Leipzig, had on foot a fine army with respect to numbers, and external show: but that prince was both indolent and insincere; and Arnheim was always prepared to negotiate with Wallstein, upon condition he could distress the Swedes, whom he hated;—extract some advantage for his master, and, above all, make a good separate bargain for himself;—So that never was a conquest deserted with more baseness, and less regard to appearances than that of Bohemia was. Nevertheless, Wallstein, who was an adept in artifice and dissimulation, felt the elector's pulse first, by way of negotiating, and made him considerable offers: yet they were not great enough to counterbalance the danger of quitting Gustavus; and perhaps the Saxon ministers, who were no way deficient in point of cunning, concluded likewise, that the emperor had not power enough at that time to make good his promises. Supposing both, or either to be the case, Wallstein in part carried the point he aimed at, which was to render the Saxons *suspected* by the Swedes. Some historians assign other reasons, which appear to me not quite demonstrative; as that Wallstein made these advances out of gratitude, because the elector had spared his fine palace at Prague, and moreover had been alarmed a little by Battista Seni, his astrologer, who predicted in that month the culmination of a planet very unpropitious and adverse to his fortunes. Without entering into these matters, the treaty, at that time, vanished into nothing, though colonel Spar, by Wallstein's orders, had gained over most of the Saxon officers by proposing such rewards as always came

from Walftein; who, little dismayed with this disappointment, repaired to Pilsen, and reviewed his army. He had, by his bounty and dexterity, collected together all the disbanded veteran troops, that had ever served under the Imperial ensigns, and took care to draw to himself each commander of note, who had declined the service out of ill humour against the court of Vienna, or from attachment or personal friendship to himself. Neither did he omit to solicit any officer of note, of which sort there were then many, whose swords and consciences were always ready for sale. Though he punished with more than Roman rigour, yet he rewarded with more than Roman profusion; and for this reason, men who knew they had military merit, delighted to serve under him. Nor was the court of Vienna idle in her co-operations. Orders were given to supply the army with every necessary that could be imagined. The provinces were all requested to make generous contributions, and upwards of £. 30,000. were sent to Aldringer to set in motion the troops which he commanded in Suabia. At the same time a considerable reinforcement was expected from Poland, as the diet had been convened at Warsaw the month before, and as the emperor had formerly sent 10,000 men, under Arnheim, to the assistance of the Poles, in consequence of a treaty of alliance concluded in 1621: but Sigismund, who died soon afterwards, had an insurmountable aversion to engage himself in any farther military contests with Gustavus, and pleaded, by way of excuse, the intractable nature of his form of government, and the apprehensions he had of new disturbances from the side of Tartary and Moscovy. It is true this prince loved the house of Austria cordially and unfeignedly, but the States maintained a sort of understanding with Gustavus. To content the king for their undutifulness they made a very decent provision for a couple of his sons, at the expence of two considerable bishoprics.

At Pilsen, Walftein received a deputation from the senate of Nurenberg. The gentlemen, who composed it, represented to him, that the honours and civilities paid the king of Sweden were things of indispensable necessity at that time, and in that conjuncture of affairs. Walftein knew their errand before they spoke, and, with an air of politeness and indifference, put their memorial into his pocket without reading it. Nevertheless, he entertained them splendidly, and ordered an escort of troops to conduct them home.

He then, at the head of 40,000 men, invested Prague, which was defended by 2000 regular Saxons, and about 5000 militia. The garrison made good shew of resistance, at first, and

and after a considerable breach was opened, repulsed the enemy in two several attacks, which enraged Wallstein to such a degree, that, having commanded his infantry to make a third attempt, he ordered two regiments of horse to push them on with drawn swords, and by these means compelled them to mount the breach.

Thus was Lessér Prague taken. The garrison retired to the castle, where they and the rest of the Saxon troops agreed to surrender at the expence of their artillery, ammunition, and colours, reserving nothing except their swords, and seventy baggage waggons, which were granted them. Upon this the emperor sent Wallstein a patent creating him duke of Great Glogau in Silesia.

About this time it was that the elector of Bavaria, who found himself on the brink of a precipice, determined to make a bold adventure, once for all, freely and openly, without reserving to himself the possibility of playing an after game either with France or with Gustavus. Of course he consigned his life and fortunes to the emperor's protection, hoping perhaps by such an implicit act of generosity to procure compassion; and published a manifesto*, which may be considered as no mean effort in politics, wherein having taken care not once to mention Wallstein, whom he hated, or the king of Sweden, whom he dreaded, and touching gently on his *thrice-dear* cousin the elector Palatine, whose patrimony had been devoured by him, he paints in the warmest colouring his indispensable allegiance to the emperor, as well as his obligations of gratitude, and supposes none could suspect him of concluding a separate bargain with a great western monarch, with whom he had signed and ratified the eighth of May 1631, but such as were either professed enemies to his prosperity, or detractors from his virtue. He then pays France, in the same breath, no small tribute of adulation, but insinuates, in the words of the prophet, alluding to that crying sin of co-operating with heretics, *That thou, meaning France, floodest that day on the other side; in the day, that the strangers carried away captive our forces, and foreigners entered into our gates, and cast lots upon Jerusalem; even thou wast as one of them*†.

There

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 182, & seqq.

† *Obadiab*, ver. 11. The curious in history may peruse an example, equally strong, of this prince's uncommon talents for dissimulation and artifice, by consulting a letter from him to the elector Palatine in the month of September 1620, some few weeks preceding the battle of Prague. [*Expedis. in uirumque*

There is a certain circumstance, very peculiar, in this manifesto: for though it mentions abundance of facts, yet they are so cautiously collected, and alledged in such general terms, that it is not possible to ascertain the chronology of this extraordinary composition; since all we know is, that it was dispersed here and there in various courts, about the spring of the year 1632.

As it is not my intention to describe the war in full detail, with exception only of those parts where Gustavus was present, it may suffice to observe, in regard to Walstein, that in six weeks after his acceptance of the dictatorship, and just as long before the death of Tilly, he had good sense and foresight enough to dispatch Don Baltazar di Maradas *, at the head of 8000 men, into Bohemia, with a view to distress and harass the Saxons. The vigilant Spaniard, though in truth a better courtier than a general, for he had three or four civil employments, equally lucrative and honourable, *his armis illa quoque tutus in aula*; made a shift however to take Satz, the capital of a circle, by some called Zadeck; and having utterly ruined Bindhauf's regiment, which composed the garrison, gave the first check to the cause of the protestants. Indeed the elector of Saxony's conduct was quite inexplicable in an honourable sense, for, besides some omissions, already mentioned, not wholly reconcileable to a sincere alliance, he had left Bohemia, not many weeks after the reduction of Prague, at a time when he was victorious without opposition, and carried Arnheim his general with him, under pretence that no one else was capable of negotiating with Oxenstiern at the diet of Torgau, which was held in February 1631, and to which the emperor dispatched a deputy, who proposed some indistinct advantages. The Swedish chancellor soon cut the matter short; by telling him roundly, whether with sincerity or otherwise one cannot say, that the king, his master, and his protestant allies, expected first, by way of preliminary, to see the expences of two campaigns refunded to them.

What still rendered matters more suspicious, was, that previous to this, the elector of Saxony, in his own person, received

utramque Austriam & Bohemiam Ephemeris. 4to. Monachii. 1621, p. 50. 54.]
Lib. rariss.

* To this commander a pretended Low-Country captain alludes, in one of Dryden's plays;

Brave man at arms! but weak to Baltazar.

Allusions are made to him likewise in some of Johnson's latter comedies.

received proposals from a duke of Saxe Lauenberg*, who had reconciled himself to the catholic religion, and acted the part of an Imperial agent. Nor was it less extraordinary, that a prince, uninterrupted in his conquests, should relinquish a country, at least in effect, three better parts whereof he had entirely subdued, at a time when hardly any opposition could be made against him; and when his own troops, not to mention the addition of count Thurn's army, amounted, in case he had chosen to collect them, to 10,000 cavalry, and 27,000 infantry. I am sensible, it is true, that this number may appear to many readers overcharged; but then the Saxons must make themselves responsible to posterity for the mistake, since the lists stood thus, according to the accounts which they themselves published. Dewbatel likewise laid in Lusatia at the elector's elbow, and with his own Swedes, Germans, and Hamilton's English, had expelled Goetz and Tieffenbach out of that province; and besides this, the elector of Brandenburg had 8000 men, all prepared to unite with Dewbatel, which junction was afterwards effected.

Nor must we here pass by another piece of equivocal conduct in the elector of Saxony; for though, on the reduction of Prague, most of the late proscribed and exiled protestants returned home, after a banishment and proscription of twelve years, yet they found their new friends so very vigilant and clear-sighted in the article of levying contributions, that the difference appeared to them only *nominal*, between an *evangelic* or *popish* government: so, of course, the greater part withdrew themselves as voluntary exiles, to the very places which they had lately quitted.

Before we permit the king to leave Munich entirely, it may be highly necessary, to lay open a very extraordinary conversation betwixt him and the English ambassador, which has perplexed and puzzled me more than any single incident through the whole progress of my work; and the rather, since, though I have strong reasons to conjecture that his majesty's conduct might be justified, if any accounts could be obtained besides this of Vane, who hated Gustavus, and had neither parts nor inclination to serve the cause, yet the misfortune is, that no professed historian, on the subject of this period, mentions a single circumstance relative to the present affair. Notwithstanding all which, the love of truth, joined with a disapprobation of partiality, forces me to lay the transaction before the eyes of the public, and leave it to

* Henry Julius.

work its own way upon the reader's mind. It had been easy for me to have passed by the whole story, as being the first producer thereof, after it had slept without notice for the space of one hundred and twenty-five years: but it is not my principle to serve even an hero under such conditions. All men have, more or less, some failings of human nature; nor do I pretend to engage in drawing a faultless character*: yet, by a mere chance, it may lie in my power to throw some little light upon Vane's account, and extenuate, if not entirely exculpate, his majesty. In the first place, therefore, I shall present the reader with Vane's letter, or memorial, transmitted by him to the court of Whitehall. It is drawn up in French: and that seems to me an affectation; for the French language then, and now, is better known in Germany than the English, in case his packet had been intercepted. The letter translated, runs as follows:

Lieutenant colonel Douglas †, being thrown into a common prison by his majesty's orders, for making a journey to Munich without his master's permission, it was my fortune the next morning, the sixteenth instant ‡, the king being then upon the point of leaving the said city, as I was going to take my leave of the king of Bohemia, to meet his Swedish majesty, by mere accident, in the great saloon, when it appeared to me neither impertinent nor unseasonable to solicit him in favour of the said Douglas, and make an attempt to procure his liberty; remonstrating in his behalf, that though he had taken this step without his majesty's concurrence or consent, yet that, nevertheless, he had obtained permission and leave to go, from the Swedish chancellor. Upon which the king, kindling into some warmth, *swore he would take care to see the chancellor hanged*. As his majesty went down stairs, in order to step into his coach, I renewed my applications, and besought him, once more, to receive Douglas into favour: upon which, turning short, he replied with vehemence, *By heaven! if you speak one syllable more on that subject, I will order the man to be hanged before your eyes*: to which my reply was, *that I hoped his majesty would never commit such a sort of action. And why so?* answered

* One or two voluminous German compilers assert, that Gustavus had a natural son, supposed to be born about two years before he espoused the princess of Brandenburg: but I have never yet received light enough to say any thing in support of the allegation.

† This officer, afterwards Sir George Douglas, betook himself to a civil employment.

‡ May, 1632.

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the king, *By heavens! if your master was present, I would do the same; and if the man, who has affronted me in this manner, were held in the arms of his Britannic majesty, I would tear him thence, although obliged to go to England for that purpose, and commence a war of an hundred years duration: but sure I am, the king of England will never support a subject in a cause where I am affronted.* To which my answer was, *Your majesty may say, at Munich, whatever you please, but will never persist in such an opinion after mature reflection.* Upon which he replied, *Do not tempt me into a passion.* Sire, said I, *you cannot be offended, when an ambassador of Britain interferes for one of his master's subjects.* Well then, rejoined the king, *I at length release him upon your parole only, but will not be affronted a second time*.* To which my answer was, *Sire, it never appeared to me in the light of an affront, to interpose in behalf of a cavalier, who had served your majesty with so much fidelity.* Yes, replied the king, *to seek to quit my service, after I had released him, was not only an affront, but a contravention of my military edicts†.* Sire, added I, *I acknowledge the favour, which your majesty have formerly granted to my solicitations; and it will still be a fresh act of clemency, if you condescend to pardon him, even after a second transgression.* To which the king added once more, *Do not provoke me into a passion.* Adieu, Sire, replied I; and being on the point of departing from him, *By heavens! cried the king, the fellow is a rascal, and I do not chuse to be served by such sort of animals.* May it please your majesty, answered I, *I have always understood, that the subjects of the king, my master, have rendered you the most excellent and faithful services.* Yes, said the king, *I acknowledge the people of your nation have served me well, and far better than any others; but this dog, concerning whom we are talking, has affronted me, and I am resolved to chastise him.* It was my purpose then to have resumed the conversation, but the king cut me short, by saying; *Sir, I request you not to take exception at what has lately dropped from my lips; it was the effect of a warm and hasty temper. I am at present entirely cool, and beseech you to pardon me‡.*

It is now high time to make some observations on this extraordinary dialogue, concerning which I shall briefly premise, though the remark has been made by me, more times

* The king meant Douglas, but Vane artfully enough takes it upon himself.

† By this it appears that Sir Henry Vane had interceded formerly for Douglas, on some other offence, and obtained his pardon.

‡ Sir Henry Vane's letters in the Paper-Office.

than

than one, that Gustavus's frailty was an undue warmth of temper, which, at the same time, manifested the goodness of his heart; for the people, that served under him, did not dislike an harsh expression, inasmuch as his anger was momentary only, and the amends he made those, whom he had chagrined, more than repaid them for the transitory uneasiness of a slight mortification. Perhaps one cannot defend him better, upon this occasion, than by inserting the very words of his own apology to his generals, at a council of war: *I am thought by many of you, said he, to speak hastily and angrily on certain conjunctures; but, alas! consider, my fellow soldiers, what a weight lies upon my mind. I am to perform all, and be present every where; and when the human thoughts are on the stretch, obstacles and interruptions of the grand pursuit make men peevish. You must bear with my infirmities, in the same manner as I submit to your's: one general has a tendency to avarice, another has a passion for wine, a third wishes to wage war with the barbarity of a Croatian; yet, without going further than admonishing and advising you, I have discarded no man, but, on the contrary, have kept you all about my person, and, more or less, esteemed you all*.*

Thus far with regard to the sudden gusts of a great and high spirit, like that of Gustavus. As to Vane's narrative, much may be remarked; it is certain he disliked the king, neither had the king a favourable opinion either of his abilities, or of his intentions. It appears, by the notes on his memorial, and from what shall be remarked before we leave the subject, that he sets forth just so much as serves to gratify his own spleen, namely, that Douglas came to Munich by Oxenstiern's constrained consent, without the king's permission. From the face of his own recital, it appears highly suspicious, that a passion, so fierce and violent, as he describes the king's to be, must have been kindled and exasperated by something more offensive, and more provoking, than Sir Henry chooses to disclose; for Gustavus alludes to ingratitude, having pardoned Douglas once before, at the ambassador's intercession, as likewise to disobedience, personal affront, and a thought conceived of passing into the enemy's service.

It appears, in the next place, that Vane was answerable, in a great degree, for that very anger, in the representation of which he labours afterwards to traduce the king's character: for his solicitation was of the teasing kind; and when he had gained his point, he still wanted *more last words*. He caught at those circumstances where he knew the king's temper was

* See *Soldat Suedois*, p. 365, &c.

inflam-

inflammable, and dwelt upon them : and when he received a rough answer, laid the foundation of producing a second, that was still more so. His sincerity likewise is much to be doubted. He knew Gustavus better than to suppose him in earnest about hanging Douglas ; yet makes a reply with the gravity of a school-divine, or a casuist ; and when the king speaks of Douglas's second affront, passes that by, and supposes the affront to proceed from himself. Nor stands he quite clear in point of politeness, and common good manners ; for when Gustavus felt the infirmity of passion coming upon him, as Vane still administered fresh fuel to it, and besought him twice to drop the conversation, and not push matters to greater extremities ; yet he still persists, even after he had obtained the object of his wishes. Under this class of incivility I rank likewise, the telling a passionate person, that he threatens more than he ever could expect to make good upon mature reflection. Whoever understands the human mind, knows, that such a reflection carries its own poignancy along with it ; and it was highly rude and indecent to assure the king, that he might perform at Munich what he durst not presume to do in England.

It appears also that Vane was either resolved to exasperate Gustavus, or ill understood the better half of his political trade, which consists in seizing the *moments of address* ; since by the *diary* of the king's actions, it appears, that he was *then* stepping into his coach, in a great hurry, in order to raise the siege of Biberach, and give Ossa battle. Now on such an occasion, it may well be supposed that his majesty's spirits were all on a flame, and his mind wholly occupied on a subject, where interruption only, without impropriety, teasing, or ill manners, would naturally produce some hasty and unguarded answers.

Nevertheless, after various difficulties on this head, it may be possible, at last, to obtain some knowledge of the groundwork of his Swedish majesty's resentments, and that from a person no less instructed than Fowler *, secretary to Douglas, afterwards created a baronet, who, in consequence of this broil, exchanged the laurel for the olive, and went from England to Poland in the character of ambassador extraordinary, with instructions to act the part of a mediator at the treaty of Stumbsdorf, in Prussia, 1635. As

* *History of the Troubles of Suetland, and Poland, &c.* Relation of the treaty of pacification, between Poland and Suetland, concluded at Stumbsdorf in 1635. Brief commemoration of the life and death of Sir Geo. Douglas, knight, lord ambassador extraordinary from England, fol. Lond. 1656, inscribed to the lord protector.

Fowler

Fowler loved and honoured his master, Douglas, extremely, it is highly natural to expect no great partiality on the Swedish side; yet enough is said, whereby one may be enabled to say some little matter in behalf of Gustavus; however, upon the whole, I fairly acknowledge that both parties were to blame, and perhaps equally.

Once for all, therefore, we will make an abstract of the author's narrative *.

Douglas transported a company of Scottish infantry into Sweden, in the year 1623; and was afterwards advanced to be lieutenant-colonel in Sir James † Ramsey's regiment of foot; and as that officer happened to receive a disagreeable wound, as we have mentioned before in its proper place, he commanded the corps at the siege of Wurtzburg-castle, if my relation *fail* not ‡; and at the taking of Creütz-nach, he, by the king's commands, repressed the insolence of the soldiery in so satisfactory a manner, that his majesty destined him to be the *governor* of that most important place.

Before this commission could be signed, a reverse of fortune changed the commander of a town into a prisoner; for, on account of some strange expressions in a memorial or letter to the king his master, who was naturally warm, and very jealous, in points of honour, orders were sent from Gustavus to confine him; but Gustavus, on reconsidering the whole affair more coolly, forthwith commanded him to be set at liberty, and directed that his commission of governor should be delivered to him.

"And here it may be thought," says Fowler, "that our lieutenant-colonel had cause to rest contented, having received ample satisfaction, by a preferment so honourable §:" but Douglas was not to be reconciled; protesting he had received an affront, which he would bear from *no hand whatsoever*; and therefore, when Oxenstiern tendered him the commission, he demanded a pass for Munich, in order to debate the matter with his sovereign. This, the chancellor told him, he could not, and dared not grant; but upon over-persuasions, as he personally loved the man, he at length, reluctantly, granted him a short furlough, that he might, if he pleased, attend the king, and demand his discharge.

* Fowler's History, 216—219.

† Some say Alexander Ramsey.

‡ Here Fowler suspects a mistake: we will subjoin, that he ought to have said Marienberg-castle.

§ Such it certainly was, for the king run the risk of his life in taking this fortress, which he considered as the strongest place he had ever besieged.

What made Douglas the keener was, the hope of sheltering himself under the wing of Vane, the British ambassador then going to Munich; who never in his heart loved Gustavus, and therefore, it is probable, encouraged this officer to embroil the misunderstanding afresh. By all accounts from history, Douglas, though a man of worth and honour, and an excellent soldier, was as haughty, though not very high in command, and to the full as passionate as Gustavus. This greatly exasperated the king, who thought the ambassador and soldier had both conspired to give him the bravado in the name of the British nation.

Nor did Douglas use any address or management upon this occasion; but, instead of employing his friends to seize the *mollia tempora* of applying to Gustavus, presented himself abruptly before him in a public tennis-court, where the kings of Sweden and Bohemia were amusing themselves.

This want of respectful duty and common good breeding soon struck a mind like the king's, naturally warm on receiving affronts: *Sir*, said he, *why are not you at your post of command?* *Sire*, replied Douglas, *I have none. Commit him to prison then*, rejoined the king, and spoke no more*.

This spirited act of authority, which the ambassador thought fit to look upon as an insult on the prince he served, and the whole British nation, made both him and the king alike peevish and equally passionate.

Thus have we given a slight recapitulation of all that Fowler says in behalf of his patron, which seems, according to the best of our judgment, to incline the turn of the scale in favour of the northern monarch. Fowler declares, too, that he knew all the dialogue which passed between the king and the ambassador, and yet, for certain reasons, thought convenient to suppress it. For my own part, I have ventured to tell the story from authentic papers, and hope, as it was my business to conceal no one considerable fact in history, that I have thereby done no injury to the memory of Douglas or the *manes* of Gustavus, who, to shew his humanity, and forgiving temper, after a short recollection, released Douglas a second

* It was certainly Douglas's duty to have asked his dismissal by letter or memorial, staying on his post till a proper substitute could be found to replace him, and not have left so important a charge in the midst of war, and the royal army so far removed from him. By all military laws, he was disobedient: nor could he say to the king, he had *no employ*, till he had first petitioned to be discharged, and had seen his successor in possession. For, if the commander of a town, upon any disgust, not represented, is at full liberty to leave his charge, what prince, or general, can be safe with such a servant, or who can be secure from treachery, or desertion?

time.

time. The former part Vane himself acknowledges, in a subsequent letter * to secretary Coke, dated from Augsburg, nine days after the first-mentioned dispatch: "The king of Sweden," says he, "three or four days after this embroilment †, sent my lord Spense to my lodging, professing to be exceeding sorry for the discourse he had held, especially wherein it touched the king my master, which, if it were possible, he would redeem at the dearest rate. That he was his majesty's brother, and servant, whose friendship he valued more than any others, having none but him, on whom he could rely: that though his satisfaction had been public, as well as his offence, yet, not content therewith, he would have written to his majesty, by an express, to excuse the heat of his passion; but either he must have accused himself, or cast the burthen upon me, as if my solicitations had provoked him to that passion; which he, willing to avoid, desired me to make a favourable report to his majesty."

But to return to the affairs of Germany. Within a few days after this altercation with Douglas, an embarrassment appeared of a very different nature; for Gustavus's old rival in war, Sigismund, king of Poland, died of an apoplexy ‡, after a wearisome and turbulent reign of forty-five years. On this event the Poles were divided in their affections, between Uladisläus, the elder son of Sigismund, and Casimir; and during the interregnum, prince Radzivil§, who loved Gustavus, and had made him a visit in the late king's decline, for Sigismund had many warnings of his approaching fate, received orders from the senate to command the army then prepared to act against the Moscovites. Some very sensible historians, and Le Vassor ||, amongst the rest, seem disposed to think, that Gustavus had an eye to this kingdom in his own person, which they ground on no other proof than that Radzivil held a correspondence with him, and that he dispatched ambassadors into Poland, to watch the motions of the future election. But his Swedish majesty, at that time, had building enough to erect, without enlarging his plan, and

* *Letters of Sir Henry Vane in the Paper-office.*

† His majesty could not make the acknowledgment sooner, for he was absent, in order to raise the siege of Biberach.

‡ April 29, 1632: and Uladisläus was elected, if I mistake not, the October following. See more of this negotiation below.

§ He had been mortified, because Sapieha, palatine of Vilna, had been preferred to him, as supreme commander in Lithuania. *Kobierziski Hist. Vladisl.* p. 920.

|| Tom. vii. 179, &c.

that greatly too; nor was he a prince to amuse himself, at such a conjuncture, with a prospect so remote in point of distance, and so chimerical in its own nature, if one rightly considers the perverseness, as well as changeable dispositions, of the Polanders. Had he not engaged in this German expedition, true it is, he had pretensions to urge, and a head and hand capable to support them; but at present it appears to me that he laboured only to form a party in the diet, sufficiently strong to prolong the *truce*, which would otherwise end in three years, between him and the Polanders; a circumstance of great consequence to a warrior, who had his hands full, and wanted no collateral business. All other steps taken by him seem conformable to this first idea: and if he preferred Casimir to Uladislaus, it was because the former seemed less attached to the court of Madrid, as well as that of Vienna.

We have related before, that Cratz made himself master of Weissemburg, whilst the king marched from Munich, where, amongst other things, as we ought to have observed, he seized 8000 new regimentals, in order to give battle to Ossa, who had invested Riberach; and to crush the insurrection of the Bavarian peasants: but the former, having lost the best part of his artillery, retreated towards Lindau, and the lake of Constance; and the latter submitted without resistance. Upon this occasion, it was observed of Gustavus, that his enemies could never project an undertaking, which he did not counterwork by devising a remedy the first moment he attained the knowledge of their intentions. So that, it is difficult for us which to admire most, the inventive powers of his genius, or the celerity wherewith he executed any design, immediately after he had conceived it*; it being a maxim with him, that the grand science of war consisted in seizing incidents, or keeping always in a state of preparation, though the particular stroke may be unforeseen. He then committed the army to duke Bernard's care, who pursued Ossa almost to the feet of the Alps, and cut to pieces one of his finest regiments, that of Annibal count Hohen-Ems, though the commander had thrown himself into a walled village. Eight ensigns were lost, but the count and 400 soldiers, that survived, were sent prisoners to Ulm.

Meanwhile the king, attended by a few followers, flew to Augsburg, and taking with him, from thence and the country adjacent, a strong detachment, conceived great hopes of

* *Marro's Second Expedition.*

relieving

relieving Weiffenberg, a place of great importance to him, as it secured the retreat from Augsburg to Nuremberg; but the Bavarian general had performed his business before it was possible for the Swedish army to arrive, and, dreading the approach of Gustavus, evacuated the town almost as soon as he possessed it; which may be considered no small omission.

It was during the prelude, in Bohemia, towards a more serious and general campaign, but what period we cannot precisely say, that a party of Imperial troops took prisoner, after a sharp rencounter, Torstenſon, who was then known to be the best officer of artillery in Europe, and useful to the king, his master, beyond expression. But such singular good fortune served only to supply Wallſtein with fresh opportunities of exerting that generosity, and magnificence, which were peculiar to him; for he paid Torſtenſon's ransom to the Croats out of his own purse, and restored him to Gustavus without delay*.

Wallſtein then finished the reduction of Bohemia, by investing Egra, where something happened equally heroic and extraordinary with regard to himself: for the magistrates knowing there was a young lady in the town whom he passionately admired, arrested her without ceremony or previous notice, and ordered her, upon pain of death, to command the general to desist from his enterprise. This woman, cast by nature in no common mould, made a semblance of complying with great frankness, and sealing up the following billet, addressed him thus; *Regard not my life; I am prepared to die, upon condition your Excellency can obtain true glory and serve your master with fidelity and success*†. But the females of that age aspired to vie with the men in acts of fortitude. Banier's wife‡, following her husband, in his expedition into Saxony, was brought to bed of a male child in her coach; which resembles an accident of the same sort, which happened to Agrippina, the wife of Germanicus§; and at the battle of Rhinfield, in particular, several ladies staid in the field during the warmest part of the action; nor did they retreat when the troops of their husbands, who were Imperialists, were cut to pieces. So that some were killed, some robbed, and the remaining few escaped with difficulty||.

By this time Wallſtein began to edge round towards the

* Riccius de Bell. Germ. 4°. 412.

† *Memoires d'Eleſtrice Palatine*, 4°. 197.

‡ The countess of Lovenſtein.

§ *Memoires d'Eleſtrice Palatine*, 4°. 196.

|| *Ibid.* 198.

eastern side of the Upper Palatinate, on whose southernmost skirts lay the elector of Bavaria with all his forces. It now behoved Gustavus to make an exertion of those great talents which Providence had bestowed on him; for he had a conquest to secure behind him of seven or eight hundred miles in length, and half the breadth; and two armies to confront, the one equal to his own, and the other doubly superior. Far from being puzzled or dismayed, he maintained a presence of mind that astonished even his own generals; and without calling in a single army to his assistance, he had no less than five small ones in the parts adjacent, he rather advised them to pursue their separate business; and instead of thinning them by detachments, augmented them from his own corps. With the composed coolness, therefore, of a man victorious, he even sent away many commanders, whom he wanted much, if that can be supposed; for he detached Horn towards the Upper Palatinate, and permitted duke Bernard, whom indeed his brother William replaced in a short space, to pursue Ossa, and left Hepburn commander in chief at Munich, and over the whole duchy of Bavaria; whilst Oxenstiern, Banier, and duke Julius the administrator of Wirtemberg*, and sir Patrick Ruthven, all commanded separate bodies, in or near the circles of Suabia and Franconia. He then made a treaty of accommodation with the city of Strasburg, through whose territory Haracour had lately marched a detachment of Lorrainers to the assistance of Ossa and Montecuculi the elder, a circumstance not extremely agreeable to the king's system; and therefore, for these reasons, he spared no pains to bring the Strasburgers into terms of friendship; and the rather, because he thereby secured his chancellor † from a like occurrence in his government of Mentz, and in the protection of the Lower Palatinate, which department was also assigned to him. He had an apprehension too, that a reinforcement of Spanish troops might pass the Valteline from the Milanese, and unite themselves with Ossa; and on this account he wrote a letter with his own hand to the cantons of Switzerland, who had lately assembled at Lucerne, and were now adjourning to Baden. Its tenour ran to this effect; and as I have an old translation now before me, I shall content myself with correcting a few inaccuracies of language, and faults of connection, here and there:

* The king had some suspicions of this prince, and having confirmed the alliance with him, resolved to station an army near him, to enforce the observation of articles, that had been agreed upon, *de novo*.

† Oxenstiern.

“ Gentlemen,

" Gentlemen,

" Being informed that the king of Spain attempts, by all possible methods, to persuade you to grant free passage to his troops, out of Italy, into the parts of Germany now near me, in opposition to the progress and prosperity of my arms, and to the advancement of his own pernicious and unjust designs, as well as the support and assistance of my enemies, and their proceedings; I have thought good to exhort and admonish you, in the most affectionate terms, to recollect within yourselves, that the republic of Switzerland has ever, hitherto, flourished in high reputation, and gloriously maintained its liberties against all encroachers and invaders whomsoever, in opposition principally to the two houses of Burgundy and Austria, each of which has made frequent attempts to divest you of those invaluable blessings; particularly that liberty which exceeds all other sorts of liberty, namely, the *free exercise of conscience*; not to mention various efforts tending to the destruction of your civil rights and freedom.

" Therefore, gentlemen, let me beseech you to remember that good understanding which I have always maintained with your commonwealth; and for these reasons, permit me to advise you to stand vigilantly upon your guard from henceforward, persevering firm and constant within the bounds of an exact neutrality, conformably to that good faith still subsisting between us; neither commanding nor allowing passage to the enemy, nor granting him assistance or favour under any shape. Otherwise, I shall find myself obliged to begin first, and declare hostilities against you; and then, in case an event so disastrous should take place, you yourselves would draw down the war upon your own heads, and all the ruin, desolation, and calamity, that usually attend it. But I have conceived much better hopes of you, *my friends*; and, for my own part, hereby assure you all in general, and each in particular, of my best love and affection towards you.*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS."

This letter was accompanied by a couple of Scotch colonels, with instructions to solicit leave for levying two regiments of Switzers.

The answer † returned to the king's letter was very polite and cautious, containing a fair assertion, that no demand had

* See more of this negotiation, and letter, in the *Hist. or Auth. Relation* in High Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 55.

† *Mercurie François*, tom. xviii. p. 359.

been made, hitherto, on the subject in question, by the court of Madrid: nor should a representation of that nature be listened to whenever it might happen to be presented. That the neutrality, so generously proposed, was embraced at the same time with the utmost thankfulness, upon supposition, that it interfered not with any prior obligations: and lastly, it was acknowledged, that as the progress of the Swedish army seemed to approach the Alps, it was hoped the Cantons should enjoy their proportionable share of royal favour; and suffer no diminution of rights and revenues in such of their possessions as laid in adjacent provinces, then made, or thereafter to be made, the seat of war.

His majesty, by this time, being returned to Augsburg, and having conquered in two years, or brought over to his interest, nearly three hundred cities, fortresses, and walled towns, collected together his own little army, which consisted of about eighteen or twenty thousand men, and marched to Donawert. He then took the two episcopal cities of Aichstadt and Dillingen, as likewise Pappenheim-castle, which lies eight miles to the west of Aichstadt, removing the best ordnance in all three places to his grand magazine at Augs- burg. By the seventh of June he arrived in his old encampment at Furt, near Nuremberg, where duke Bernard, who had pursued the Imperialists to the lake of Constance, joined him. What his intentions then were soon appeared to the public, by the answer he made the magistrates, who requested him to honour their city with a visit; *Gentlemen, said he, I shall not deny myself the pleasure; but at present I had much rather see Walstein than Nuremberg**. The truth was, the king intended to have passed through the Upper Palatinate, where Horn then was, and given Walstein battle, before the elector of Bavaria could have joined him; but the country was so ravaged and wasted, partly by war, and partly by express order from the Imperial general, that the enterprise was laid aside, because it was thought impossible to succeed. The king, who had actually began his march towards the Walsteiners, returned to his ancient lines, and intrenched himself according to the great abilities he possessed in that then unknown branch of the military science. His subsisting himself in this hazardous situation, for the space of *sixty-one days*, and his resistance of the efforts of 60,000 men, with only 20,000, not to mention that he had the confidence, upon receiving some small reinforcements, to attack his adversary sword in hand, though intrenched up to the

* *Swed. Intel.* part ii. 181.

eyes, and protected with barricades of trees and battering artillery, beyond number, *will be always esteemed, by such generals as are masters of the finer parts of their business, the highest pitch of ability which the human mind can attain in the profession of arms.*

Indeed this conduct of his majesty appears nothing near so wonderful in *our* days, as it certainly was in the *last* century, forasimuch as the practice has been *copied*, more or less, by all experienced commanders ever since: yet the exertion of the idea, in its masterly manner of execution, is first due to the GREAT GUSTAVUS. The thing, it must be allowed, ever has been and will be a real and equal truth in all ages; but then the person, who makes the experiment, must be like the man, whom I have lately mentioned. When a genius, such as Gustavus, has once adjusted certain previous circumstances, he may safely face a *treble* number of troops for a long duration. Like the great master of mechanics, who used to say, that if certain postulata could be granted him, he would undertake to move the world with a single thread: *Δις πρὸς τῷ, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κινήσω.*

In these encampments against forces sometimes *doubly* and sometimes *trebly* superior, as was the case partly at Werben, and more particularly here, it is impossible for me, either to analyse the king's abilities, or explain the various principles upon which he proceeded. It may suffice to remark, that in military fortifications, of all sorts, he had then no equal, and particularly in the management of his artillery. It was he who first fortified the weaker parts of his camp with *those* fort of redoubts, the carrying of which resembles storming so many separate towns sword in hand.

Under this article I shall just mention a slight circumstance, having touched upon the point in other parts of my history more than once. In the former part of the last century, cannons were made much longer than they are at present; concerning which something was said in the siege of Ingoldstadt, with reference to the piece of artillery from which a shot struck the king's horse; till at length it was conjectured by some, that a cannon, formed two feet and a half shorter than even those in common use, might convince mankind that a ball moves with greater force through a less space than a larger. This Gustavus proved by repeated experiments, in the year 1624, when an iron ball, of forty-eight pounds weight, was found to go farther, from a new short cannon, than another ball of ninety-six pounds weight out of a larger piece; whereas, in other respects, it is certain, the larger the bore and ball, the greater the range.

By

By this time the duke of Bavaria invaded the Upper Palatinate with all his forces, and whilst he reduced Amberg, the principal city of the country, dispatched a part of his army to invest Sultzbach, which belonged to prince Palatine Augustus, whom we have often mentioned. This place, after some resistance, capitulated; but Schomberg, who commanded the detachment, violated every article of the agreement; for he enlarged the garrison contrary to the terms stipulated, despoiled the citizens, plundered the prince's cattle, and raised one thousand pounds by way of contribution. This scene of perfidy sharpened Gustavus's resentments, and determined him, as we observed before, to enter the said Palatinate, and give the Elector battle before he could form his junction with Walsstein: but the country was so wasted and ruined, that it was impossible to subsist a second army therein, and the Imperial generalissimo, who longed to see the duke destroyed, and yet found himself obliged to preserve appearances, had commanded a body of 3600 cavalry to advance to the assistance of the Bavarians.

Elevated with his late successes in Bohemia, he dispatched colonel Spar to the elector of Saxony, with fresh proposals of accommodation, and as things now began to take a less favourable turn with regard to himself, he condescended to cast his eyes upon them. How great was his astonishment, when he perceived that Walsstein raised his tone to an immeasurable height, and declared, that the losses the elector had sustained at Leipzig, when Tilly plundered it, were more than counterbalanced by the reprisals made by the Saxons on the town of Prague: that to reimburse himself into the Imperial favour, he should advance two months pay to the army, freely and speedily resign the *bona ecclesiastica* he had impropriated, and join in the common cause of driving Gustavus out of the empire: and then, by way of acknowledgment for all these compliances and advances, the Bohemians were to enjoy the free exercise of the evangelical religion.

In truth, Walsstein, beneath these appearances, determined to make the example of Saxony a terror to all Germany, and therefore named concessions impossible to be granted, unless with extreme dishonour. He besides had a great number of pensioners in the electoral army, the titular prime-minister was one, though Arnheim indeed was every thing, and always expected some advantage either from mutiny or desertion. Some letters too had been discovered, even before this period, between him and the general, which gave the

Swedes no small suspicions *. But matters were not yet ripe for defection on the Saxon side.

It was therefore Walftein's design to intercept the retreat of Arnheim's army in the noted pass and defile between Auffig and Leütmeritz. To this purpose he approached his enemies, as near as he could, without alarming them, and ordered some troops, under pretence of taking in an incon siderable town or two, to file off privately towards Saxony. He then made new and not disadvantageous proposals to Arnheim; and sent an officer of great experience, whose person was unknown to the Saxons, to deliver the conditions to him, being disguised in the habit of a trumpeter. Thus he learned the posture and situation of the enemy's camp. It was unlucky for Walftein, that Arnheim had been formerly his pupil, his confident, and his favourite. The scholar soon penetrated into the designs of the master, but profoundly dissembled all sort of suspicion, and affected to be ignorant of the march of any troops whose business it was to intercept him: and wrote back by the trumpeter, that he had authority and orders to treat, and was ready to do so at a minute's warning, and then dispatched couriers every hour with fresh expresses, growing every hour more compliable. That night he passed his cannon and army over the bridge at Leütmeritz, which he broke down immediately after him, having previously detached a chosen body of troops to secure Auffig, and consequently both sides of the Elbe: and by preventing the Walfsteiners in this single circumstance, entirely ruined all their scheme. At Pirna he crossed the Elbe on a bridge of boats, and intrenched himself strongly, waiting for his master and Banier, who had promised to reinforce him with 10,000 men. Though this retreat depended more on political than military genius, and though it cannot be compared in all points with that of Banier in the year 1637, and many others during the course of the thirty years war; yet it must be acknowledged a very fine one, and may be considered as the masterpiece of Arnheim's performances in the capacity of a general. Thus in half a campaign the emperor recovered Bohemia with the same ease that he lost it in a preceding one.

During this interval, Pappenheim, general of the catholic league in Lower Saxony, had several rencounters of various kinds and successes against the Swedes, availing himself of the misunderstanding that subsisted amongst their commanders. The magistrates of Hildesheim sent him a message of

* *Chemnitzius de Belle Sueco-Germanico*, tom. i.

accommodation,

accommodation, to which he returned for answer, that he would make them a visit very soon, and save them the trouble and expence of a formal deputation; notwithstanding which, he never had the power to keep his word. Amongst others, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel set himself to oppose his conquests, and met with several disagreeable checks here and there. About this time an event broke out, which had like to have done the Swedish cause considerable mischief. Some Danish soldiers had been cut to pieces in the town of Friedberg by the troops of the archbishop of Bremen, who was an ally of the crown of Sweden. The courts of Vienna and Brussels took care to aggrandize this breach of faith to the utmost: and Pappenheim dexterously laid hold of an expedient, which went very near to detach the Danish king from the Swedish, and throw the former into the arms of the emperor: for possessing many towns in the diocese of Bremen, where the prince of Denmark was coadjutor, and finding it expensive, and perhaps hardly possible to keep them, he offered to sell them at a moderate price to his Danish majesty, thereby hoping to produce a misunderstanding between Sweden, Denmark, and Bremen. When the states of the second of these countries were convened to take the proposal into consideration, the prudence of the sage and moderate soon got the better of a few impetuous and turbulent spirits, who had given heedlessly into the snare. Thus the misconduct at Friedberg being entirely placed to the archbishop's account, an embassy was sent to Gustavus in order to reconcile these reciprocal grievances, and place matters, for the future, on a more solid and amicable footing. In a word, there was something peculiarly gallant and heroic in the demeanor of all his Swedish majesty's enemies during the invasion which he made into Germany; for no arts, intrigues or promises could ever induce Denmark, Poland or Moscow to distress or perplex him. Or supposing this not to be the case, and that they took no secret pleasure to see the house of Austria reduced to a state of humiliation, then it is plain they dreaded lest Gustavus should conclude a sudden peace with the emperor, and destroy them without the possibility of being succoured or supported by the latter.

The Swedish general Todt invested Staden; but Pappenheim gave him battle, and compelled him to raise the siege by throwing into the town three regiments, who crossed the river Schwinga upon portable bridges. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that the Swedes retreated in good order; and as the Bavarian colonel Boninghausen, a principal commander

mander under Pappenheim, was dispatched after them with a large body of cavalry to harass the rear, they prepared an ambuscade for him, and cut to pieces two thirds of his detachment. Animated with this lucky change of fortune, Todt returned to his point, and there had the honour, in his turn, to blockade Pappenheim, who, according to his custom, made a furious sally, and carried his troops through the Swedish army; which he effected the more easily, as Todt and the duke of Lunenburg hated each other, and performed nothing in concert. The former was therefore recalled to the king, and replaced by Bauditzen.

As Pappenheim's presence was looked upon to be highly necessary in other places, and as it was thought impossible to maintain his conquests in the archbishopric of Bremen, he restored the keys of Staden to the magistrates, and having exhorted them to continue their allegiance to the house of Austria, recommended his sick and wounded soldiers to their humanity and protection. By this voluntary cession the Swedes became masters of the Elbe on either side, from Hamburg to the Baltic.

He then passed into the territory of Brunswic and the bishopric of Verden, and extracted no small advantages from the new misunderstandings that arose between the duke of Lunenburg and the archbishop of Bremen; and having made a general destruction of forage and provisions in the country round him, left part of his troops under the command of count Gronsfeld, and advanced with others into the territory of Hesse-Cassel; and then commanded, as it were, the states assembled at Zell to enter into no measures prejudicial to the Imperial interests, since that would oblige him to march over the ruins he had already made. The states of Lower Saxony perceiving, plainly, he was on the wing of departure, conferred the supreme command on the duke of Lunenburg, and constituted Bauditzen lieutenant-general under him. It was thought by some, that Pappenheim meditated this retreat in order to consult his friends, and attempt to succeed Tilly in the employment of generalissimo to the princes of the league: but that appears improbable; for, besides a dislike to be near Wallstein, he loved no superior, especially one of so interfering a temper as the elector of Bavaria; and therefore preferred a separate command in a station less distinguished.

When he dislodged from Lower Saxony, the Swedish generals reviewed their army, which amounted to 9000 foot, 5000 horse, and 700 dragoons. During his absence they repossessed so many places, that he found himself obliged

to

to return to Brunswic, and ordered Gronsfeld to join him. He then made Bauditzen an offer of selling Nienberg to him for £.9000.; but the latter sent him word, that he hoped to possess the place as a foldier, and not as a merchant. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel defeated four regiments under Boninghausen, and took that officer prisoner.

Thus was almost every town in Lower Saxony, Westphalia, and Hesse, taken and retaken half a dozen times in the space of a year, at the expence and to the affliction of the poor inhabitants, and with little advantage to the contending parties; for, in those parts, they who conquered in the field soon became masters of the rivers and the towns.

War was carried on with like success, and upon the same principles, in the circle of the Rhine, where William margrave of Baden-Baden, Ossa, Montecuculi, and Haracour with his Lorrainers, supported the part of the emperor; whilst Oxenstiern and the Rhingrave, with one small army, and the dukes of Birkenfeld and Weimar with another, sustained the cause of Sweden. To the relief of the former parties the count of Embden made a very dexterous march at the head of 8000 Spaniards through the bishopric of Liege, and crossed the Moselle about the middle of April with little or no molestation, though the inhabitants mortally hated the nation which his troops belonged to, and that for reasons of the freshest date. Oxenstiern formed a resolution to intercept one half of his army in its progress; and for that purpose dispatched the Rhingrave at the head of the very chosen party of his cavalry, who lodged that night at a village called Nieder-Ulm. Of this, Luca Cagno, commissary general of the Spanish forces, procured intelligence, and dislodged at midnight with 1200 horse to give the Rhingrave a *camisado*; for in that age all attacks in the dark were so called, and had no other name: but the latter being apprised, by his spies, of the Spaniards' intentions, posted himself in an advantageous pass mid-way, and gave them so rough a reception, that they soon betook themselves to flight, and overturned 1000 horsemen, who had advanced out of the lines to support their retreat. The Swedes took eight colours, and pursued the enemy so far, till the cannon of the camp compelled them to retire. To restore matters a little after this signal affront, Don Philip De Sylva joined the count with 3000 infantry, and ten pieces of artillery; in consequence whereof the town of Spire* was besieged and

* The Imperial chamber here, which we have mentioned more than once in the course of our history, was removed to Wetzlar in 1693.

taken

taken by capitulation ; for which Horneck the governor was immediately arrested by Oxenstiern's order, and condemned to death by a court-martial ; nevertheless, his majesty was pleased to pardon him, at the queen's intercession. The Spanish general extorted, by way of composition out of the poor inhabitants, £.10,000. which he refused to apply to the emperor's use ; and discovered a coffin in the house of the knights of the Teutonic order, where Horneck had secreted the greatest part of his wealth.

This unfortunate panic which seized Horneck, made Oxenstiern extremely vigilant in strengthening the fortifications of Mentz and Wormes ; and at the same time care was taken to reinforce the garrison of Mannheim. The chancellor * then erected two bridges across the Rhine and the Maine ; and when the French ambassador complained to him, that the governor of Mentz had ordered all the ecclesiastics to retire, upon the approach of the Spaniards, he immediately cancelled the said governor's decree, and assured the ambassador, that what had been done was contrary to his master's intentions, and his own orders.

Some days afterwards her Swedish majesty signified an inclination of taking up her residence at Mentz ; upon which the grave statesman Oxenstiern, with the politeness and gallantry of a young courtier, accompanied by all the nobility and princes that served in his army, paid his attendance to her at Costheim, on the other side of the Rhine, at the head of the flower of his cavalry ; and on the opposite bank of the river ranged two bodies of infantry, each consisting of 4000 men, who made the queen and court-ladies an unaccustomed compliment in one general discharge of their fire-arms. Her majesty, attended by her own guards, entered the city with a train of twenty coaches, and lodged in the archiepiscopal palace.

About this time the margrave of Baden-Baden received orders from Vienna to demand the town of Spire in the emperor's name ; but count Eimden told him, that every subject was to serve his respective sovereign ; and that he could not order the garrison to dislodge, till proper instructions arrived from the court of Brussels. Nevertheless, he began now to find himself greatly straitened in the neighbourhood of Spire, and Oxenstiern pressed and perplexed him more and more, having surprized a courier with some of his dispatches, by which he became informed of the enemy's wants and distresses. It is true the Infanta Isabella took all possible care of this general's safety, and don Gonsalvo di Cordova

* Oxenstiern.

received

received commands to march to his support with 8000 fresh troops; but the vigilance of the Swedish chancellor was so great, that it was difficult to form this junction, and of course Cordova advanced to Triers, and then desisted.

Embden was much disconcerted at this disappointment; and having left a garrison of 1000 men in Spires, filled the magazines of Frankendale, and furnished it with a defence of 1500 infantry, and 250 horse, owed his safety to a feigned march, and a well-managed retreat. To effect this, he ordered his troops to ascend the Rhine, and join Ossa; but at midnight turned his course short, and made all imaginable expedition to Triers. Oxenstiern, whose army was now enlarged, watched his motions with 18,000 effective men, but Embden hastened with such extraordinary diligence, that it was next to impossible to overtake him. Nevertheless the chancellor continued to pursue him with the bulk of his army, and dispatched the Rhingrave, with all the cavalry, to embarrass his retreat, and force him to halt, if that could be, and so draw him into a general action. In the valley of Steinbach the Rhingrave at length came up with and obliged him to turn round and defend his rear, which he did with great firmness, but cautiously avoided a full and decisive engagement, refusing to seize little advantages, and skirmishing only, till the artillery and baggage had gained a place of safety. Cordova joined him at Triers, and Merodé, at the head of some Imperial troops, increased their numbers.

As the elector of Triers had made a separate treaty * with Louis XIII. and as France had engaged to become the guaranty of his dominions, for we have made it manifest that she always loved to have a finger in German affairs, so now, as that prelate, who had lost Coblenz, Philipburg†, and all his strong places, except Ehrenbreitstein or Hermanstein, found himself surrounded, tormented, and devoured on every side, it was thought necessary to march 24,000 men to his assistance, under the command of the marshals D'Effiat and La Force. The Imperialists were chagrined above measure, nor was Gustavus thoroughly pleased, when the elector resigned fort Hermanstein or Ehrenbreitstein to the French; which indeed that prince was not greatly inclined to do, but the two generals told him, that in proportion as he became safe, he became forgetful likewise, and that they expected realities from him, as well as promises. This

* It was signed at Ehrenbreitstein, April 9, 1632, APPENDIX, No. XXVIII.

† This town belonged to Philip Christopher, elector of Triers, as bishop of Spires.

fort had the good fortune to command the Rhine, and was rendered next to impregnable by situation and art. As to Coblenz, the elector appeared very willing to resign it into the hands of the French. It is a town of no small importance, as it stands on the conflux of the Rhine and Moselle in such a manner, that nothing but the first-mentioned river separated the subjects of Triers from the Spaniards. Nevertheless, the latter contrived to throw a sufficient garrison into it, which piqued the two marshals of France not a little, for few nations hate one another more *cordially* than the French and Spaniards. Gustavus soon made his allies happy in this respect, for he dispatched Horn from Mentz, with an army of 14,000 fresh troops, in order to disperse the Imperialists; chastise the chapter of Triers; and repossess Trarbach and Coblenz: which latter place, by a convention between the two kings, was delivered up to the French, and the inhabitants reimbursed the Swedes for the charges of the expedition as well as the siege.

Horn afterwards made himself master of Graffenberg and Trarbach, a strong fort on the Moselle, about thirty miles from Triers, both which places were garrisoned by Spanish soldiers. He then entered Spire, for the Castilian governor dislodged at his first approach; and lastly, possessed Strasburg, which had long fluctuated between the then contending powers, and at length made a formal declaration in favour of Sweden.

Meanwhile the elector of Triers had not power to consign his own metropolis into the hands of France, for the chapter, which was in the Imperialists interests, and more zealous catholics than their bishop, had rebelled against him, and ventured, titularly at least, to degrade him; inasmuch that a count Isenberg who served the emperor, had taken care to secure the city for his master. The elector then sent a trumpeter to his own commander at Philipsburg, but this man's loyalty had received a taint from his Spanish neighbours at Frankendale, and all the answer he returned his sovereign was, that he acknowledged no authority but what came from Vienna, nor could afford him any other admission than such as could be procured by the point of the sword: and, to manifest the sincerity of his intentions yet further, he burnt all the houses that stood near the fortifications, and having manned his walls, placed his artillery in a posture of disputing the event.

The two marshals not caring to waste time on an officer of so singular an humour, advanced with their troops into the duchy of Deuxponts, and paid their compliments to the

duke, who received them in a manner, almost peculiar to himself. This prince had uncommon talents of wisdom, politeness, dexterity, and persuasion. During a civil war of twelve years continuance, he had *aided* none, and *offended* none: and though the several marches of Imperial, Lorrain, and French troops had produced some inconveniences to his subjects, yet every general, upon the first conversation with him, found himself so struck with his eloquence and address, that far from burthening the inhabitants, he sought to ease them. La Force was soon recalled, upon advice, that *Monsieur* had entered France. D'Effiat crossed the mountains of Voghesi * with all his cannon, and raised contributions from Strasburg, not in money, for that Gustavus might have opposed, but in necessities for the support of his army. He had instructions from the cardinal to behave politely and humanely to all people, and of course always asked for quarters even in neutral, or friendly countries. Having advanced to Lutzelstein, he there died of a camp fever. Upon this event, the *maréchal* D'Etrée received the brevet of command in chief, which the viscount Arpajou, general, *pro tempore*, resigned to him.

It was D'Effiat's purpose to have crossed the Rhine at Gernersheim or Spire, and besiege Philipsburg; but De Charnacé, the French ambassador to Gustavus, told him, that, besides the difficulty of the attempt, his Swedish majesty, who already possessed the greater part of the bishopric of Spire, would never allow the French to fix their footsteps in that diocese. The resolution was consequently formed to lay siege to Triers.

During this period the contending generals were not inactive in the circle of Suabia and the territories adjoining, where Ossa, Furstenburg † and Montecuculi acted against Banier, duke William of Weimar, Schavaliski, Ruthven, and the administrator of Wirtemberg, concerning whom we have spoken already. Nor was the circle of Franconia less quiet; for the duke of Saxe-Coburg, and the margrave of Culmbach, commanded the Imperial party, and the colonels Haefver and Mussel conducted the Swedish. To describe

* This chain of mountains, which Claudian, if I remember right, expressly mentions, takes its rise near Daun in the Sungenau, and stretches on to the duchy of Deux-ponts, and a part of the Lower Palatinate. From the Voghesi mountains the Maelt, Moselle, Marne, and Saon take their rise.

† This was not the person who commanded the main body at the battle of Leipzig.

the

the various rencounters, conflicts, and little battles, that happened here, and in the several departments above-mentioned, would swell my account to such a size, that though it might astonish my readers, yet it would bear too hard upon their patience at the same time. It may suffice therefore to conclude this sketch of the war in parts separate and remote from Gustavus, with observing only, that if he had not recalled duke Bernard to Nuremberg, on the expectation of Wallstein and Maximilian's junction, it is probable, *that* spirited and fiery young warrior would have carried the Swedish arms through the Tyrolese, and driven the archduke from his own capital.

It appears, by this time, that the firearm of the war ran entirely against the emperor; yet nothing embarrassed or afflicted him so much as the forlorn condition to which he saw the elector of Bavaria reduced. He not only pitied this unfortunate prince, but knew him to be *capable* of deserting the cause; and feared also, lest Gustavus should push the war into Upper Austria. Couriers upon the heels of couriers were dispatched to Wallstein day and night, to dissuade him from invading Saxony, which was then his intention, and implore him to carry his assistance into Bavaria. At length the splenetic general complied, merely because it was indecent and dangerous to refuse any longer. In all probability, what mostly determined him was, that some of his personal enemies, or some who wished well to the house of Austria, had spread a report, that he feared to confront the king of Sweden. The surest way to animate or exasperate the heroes of the sword, is to throw out suspicions on their conduct, or their courage; for then reason, philosophy, and even presence of mind, the most shining of all their qualifications, are obliged to give way. It was under these *circumstances* that Tilly lost the battle of Leipzig; and the valiant Hepburn, favourite of Gustavus, resigned his commission, and refused to be reconciled to his master, who *condescended to ask the continuance of his friendship*. In a word, a thorough enthusiastic warrior can support most things but an impeachment of his military character; and from my knowledge of history, such as it is, it appears probable to me, that more generals in proportion have died of chagrin, and a broken heart, than poets, and enamourats. In the wars we are now speaking of, the amiable duke of Feria paid his life a sacrifice to the perverseness of Aldringer; for Aldringer, it is well known, was ordered by Wallstein to contradict that general in every point which he had at heart; and Spinola, whitened with the service of forty campaigns, whom fortune

courted many years after she is accustomed to desert others, retired at last to a little niche in the terrestrial system hardly known*, crying out, *m' hanno levato l'honore, m' hanno levato l'honore*; and grasping in his hand, on his death-bed, his catholic majesty's letter, which authorized him to act according to the very manner in which he had acted†.

But to resume my narrative: Wallstein having reduced Egra, Elnbogen, and Leütmeritz, left Don Baltazar near the last place, and Holk in the neighbourhood of the second, with two separate armies, and then joined the elector of Bavaria at Luditz, near Egra. Perceiving therefore it was now high time to draw Gustavus towards the Baltic, he judged it proper to advance towards the centre of the Swedish conquests, and made more than a semblance of possessing Nuremberg, a town, whose interests his majesty had greatly at heart, for the sake of the inhabitants and himself. No man could be more eager to form this junction than the elector; inasmuch that he mounted his musqueteers behind his horsemen, to perform the march with greater expedition. Nor could the king impede the union of the two armies; for his scheme of entering the Upper Palatinate, and posting himself between them, proved impracticable on the first attempt; and of course the pass of Rhinsberg laid free and open to the admission of the Bavarians‡. Still it was necessary to possess Nuremberg, even at the expence of making a long circuit in marching; for if that town, sincerely attached to the king from inclination as well as religion, had been pre-occupied by the enemy, it was highly probable, that the trunks in Suabia, under duke William of Weimar, Banier, and Ruthven, had been intercepted, and cut to pieces, in their advance to support their master. By this position, likewise, Gustavus secured to himself the diocese of Wurtzburg, and was open to receive the separate corps under Oxentien, and others, then stationed in the circle of Franconia, and the Lower Rhine. As Wallstein was now advancing, and the service threatened to become extremely warm, the king, like a sensible and prudent prince, took care to discharge the arrears of his officers and soldiers.

When the Imperial general left Egra, he brought up the rear of his army himself, count Galas conducted the main body, and Aldringer led the van. As he crossed a wood, a musket-ball passed through his coach, and missed both him and Fertski, his brother-in-law, very narrowly. Whether

* The fort of Scrivia.

† Galeazzo Gualdo. Vita di Mazarini.

‡ Morro, Second Expedition, 319.

this

this was done by accident, or design, cannot well be ascertained; however Walstein, for political reasons, resolved to take it in a serious acception. When he and Maximilian met, though each of them were masters of the most profound dissimulation, yet their personal resentments ran so high, that neither one nor the other had the power of concealment: but the elector had the mortification to be obliged to make his first advances. The number of the two combined armies amounted to 60,000 effective men, and upwards; though Walstein, who loved to rhodomontade like a true Austrian, gave out a list, on approaching Nuremberg, of 39,000 infantry, and 24,600 cavalry, besides Croatians*. At all events this was the largest army, that had appeared in Europe since the days of Charlemagne: but it was a maxim with its leader, *Que la fortune favorise toujours les gros escadrons*: Nor did he spare any pains, by false reports, fictitious declarations, and pretended movements, to draw the king off from Nuremberg; but the latter knew his business, and remained immovable, at the head of 18,000 or 20,000 men, at most, it being a maxim likewise with him, in his turn, *That a great general, with a small army, can hardly ever be obliged to fight*. Upon this account he had, for some days, formed a resolution to encamp near Nuremberg, and on that spot justify his theory, and exhibit to the world one of the most shining efforts in the art of war that has or can be found in history. Being, to a certain degree, in an hostile country, he had three great difficulties to contend with; namely, how to support his army; how to prevent an enemy, of strength trebly superior, from forcing his lines; and how direct the reinforcements, that were to join him, to advance their marches in such a manner as not to be intercepted and cut to pieces. As to the *first*, he had penetration enough to see that the Nurembergers loved him; and that the town had sufficient provisions, as well as bills of exchange, to support his army, till he should have strength to march abroad and confront his enemies in open field: besides, being inferior in numbers, it was not in his power to subsist his camp by convoys and remote magazines. As to the *second*, he displayed the full perfection of one of those talents he particularly prized himself upon; for never ground was better chosen, and, if the times be considered, no camp

* In other words, the list ran to this effect; 197 companies of foot, at 300 men in each company; and 246 troops of horse, besides some irregulars, at 100 in each troop. The Bavarian army included, consisting of 58 foot-companies, and 124 troops of horse.

had ever been fortified in such a manner, and upon such principles of art. Nor had outworks, and redoubts, of three miles circumference only, ever been protected with 300 pieces of artillery. And lastly, as to the *third point*, there alone laid all his diffidence; for though Horn, Banier, duke Bernard, and others, were each of them, as it were, a second Gustavus, yet he felt the sharpest anxieties, when he reflected, that these generals might miscarry in their attempts to join him, and then his ruin was next to inevitable.

The town of Nuremberg had behaved more generously towards the king, than any one free Imperial city in the empire; for it had declared in his favour, as long since as the November preceding. His majesty was not of a temper to see himself outdone in acts of shining and more distinguished friendship.

Here, round the suburbs of the town, he fixed his camp; and as Wallstein was supposed to be in full march to attack it before it was completed, than which the king expected nothing with greater degree of probability, one half of the army performed the duty of pioneers, day by day alternately, assisted by a considerable number of peasants, as well as citizens; to whom the king allotted a portion of work distinct from the Swedes, in order to excite emulation between the two parties. Wallstein saw the plan, and dreaded to assault the work, even in its infancy. Eight distinct forts were erected, one particularly stannamed the royal, all guarded with abundance of cannon, not to mention batteries, bastions, half-moons, and every other fort of fortification. The ditch of circumvallation was in all places twelve feet wide, and eight deep; and in critical situations, its width was eighteen feet, and its depth twelve. Advantage likewise was taken of the river Pegnitz, and of all troublesome and irregular ground. The whole camp, not comprehending space allowed for irregular angles, and outlines of defence, intrenchments, and redoubts, of various shapes, all conformable to the genius of the spot of earth, contained, as nearly as I can calculate, and the account came from Hepburn, about 219 clear square acres: and thus the king, by this grand masterpiece of contracting his boundaries, reserved to himself the full power of bringing more hands to act than Wallstein could overcome. Persons of less abilities would have wanted proportionably greater space to move in. The common demands for food and forage, must have spread the troops at greater distances, as appears, evidently, to have been Wallstein's case; and the providing magazines, and escorting them to the head-quarters, must have

have separated the army too much, and weakened it by daily skirmishes, however fortunate and successful. The king, taking previous care to see Nuremberg excellently provided, made it, at one and the same time, his granary, his stable, and his shambles, for the space of eight weeks and five days: and one thing is very remarkable, that though the town fed the royal army, which afterwards increased, and maintained at least 20,000 mouths besides, for many gentry and peasants flocked into it; yet corn, at last, rose to a price not much higher than it then sold for in London.

The mind is lost in astonishment, when it considers the wonderful foresight made use of on this extraordinary occasion. Indeed it may be asked, how the king, with so small an army, could furnish and protect his camp with such a number of cannon as 300 pieces? But the question solves itself, when we reflect, that part of the artillery along the ramparts was at his disposal, and that the arsenal of Nuremberg, both then and now, was as well furnished as most in the empire. Here one may subjoin another remark, namely, that when I make his majesty's troops amount to the number of 20,000 men, the garrison of the place, a sort of city militia, is supposed to be comprehended in the calculation. This body of troops consisted of twenty-four companies, and carried for arms, on their ensigns, the twenty-four letters of the alphabet.

Notwithstanding all these conveniences, though it must be acknowledged one half of them was created by dint of parts and genius, it has been thought by many*, and not without some appearance of reason, that the king fixed on Nuremberg more from a principle of generosity and gratitude than from any local advantages: for had he, say they, withdrawn first to Mentz, and then returned and encamped beneath the walls of Bamberg, he might have eaten out the territories of a prelate, who had used him basely, and joined his own armies, a point then of the highest consequence to him, with one third part of the danger and difficulty. Still setting apart the obligations of gratitude, and ties of reciprocal affection, Nuremberg seems to me, upon all accounts, to be the preferable place; it had both provisions and money in great abundance; it had a district round it, of about sixteen English miles square, all subject to the king's good pleasure; it was connected with a considerable number of free towns, and little protestant adjoining states; and had abundance of artillery, which the king wanted above all

* Le Vassor, &c.

things: whereas at Bamberg, the diocese had been devoted, in turns, by each contending party; the ordnance would have been removed, or rendered useless; magazines within the town there were none; and the inhabitants were all zealous Romanists, and professed enemies. As to the arrival of the Swedish armies, the king had planned that measure with cool reflection, and had great reason to hope he should effect that junction under the walls of Nuremberg, and within sight of Walstein.

As a proof of this, in his worst situation, he dispatched a person he valued * to the elector of Saxony, exhorting him to behave like a man of spirit, and shew no symptoms of despondency; *Tell him, said he, whatever appearance things may carry, I will make him a visit soon, attended by my valiant and faithful army.* His majesty had still a farther view in this embassy; for he charged his negotiator with a secret commission, and that was, to pacify an unaccountable jealousy and aversion, which subsisted, on the Saxon side, against the king of Bohemia. He then informed the French king very composedly by letter, *That he was not distressed to such a degree as the enemy set forth; but, on the contrary, had troops sufficient to oppose against him; and that the bravery of his soldiers was never to be extinguished, except by death. We perform our exercises, continued he, every day in the field of Mars, and will give Walstein to understand what, and how much, can be performed by men who fight the cause of public liberty, and defend princes and nations who groan under tyranny and persecution†.* He had presence of mind; at the same juncture, to dispatch an ambassador to Ragotski, prince of Transylvania, under pretence of accommodating some differences between him and the fair Catharina of Brandenburg, relict of the late Gabriel Bethlem; but in reality, to induce him to attack the emperor in his Hungarian dominions. From Transylvania, the minister had orders to hasten to Constantinople, in order to learn the sentiments of the divan, in reference to the Ger-

* Augustus, count Palatine of the Rhine, who passed on from Dresden to Berlin, and finished a second negotiation there; but returning to join his matter at Nuremberg, died at Weinsheim in Franconia. He was a young man, from whom the king had great expectations, both as a soldier and a politician.

† Le Vassor, tom. vii. 345. Whatever the king might write, yet Richelieu was so terrified with his majesty's situation, that, fearing Walstein might totally destroy him, and of course render the courts of Vienna and Madrid too powerful for that of Versailles, he immediately made proposals of an accommodation with the duke of Orleans.

mainle wars: but in the latter place he obtained nothing, except fair words and an obliging reception.

By this time the Imperial general arrived, and having viewed the king's intrenchments, determined at once, contrary to his intentions on the road, not to assault, but attempt to starve him: and, upon this principle, he pronounced, vain-gloriously enough, that Europe should see, in a few weeks, who was master of Germany, whether Gustavus or himself. In truth, this extraordinary personage, putting fear out of the question, did not choose to bring his dictatorship to so short a conclusion; upon which the elector of Bavaria, who disliked both his phlegm and his vanity, pressed him earnestly to force the Swedish lines sword in hand; "Sit," said Wallstein, assuming an air of coldness, "begin the attack with your whole army, and I will support you with all my forces."

Meanwhile Wallstein contemplated the new intrenchments, made by Gustavus, with the same attention as a geometrician could be supposed to study a fresh work of Euclid, just recovered from obscurity; being resolved to force it, if the attempt was practicable, confiding greatly in the superiority of his numbers: but, upon examining the fortifications erected, and precautions taken, he changed his resolution, for he was thoroughly astonished; having chanced to forget, that a few troops judiciously posted, and intrenched up to the eyes, were at least a match for whole Imperial legions, who were to act in a state of exposure above ground. He then coolly traced out a camp, almost within sight of, yet three miles distant from the king. Its defence was very slight and insubstantial, consisting only of a small ditch, protected in various parts by interlaced forest-trees, baggage-waggons, and gabions. He then caused his troops to lodge in eight different divisions, and covered such an extent of ground, that the whole appeared more like a populous country than like a camp.

As to subsisting an army, there indeed laid his chief excellence; for in the management of his artillery, of which he had enough, he was no great genius, and had few good hands; nor was he, as an honest Briton said bluntly of him, *in any degree a notable spade-man* *. But in respect to provisions and forage, he shewed himself a purveyor of the first class. Amongst other things, his store-bread was admirable. In hard times this makes half the standing diet of a soldier, and answers all purposes very well, when nothing

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part El. p. 2.

better

better can be obtained. As he had troops to spare in great abundance, it was his intention to check the Swedes in all little excursions for the support of their camp; and this he partly effected, having daily more men at leisure, than the king could bring to act upon the most trying emergency.

The country behind him, and on each side, was all open to his devotion, and provisions and ammunition were conveyed to him even from Vienna and Munich; the first by water-carriage, as near as Ratisbon. He possessed all the towns and passes in the circle of territories which surrounded him, except only beyond that little segment which the king occupied. He then stationed two large bodies of troops in the diocese of Bamberg and the Upper Palatinate, and caused his Croatians, like beasts of prey, to scour the whole country night and day, in a line cross-wise from Munich to Bamberg; a tract of excursion, which measures at least one hundred miles.

Having slightly sketched out the ground-plot of a camp, he drew up seventeen regiments at the head of his intended lines, by way of bravado, a practice extremely common in those days, being a fine *pons asinorum* for those hot-brained fighting warriors, who mistake animal vivacity for true courage. The king humoured Wallstein in this sort of interlude, though determined in his own mind not to hazard an engagement at that juncture, and drew out his cavalry in line of battle, just under the enemy's nose; for he well knew, that a small river divided the two armies, and served both for a barrier and an excuse. This river, called the Pegnitz, having traversed Nuremberg from east to west, passed between the two camps, and supplied both armies: but as the weather was extremely dry, and the season of the Dog-star began to approach, the Swedes and Imperialists suffered much from the scantiness and corruption of the water, so that petechial fevers multiplied exceedingly*.

It soon became manifest to all men, that Gustavus's conduct not only puzzled Wallstein, but created serious apprehensions in the mind of that general; for it made a visible change in his way of thinking and speaking. He altered that decisive tone which he had formerly used in matters of war. From being confident, he became distrustful; and what was once haughtiness and obstinacy, began now to soften itself into something, which carried the appearance of

* Brachelii. Hist. nostror. Temp. p. 282.

deference and docility. He found himself necessitated to make his military motions step by step, having to do with one who was capable of ruining him from the *instant* of a single moment. So that his *greatest chance* consisted in the hope of compelling the king to listen to some necessary accommodation, occasioned partly by hunger, and partly by the interception of his reinforcements. Perhaps he had some hopes too of corrupting the fidelity of the town of Nuremberg; but that was an airy and childish expectation. Therefore as one single *stroke*, if the comparison may be allowed, oftentimes determines the character of a general, as much as a painter; he saw with grief, that though Gustavus had had seemingly no choice, yet he had chosen for his encampment one of the *best* places he could have found in all Germany. No town but Nuremberg could support him; and in any other spot, Wallstein might have starved him in a fortnight's space, or hunted him, like a fugitive, from one extremity of the empire to another.

It was matter of astonishment to all mankind, that two armies, on whose conduct the fate of Germany depended, should lie gazing on each other for eight weeks, without striking more than one single blow, if we except, and that indeed was unavoidable, the little onsets, ambuscades, and skirmishes betwixt *partisans*, who roused here and there to procure forage, and intercept convoys: yet in all the time above-mentioned, it is not certain that a musket-ball was exchanged in earnest, or one considerable alarm given by either party from the two encampments. The truth of the whole was this: Wallstein durst not *attack*, and the king, for prudent reasons, *declined* engaging; yet such was the vivacity of his high spirit, that he declared himself, more than once, to be quite out of temper with the *thyme*s of Wallstein; who, though he well knew the weakness of the Swedes, yet likewise knew their valour and discipline; and of course, as Gallion tells us*, resolved to make it "*the campaign of starving*." And hence it was he declared so confidently, that the mystery of re-establishing his master's affairs did not consist in giving frequent battles; that his predecessors had played *this* game many years, without obtaining the object of their wishes: Therefore, said he, I shall take the liberty to wage war upon different principles.

This plan was not unworthy of a great general, and Wallstein had parts to comprehend the idea in its full extent; yet it is plain he proceeded upon selfish and ambi-

* *Memoires*, tom. i. p. 68.

tious motives also.* His grand object was to *protract* the war; he served his Imperial master sparingly and grudgingly; and had no desire to remove hostilities from the threshold of the Bavarian territories, whose elector he considered as the principal cause of his late disgrace.

The king dispatched couriers to the several generals he intended should join him, and subjoined to each letter a plan and sketch of their respective marches, drawn out by his own hand. He then amused himself, at intervals from more immediate business, with reviewing his troops every day, and seeing some ideas in exercise realized, which his inventive genius had lately brought to light. As the trial of skill consisted in starving with good grace, he resolved to fight the first moment he could increase his handful of men to a moderate number, knowing precisely how long, and in what manner to ward the blow, or when to return it; and in the interim employed all his thoughts how to procure a mouthful of bread, when Walstein had none. Indeed, the effects of this foresight and economy soon made their appearance; for by this time, he reduced that magnificent person, who affected a table spread with princely profusion, to fix dishes at dinner, for himself and officers, and two bottles of wine, both which reductions he was obliged afterwards to diminish yet further. The king, with his small body of troops, harassed his convoys, and destroyed his magazines; not to mention, that Walstein's supplies came by land-carriage from Ratibon, having no navigable stream to befriend him. As to the Rednitz, which ran through his camp, notwithstanding it came from the country of his firm ally the bishop of Bamberg, yet it was too narrow, and too shallow, to admit boats of any size; and, to increase this inconvenience, the stream was against him. Gustavus, upon the whole, was the best purveyor; though indeed it is hard to comprehend, how an inland town like Nuremberg, could be supplied in the manner it was; for neither meat, nor ammunition, nor bread, were wanting; and the quantity of oats was beyond description. Amongst other things, the city furnished his army each day with 8000 loaves. Thus, though Walstein took care to post his troops on every road that led to Nuremberg, and by the same methods that he deprived his enemy, supplied himself, being master of all the passes, and having a communication open with Forcheim, where the Germans gravely tell you Pontius Pilate was born*, as likewise with Wurtzburg,

* The verses on the occasion are *so classical*, both in *style* and *quantity*, that one cannot abstain from citing them :

Forcheim

burg, Cronach, and all Bavaria; yet the king lived better than he; not that he could dispute every inch of superiority with him, being four degrees inferior to him in respect of cavalry*, but by procuring better intelligence, and watching the critical moments of advantage and surprize.

Gustavus, notwithstanding his great parts and foresight, felt some misgivings in his own breast, in reference to the dangers that attended his little armies, which were now in full march towards him from various quarters. Far from discovering the least external symptoms of dismay, he asked the separate opinion of every general, and condescending even to send for Gassion†, then not arrived to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel, explained to him the critical and perilous situation of his army with familiarity and confidence; expressing no kind of *dissidence* with respect to his own conduct, but manifesting *some* apprehensions with regard to the fate of his reinforcements. Hence it appears, that the bravest of men, and such Gustavus truly was, can be alarmed, though not dejected, with danger. Such pre-sentiments make the great general what he is, upon sup-position that they do not disturb his presence of mind, or, in other words, the free exertion of the powers of his understanding.

Meanwhile Gustavus depended as much upon the want of good agreement between Walstein and Maximilian, as Hannibal ever expected advantage from the misunderstanding that subsisted betwixt the Roman consuls and the generals under them. The Bavarian elector, being a person equally well skilled in penetration and dissembling, soon found, that opposition, far from humbling Walstein, only served to inflame and exasperate him; and submitting therefore with the best grace he could, he had the mortification to see his new and well-beloved acquisition, the Upper Palatinate, laid waste and devoured by his own allies. Walstein went so far, as to refine upon the passions of resentment and malice; for, perceiving that his rival hated Gustavus with a mortal hatred, he affected a thousand politenesses and civilities towards him, and spoke of him in the style of something more than human. One circumstance, about this period, seems highly probable and generous in Gustavus; for when he sent a route of the roads, planned by

*Forchemii natus est Pontius ille Pilatus,
Teutonia gentis, crucifixer Omnipotentis.*

* See *Le Blanc*. Hist. de Baviere, tom. iv. p. 393.

† *Vie du maréchal Gassion*, par Michael Le Pure, tom. i. p. 69.

by himself, with uncommon judgment, to every commander who was to march to his assistance; *Gentlemen*, added he, in the conclusion of his letters, *your king, and military protector, can only direct his absent disciples in general terms: incidents will arise, which no human foresight can pre-determine: seize the moments; snatch the proffered opportunities, which take birth and flight in one instant. I resign into your hands full discretionary power; use it in a manner worthy both of me and yourselves*.*

We have kept silence for some time, with respect to the situation of affairs between Gustavus and Charles I. but an incident presented itself at this period, almost to a day, and we shall just touch upon it in our progress. Vane, piqued as the *offending* party usually is, with the late conversation betwixt him and Gustavus, had withdrawn himself, by way of resentment, from Munich to Ulm, and renewed his solicitations about the restitution of the Lower Palatinate, most of which the Swedes had then conquered. This step he had taken according to his old custom, or, in other words, with impropriety and teasing; and what inclines us the more to form this conjecture, is, that the king of Bohemia neither co-operated with, nor imparted his designs to him, as Vane himself confesses.

The stress of the difficulty laid here. Gustavus had a full design to *conquer* and *restore* the Lower Palatinate, but as he knew the Spaniards, then very powerful at sea, might interrupt his commerce, a point, if he had had leisure, very near and dear to him, and perhaps send a fleet to give laws to the Baltic, he made it a preliminary *sine quâ non*, that England should declare a *naval* war against Spain; that which, as with great judgment he foresaw, nothing could be easier to her, or more agreeable to the bent of the nation, if the king had wished, in earnest, to see his brother reinstated. Charles hung like a dead weight upon this topic, and refused to comply.

To the present part of the question Vane says nothing; but an extract from his letter †, with reference to the preceding paragraph, may be worth transcribing:

“The king of Sweden, within these few days, hath plainly told the king of Bohemia, that he would neither conclude with him, nor myself, until he had spoken with the elector of Saxe.”

* Vide *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 311.

† Dated from Ulm, June 23, 1632. *MS. Paper Office*.

“ This

"This I have certain information of, though not from the king of Bohemia. Whereupon I thought fit to write him the inclosed letter. * * * Thus you see the hard game I have to play; and which is so much the more difficult, in regard of the great intelligence there is between the king of Sweden and some of his majesty's subjects, by intercourse of letters cut of England into the army. But this is a tender point, and tenderly to be dealt in; and therefore no notice to be taken of it at present. What issue the present conjuncture may produce is not to be foreseen; but I conceive it worthy of his majesty's great wisdom, and the state's, seriously and timely to take into their consideration the true balancing the estates of Christendom, for they are now upon a crisis."

He then adds, that the king of Sweden, "though he had raised himself by contributions and otherwise, yet did not pay his troops a farthing, but suffered them to plunder *; and if he shall be obliged to retreat, and pay them no better, they may possibly disband of themselves†: therefore he (Sir Henry) hopes, that he shall have orders to put the king to a point, for what he holds in the Lower Palatinate, and to return to England."

As to occasional rencounters in the field, for nothing passed between the main armies, never troops were kept in better breath than the Swedes and Imperialists: but this sort of war *in detail*, or *la petite guerre*, as the French call it, merits not to be recorded, as it decides nothing, excepting here and there in a particular instance, which shall be just mentioned in my way: Yet one thing highly deserves to be transmitted to posterity. The king, in frequent conflicts with the Croats, a set of beings he mortally hated, as way-layers, robbers, and murderers, devised a new practice in the military art, for mixing dragoons, who then carried a shorter musquet, and not carbines, with his own light cavalry, either serving on foot, as occasion required, or doing great mischief on horseback, as their pieces discharged a heavier ball.

* For the confutation of this unchristian and infamous report, in every branch, which Vane had dwelt upon in other letters, and we have replied to occasionally *in loco*, compare particularly the pages 276, 277, 298, &c.

† This is a suspicion highly tinged with malice; for, in the whole course of the king's wars, I find no defection, which, besides other things, proves incidentally that his pay was punctual. Vane remembered well the old rule, *Calumniari fertur, ut aliquid remaneat*.

Amongst

Amongst these lesser actions of a significant cast, the valiant colonel Dewbatel, at the head of his own regiment, supported by some few of Sperreüter's * men, having defeated a party of Croatians, fell in unawares with 6000 Walsteiners; upon which event, he led his soldiers on four or five times to the charge, and made incredible efforts to cut his way through the enemy, till at length, having lost one half of his little army, he found himself unhorsed in the engagement, and conducted prisoner to the Imperial general. His majesty having received intelligence of this rude and unexpected shock, posted away full trot, with a select body of cavalry, in order to disengage his brave commander, but unfortunately found the field of battle covered with the dead bodies of his soldiers, and nothing else; for the Imperialists very wisely retired the very moment after they had performed their business.

Walstein received Dewbatel with uncommon marks of esteem, and commanded Peroni, steward of his household, immediately to discharge his ransom, which in those days, for an officer of that rank, ran sometimes to the amount of *one thousand pounds*. More reasons perhaps than *one* induced him to perform this act of politeness. He knew the man to be a favourite with Gustavus, and hoped probably, by such an instance of generosity, which indeed agreed with Walstein's natural temper, to open an honest warrior's heart, and extract some useful intelligence from him. Therefore from these motives, and under pretence of admiring Sperreüter's turn of mind and disposition, he created occasions of holding several private conversations, which ran chiefly upon encomiums with regard to Gustavus, and on the earnest desire he had to give peace to Germany, and produce a reconciliation between the emperor and his majesty of Sweden.

Not many days afterwards, some Swedish partisans, with Gashon amongst them, had the good fortune to seize Dartnitz, an officer of Walstein, in whom that general placed a peculiar confidence, who was hastening without a sufficient guard from one quarter to another. Here his majesty examined strictly, *upon oath*, such was his usual custom with prisoners of condition, and finding that Walstein intended to remove to his camp the next day a large magazine from Freystadt, which contained all that could be amassed in Bavaria,

* What this officer's real name was, I know not; for the king one day in Poland, returning over the field of battle, saw a soldier pierced through with a pike, and the instrument remaining in his body, without discovering any symptoms of pain or weakness; which struck his majesty so much, that he surnamed him on the spot Sperreüter, or *knight of the spear*,

the Higher Palatinate, and the bishoprics of Ratibon and Aichstadt, he conceived an idea of intercepting or destroying the convoy, and put the execution thereof into Dewbatel's hands, who by this time was returned from the Imperial army *. This officer, impatient to justify his majesty's choice, left him towards the close of the evening, having received his private orders, and mounted on horseback, at the head of three regiments of cavalry, his own dragoons being one, which the king allowed him to select from all the army. Gassion had a private order from his majesty some minutes before, and had the honour to assist in this expedition with his own shattered regiment, consisting only of 300 horse. They arrived at Freystadt, a small town near Neumarck, about sixteen miles from Nurenberg, about two hours after midnight; secured the corps de guard unperceived, and fixed three petards to the town-gate, the last of which succeeded. Dewbatel shaped his entrance one way, and Gassion the other; so that in two hours the whole garrison, being oppressed on either side, was either killed or disarmed. Then the Swedes had leisure to load 200 waggons with military stores, and burnt more than 1000 loads of corn and hay; after which they began their retreat composedly and in good order, driving with them an incredible number of cattle. Who could have imagined, that the Swedes, with so small an army, would have undertaken an enterprise, which befitted the persons only, who had a superiority of forces? Meanwhile the king, who knew what Wallstein would do on this occasion, almost as well as Wallstein himself, advanced with a body of 2000 cavalry, to secure the retreat of his men. Eventually, as he concluded, the Imperial general took the alarm in an instant, and dispatched Spar, serjeant-major di battaglia, with his own regiment of musqueteers, and some other infantry, eight select troops of Gonzaga's and Coloredo's horse, and twenty squadrons of Croatsians, to make an example of these adventurers. But as his majesty accidentally fell in with Spar, without seeing his own troops, or being seen by them, they retired without any molestation, and knew nothing of all that happened, till the fortune of the day had been decided. Spar, the Imperial general, who outnumbered the king doubly, for his majesty thought by joining his own troops to preserve an equality in numbers, felt himself animated with the glory of fighting a battle in miniature with the great Gustavus; and, of course,

* *Hist. or Auth. Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. 81. 82.

gave him so desperate a charge, that colonel Reifs was shot through the body; and a gentleman of the bedchamber, and Cratzenstein, one of the pages, were both killed at their master's side. As Reifs led the commanded musqueteers, the king was obliged to dismount, and conduct them himself, persevering with incredible patience, knowing well that his men would never desert him. At length the Croatians began gradually to disappear, by little and little. The regular horse behaved well in part; but two Imperial regiments * performed wonders, for, having gained the covert of a small wood, they fought on till they had not a single charge of powder remaining; and then, by mutual consent, filed off among the trees, but the ground behind perplexed them in their escape. Gonzaga's horse ran away, for which Walfstein convened him before a court martial, though he had the honour to be cousin to the empress, and though it appeared, on his trial, that he kept the field after every man of his regiment had deserted it. This rough encounter happened in the neighbourhood of a village, called Burgham, about three miles from Altdorf †. The king, during the conflict, was so pleased with the behaviour of Leslie and Gordon, who were afterwards concerned in Walfstein's death, that he declared publicly, if he took them prisoners, he would discharge them without delay, and pay their ransom himself. This he did; but some obstructions deferred the execution of his promise for the space of five weeks. When the confusion of the action was partly over, some Swedes saw a horse, richly caparisoned, fastened to a thorn-tree, and asking an Imperial horse-boy ‡ if he knew the owner, received for answer, that it was his general's; and amidst some officers and rushes just by, for the ground there was very morassy, and the cavalry could not clear it, at length Spar was discovered, who, making some resistance, received two very rude strokes from the club end of a musquet, and soon lost the massy gold chain which hung round his neck. This officer was somewhat unfortunate, for he had paid one ransom the preceding year; and what perplexed him afterwards in his examination, and gave the king some advantage over him, was, that he had passed his parole not to serve against the Swedes for a certain duration of time. When brought to his majesty, in the field of action, the king only said, laughing heartily, *Ah!*

* These regiments were Irish and Scotch.

† *Invasions of Germany, cum Fig.* 120. p. 76. Lond. 1638.

‡ These horse-boys, in both the services, were probationists for the cavalry.

monfieur

monseigneur Spar, I see you love me so dearly, that you cannot possibly refrain long from my company.*

Besides those already mentioned, Tertzki likewise, Walstein's brother in law, was taken prisoner. The enemy lost 800 chosen men on this occasion; but only two pair of colours, having taken care to tear the others into pieces. His majesty rewarded the common soldiers, who brought him these colours, very generously, gratified many officers, and complimented all, spoke to several inferior men by name, and applauded them highly. At night he returned Dewbatel public thanks before the principal commanders of his army; and thought the advantage so considerable, as to send for his chaplain, and order mention to be made thereof in the devotions of next day.

Gassion, with his comrades, reached the camp before his majesty arrived; upon which, with fifteen chosen horsemen, he remounted immediately, and went in search of his master, whom he found returning. The king embraced him with a smile, and asked his intentions: "Sire," said he, in military Latin, for he then could not talk German, "you once promised me the honour of dying near you, and I hastened now to take my chance." *Frenchman*, replied Gustavus, for that was the appellation he always gave him, *take my word, I will engage in no battle, but you shall share in the blows given, and received on either side.*

As Spar had violated his *parole* of honour, given at Francfort upon the Oder, of not serving against Gustavus and his allies for a certain period of time, he proved a prisoner that might be depended upon, as he was exposed to the rigor of the then established military practice. Being twice examined by the king in person, upon oath, he answered, on the faith of a Christian, that he knew nothing of Walstein's designs, as that general made no participators in his secrets: but the commonly received opinion, with which his own coincided, was, that he aimed only to compel him by hunger into a treaty. The king insisted no farther, and was perhaps the only prince or general, as the custom then run, that would have pardoned Spar in such a situation as that officer stood.

In this partisan war, a sort of piracy and murder, offensive to a generous spirit, and particularly as it rarely determined any thing, his majesty began to discover great uneasiness; for many of the best generals, including the common soldiers almost to a man, began to grow cruel and

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part iii. p. 22.

rapacious. This hurt the king's mind both as a Christian and a warrior; for it was a maxim with him, that avarice was illiberal in a military man, and that barbarity usually implied cowardice. Besides, he plainly foresaw, that want of *morals* would soon create want of *discipline*; and that *then* his *once* invincible army would be reduced to the level of the common standard. Nay, he remarked, that even Wulstein in the present campaign preserved a subordination and regularity which were quite the reverse of that licentiousness with which he had formerly indulged his troops. Sending therefore for every commander to his tent from the lieutenant-colonels to the lieutenant-general, the latter being the second post then in all armies, and assuming, which is very difficult, an air of affliction and firmness at the same time, he delivered his sentiments in the following words:

Gentlemen,

You partly belong to those numbers who have shewn themselves unfaithful and disloyal to their own country, having endeavoured to procure and complete its ruin to the utmost of your power. You, my generals, and all you my inferior officers, I have ever esteemed as brave cavaliers, and make this confession now to your honour; testifying at the same time, that, upon all occasions of service offered, and more particularly in the hour of battle, you have given me such demonstrations of your valour, as have entirely satisfied my most ardent wishes. But when I reflect on the ravages, extortions, and cruelties lately committed†, and believe me, my friends, the seeing you all before me enlivens my memory with the strongest recollection, and that you, persons of rank, birth, education, and competent incomes, have been guilty yourselves of those very insults, and companions of those who neither observe discipline, nor see it observed;—I own my mind is struck with astonishment and horror. Turn your eyes inward upon your own consciences; and I ask no more. Is it not a case afflicting and deplorable; is it not a sight odious to the Supreme Being; that one Christian, even of the same profession in religion, should despoil another? That brethren should render brethren miserable, and friends destroy friends? Demons themselves, as far as can be conjectured, have more justice and less barbarity!*

How often has anguish cut me to the heart, when the voice of fame reports, on numberless occasions, that the Swedish soldiers

* Meaning Germany; for the German officers and soldiers were neither so moral nor so well disciplined as the Swedish.

† In Bavaria; where uninterrupted successes first rendered them insolent.

are more cruel and more licentious than the Imperialists! But here lies a mistake. All my troops are denominated Swedes, but the offence springs from the native Germans: and had I known the cast and complexion of the nation in the same manner as I now stand informed; and that you, Germans born, had no more natural affection for your mother-country than has since appeared, rendering it no better services, and discovering no greater fidelity towards it; believe me, on the honour of a soldier, I would never have saddled a horse in your behalf; much less hazarded my life, kingdoms, and reputation, as also the persons of those brave and faithful men, who accompanied me hither, for you.

No——since I now perceive, that you are animated with a rage for the destruction of your country, it would have been my choice and judgment both to have left you precisely in the state I found you; that is, in other words, plunged and buried in the depths of slavery as well mental as corporeal.

Let your own consciences bear testimony, that it is not my usual custom to deny any of you a request that is reasonable; and the Supreme Being knows moreover, that I never intended more than, by the co-operation of divine assistance, to restore every man to his own, and his own to every man; and for the acquisitions proposed to be made in Franconia and Bavaria, it was my fixed intention to distribute them impartially to the nobility and gentry of the German nation, and leave no man's good services unrewarded. But this diabolical practice of ravaging and destroying lays a dead weight, I must confess, on my best purposes, and checks the vigour of my christian resolutions. But answer me, fellow soldiers! have you not the spirit and dignity of sentiment to reflect a little, what kind of idea posterity will form concerning you in future histories? Remember, likewise, I conjure you, what perplexities you are creating to your honour and consciences, and what visitations and punishments you are now drawing down, not only on your own persons, but on your country and successors, by these outrageous acts of oppression and inhumanity! Oh! that you could once reflect what an account you have to settle at the great tribunal! Happy, thrice happy had been my condition, if I had still remained in my own kingdoms, and not travelled so far to behold such enormities as I have beheld!

You will say, perhaps, that you want money, and yet it is evident to all mankind, that I pay you and the whole army punctually, to the full extent of my power: but by your depredations, extortions and ravages, you bring the honour of my credit in question, and deprive me of the very means to support my forces. And whence, I demand a second time, proceeds it, that you are not satisfied? What share have I received, in any instance,

instance, from all your plunder?—Just nothing. Here therefore I protest, in the presence of the Supreme Being, for what I say is religiously true, that in all this war I have not enriched myself to the amount of six German dollars*. Nay, I can make it appear to demonstration, if any doubting person amongst you desires to be satisfied under this article, that I have drawn from my own patrimonial treasures, since I have left Stockholm, at two and thirty several remittances, the full and complete sum of three hundred and sixty thousand pounds; all which I have expended for your advantage, and for the re-establishment of such princes as are united with me in the same truth of religion. This, it is true,—for there may be some tincture of vanity in the recital, I ought perhaps to have kept in the dark: but one thing there is, which I can never allow to be buried in oblivion, and that is, the loss so many brave and excellent officers, whose virtues indeed surpass all estimate. Here gratitude and human nature must break forth: for I valued such persons beyond all my riches.—And to proceed still farther, what have you, gentlemen, from the first to the meanest, ever contributed towards the expences of the war?

Thenceforth therefore I request and COMMAND you to despoil no man of his goods or possessions. As you have spirit and intrepidity, leave the marks of them on the breasts of your enemies; but stain not the honour of a warrior by committing outrages on the unarmed and the innocent.

BE CONTENT WITH YOUR WAGES †, as a soldier ought; and desist not by pilfering and plunder, like banditti and Croatsians! Otherwise, you, from the highest to the lowest, will be always infamous; and I, with such assistants, shall never become victorious †.

Thus spoke the king; and the speech which is here produced, almost verbatim, carries its own marks of authenticity with it, being of such a cast, that few historians will have the vanity to say they were able to invent it. The effect was, it soon melted the rugged audience into tears, and produced afterwards a thorough reformation. Nor was a syllable offered by way of justification or excuse. Nevertheless, his majesty pursued the blow with a general proclamation, to which it was annexed by way of penalty, that thenceforwards he would pardon no man, of what rank soever, either of

* About one guinea English. In the original he pointed, it is said, to the boots he had then on: *I have not gained, observed he, this single pair of boots, which I now wear.* See Schefferi Memorab. 149.

† *Swedisch Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 24, 25, 26. See also *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 317: and, *The Historical, but Authentic Relation*, fol. Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 80, &c.

-birth

birth or military station, in case he appeared to be a delinquent. *And if,* added he to some German officers, *you dare pretend to desert or mutiny, I have enough left of my faithful and valiant Swedes to cut you all to pieces even in Walstein's presence: for having reason and Christianity on my side, I WILL BE OBEYED.* He then caused a lieutenant to be hanged, whose ill stars led him to be the first offender; and when a poor peasant complained of a common soldier, who had stolen the support of his family, a single cow, he seized the fellow with his own hands, and calling for the regimental executioner, commanded him that instant to perform his office: *Friend, said he to the criminal, every soldier is my child: yet it is better for thee to die, than that the wrath of God should descend, on account of this transgression, upon me, and thee, and the whole army assembled round us*.*

Walstein still continued his politeness and deference towards Gustavus, and restoring to him a captain Reischel, after having entertained him at his own table, and discharged his ransom to the Croatsians, besought that officer to assure his majesty, That he considered him as the *first general* in the world, and should die contented, if he could only have the honour of concluding a peace between him and the emperor. His majesty received this message at table with a smile, and answered, *That Walstein, it must be confessed, was a person of magnificence; and as he was always ready to do him justice, so he was too honest a man to wish his death, especially till he could once have the pleasure of giving him a good shake by the collar in open field†.*

By this time maladies began to be extremely rife in either army: for the water of the Pegnitz, which supplied them both, grew scanty and disturbed, and the putrefaction of dead horses was such, that petechial fevers raged to a degree scarcely credible. His majesty suffered most from want of green forage, and was master only of a strip of meadow-ground for that purpose. It was now reported not only at Vienna, but throughout all Europe, that Gustavus had humbly sued for peace. True it is, the *pacificator-general* of the empire‡ made a tender of his services; the Danish ambassador renewed his late attack, and interposed a little; Christian-William, late administrator of Magdeburg, and

* Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-Germanico, tom. i. 316.

† *Mercurie Franç.* à l'an. 1632, p. 388.

‡ So the king always styled, in a ludicrous manner, the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, who was supposed to be a secret pensioner to the emperor.

cousin to the queen of Sweden, had private permission, being before a prisoner, to leave Vienna, in order to sound the king's dispositions; and Spar proposed to make terms with Wallstein from his own free will; but his majesty continued shy, and desired to be excused from hearing the *bare mention* of any single preliminary. As a proof of the sincerity of his declarations in this respect, he wrote to Oxenstiern, commanding him to join him; *but, said he, conceive not your master in such a situation, as to suppose yourself obliged to run such bold and hazardous risks, as men usually do in affairs of desperation. Proceed coolly and solidly; let no apprehensions hurry you from the free exertion of your understanding.* I can look the enemy in the face for a longer continuance.

It may be worth while now to consider this great master-stroke in the art of war, the conduct of Gustavus; who remained, begirt with numbers trebly superior to his own forces, from the beginning of June till the 21st of August; for *that day* his several armies reached him. Their first conjunction with themselves was tedious and difficult, and their combined march, in order to join their sovereign, was long, intricate, and dangerous. The chancellor Oxenstiern then laid in the electorates of Mentz, Triers, and Cologne, where he had upon his hands the Spanish troops, whom Horn held in play with a small army during his absence. He had a junction likewise to form with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who was to steer his course through Pappenheim's troops; but fortunately for him, that vigilant general was then making his *romantic and heroic* journey to the relief of Mastricht. When it was that the king wrote first to Oxenstiern with directions to advance, I once knew, but the memorandum is mislaid; nevertheless, it was, if I mistake not, about the middle of June; but the chancellor could not possibly move till the 11th of July.

Duke William of Weimar, his younger brother Bernard being recalled to Nuremberg, was then near the lake of Constance, so that Milan first, and all Italy afterwards, began to tremble. This perhaps is only a figurative manner of expression in the author I am now perusing*, and took its rise, probably, from the zeal of the honest Finlanders, who being no great geographers, asked the peasants about Lindaw, *how many days march it might be from thence to Rome?*

This general, about the time that Wallstein *besieged* the king, for that indeed is the most proper expression which can be used on the occasion, this general, I say, received orders

* *Loccenii Hist. rerum Suecicarum*, p. 596.

to hasten in person from the foot of the Alps almost to the Baltic; namely, to the duchy of Magdeburg, and the bishopric of Halberstadt; in order to glean up the English and Scottish remains of Hamilton's army, now reduced to two regiments, the first commanded by Ballandine, and the latter by Alexander Hamilton. Our vigilant and industrious countrymen saved their future general a part of his labour; for, venturing forwards of themselves with generous resolution, they reached Halle in Saxony, where they found the blue and green brigades, four companies of Mitzval's infantry, and two regiments of cavalry. Thence passing through Lutzen and Zeitz, they found their commander, who had with him few forces, except his own guards, that attended him from Suabia; and then crossing the forest of Thuringia, reached Franconia, where five Saxon regiments joined them, of which two were horse. At length they fell in with the chancellor Oxenstiern at Wurtzburg about the tenth of August.

The general, Banier, who led the *third* army, was then near Augsburg, where he commanded against Cratz, late Bavarian velt-marechal under Tilly *. On receiving his instructions he crossed the Danube, nor durst his enemy pursue him; and gliding by the western side of his master's camp, so far was the king from wanting his assistance, advanced to Weinsheim in the margraviate of Anspach, with a view to facilitate the approach of Oxenstiern and duke William of Weimar. But how vast was his surprise, and how greatly did he admire the king's judgment and intrepidity, when he found his brother Bernard posted there with a strong detachment from the royal camp! Hence it is plain, that Gustavus with his handful of men despised all the efforts of Wallstein; and felt no pain but how to enable his combined armies to reach him with safety; blending and consolidating them together in one point from the greatest distances; overlooking the loss of days and weeks, with respect to his own distresses, and exposing himself to all sorts of dangers, upon condition only, that he could once make them strong enough to look Wallstein in the face, in case he marched from his lines to intercept their approach; which he knew to be both possible and

* It may be worth while to remark here once for all, that the post of velt-maréchal was beneath that of the lieutenant-general; which the French historians are ignorant of in their accounts of these wars: for they talk of a velt-maréchal as commander in chief; whereas it appears from history, that Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, after the king's death, was appointed velt-maréchal of the Saxon army under lieutenant-general Arnheim.

practicable :

practicable :—provided the Imperial general had spirit enough to undertake the enterprize.

The Swedish troops being thus surprizingly assembled together, advanced slowly and cautiously, for such were their directions, to Hertzog-Aurach, which, as it was a walled town protected with a strong castle, the king took, in spite of Walftein, for their conveniency, a few days before. From this place they proceeded gently to Bruck, which lies ten miles to the north of Nurenberg, where the river Aurach falls into the Pegnitz : and on the western side, the town and castle standing to the eastward, which shews what an excellent defence the king's prudence secured for them, they fortified and encamped themselves for three days. There Gustavus made them a visit, and led them triumphantly to his camp under Walftein's nose. They amounted to 26,000 hardy veterans, who desired nothing more than to come to blows. His majesty acknowledged their zeal and diligence, their affection and fidelity, with a transport of joy ; and soon availing himself of their spirit and ardour, determined to bring this *gazing and starving* contest to a short conclusion.

Walftein's countenance began to change at this junction ; and as he had not ventured to attack the Swedish reinforcements in their approach, people thence formed presages favourable to the protestant cause. The king burnt with impatience to talk to the Imperial general in a higher style. When he had troops to act, it was never his humour to allow them to sit with their arms folded ; and he, whose eyes penetrated into, and whose ears were open to every thing, had chanced to maintain a correspondence with a couple of sutlers in the Imperial army ; but one of them, happening to be detected in stealing Cronenberg's service of plate, confessed the treason, and impeached his accomplice. They were both broken on the wheel the same day ; and thus the king's correspondence was entirely ruined.

The king having set apart a day of public thanksgiving for the arrival of his armies, and borrowed money of the Nurenbergers at six *per cent.* in order to advance a month's pay to his forces, balanced immediately in his own mind, whether he might not have recourse to forcible means, inasmuch as artifice had failed him, and his information been destroyed at the very source. At length he formed the heroic resolution, to which an unlucky circumstance afterwards contributed, of besieging and attacking Walftein in his own lines, determined either to enter his camp, or compel him to dis-

lodge.

lodge. *This* general, as well as the elector of Bavaria, astonished at the sight of such extraordinary preparations, sent express upon express to Pappenheim, beseeching him to assist in rescuing them from their dangerous situation : but that commander, who loved neither of them, and who made the sacrifice of his plain-dealing to no man, affecting independency, and having his own particular ambition and humours, made them no return but ceremonious excuses, and well-studied delays ; for he considered himself as the only antagonist worthy to oppose Gustavus, in the character of generalissimo of the Imperial armies. The reason he was so ardently fought for appears to be as follows. Walsstein, apprehensive of starving, had sent Holk, into Misnia, with ten thousand men ; so that he only exceeded the Swedes by fourteen thousand, and such troops as he could draft from outposts and neighbouring garrisons ; which might make about half an equivalent for those he had detached.

His majesty, with little ceremony, thundered upon Walsstein from three vast batteries of cannon ; and that general, who, by this time, had learned to copy Gustavus in expecting great things from the force of artillery, erected batteries in all convenient places, and gave his officers charge, under pain of his highest displeasure, which with him was but another phrase for disgrace, degradation, or death, never to be transported by any heat of passion, or any seeming fitness of opportunity, into an engagement, more than barely defensive and repulsive. As this attack was undertaken, discontinued, and resumed for several days, it so happened, that whenever the king's troops advanced too near, or exposed their flanks, the Walssteiners treated them very roughly, but always contented themselves with the first advantage, and never once gave a momentary opening, which Gustavus watched for, and strove to entice them too, whereby things might be drawn on to a general action ; so implicitly was Walsstein obeyed. Indeed, never was a commander better calculated to break the spirit of that dangerous sort of officers, who do great mischief merely by possessing animal courage, without coolness and conduct. In one of these engagements Banier received a musquet-shot in his arm, just above the elbow-joint, which remaining there, gave him inexpressible torment.

The king then dismantling his batteries, employed two days in passing the greater part of his forces over the Rednitz, at a small distance above the town of Furt ; in crossing which little river, William Harvey, only son of the earl of Bristol,

Bristol, was unfortunately drowned. He was a young man endowed with every amiable quality, and served, that day, with the curiosity of a stranger, being then returning home from a tour of three years duration over France, Italy, and Germany.

In making this movement, the king proposed to dislodge Walsstein from a part of his encampment; for by seizing a certain eminence, he had then full power, which he wanted before, to bring three newly-erected batteries to perform their duty. The Imperial general foreseeing the consequence, retired to the old castle of Altenberg, which name implied an high situation, and there intrenched himself anew. The forest of Altenberg spread itself round him; the ascent of the hill was steep and craggy. He immured himself behind a three-fold barrier of trees, each rising in a semi-circle one above the other; and in short possessed a lodgment hardly possible to be taken, provided the defendants acquitted themselves like men of honour.

It is thought, that Aldringer, who was a person of sharp and ready parts, induced the king, by an artifice, to assail a post, which upon cool examination, if the king had been left to himself, he would certainly have declined. For at nine o'clock, just after finishing morning prayers, which were longer than usual, as the day was a festival*, a valet de chambre of Aldringer, who had himself been a valet de chambre, and rising by his dexterity and courage knew how to choose an enterprising genius, was brought prisoner into the king's presence. This adventurer, who threw himself purposely into the way of the Swedes, told his majesty, with an air of confident firmness, that the Imperial commander was then actually decamping, in order to comply with the remonstrances of his troops, who declared they were ready to die as soldiers ought, but did not choose to perish by famine. The king from his eminence soon discovered the enemy in great motion, and ordering his men to advance, learned at length this fatal truth, that they were only hastening to seize a post†, which, if Aldringer's servant had not misled his judgment, he had surely taken possession of before Walsstein could do so. Piqued therefore to see himself overreached by a suborned dissembler, concerning whose future fate or punishment we know nothing, he saw the desperate nature of the undertaking, yet resolved to proceed; stung to the

* St. Bartholomew, August 24.

† An old fortress called, The Burgthal.

heart

heart with the phlegm of Walstein and the artifice of Aldringer. Thus when the passions are thoroughly disturbed, there appear to be certain moments in war, where the parts of a finite being are hardly sufficient; since something of human infirmity will ever adhere to the most perfect man.

The king, forming his resolution in an instant, and ordering the dragoons and part of his cavalry to dismount, advanced sword in hand at the head of the van-guard of the left wing*, having ordered each post to be relieved every two hours; but the main attack against the ruinous castle of Altenberg was supported wholly by commanded musqueteers, all drafted from the several brigades, who left their colours below the mountain with their companions†. There was an arched projection on one side of the hill over-hung with trees; and in this hollow the king lodged his body of reserve. Many other desperate attacks were made, and one particularly on the posts where Aldringer and Caraffa were lodged, and where Walstein, Galas, and Aldringer stood during the course of the engagement. The first disappointment seemed rather to sharpen than blunt his majesty's courage; for all the batteries being now mounted, he thundered upon the enemy continually, with more than two hundred pieces of cannon, to which Walstein replied with unwearied diligence. The king, though ever fixed in one place, formed the disposition of each attack, and dispatched his orders accordingly; and the whole combined operation proceeded only upon one principle, which was, to possess the summit of the mountain; a task rendered difficult by nature, and more so by the intervention of art, and the obstinate resistance of the imperial troops; for Walstein's army was a piece of machinery, which he forced to act almost as long as he pleased. On the contrary, Gustavus's men loved and adored him on a principle of honour, and fought death out of free choice and pure magnanimity. Yet the height of the mountain was

* The curious may like to know, how the posts of honour were distributed on this important day's service. Duke William of Weimar was lieutenant-general; and his business was to take the command in case of accident; his brother Bernard conducted the cavalry, and general Strief, an old Mansfelder, served under him. Some substitute acted for Banier as commander of the infantry, and Torstenson directed the artillery. Hence it appears, that Oxenstiern had risen to no great employment as a soldier; nor had the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, both then present, any distinguished command. Gustavus never made compliments of rank or seniority in a battle.

† These assailants were all subdivided into little bodies, consisting of 500 men; and an experienced colonel, for the king had sometimes five in a brigade, a lieutenant-colonel, and other proper officers, were assigned to each body.

unattainable,

unattainable, though not a single Swede behaved amiss. The reader may form some idea of its strength from the following circumstance : word was brought Walsstein by an aid de camp, that *the king had mounted the hill*. He answered haughtily, with a mixture of profaneness and surprize, for he was extravagant in his language, beyond all imagination, *That he would not believe there was a Supreme Being in heaven, if that castle could possibly be taken from him**. Now, if a man reflects coolly on this monstrous expression, which nothing but the fidelity of an historian would have allowed me to repeat, I think it is pretty plain it arose more from being disconcerted than from impiety. I mention it partly to shew, that Walsstein wanted presence of mind upon great emergencies; and being firmly persuaded, that the place was not to be conquered by human means, broke out into a profusion of downright nonsense as well as profaneness.

Now began the sharpest service that had been seen during the course of the thirty years wars: so that the old officers, on either side, all agreed, that the battles of Prague and Leipsic were but a sort of holiday reviews, when compared with the bloody service of this day. The Swedes were exposed and naked from head to foot. The Walssteiners, on the contrary, laid buried in their intrenchments, not to mention parapets of felled oaks disposed in treble and four-fold rows, insomuch that it was impossible for the Swedish cavalry to act, or even sustain their infantry. The conflict lasted ten hours without intermission, which probably never happened in the same degree of violence, either before that time, or since; and the fire of the cannon and musquetry was so fierce and unremitted, that the whole mountain appeared to be in a flame†, as if the king purposed to perform something eminent in the way of artillery near Nuremberg, where, according to most accounts, the invention of cannon made its first appearance. Walsstein wanted no advantage that he could wish; and though six thousand men filled the principal post, yet he had the power to replace them from his camp every half hour; and besides, within the walls of the castle, he had opportunity to lodge one thousand soldiers, who, out of the reach of cannon-ball, stood

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part. iii. p. 50.

† By the account of the military store-keepers, the king fired that day almost 200,000 cannon-shots. *Chemnitz*. vol. i. §13. This seems a mistake, for each piece of ordnance must have been discharged nearly 1000 times.

prepared

prepared to rush forth upon the least emergency. Many Swedish regiments returned six, seven, and eight times to the attack, for the king never left the front line, since it was a service of so desperate a nature, that a commander in chief was obliged to put himself upon a worse footing than the meanest soldier that served under him. In a word, it was thought, both parties engaged, we speak of infantry and dragoons, almost to a man, some in one place and some in another; for the desperate rashness of the Swedes, and the obstinacy of the Imperialists, were not to be paralleled.

Amongst the several attempts upon Walstein's camp, duke Bernard's attack appeared upon trial to be more practicable than that of the king; and when the report was communicated to his majesty by an aid de camp, colonel Hepburn was dispatched immediately to survey the ground; and bringing word, that the account was just, the king flew thither and examined the situation himself. *Sir, said he to Hepburn, you have made a true and faithful report; yet I must not aim at making my principal impression here. It demands at least my whole body of infantry, and then the artillery and cavalry are left naked to the mercy of the enemy, who may chuse where to make his capital effort, or assault me, if he please, in two places at once.* This account has been delivered down by Hepburn himself, a person who at that juncture bore his master some *ill will*; and confutes a rumour, then current over the empire; namely, that Gustavus might have carried his point, and dislodged Walstein, if he could have departed from his obstinacy, and, following duke Bernard's advice, resigned an ill chosen post in exchange for a second, that was better situated. So far was this assertion from being true, that on the contrary, all the generals testified their approbation of the king's sedateness of judgment, as well as quickness of decision.

Having mentioned something relative to Hepburn, it may be worth observing here, that one or two sharp expressions had passed between him and the king a few days before, upon which the former angrily and haughtily declared, that he would never more unsheath his sword in the Swedish quarrel*. Therefore, in the present action, he attended the king as a simple spectator. When duke Bernard's impor-

* Part of this account is taken from *P. Bougéant's Histoire des guerres, &c. qui précédèrent la paix de Westphalie*, and it is the only passage wherein I have derived the least assistance from him: for though his work is a clear piece of prose, well methodized, yet his materials are few and meagre, nor are his *three* original authors, whom he copies, judiciously chosen.

tant information arrived, the king turned round and exclaimed with some eagerness, Where is any able officer to hasten away and survey the ground*? But the confusion and slaughter being so great, that none could be found, for each commander had full employment in his respective post, the brave Scottish warrior made a tender of his best services; Go, said the king, *I am much obliged to you.* Having returned to Gustavus, and made his report, and accompanied him a second time to the spot of ground in question, he returned his sword into the scabbard, saying, Now, Sire, I shall never draw it more in your behalf. His late master made no answer at that time, either because his affairs were in such a situation, that he had not a moment to spare; or more probably, because he thought the usage so harsh and abrupt, that he rather disdained to make a suitable reply to it, and therefore considered silence as the answer which carried with it most expression, and the greatest degree of dignity.

His majesty, as the afternoon began now to decline, perceived plainly that nothing could ensue that day but fruitless attempts and inevitable slaughter; and therefore leaving, for the honour of his troops, the musqueteers, employed in attacking the hill, to maintain their ground, commanded the gros of the army to form on the plain below. Before these orders could be completely executed, a large part of Wallstein's cuirassiers issued out of their lines, and fell with all the fury and insolence of conquerors on a body of Swedish infantry, conducted by Torstenion, who, with musqueteers and pikemen, faced a four-fold number of assailants with incredible firmness; till at length, half overpowered by numbers, he saved the remains of his men, keeping still next the enemy, at the expence of his liberty, which he soon regained in exchange against Spar. Meanwhile Cronenberg†, with his own regiment of 1500 horse, sur-named the *Invincible*, flew like lightning upon Stalhaufe‡, who commanded 200 Finland cavalry; but the latter had the courage and fortune to repel the Imperialists, and pursued them, till the cannon of Altenberg castle stopped him from advancing farther.

* Others say, that colonel Erpach, being mortally wounded, Hepburn, at the king's request, supplied his place, and maintained the post.

† It was Cronenberg who carried off Tilly at the battle of Leipsic.

‡ This colonel, a Finlander by birth, rose purely on account of his merits being originally a footman to Sir Patrick Ruthven. He was remarkable for speaking excellent English.

And

Night, the most expeditious as well as most effectual of all truce-makers, introduced a breathing space at least, after a day's work of most desperate service. The honour of the action remained equally distributed between either party. The Imperialists kept their intrenchments, and the Swedes slept all night in plain ground, just in the front of the enemies lines; so that nothing saved the former, as they themselves confessed, but the great advantage of situation. Thus ended the obstinate conflict at Altenberg, which, in the sense of some, was a sort of victory, for Gustavus missed his aim, and Walftein maintained his ground: so that, according to the example of Marcellus, and the other Romans who repelled Hannibal to the gates of Nola, he and his generals all concluded that they had obtained some very signal advantage; and flattered themselves with the expectation of future victories, having once beheld the day, when they had *ceased to be beaten* by a conqueror equally formidable with the great Carthaginian.

In addition to the misfortunes of the Swedes, there fell most violent rains, which lasted till morning, so that the king sat till daybreak in his coach, and his domestics laid round a *nominal* fire, for it was hardly possible to make it burn.

Walftein, who did not mount on horseback till news was brought him that Gustavus had stormed the castle of Altenberg, had his horse killed under him by a musquet-ball; and, by another shot, the king lost part of the sole of his boot, next the toe; and a domestic was killed at his elbow by a cannon-ball. Duke Bernard, that day, gave specimens of conduct and courage, which no ways misbecame the successor of Gustavus. He gained an eminence that was almost upon a level with the old castle, and by the king's orders erected a battery thereon; but, in the interim, the Imperialists retired to a second distance, and having intrenched themselves afresh, clogged the new ascent with the fall of so many trees, that it was impossible for the troops to get up without exposing their whole body to inevitable destruction.

Though historians make the losses to be nearly equal on either side, that is to say, about one thousand killed, and fifteen hundred wounded, in each army, yet sure it is, that the Swedes must have suffered most considerably, as appears from the very nature of the description. Among the latter, fell general Boetius, count Erpach; Crailsham, a British officer of repute*, and many others; and the Imperialists lost Maria de Carassa, a young nobleman of great hopes,

* *Invasions of Germany*, Lond. 1638, 12°.

Chiefa; and Fugger, all colonels. The latter died, bravely, in the opinion of some, though not in the character of a man of honour; for being examined by the Swedes, in his last moments, and the king, if I mistake not, stood by, he called for a bumper of wine, and said, "Gentlemen, it is now no time to dissemble; my general, in his turn, will assault you;" and having thus drank, he expired immediately. As to what the Imperialists suffered, we know nothing that is very certain; but the list of the wounded, on the Swedish side, was very great; for as many officers, higher and lower, were disabled for a season, as were thought sufficient to conduct 6000 men.

Next morning, his majesty, after having passed a wet, cold, and tedious night, reflecting, all the time, with great compassion on the fate of the *commanded* musqueteers, who lay directly under Altenberg castle; and asking his domestics anxiously, at break of day, if any officer of the field was near him, received for answer, that none but Hepburn was there, who, as we observed before, came there only out of curiosity. Him the king requested earnestly, notwithstanding Hepburn's *late* behaviour, to make a visit to the poor foldiers above-mentioned, and remark likewise if any place could be discovered, from whence the ordnance might be brought to act against the old castle. He then desired him to call, in his return, upon duke Bernard, and command his troops whilst the general came to receive fresh instructions. I think, all these circumstances, combined with others that have been mentioned, may serve to shew, that though the king was warm and hasty; yet, when the transport of his resentment was over, he subsided always into the friendly and condescending character; and asked favours, very often, on purpose to give an opening to reconciliation. When Hepburn returned, he made report to his majesty, that the musqueteers were almost buried in dirt and water, but that he had discovered a spot of ground, whence, if the earth was raised a little, four pieces of battering artillery might be brought to bear against Altenberg fortrefs, at the distance only of fifty paces: *I had rather, said the king with great emotion, you had found me a place at ten times that distance; I cannot bear the thoughts of seeing my men torn to pieces a second time* *. Therefore, having held a short consultation, to which duke Bernard had been lately summoned, in his own coach, he gave orders for a general retreat; which was performed with such regularity and firmness, that Walstein

* *Monro; Second Expedition.*

durst

durst not uncouple one single band of Croatians to harass his rear. Indeed, part of the stress of the difficulty turned upon bringing off the *commanded* musqueteers with reputation and safety, for they laid more advanced towards the enemy, than any other Swedish troops: and his majesty felt so much uneasiness in this particular, that though duke William of Weimar had undertaken to see the business performed, and had sent Monro, then the first time acting as colonel, which made his general destina him to some distinguishing service, to *conduct* the retreat, at the head of 500 picked musqueteers; yet Gustavus, still impatient concerning the event, resolved to see with his own eyes how that officer and his foldiers acquitted themselves; and overtaking Monro, whom he observed to be wounded, having received, the day before, a musquet-shot in his side, had the generosity and humanity to bid him return to his tent, lest his health might be endangered. Taking the parizan courteously out of his hand, the king performed the duty of a simple colonel himself, and brought his men back with such composure and resolution, that the enemy, far from pressing on his heels, durst not discharge a single musquet. It is true, many may think this office, humane and compassionate as it was in itself, beneath the dignity of a crowned head; but it was the king's *humour*, as Tilly said on a less important occasion concerning himself, and *that* must suffice for a general answer; for it was a maxim with his majesty, and perhaps the only dangerous one which he ever adopted, *That no duty, compatible with the honour of a simple colonel, misbecame the greatest commander.**

Whoever shall consider the whole of the transaction at Altenberg dispassionately and sensibly, will perhaps admire Gustavus more, in this instance of disappointment, than in many of his shining and most prosperous victories. Misled by false intelligence, and warped a little in his judgment by the warmth of his temper, and an impatient sensibility of disgrace, it is certain he took the step too *precipitately*; and thus much some of his generals modestly suggested: but then in what manner did he retrieve an error, ill consequences of which in another commander had been unavoidable?—He seized his opportunities, and shifted and resumed his hold, with such acumen of judgment, inducing the army, by his own example, to act with a resolution not to be paralleled; that though the chances against him were at

* *Character of Gustavus Adolphus*, Lond. 4°. 1633.

least as *three to one*, yet he brought the amount of loss, on either side, to be nearly equal; formed his retreat, the next day, with such boldness and gallantry, as gave his enemies the option of a second battle; and then intrenched himself afresh under their beards, where he remained unmolested, from the twenty-fifth of August till the eighth of September. —All *military* engagements, of *equivocal* success, are best judged of by their *consequences*; but this action was attended by no consequences, either good, bad, or indifferent. It occasioned no single variation in the king's future motions; nor did it influence his intended decampment, which took place a fortnight afterwards.

The king, after this bold but unavailing attempt, changed his plan undismayed; and removing to some little distance from his last lines, sketched out a new camp, still nearer to Walstein's than the former; for a cannon-ball could do execution, from one to the other, at its greatest range. Matters being now reduced, for a time, to a state of pause and quiet, the English ambassador made a farther attempt, without being furnished with a fresh degree of power, and of course received a repulse more strongly worded than the last had been. For this, we have his own authority against himself, his master, and the ministry*. “The king of Sweden *complained*,” said he, “that he had been *amused and led on with subtilty and finesse* by the ambassador, and said publicly, *That this was a RIGHT ENGLISH TREATY*, for they used to be *eternally in treaty*, but *never concluded*.”

What piqued the king, was the perseverance and shuffling of the English court. He wanted an *offensive* treaty of *definite* duration, but could not gain it; he requested a *naval* war against Spain, but could not procure it: and knowing Charles's mutable and timorous temper, resolved to chain the Proteus, or else leave him at full liberty. He had conceived, likewise, a disapprobation of Vane's errand, from the first moment he saw his instructions at Mentz, under the great seal of England; which instructions were never altered afterwards in any material circumstance; and the tenor of them ran invariably, that the ambassador should engage in no league, but such as was purely of a *defensive* nature. Whence it appears to demonstration, that the reconquest and restitution of the Palatinates, points wherein the honour and religion of England ought deeply to have been concerned, were never thought of sincerely, consistently,

* Letter, dated Aug. . . . 1632, MS. *Paper-Office*.

or in good earnest. This both the elector and electress Palatine knew, and despised their professing and protesting brother accordingly. Sorry I am, that such truths as these should pass from my pen, at so great a distance of time. I know the reverence that is due to the ashes of a crowned person, and touch them with a cautious and unwilling hand: for, as a man of private virtue, and an encourager of the fine arts, I respect and venerate the memory of Charles I. and make some allowances for the untoward circumstances of the period of time into which Providence was pleased to throw him.

To return to the negotiations before us, concerning which some farther information may be given by producing an extract from a third letter of Vane* to secretary Coke, which seems to me to precede the last cited in order of time; but the date of the day being either omitted in the original, or overlooked by the person who had the goodness to transmit the copy to me, I can only say, that they both came from Nuremberg, or the king's camp, in the same month, namely, August 1632. "Having been in treaty, in conformity to your last directions, with the king of Sweden, we not agreeing *de genere fœderis*, nor upon the *indefiniteness* of the time,—he pressing a league defensive, (*offensive*) and *time certain*; I, going according to my instructions, from which your honour knoweth I am not to depart; on the nineteenth of the present, after four hours consultation, with some of his council, on this affair, he sent his secretary Camerarius † to me, with this declaration, that he had so long been in agitation between himself and me, that he gave his majesty many thanks for the honour he had done him, in sending his ambassador to offer him an alliance; and gave me thanks for the pains I had taken therein. The conclusion was, *That he would not accept of the auxiliary treaty, nor of the condition proposed by me; and for the indefiniteness of the time, it was against all form of proceeding in alliances. That he should write to his majesty, to give him thanks for the continuance of his good offices towards him.*"

It appears, upon the whole, that Gustavus, well knowing his Britannic majesty's timidity, insisted upon a public declaration of a *naval war* against Spain; and being well ap-

* MS.

† A politician of great abilities, as appears from some letters I have seen. He had formerly served the elector Palatine in England. I have been informed he wrote the famous *Apology*, published in Latin, 4^o. 1624.

prized of Charles's irresolute temper, demanded a *time specified* for the duration of the alliance; paying little regard, either to British subsidies, or the transportation of British forces, having well digested in his mind, what had formerly been done, in that respect, for the elector Palatine; and more lately, with reference to himself. Therefore not being able to possess Charles wholly, he disdained to compound for the tythes of his friendship, the payment of which he foresaw to be precarious; and thus the matter ended, honourably to the penetration and magnanimity of Gustavus.

Wallstein and he laid gazing at one another in a second state of inaction, if we except only rencounters, surprises, and intercepting of convoys. Gustavus, for want of more important employment near Eubach, cut to pieces a regiment of Croatians, a set of warriors he mortally hated, being of somebody's opinion in that age, I forget now who the person was, that defined a Croatian *to be a sort of Christian, who did not acknowledge the eighth commandment*: and then remarking that Wallstein derived all his provisions either from Bavaria, or the Upper Palatinate, which latter road lay through the town of Neumarck, placed Sperreüter on the Bavarian side, with 5000 men, near the pass of Wilsburg and Weissenburg; and lodged 3000 chosen horse on the Neumarck side, from whence an Imperial convoy was expected hourly, and missed little of seizing the generalissimo himself, who, being advertised of the Swedish designs, ventured in person to secure the arrival of his troops. A page belonging to him was taken prisoner, and reported that his master escaped by stealing through the labyrinths of a thick wood. Still I have some doubts concerning the fact; for Wallstein rarely placed himself in the way of danger; which, whether it proceeded from prudence, or timidity, some extolling him for such practices, and some depreciating him, cannot well be ascertained.

During this interval a body of Croatians, which had placed themselves in ambuscade to intercept a party of Swedes, stumbled by mere chance on a party of gownsmen that belonged to the university of Altdorf, and made them all prisoners of war, without any respect to the *jus publicum*, or the *German Muses*. Thus the professors Agricola, Nesser, and Bruno, had the misfortune to lose all they possessed, except their learning. A detachment from the king's army made reprisals on the town and rich monastery of Castel, about thirteen miles to the east of Altdorf, where they found two Jesuits, one of whom, attempting to escape through a window, missed

missed his footing on the ladder, and broke his neck ; but the other, being carefully secured, served in exchange against the *Literati*.

The king grew impatient to see moments of importance wasted upon depredations and skirmishes, that determined nothing. He therefore, once for all, formed the resolution of posting Horn, now returned from the electorate of Mentz*, and Banier, † then recovered from his late wound, at the head of two small armies, near the town of Lichtenau, a strong fort in the burgraviate of Nuremberg, not far distant from Anspach : thereby proposing to make this

* Others say duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar ; which, upon recollection, appears to be most probable.

† We will here, once for all, say something of this excellent officer, who, when he was between a child and a youth, fell from a window four or five stories high, without groaning or shedding a tear. Gustavus hearing of it pronounced him born for great events, and made him a soldier. He was descended from one of the best families in Sweden, and resembled his master extremely in person, with which the king was not displeased. It was computed he had killed eighty thousand men, in the several pitched battles where he had commanded, and taken six hundred colours. As a soldier, his retreat from Bohemia may be looked upon as a masterpiece ; for in this branch of science, he excelled all officers before or since. As a politician, his reconciliation of the protestants, after the battle of Nuremberg and the peace of Prague, to the Swedish interests, may be looked upon as an act of prudence and firmness worthy of Oxenstiern himself. His letters to the *maréchal Guebriant*, and others, shew him to be very great and very determined. Nevertheless, there was something of levity in his second marriage. He buried his wife, who was a countess of Lovenstein, whilst he laboured under the chronical illness which occasioned his death. No husband appeared more inconsolable ; but in his return from the funeral, chancing to meet the margravine of Dourlach on the road, he was so astonished with her charms, that he made application to, and married her in a few days.

In his last testament, he bequeathed Torstenson, then in Sweden, to the army as his successor ; and requested his consort, in the strongest terms, never to allow his body to be unbowelled and embalmed, 1640-1.

He had received an excellent education, which made the king call him one of his *learned* generals. Before he fought and gained the battle of Wittstock, 1635, he banished every known coward from the Swedish army, and gave the desponding and timorous full permission to quit the service. *Continuat. Lower Austr. vol. 41.*

One slight circumstance more shall be mentioned. His retreat, environed by the enemy and the Elbe, at Torgau, at a time when all Germany gave him over for lost, and by which he preserved a very fine army with little or no loss, has ever been considered as a masterly performance in the military art, and an *emblematical* print was published, whence came the well-known expression of *cul de sac*. [*Memorab. Suec. Gent. 46.*] The emblem took its rise from Banier's own words on the occasion : " The Imperialists," said he, " inclosed me in a bag, and though they tied the mouth of it with great strength and diligence, yet they forgot to darn up a trifling hole, which was at the bottom."

body of troops superior in force to all flying parties; and alluring Walstein, at the same time, to march out with his whole army in order to dislodge them; when the king expected a fair opportunity to give him battle upon equal ground. As things thus stood, no military scheme ever appeared better concerted, for he left his adversary but *three* choices, without any subterfuge or succedaneum, namely, *fighting, starving, or decamping*; since an army posted at Lichtenau had the power of cutting off the channel of intercourse with Bavaria and Suabia. An unforeseen accident, however, destroyed all this sublime plan in one moment, and gave his majesty the keenest mortification.

Scheverlin, a patrician of Nuremberg, defended this fortress of Lichtenau, which the king, who always proposed to make his use of it, though not for the purposes now related, took care to see well provided in every respect. The governor, till then, was a man of character, and had behaved reputably, when Walstein's troops besieged him some weeks before. Now, his fortress being invested a second time, as Walstein either knew the importance of the place, or gained some intelligence of the king's designs, he made a sacrifice of his honour and good fame all at once, and entered into a capitulation without any one urgent necessity. Some suppose him to be corrupted, but that no where appears; it was an act of mere timidity, and despondency; for as the Swedes had faced the Imperialists so long without beating them, he became firmly persuaded, that Walstein would destroy Gustavus; and such indeed was the opinion of the public, from the beginning of their trial of skill to the conclusion. Thus the king understood the crime; and ordered the magistrates of Nuremberg to secure his person, and prepare his process. However, as the man did not belong to him, and as his punishment became no example to his own troops, he despised all resentment against a base spirit, and gave himself no concern, whether he was condemned, or acquitted. Thus was a plan of extraordinary consequence destroyed by the misbehaviour of a single person, whom no one doubted; and what doubly sharpened the king's affliction was, he had a further view in possessing Lichtenau. It was a strong post, capable of securing his decampment, concerning which he now began to think in good earnest; and was equally necessary to him, in case Walstein should defeat him. He had now his whole system to reform anew, and passed two or three days in meditation, walking to and fro, by himself, in his tent or the fields, as was his usual custom upon such occasions.

At length, considering the condition of his army, he determined not to push a punctilio of honour into an act of cruelty; and as Walstein, who had no compassion, was resolved to see which army should *starve* last, the king, for the sake of his brave followers, took the *apparent disgrace*, though indeed it was an example of solid glory, to dislodge first, his grand scheme being now destroyed, with regard to Lichtenau. This shews us how inventive the parts of a great commander ought to be, and how abundant likewise in resources; since otherwise the fruits of a whole campaign may be blasted at once, by the misconduct or baseness of an officer to all appearance inconsiderable. Indeed it was high time for the one or other party to decamp, since *perseverance* was nothing better than *deliberate murder*. The king, though warm and hasty, was naturally inclined to be compassionate; nor could he bear to see brave men perish piecemeal like felons in a prison. The season of the Dog-days had been uncommonly hot; the waters of the Pegnitz were foul and corrupted; the stench of the dead horses, there being hardly room to bury them, was insupportably noisome, and *petechial* or camp fevers of the purple kind, raged to a degree of pestilence. Walstein had more room, yet suffered more; for his numbers were greater, and his management less circumspect.

His majesty being now on the wing of departure, and the grand trial of skill supposed to be concluded, the marquis of Hamilton, who by this time had neither men nor command, took his final leave, at Neustadt upon the Aisch, where he was dismissed by the king with distinguishing marks of esteem and affection*, and all the British officers had leave to attend him a half day's journey. The *inflexible* Hepburn took this opportunity of quitting the Swedish ensigns, proposing,

* Besides what appears to us from Vane's papers, Chemnitz, the king's historiographer, who wrote upon excellent materials, gives us a short but sensible account of all that passed, with respect to the British ambassador and British general. Venius primum cum campiductore Hornio Herbipolim, mox cum regni cancellario Moguntiae, regis iussu, inchoata re, sed neutrum consummata, ad regem Monachium Bavariae se contulerat, & conventum sane illic de plerisque: nec obscura de *indiciis*, (promissa utrinque moderatione) spes apparebat, conclusionem foederis ea propter haud dilatum iri. Resumpta igitur ad Noribergam tela. Sed a Britannico legato conditiones propositae omnino novae, & faciem rei mutant: adiectis nonnullorum articulorum appendiculis; è quibus nil serio agi, nec foederis quæri perfectionem rex suspicabatur. Marchioni ergo Hamiltonio delectum habendorum in Magnam Britanniam, ut diximus, eunti, *latentes hujus processus causas indagare, regem Magnae Britanniae, semotis arbitris, de eo edocere, aliorumque per proba consilia illic turbare*, una in mandatis datum. Tom. i. p. 316.

as it is thought, to make a tender of his services to France, but had the misfortune, in that kingdom, to be killed in a duel*. The king loved him, and confided in him more than in any colonel that acted under him; and some days before their disagreement, appointed him commander of half the infantry in the camp of Nurenberg: but his *just* and *noble* spirit had not the power of making greater condescensions than those we have formerly repeated.

The Austrians made unwearied applications for assistance to the diet at Warsaw; but the Polanders had a king to chuse; and perceiving, likewise, that affairs took a more serious turn in the empire, had not much inclination to embark in a system of difficulties, which appeared to be of no short duration. Besides, *national contests* in Poland, like *rebellions* at Naples, are a sort of political holiday; the inhabitants rejoice in them, as much as ever the Spaniards took delight in the *Juego des toros & cannas*; nay, the very ladies are all cabinet-counsellors and politicians; and the husband frequently recites to the senate the lecture he has first received in his wife's dressing-room†. At this very juncture too, as well as at most others, each man thought of advancing his own interests, and gratifying his own resentments, and bestowed only a few empty wishes on the emperor and his cause: and as to a supply of forces, it was alledged, that all they could collect were hardly sufficient to maintain the public peace at home, as they were upon the eve of a great event, the election of a sovereign.

Passing by every circumstance of this litigious cabal‡, except such as relate immediately to my present subject, it was debated in the diet, under the third-head of enquiry, whether the treaty projected with Sweden, should be confirmed and closed; and the nobility, almost to a man, were for the affirmative. Gustavus, amongst all the tumults of war, had a watchful eye to these transactions, not chusing however to engage in them over-deeply, and dispatched a gentleman, vested with full powers, to make the Poles an offer of securing their kingdom from the Moscovites and Tartars, and to procure

* This officer had excellent parts, but was no great master of modern languages. As he often went from Gustavus to Richelieu, the latter used to say, when he was in a cheerful humour, "I long to have some accounts from the king of Sweden, as also to see colonel Hepburn, and hear him talk about his *bimaras*." From whence the writer of Richelieu's Life concludes, that he pronounced *chimera*s in that manner.

† *Memoirs communicated.*

‡ *Le Soldat Suedois* de Fr. Spanheim, 711—717.

a good

a good understanding betwixt the government of Poland and the neighbouring states.

Fame reports Gustavus to have insinuated, that deputies on his part, for the future, had pretensions to demand free entrance, and vote in this assembly, by virtue of the territories he held in Prussia and elsewhere, feudatory to the crown of Poland. But the senators were full as cautious as the king was enterprising: they made him protestations and excuses in abundance; but referred the grand decision to the eventual circumstances of things.

The elector of Brandenburg's request was attended to with more alacrity; but the senators eluded the article of allowing him a deliberative vote in elections, alledging, that such a concession was inconsistent with their oaths, and the allegiance which they owed their country; yet besought him to employ his best offices with Gustavus, in order to bring about a more lasting and more effectual accommodation; beseeching him likewise to name a place where the respective deputies should meet, and, to shew their sincerity, recommending some town in Prussia, or the neighbouring provinces, for that purpose.

Secretary Arnoldin and count Morzburg took care of the Imperial affairs at this diet; but perceiving the Swedish party to be overpowerful, they passed on to Moscow, by their master's orders, to conclude some sort of treaty with the great duke. Meanwhile Gustavus gave a final audience to the ambassadors of Russia and Tartary, who made him an offer of breaking into Poland, Silesia, or Hungary. The king received their proposals with courtesy and thankfulness, but waved the acceptance of their services; partly because he found sufficient already on his hands, and partly because he detested a war that must be carried on with barbarian ferocity.

At or near this period, as far as may be conjectured, his majesty received a deputation from the peasants of Upper Austria, who had spirit, for the sake of the evangelical religion, to form a revolt under the emperor's eye, and complain in unpolished, but animated expressions, of the violations committed on their fortunes and consciences*. These uneasinesses had blazed forth in the very beginning of the thirty years wars, and though the fire seemed extinguished to outward appearances, yet the embers were perceived to glow at bottom. Upon the present occasion they acted with so much secrecy and judgment, that the court of Vienna

* *Soldat Suedois*, 723—734.

only suspected, and not groundlessly, that some clandestine intelligence had been carried on betwixt them and the Swedes. Oppressions, confiscations, decimations, and tortures, seemed to harden these resolute protestants. This civil contagion made its first appearance at or near Mühl*, and overspread the Higher Austria with great rapidity. The emperor no ways liked a distemper that approached so near his vital parts: he found also, that his revenues diminished, and the passage of the Danube was intercepted between him and Walstein.

These revolvers, some say, made an army of 18,000 men, and being rendered wise by the experience of past errors, seized most of the frontier towns by way of security, in order to facilitate their retreat in the hour of need; and by making themselves masters of the river on either side, they allowed none to pass or repass but friends and allies, and issued out their protections like commanders in form. It was greatly feared, lest the infection should spread through the other parts of the hereditary dominions, and as a proof of this, the court thought fit to proceed upon moderate terms. Count Kevenhüller, the great historian, if I mistake not, was dispatched to treat with them, attended by several barons, protestant as well as catholic, and his orders were to proceed with great temper and equanimity. Nevertheless, with a view to be prepared for all events, it was resolved to raise a body of recruits, and Tieffenbach, now recalled from Silesia, coasted up the side of the Danube with some regular forces, expecting the issue of the negotiation. Colonel John de Wert, a warrior of the most singular character that is to be found in the seventeenth century, attended him with his irregular cavalry.

Kevenhüller discharged his commission with the utmost exactness; but the *insurgents* placed no confidence in rhetorical promises. They had advanced too far to look back on eventual resources, and had no security but in the change of their masters; and though they were plain country persons, yet they had sense enough to foresee, that one cannon ball would tear to pieces all Imperial patents and letters of amnesty†. For these reasons, they first pillaged the

* I suspect, that my relator, F. Spanheim, misleads me here: there is no town called Mühl, in Upper Austria; but the district of Mühl, is well known. If any place of that name be alluded to, it must be Mühlendorf, a strong castle near the Danube.

† *Soldat Suédois*, 727.

monastery of Lambach, and seized the passage of the river Traun; by which means they kept a correspondence open with the protestants about Cremsmünster, famous for its rich monastery of Benedictines, and were very near seizing two brothers of the grand duke of Tuscany, who were making a tour to Wallstein's camp. On the approach of Tieffenbach and John de Wert, they broke off the negotiation in an instant, and perceiving they wanted both military directors, and a foreign protection, sent deputies to Gustavus, beseeching him to remember, that he entered Germany in defence of the civil and religious liberties of the oppressed and persecuted. The king received these *rural* ambassadors with great courtesy, making them handsome presents, and giving them ample assurances of protection and assistance. He likewise, as it is asserted by many, sent several officers to them, disguised like peasants, with orders to direct their warlike operations upon better principles.

During the interval of the inaction which preceded the two decampments, we will leave the two superior commanders for a few minutes, and take a slight sketch of the other parts of the empire, where the war was carried on with all imaginable keenness and obstinacy. So great were the terrors conceived with respect to Gustavus, that Strozzi, Piccolomini, Annibal, and Louis Gonzaga, were all employed to protect the western frontiers of Austria. The court of Vienna laboured also under some uneasiness on the eastern side; for Ragotzki, the successor of Gabriel Bethlen, formed pretty much the same pretensions, and expected the same gratifications from the emperor. He had actually requested permission from the *Porte* to commence hostilities, and the Turks had sent him, by way of approbation, a scymitar, a standard, and a quantity of arms: but what gave greater umbrage to the Imperialists was, that Gustavus had dispatched the Sieur Straßburg with a private commission to this prince of Transylvania, with orders to proceed to the Ottoman court, and carry on a second intrigue there. David Salomon, Ragotzki's lieutenant-general, collected some troops, and his master demanded from the house of Austria to receive his investiture in form. It was reported also, that the prince of Moldavia and the Pacha of Buda had orders to support the Transylvanians; yet matters kept quiet in that quarter.

As to Saxony, Holk had entered Misnia by the 30th of August, and committed outrages that can hardly be credited. It is true, he left his generalissimo near Nuremberg as long before

before as the 20th of July; but his instructions were to intercept, as he passed along, the army of duke William of Weimar, who then marched to the king's assistance: but in this attempt he did not succeed, being deficient either in abilities or good fortune. During this irruption the elector and Arnheim were making conquests elsewhere, otherwise Holk might have been repulsed with ease; for the Saxon army amounted to seven and twenty thousand fine troops to all appearance, and Holk pretended to no more than half of that number. But Arnheim had a violent inclination to reduce Silesia, contrary to Gustavus's opinion, where Dewbatel conducted the Swedes, who were all fresh men, new raised, and colonel Burgsdorf* led the Brandenburgers in the absence of their elector, who had made a journey into Prussia, in order to exert some influence in the diet then held at Warsaw. In this excursion he had a great escape, for during his abode in the castle of Neuenhoven, his bedchamber began to sink so suddenly, that he had but just time to seize the iron bars of the window, and support himself there by main force till people came to his assistance.

As this expedition into Silesia was of too extensive as well as too grasping a nature, so some circumstances conspired to render it disagreeable likewise; for Arnheim and Dewbatel† had two never-failing topics of contention, the one concern-

* This officer had been sent to the camp of Nuremberg, that his master might know to what purpose Gustavus destined the Brandenburg troops. The king opposed this junction with the Saxons in Silesia to the utmost of his eloquence, though the thing was done before his advice could be put in practice, and besought the electoral troops, as he foresaw an invasion from Wallstein's or Pappenheim's army, to continue in their quarters till he, or Oxenstiern arrived. *But, said he, if in the interim it is the fate of the elector of Saxony to be attacked at home, leave him not with his throat exposed to the enemy's knife.* Chemnitz. tom. i. p. 316.

† As I have expressed, in a former note, some doubts concerning this officer's real name, for historians had then given him no less than five: so Chemnitz in his relation of this expedition, p. 319, helps to embarrass me still more, for he calls him *Mac Duvallius*, or, in plain Scotch, *Mac Dougal*. Yet this may be a mistake, for Monro, who often mentions him, must have known him to be a countryman. This man rose purely by merit, being five years before only a serjeant in the blue regiment. But the taking of Hanau advanced him in a month's time from the post of lieutenant-colonel to the colonelship over one regiment of cavalry, and another of infantry. He proved at last a fatal, though uncommon instance, that bravery and ingratitute may go together. To conclude this note, I find a colonel *Mac Dougal* landed with Gustavus, but meet with him no where afterwards under that name, except on this occasion. Yet as other historians assign the present translation in Silesia to Dewbatel, I acknowledge my difficulty to be unexplicable.

ing superiority of command, and the other about the division of their conquests. The former, according to custom, performed but little; for he always made war give place to his private politics, and changed of a sudden from the ambitious to the moderate: but the latter gave good content to the king his master, and more especially in the following instance.

The inhabitants of Great Glogau, though their duchy and town were reputed unalienable, had been obliged to take their oaths of fealty to Walftein, newly created their master; but the Swedes soon freed them from these obligations, and general Goëtz, not being able to escape with his garrison, found himself obliged to surrender on disadvantageous terms.

Arnheim's presence became now necessary in Saxony, which gave Dewbatel greater means of extending his conquests. As the Imperial army laid encamped under the walls of Steinau, he contrived to seize a fort, which commanded the bridge leading into the town, and seized a quantity of boats, laden to the amount of eighteen hundred pounds. He then cannonaded both town and trenches, and attacking the enemies lines sword in hand, killed two thousand men, forced four thousand into the city, and pursued the rest to a considerable distance. Prince Ulric of Denmark made this campaign with the Swedes and Saxons in the capacity of a volunteer.

Next day the Imperial commanders halted*, and having rallied their troops near Breslau, intrenched themselves, to the number of 20,000 men, in an advantageous post, protected by woods and marshes, and approachable only by one entrance. There Dewbatel penetrated at the head of 6000 chosen infantry and dragoons, and forced them, after an obstinate resistance of two hours, to throw themselves into a forest, through which they retreated. The Oder now parted the two armies, and by its depth and breadth saved the Imperial troops, who by this time had suffered exceedingly. Dewbatel made all possible efforts to repair the bridge, but as the enemy's safety depended upon counterworking him in this intention, he at length found himself compelled to desist, and crossing the river at a favourable fording place, under the direction of some fishermen, invested Lignitz†, whose duke,

* Don Baltazar di Marradas, Goëtz, Dhona and Illo.

† The dukes of Lignitz, in 1537, entered into a treaty of fraternity with Joachim II. elector of Brandenburg, which they ratified by oath: but the States of Bohemia complained to Ferdinand I. that this compact aimed directly

duke, by a timely surrender, saved his capital and country from ruin, and declared himself a good Swede. Then turning short, he summoned Breslau, where the townsmen soon formed a mutiny in favour of the protestant armies, so that general Dhona, who had thrown himself into that city, escaped with great difficulty, to his own castle of Warthenberg.

Holk availed himself of the absence of Arnheim, who trifled away much good time before he returned from Silesia. There must always have been great unsteadiness, and some duplicity in the conduct both of this general and his master, as has been pointed out in various places. It may be worth while to give my reader a faithful sketch of the elector of Saxony. It is drawn up in such a manner as to carry the marks of originality with it. "The duke of Saxony," says Feuquières, ambassador of France, in a letter to his own court, "is a warm and bigotted Lutheran, disdainful, haughty, extravagant in drinking, hated and despised not only by his subjects, but by his own children, whom he treats as prisoners; a passionate admirer of pleasure or inactivity; incapable of great affairs, dependant on the king of Denmark, a concealed enemy to the crown of Sweden, partly for its interference in Germany, and partly on account of its pretensions to Magdeburg and Halberstadt; jealous of the house of Weimar, and extremely attached to the prerogatives and dignity of the empire. When *that* is concerned, all foreign powers are suspected by him; and it is his private inclination, as well as opinion, that a true German may dispense himself from transmitting any systematical intelligence to such, as live not within the limits of the system. His original prepossession to the house

directly at the rights of the crown of Bohemia, to which the duchies of Lignitz, Brieg, and Wolau, ought to devolve upon the extinction of the families then possessing them. This emperor therefore declared, in 1546, that the confraternity of 1537 was null and void in such wise, as if it had never existed; so that the dukes of Lignitz were obliged to retract it, and promise, that the three duchies should fall to the kingdom of Bohemia in case their own family became extinct. The elector of Brandenburg entered his protest against the Imperial decision, and the duke of Lignitz dying without a capable successor, in the year 1675, Frederic William, surnamed The Great, then elector of Brandenburg, presented himself as heir; but the emperor took possession of the territories, and George William could not obstruct him.

The like happened not long after the death of Charles VI. in 1740. His present majesty of Prussia revived his rights upon these duchies, and declared himself master of them by force of arms.

house of Austria always subsists: nevertheless, it appears expedient to him to manage that family with dexterity upon principles of advantage; first, because it is his opinion, that the proximity of situation renders him more necessary to the emperor than to any other prince; and secondly, as he is jealous beyond conception of the Palatine, Brandenburg and Weimar families. The pre-eminence of the *first* was insupportable to him. The aggrandizement of the *second* gave him umbrage; and the pretensions of the *third*, from which the electorate had been forcibly wrested, filled his mind with suspicious apprehensions. The general Arnheim, and one of his ministers, govern him absolutely; which he believes not, as he reserves to himself the power of snarling and blustering wherever he pleases. The landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, who married his daughter, and Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg*, still preserve great credit with him. At their instigation he always maintains a secret correspondence with the emperor and Walsstein†.

Holk, from whose irruption into Saxony we have made a small digression, in order to give the finishing touches to the elector's character, poured first into Vogtland with all the impetuosity of a raging torrent, imagining, like a true Barbarian, that a country could never be *thoroughly conquered*, till it was *utterly destroyed*‡. Having reduced many villages, as well as the fair town of Olsnitz, to ashes, without assigning any reason, he took Zwicka || by *composition*, and blockaded Plauen. He then stripped the electoral palace, called Augusta, of all its rich and magnificent furniture, and having reduced Chemnitz by a regular siege, pushed on to the gates of Dresden, where one circumstance helped to rouse the

* Supposed by some to have killed Gustavus treacherously and dishonourably in the battle of Lutzen; or rather to have conspired against his life, by giving some secret signal to the Imperialists during the heat of the action. It is true that this circumstance of maintaining intelligence with the emperor and Walsstein seems to be of an untoward and suspicious nature, and appears to bear hard against him.

† If I mistake not, there is a second, just delineation of this prince in *Daniel Eremita's* beautiful book of Travels. Vide etiam *Considerat. Causarum Belli Boemici*. 4^o, part ii. p. 93.

‡ *Swedish Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 92.

|| An elegant little town, called in Latin Cygnea, romantically situated at the foot of mount Schneeberg, or the snowy mountain, on the banks of the Mulda. It stands in Misnia, but the church-yard lies in Vogtland; whence arises the common saying in the neighbourhood, that an inhabitant of Zwicka is a Misnian in his life time, and a Vogtlander after his death.

elector a little: for in a random skirmish some papers were found on one of Holk's quarter-masters, which shewed the Imperialists kept a fair countenance, and made liberal promises to the court of Dresden, but concealed very malignant intentions beneath the disguise.

Nor were the French idle at another extremity of the empire; for the *maréchal d'Estrées* and count *la Suze* besieged *Triers* with an army of 24,000 men, and reduced to episcopal obedience the town and chapter, which some time before had admitted a Spanish garrison, and colonel *Isenburg* as governor, in behalf of the emperor. This commander not caring to immure himself in a place where no honour was to be gained, appointed eight hundred men to defend the town, and when the French approached it in good earnest, made an attempt to supply his want of provisions by means of a large convoy. The troops which conducted it, namely, twelve hundred infantry and three hundred horse, had private orders to continue in *Triers*, and reinforce the garrison.

The *maréchal* secretly informed of this project, gave instructions to count *la Suze* and *Arpajou* to intercept the enemy. Having forded the *Moselle*, their advanced guard, which consisted only of twenty men, commanded by a lieutenant, soon came to blows with some squadrons of Imperial horse, but four companies of infantry, one of which was cardinal *Richelieu's*, supported them immediately. These skirmishings naturally drew on a general engagement, and at length *Isenburg* was obliged to retire. In consequence of this disappointment, the town was taken forthwith, and the electorate cleared of Spanish garrisons. Many strong places were assigned to their lawful master, but the French kept some by way of *deposita*, till proper instructions arrived from *Paris*, with reference to their disposal.

At the same time *Henry*, prince of *Orange*, besieged *Maestricht* with so much vigour, that the *Infanta* had great apprehensions of losing this master-key to several provinces, notwithstanding she reposed the highest confidence in the bravery of the *marquis de Leda*, who, though deputy-governor, had then the supreme command. As the Spanish army had been sensibly weakened by the revolt of *Berg* and *Egmond*, the *Infanta*, by way of a last resource, cast a wistful eye towards *Pappenheim*, as one of the most valorous and enterprising generals then in Europe; and, to tempt him more, offered him great pecuniary recompences*, and the order of The

* About 16000*l.* sterling.

Golden Fleece. As this *enterprise, march, and attack*, have been seldom paralleled in military history, I shall venture to speak of them more circumstantially and diffusely than has hitherto been done.

There is reason to think, that money and honour had no great weight with Pappenheim; but the nature, difficulty, and danger of the attempt delighted him. He fancied he saw a path opening to glory, by pursuing which he might at length advance himself beyond Tilly and Walstein in point of reputation, and make pretensions to rival even the great Gustavus. Therefore, without hesitating a moment, he accepted the proposal; he, who before had neglected the commands of Walstein, turned a deaf ear to the requests of the elector of Bavaria, and had evaded the very orders he received from his master the emperor concerning his march to Nuremberg. Nor does it appear, that any previous application was made by the Infanta to the court of Vienna, since indeed there was hardly time or opportunity to effect it; but the great generals in those days acted principally from their own discretion, and *that* made them perform such wonders as they then performed; whereas, on the contrary, as somebody has said aptly enough, *A prime minister, with a map in a closet, is almost more than a match for any commander's good fortune.* There, said a statesman to Turenne, laying his hand on a map, *you may cross the river.* Yes, Sir, replied the general, *but your finger is not a bridge.*

Pappenheim was then near Hanover. He had a long and difficult march to make, partly through hostile, and partly through neutral and uncertain countries, all long ago devoured by war. He had the drought and heats of summer to struggle against, and was obliged likewise to throw a passage for himself over the Weser, the Rhine, and the Meuse. Having therefore first taken care to place good garrisons in all those towns that had been reduced to his devotion, and leaving Gronsfeld with a part of his army to preserve the circles of Lower Saxony and Westphalia in their obedience, he began his journey when Bauditz and Lunenburg, who acted against him, least expected it; and forcing the Imperial towns of Dortmund and Essen, raised, from thence, sufficient contributions to defray the expences of himself and his followers for some days. As to the convent near the latter town, whether he compelled the princess abbess and her fair votaries to subscribe to his undertaking, or whether they contributed their contingent out of pure catholic zeal and gallantry to so brave a man, is to me uncertain. He then

crossed the Rhine with great spirit, and though the states of Holland both advised and threatened the elector of Cologne not to allow him a passage through his territories, a treaty of neutrality then subsisting on his part*, yet that prince, ever secretly favouring the cause of his own religion, returned them only protestations instead of realities, and connived at Pappenheim's admission into his capital at the head of 500 dragoons; resigning, in secret to him, the forts of Stein and Himmelftein, which gave him a passage cross the Rhine. From Cologne the general of the league† drew refreshments and subsistence for his whole army, which amounted to 12,000 foot and 3000 horse; every man of whom was in high spirits, and possessed with the same enthusiasm that animated the master. The refugee bishops of Mentz, Wurtzburg, and Osnaburg, all flocked to him as their great deliverer, and loaded him with their benedictions. They had such confidence in his conduct, that they concluded first on the preservation of Maestricht, and next on their own restoration, as points certain and incontrovertible.

Pappenheim then, after a march, which, for rapidity, can hardly be paralleled, passed through the city of Aix-la-Chapelle, and coasting along the Meuse, made himself master of Sittart, where he threw a bridge over the river, and protected its head with a strong fort. He then purposed to erect a second fort between Maestricht and Liege, in order to give laws to one, that the prince of Orange had raised, and allow the Spanish army, having cut off such provisions as came to the Dutch camp, full power and opportunity to join him: which junction, by the way, the two generals of the Spaniards, Don Gonfalso di Cordova, and the marquis de Santa Croce, never intended to realize. The enemy however rendered all these fine projects abortive, having secured to themselves the spot of ground in question, and disposed troops in such a manner, that the Imperial pioneers durst not venture to break the ground.

It was death to the old Castilian pride, to see an hero called, as it were by magic art, from the depths of Germany, and advancing like an enthusiast into the Low Countries, fully determined to fight the battles, and vindicate the glory of the Spanish nation. As he testified such an appetite for dan-

* He had also passed his word of honour to Oxenstiern, to continue truly neutral between the Swedes and Imperialists for two months. *Chemnitz. Tom. i. p. 300.*

† Pappenheim.

ger, it was resolved to give him a plentiful surfeit: and therefore, with a degree of insolence not to be paralleled, these two solemn and punctilious grandees postponed their master's honour to their own personal gratification; declaring coldly, with an air of irony, "That their catholic master had expended only four hundred thousand patagons to pave the fosses of Maeltricht with reiters and lansquenets*."

Pappenheim saw the snare that was spread for him, when it was too late; nor had he ever conceived, that such malice and envy could possess the hearts of men who made profession of arms. He long knew the vigilance and bravery of the prince of Orange, but now perceived, with surprize, but not with dismay, that the Spaniards were seriously resolved to leave their deliverer and his army to perish. No history affords a similar example in all its circumstances! But as he had entailed a debt of demand upon his glory, he still determined, if possible, to force the enemies lines, and raise the siege. At least he was resolved to *do something*, in order to shew there was no case, wherein he had not the *ability of performing something*. Though this general was as wary as he was intrepid, yet in cases of extreme dangers it was always his maxim to *proceed forward*. He first attempted to seize a bridge that belonged to the Hollanders; but that design miscarrying, he placed his troops on the side of the Wyck near Stirum's quarters, determined to break through them sword in hand, if the situation of ground, or the common fortune of chances, produced him any opening that could be thought advantageous. The prince of Orange soon comprehended the precise points on which he relied, and reinforced that part of his camp with a strong body of dragoons, commanded by the duke of Boüillon. Pappenheim considered his first design again, and having well examined the enemies trenches, determined to attack them the day following, the 7th of August; making a short oration to his officers and soldiers, the nature and drift of which every reader may comprehend, who knows the man. As he saw the affair would be obstinate and bloody, beyond example, he thought it needless to attempt any thing by way of surprize, in order to gain a momentary advantage, which would determine nothing. Therefore, early in the morning, having battered the Hollanders with all his artillery, he drew up his army in full array, ordering the drums to beat and the trumpets to sound, with the gallantry of a fair opponent. One

* Two old words for German cavalry and infantry.

hundred chosen soldiers, armed with swords, and carbines slung behind them, carrying in their hands falchins and ladders, attended by several companies of pioneers, composed the forlorn hope; two regiments of veteran infantry formed the point. The rest of the foot flanked, supported, and succeeded these two regiments. Two wings of horse, slowly advancing, closed the sides, and a third body encircled all the infantry behind, partly to sustain, and partly to press them on, and prevent them from retreating. No general ever made a finer disposition than Pappenheim did on that day; and it was remarked by all men, that no army ever advanced with more silence, and greater composure.

When the Imperial troops approached the trenches, the fire of the Dutch artillery and concealed musquetry was such, as most soldiers might pronounce to be insupportable. Yet Pappenheim's two regiments, supported by the infantry, and protected by the cavalry, performed the service they intended to execute; he himself fighting on foot within a pace or two of the foremost man, inasmuch that the defendants were obliged to abandon an important outwork to him. When the prince of Orange flew to this place, attended by all his volunteers, and the flower of this army, the dispute recommenced with redoubled obstinacy, and as the Dutch cannon, charged with cartridges, at little more than the distance of musquet-shot, were brought to bear on Pappenheim's flanks, it was impossible for him to continue where he was, without making a sacrifice of all his army. Coolly therefore, all of a sudden, he left the trenches, choked with dead bodies and streaming with blood, and ordered his trumpets to sound a retreat, which was effected with so much temper and conduct, that not a single Hollander passed the lines to pursue him.

Returning to his encampment, which was about 500 yards from the enemies' works, he comforted and complimented all his soldiers, and having allowed them a short repast for mere refreshment, as it was now about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, he led forth his brave Walloons to a second engagement; and to push matters yet farther, inasmuch as he had sufficiently experienced the bravery of his infantry, and saw plainly, that they neither wanted to be pushed on, nor had any inclinations to quit the field, he commanded not only the dragoons, but all the cavalry, to serve on foot. This was more practicable in those days, as the horsemen's boots were not so stubborn and unwieldy, as we find them since. Notwithstanding *four* hours desperate service in the morning,

morning, the Imperial troops performed this subsequent duty to admiration: some with spades filled up the trenches, some threw in barrels of earth, gabions, and rolling *mantelets*; others ascended by scaling ladders; so that, in a word, the conflict lasted from *one* in the afternoon till *seven* in the evening, without a moment's intermission. This we pronounce the more extraordinary, as Pappenheim, with 15,000 men, assaulted an army which consisted of 24,000 soldiers, intrenched in the strongest manner then known, and protected with artillery of the heaviest size, and in such quantities as can scarcely be enumerated. The prince of Orange opposed the general in person, and there the fury of the action is not to be described. Meanwhile the latter, fearing no troops could support so desperate a service, ordered some gibbets to be erected, *in terrorem*, near his camp; and, to prevent his followers, in another sense, from retiring, gave them an example rarely to be paralleled; for serving sometimes on foot, and riding sometimes from post to post, as the afternoon's attack was made in two places at once, he always, by preference, took care to plant himself, and that for ten entire hours, in the most dangerous situations. All this time, if posterity can be induced to believe what follows*, the Spanish generals, at the head of 26,000 men, kept close to their intrenchments, though within the range of a cannon-ball; never once detaching a single soldier to his assistance, notwithstanding perhaps a regiment or two only might have turned the fortunes of the day. Nor had they the complaisance to order a drum to beat, or make a false attack, which hazarded nothing. It is true, the marquis de Leda had spirit enough to undertake a sally, and, as in the heat of the action the garrison marched out undiscovered, some small havock was caused in the English quarter; but the assailants were soon handled with so much roughness, that it was thought convenient to retire to the town. At length Pappenheim, after eight or ten desperate attacks, not to mention the various charges, to which he led his men in the morning, found himself compelled to sound a retreat, pitying the brave and faithful Germans, and pouring forth the sharpest and most bitter invectives against the malevolent and insolent Spaniards. In this afternoon's service alone, he left 2000 of his best soldiers dead on the spot. Many of his officers were

* Multi existimabant dejici tum Hollandos obfessione ea potuisse, si idem animus Hispano duci fuisset. Qui suos intra castra quiete continens, ne quidem eo induci potuit, ut commotis tympanis, aut subitario saltu tumultu, aggressionem simularet. *Bracbel i Hist. nostr. temporum, p. 286.*

killed or maimed. Lintelo, his favourite lieutenant-colonel, fell amongst the foremost; Comargo received a musquet-ball in the shoulder, and Palant in the leg. A third struck Pappenheim; and a ball from a *falconet* carried away the pommel of his saddle, and ruffled the skin of his belly: but this was nothing to a man who bore, at that time, on his face and body, the scars and gashes of more than ninety wounds; and hence acquired the surname of *BALAFRE**. Nine hundred disabled soldiers were sent to the neighbouring hospitals, and more particularly to that of Aix la Chapelle. Prince Henry thought it unsafe to pursue him a single step; so that he returned unmolested into Westphalia, where, in an absence of six weeks, he allowed the Swedish generals to perform all that laid in their power; being, as was said on him with great justice on the occasion, *Omnibus par, singulis superior*. Santa Croce, and Don Gonsalvo, two of the Spanish generals, hurt him less by their treachery and malice, than by the solemn ceremony of returning him their compliments of thanks, after the attempt was over: nor did they stop here, but declared publicly, with a mixture of gravity and irony, that the renowned Pappenheim was not a man of *puncto*, having passed his word to raise the siege or perish in the undertaking, when in truth he had performed neither. Yet

* As this general's temperament was an equal mixture of the *prudent* and *ourageous*; most historians imagine him to be a man advanced in years, and speak of him in the style of an old, wary, and long-experienced commander. Much experienced he really was; for in the twenty-fourth year of his age he performed wonders at the battle of Prague. The many scars, likewise, and contusions, which he carried in his person, confirmed writers more and more in their opinion;—though, in truth, at the period we are now speaking, he was just advancing into his eight and thirtieth year, being of the same age with Gustavus, whom he affected to resemble in all things; in a similitude of nativity and horoscope; in the manner of adjusting his hair; in riding a white palfrey, &c. &c. and, what was still more difficult, in good morals and piety. He was very nobly descended; served his first campaigns in the Valteline, and performed wonders at the siege of Chiavenna. The chamber wherein he expired is still shewn at Leipzig with great respect; it is a small apartment in the castle of Pleißenberg. It is reported of him, though most historians seem to me to take that for serious, which appears to others mere matter of pleasantry, that he always maintained in conversation with his friends, that, conformably to a prediction found in the archives of his family, a certain Pappenheim *balafre*, mounted on a white steed, should kill, hand to hand, in field of battle, a great monarch, who came out of the north. Had this been spoken in sincere good-earnest, the temper of Gustavus was such he would certainly have despised him, as a vain-glorious boaster, and a credulous enthusiast: whereas, on the contrary, he always shewed him acts of politeness, and honoured him extremely, not only for his personal intrepidity, but for his inventive genius in marches, attacks, and stratagems.

others,

others, equally ill intentioned towards him, acknowledged, that he had abundantly disengaged both his honour and promise, being answerable only for his own conduct and that of his troops, and not for the eventual termination of the enterprize. In a word, the *march*, the *action*, and the *retreat*, may be considered as the finest performances in the military art*.

By this time the elector of Cologne began to be terrified at his own imprudent violation of the late neutrality; and dispatched a minister to the Hague, in order to explain his conduct with regard to Pappenheim, and protect his dominions from the resentments of the Dutch; offering to recall some few regiments, then serving under the Spaniards. But the Hollanders, says an historian†, who knew well what they were about, had a *local* memory of the depredations committed in the late irruption, by means of his connivance, and returned him no answer that appeared sufficient to compose his uneasiness.

During Pappenheim's absence, the Swedish generals, Bauditzen and Lunenberg, made considerable acquisitions in the circles of Westphalia and Lower Saxony; for Gronsfield had neither forces nor abilities sufficient to oppose them. They first besieged Duderstadt‡, a place of no small importance to their late conquests, which Pappenheim had strengthened with good bastions, and committed to the care of 1200 infantry, and 400 dragoons; so that the success, at first sight, appeared to be doubtful on the Swedish side; but the besieged, who had lost all spirit when their generalissimo was absent, soon began to mutiny for want of pay, which compelled the governor to make an offer of capitulating; but it was his misfortune to procure no better terms, than such as are usually granted upon surrendering at discretion: for the duke, and Bauditzen, knew the condition of the garrison by their spies. Abundance of artillery and military stores were found in the place; the Imperial troops enrolled themselves into the Swedish service, and the fortifications were razed to the ground.

Bauditzen next made himself master of Einbeck§; for colonel Holtz, the commander, soon surrendered, having
lost.

* *Life of Henry Prince of Orange*, in Low Dutch, fol. cum fig. ex Officina C. Dankaërtz.

† *Frederic Spanheim*.

‡ It stands in the electorate of Mentz.

§ This town is the capital of the principality of Grubenhagen, in the Hanoverian dominions. It is famous for good beer, which gave Martin Luther great satisfaction at the diet of Wormes. There are historians who tell

lost the flower of his garrison in an unfortunate fall. Taking this city destroyed the levy of six new regiments, which Pappenheim had ordered to be raised in his absence; as most of the recruits, following the laws of arms, and fortune of the country, took pay from the Swedes. The garrison of Wolfenbüttele still maintained its ground, and breathed nothing but ravage and plunder through the district round it. Upon this, the duke of Lunenburg*, from particular as well as general motives, obliged himself to blockade it. The town was an inveterate thorn, still growing among the Swedish laurels, being the only remaining place in that duchy which obstructed the prosperity of the king's arms. Though all possible means were employed to straiten the garrison, and though the course was diverted of the river Ocker, which passes through the city and supplies its mills, the governor still made so resolute and obstinate a resistance, that Pappenheim returned from Maestricht time enough to relieve him. Gronsfeld, Pappenheim's vicegerent, was very desirous to throw troops into the town, but Bauditzon took him off from that design, by making a diversion in Westphalia: where, advancing first into the diocese of Paderborn, he took Warburg by capitulation, formerly an Imperial and Hanse-town, reduced Volkmarsen to ashes, and invested the capital, at the head of 7000 foot, 4000 horse, and 1000 dragoons; but colonel Westphali, who had conveyed himself into the city with 1500 men, made so many gallant sallies, ambitious to acquit himself like a man of honour, and obtain the good opinion of the general he served, that this attempt of the Swedes was rendered ineffectual; for
Pap-

tell us, that Eric duke of Brunswic, a bigoted catholic, and furious persecutor of the protestants, owed his conversion, twenty years afterwards, to the lucky incident of having presented a flaggon of this liquor to Luther, when he was heated in a long disputation. Upon which the reformer is reported to say, that as duke Eric had remembered him on that day, God would also remember duke Eric in his last hours.

* The house of Brunswic-Lunenburg was erected into a duchy in 1235. It afterwards spread itself into four branches, Zell, Brunswic, Calenberg, and Grybenhagen.

The same division of the country still subsists; and hence it is, that this ducal house has four votes in the diet of the college of princes.

In 1682, the branch of the dukes of Hanover was raised to the electoral dignity, and enjoys, in this country, Zell, Calenberg, and Grubenhagen; and the first named branch possesses the principality of Wolfenbüttele.

The library of this place merits notice, being supposed to contain 116,000 printed volumes, and 2000 MSS. not to mention 100 other MSS. relating purely to public acts, negotiations, treaties, &c. one of the greatest historical treasures now in the world.

Pappenheim not only raised the siege, but pushed on to Hildesheim, which he mastered, and then forced the Swedish troops to cross the Elbe. Nothing more happened in the parts adjacent, except that the peasants made an insurrection in the abbacy of Fulda, in opposition to the Hessian officers, who commanded there: but the landgrave soon attacked, and constrained them to obedience.

During this period, the Imperial generals, Ossa, Montecuculi, and William margrave of Baden-Baden, were not inactive in Alsatia, having an army of 20,000 men under their command, exclusive of three regiments, then conducted by colonel Metternich, which had been raised in the county of Mark, and duchy of Juliers, where Metternich was a man of quality and a native. These troops having crossed part of Lorrain, were just upon the point of arriving in Upper Alsatia, in order to assist the town of Coblenz; but that attempt not succeeding, they united themselves to the army above mentioned.

The Austrian commanders sent a trumpeter to the town of Strasburg, and demanded quarters and magazines for their troops in the signories that belonged unto it. This request the magistrates peremptorily denied; but the Imperialists considered the message and the refusal as mere matters of form. They then made an irruption, by way of revenge, into the territories of the margrave of Baden-Dourlach, a prince they mortally hated, and extorted all the money that could possibly be squeezed from the poor inhabitants. Afterwards they took Bretten, or Bretheim, the birth place of Philip Melancthon, a town dependant on the Lower Palatinate, and having forced the garrison to enlist amongst their troops, carried away nine of the principal inhabitants as hostages.

These enterprises alarmed the administrator of Wirtemberg, especially as the Imperial army began to direct its course towards his dominions. Amassing therefore a body of 8000 men, and overreaching Montecuculi by a feigned march, he passed by that general, and threw some troops into the large town of Knitlingin, as much renowned for the birth of Faustus the printer, as Bretten had been for that of Melancthon. The inhabitants being mostly inclined to the Austrian party, Montecuculi conveyed a regiment in at one of the gates, cut 400 Wirtembergers to pieces, and set fire to the town at the four opposite corners. Metternich, then governor of Heidelberg, being kept in spirits by having a considerable army to support him, made a draught from his own

own garrison, as well as from those of Frankendale and Oppenheim, and laid siege to Wisloch, a little city in the Lower Palatinate, famous for the battle between Tilly and Mansfeld, in the year 1622. The inhabitants had been reinforced by several troops of dragoons, and one troop of horse, and soon convinced him that they were not to be terrified at a slight siege. Piqued with this disappointment, Metternich found means to fall on colonel Straßburger, near Heidelberg, and destroyed him and his small escort. He then took care to see his body embalmed, and made a compliment of it, very politely, to the governor of Mentz, requesting the persons of several living officers by way of exchange for the dead; and remarking in his letter, that as spices were dear, and surgeons rare, he expected some acknowledgment in money besides.

Horn, enraged at these proceedings, flew immediately to the support of Alsatia, and the adjacent countries; and having made select detachments from the garrisons of the Lower Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz, joined the Rhingrave Otho Lewis; and coasting along the Neccar, passed his cavalry over the Rhine at the last mentioned city, and his infantry at Wormes. Arrived at Manheim without opposition, he there encamped, partly to observe the countenance of the enemy, and partly to wait the arrival of the administrator with his little army; but being informed by a courier, that some of Montecuculi's troops had filed off to support Metternich in the affair of Wisloch, which was pressed almost to the last extremity, he made such extraordinary marches, an effort in those days not uncommon, that in the first place he raised the siege, and in the second place missed little of surprizing the besiegers in their retreat to Heidelberg.

Some of Horn's partisans, who patrolled the country, seized an inferior officer, escorted by six horsemen, who had been dispatched from Metternich to Ossa and Montecuculi, with instructions to solicit a reinforcement, in order to carry on the siege. It was this man's misfortune to fall into the hands of the Swedes on his return; when being severely and closely examined, he confessed at length, that a body of the enemy's cavalry had received orders to succour Metternich the next day. Horn thus learning their route, disposed an ambuscade accordingly; for the Imperial generals had only blind and perplexed reports, with reference to the approach of the Swedish army. Of course the colonels Montbailon and Vitzdum were employed on this business, with a chosen detachment,

detachment, and approached Wisloch in great security, neither examining the country, nor suspecting an attack. Horn once had a design to let them pass till they had advanced between his cavalry and his infantry, for then their ruin had been inevitable; but perceiving they shaped their course, by chance, too much on one side, and fearing by those means they might escape, he ordered the Rhingrave to fall on them in the rear, at the head of a few troops of horse. Montbailion faced about without dismay, and being seconded by Haracour's cuirassiers, and the rest of his cavalry, gave the Rhingrave a very rough reception; but Horn ordered other squadrons to advance, and charged the enemy on all sides. Upon this, the Imperial commander, who saw the effects of an ill-grounded security, too late, provided for his safety by the most prudential method that then occurred to him, which was, in other words, a precipitate retreat: but the Swedish dragoons pursuing briskly, brought him from his horse with a carbine-ball, and took him prisoner, as also the chevalier de Treilly, his lieutenant-colonel. In a word, one way or other, this body of troops was almost entirely ruined.

As many soldiers after a defeat are the most expeditious couriers in the world; so of course Montecuculi and Ossa were soon informed of this disaster; and making an expeditious march to Oppenheim, passed the Rhine there, and posted themselves in a situation less exposed than that they formerly occupied. The Swedish general pursued them without success; if we except the picking up a few sick and wounded men, from whom he learnt that the enemy had formed a design on Spire, which report was confirmed by the number of boats he saw collected together. This determined him to ascend the coast of the Rhine, and pass into Alsatia, by way of reprisal; and the rather, as the town of Strasburg stood much in need of his assistance; for the enemy's forces had ravaged its little territory, more like an host of Tartars than a body of well-disciplined soldiers. During this interim, the Imperial generals assembled their troops near Hagenau, and drafted every garrison that was capable to afford them a small reinforcement; being resolved to support Schellstadt, Colmar, Benfelden, and Brisac, and finish the contest with Horn by a general engagement.

Horn demanded a passage over Strasburg bridge*, a favour which was granted him, after a short consultation; and then, to shew his confidence in the inhabitants, and avoid creating suspicions, he and the Rhingrave, for the generals in those

* *Hist. or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 91.

days

days gained money, and loved pomp, made their entrance in six coaches, drawn by six horses each; but attended only by two troops of cavalry, one of which was Horn's own company of cuirassier-guards. The magistracy received them with all possible honour; and the rather, as his Swedish majesty always maintained a minister in the town by way of resident. Next morning, Horn, at the head of the better part of his cavalry, passed the bridge, and being attended by one or two regiments of infantry, formed the blockade of Benfelden, whilst the bulk of the army, reinforced by a body of Wirtembergers, laid siege to Stolhofen*, whose governor at length hung out a white flag of capitulation, and demanded a conference. Hostages being reciprocally exchanged, the Swedish troops approached the gates, relying on the good faith of the agreement, when, on a sudden, a general discharge of artillery and musquetry made an inconceivable slaughter. Schevaliski, a Bohemian colonel of great repute, and a favourite of the king, had his horse shot under him; and several officers of consequence were maimed and disabled. Enraged at such perfidy, the Swedish commander recalled his hostages, and sent the governor word, to do his worst, and die sword in hand; for quarter should be neither given nor taken. The cries of the women and children on the walls, and their supplicating postures, soon melted the heart even of this inhabitant of the north; who, for the honour of the master he served, sent the commander word, he would receive him and the garrison prisoners, but under *no* restrictions; which proposal, all circumstances duly considered, carried with it no appearance of harshness; but on the contrary, soon found a submissive and thankful compliance on the part of the Imperialists.

During these transactions, Montecuculi and Ossa kept themselves inactive under the walls of Philipsburg; in marching to which place they lost a considerable part of their army, merely from the apprehensions that they might be overtaken by Horn†; who, finding it impossible to tread on their heels, determined to secure the better parts on the eastern side of the Rhine, and then exert his utmost efforts towards the reduction of Alsatia; well foreseeing, that if he could

* A strong fortress in Suabia, protected by morasses. The French army dismantled and razed it in the year 1689.

† Hostis majore adhuc celeritate usus, diesque & noctes, nulla intermissa quiete, iter continuans, nec jacitura ulla militum, qui nimio labore fracti inter viam magno numero remanebant, (*deserti potius, quam desertores signorum,*) &c. &c. *Chen. tom. i. 330.*

render

render himself master either of Bensfelden, Schellstadt, or Colmar, he should of course give laws to the river Ill, which runs through and commands the country. In order therefore to pave his ground with greater security, he reduced Upper Ehenheim to obedience, and the fortress of Ortenburg, before which place a ball passed through the body of one of his officers, and wounded Horn in the side. He then made himself master of Offenbourg; and thus, by one uninterrupted series of valorous, prudent, and successful actions, displayed all the abilities of a disciple, who brought no disgrace to the school of Gustavus; since at one and the same time he opened to his countrymen the rich valley of Kitzingen, and the county of Hanau; and found means to restore the Upper Margraviate of Baden-Dourlach to its ancient and lawful owner, after an exclusion of more than ten years duration.

There is a certain point, in all judicious and well-conducted campaigns, first in *intention*, as the schoolmen affect to speak, and last in *execution*, namely, the giving the totality a prosperous cast at the conclusion of the year; so Horn never once let his eye swerve from this primary and ultimate object of military operations, and determined, from the beginning to the end, to close the scene of a year's campaign with the reduction of the town of Bensfelden: which acquisition, for good reasons already assigned, transferred to his master the means of subduing Alsatia, and opened to him a new field of conquest on the western banks of the Rhine; which was intended by Horn as a *collateral* check to France, and a *direct diminution* of the Austrian power at the same time. As to the former, history affords proofs abundant; and with respect to the latter, certain it is, that some days afterwards, Leopold*, archduke of Inspruch, the emperor's brother, died of chagrin and a broken heart; for he could not bear to see his territories ruined, and most of his future expectations destroyed.

At length Horn invested Bensfelden, a place of small extent, and of course more easily defended. It was rendered strong by art and nature; for the marshes round it were next to impassable, and the fortifications had been newly erected, according to the best principles that were then known. It was surrounded by three deep fosses, two of which were filled with water. The garrison consisted of one thousand men, and part of the artillery, of which there was great abundance on the walls, carried balls of forty-eight pounds weight. Ossa,

* He was forty-six years old, and left Ferdinand Charles, his eldest son, for successor.

and

and the margrave of Baden-Baden, then general of the Imperial forces on the Upper Rhine, made several attempts to raise the siege, which, as it was an enterprise attended with extraordinary difficulty, continued without intermission from September till November. At length the course of the river Ill, which supplied the town ditches, being diverted, a fair and honourable capitulation was proposed by the governor, and accepted with complacency on the part of the Swedes. Towns of less importance submitted of course. Schellstadt sustained some sharp attacks, and at length surrendered. So that the circles of Suabia and the Upper Rhine were cleared of their enemies; and *two parts* of Alsatia entirely reduced to obedience, in the space of four months. Thus stood matters when the king fought the battle of Lutzen: so that, in a word, Horn's digressive campaign may be considered a *masterpiece in the art of war*.

Having thus given a general idea of the state of the king's several armies in various parts, we may remark, that two other bodies of troops, by no means inconsiderable, passed the campaign in a style of waging war then little known, and which Gustavus did not greatly affect to practise, namely, in the character of *armies of observation*; for Ruthven, by merely showing his forces, had maintained, in obedience, the whole district that laid round Ulm; and Wrangel, under whom Sir George Fleetwood served with his English regiment, did little more in Pomerania than watch the countenance of the Polanders. In a word, the Swedish troops prevailed every where, except in those places where Papenheim commanded. There, upon the whole, they rather lost than gained, yet passed the whole summer without suffering one single defeat.

As Walstein continued reserved and cautious, and had determined within himself not to run the risk of a general engagement; his majesty, for various reasons, which have formerly been specified, put in practice a resolution he had long conceived, and that was, to *dislodge first*. Thus making a sacrifice of military vanity to solid good sense, he had but one affliction remaining upon his mind, and that was, his desertion of the faithful and affectionate town of Nuremberg; for Walstein had given the public to understand, that his intention was to sack this commercial and opulent city on the king's departure, partly to terrify the allies of Sweden, and partly to make the emperor amends for the great expences of the present campaign. Kniphausen soon perceived this *struggle of honour* in his master's breast, and told him

him frankly, that on the peril of suffering ignominiously on a scaffold, he would undertake to defend Nuremberg with 4000 men, against all the attempts of the Imperial forces. Gustavus knew the man, and relished the proposal; and having convened the patricians in one body, explained the whole matter to them with great delicacy and precision: *Gentlemen*, said he, *this officer has defended a village, protected only by a single wall, against all the efforts of Tilly*. No sooner were these words pronounced, than the Nurembergers acquiesced with great complacency, and agreeing to maintain the Swedish garrison at their own expence, and unite with them their own troops commanded by Schlammerdorf, who had formerly distinguished himself in the Palatine service, consented that the king should likewise lessen a part of his first intrenchments, and demolish the rest. All this could not content a person of such punctual good faith and tender honour as Gustavus was: he therefore first assured them, by a series of the clearest arguments, that Wallstein would not undertake the siege of a town like Nuremberg on the approach of winter; declaring likewise, that if the Imperial general should have the spirit and resolution to besiege them, he would march in person to their relief at all hazards; and moreover, added he, *I will leave Orenstiern with you, as a royal pledge of my sincere intentions*. Here the chancellor hung up his votive armour, and never afterwards appeared in the field clad in iron. The king then celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig, and dislodged the next morning, September the eighth.

As he had a great passion for *military gallantry*, when consistent with prudence, he abhorred the thoughts of decamping by stealth and artifice, but on the contrary drew up his whole army in fair array; and having lain under Wallstein's eye, for four continued hours, at length pursued his course composedly and slowly. The Imperial commander, far from disturbing his passage, called in all his advanced guards and out sentries, insomuch that a single ball was not discharged on either side. Next evening the Swedish army reached Newstadt on the Aisch *, a small town in the margraviate of Anspach, about twenty miles to the north-west of Nuremberg. Here the king rested his troops one entire day, and then turned fourteen miles southwards to the city of Winsheim. Meanwhile he borrowed a large sum from the merchants of Francfort, taking the liberty to pawn some

* There is another Newstadt in the same circle of Franconia, standing upon the river Stray, near Koëgnishofen.

demefines belonging to the Teutonic order, at and near the town of Mergentheim; and gave a fresh audience to the Moscovite and Tartarian ambassadors*, who made proposals, as it is conjectured, to secure to him the kingdom of Poland; whose intestine divisions, occasioned by the late death of Sigismund, seemed to give fair openings for no inconsiderable interposition. But our hero wanted no *successaneum* of employment, and advanced only just so far as gratitude allowed him.

Walstein had great apprehensions that Gustavus would overreach him by a feigned march, and for these reasons ventured not to *unearth*, as a German historian expresses it, till his spies brought him certain assurances that his majesty had decamped in good earnest. Though conjectures may be formed, it seems difficult to ascertain what numbers of men this general lost without fighting, especially by dysenteries and scarlet fevers; for the Austrian army then, and almost a century afterwards, had only a few medicaments, and here and there a surgeon of very moderate abilities; it being in those days, and in part of ours, a sort of maxim with the Imperialists, that it costs more to *cure* a soldier, than *levy* a recruit. Nor was the ravage less destructive amongst the cavalry, where, as a sensible author observes, consisted both their strength and pride: for it is computed they lost 14,000 horses during the time they remained in camp.

Walstein had no *real* intentions to besiege Nuremberg, since he knew the king, when once at liberty to range the empire, might soon remount his cavalry, and compel him to dislodge. For the same reasons he judged it impossible to continue longer in his old lines, for his enemy, being master of the country round, had full power to reduce him by hunger. There was an insurrection likewise in one of the Austrias; so that, having well weighed all circumstances in his own breast, he decamped, as some say, with such extraordinary caution, that he began his march at the close of the evening; keeping the river Rednitz between him and the king, who lay to the westward, and leaving behind him, for want of draught-horses, as most people imagined, innumerable quantities of stores and baggage, and a great number of sick and wounded soldiers; whilst the Croats, in the course of their march, laid the farm-houses and villages all in ashes.

At Winheim the king first suspected that Walstein and

* *Hist. or Auth. Relat.* Low Dutch, tom. ii. 162.

the

the elector of Bavaria proposed, for both their armies still continued to be united, to point their course to the banks of the Maine: and as he was particularly jealous of any attempt on his late conquests in Franconia, a part of the empire he had destined, in his own mind, to some particular uses, into which I have not insight enough to designate, a thought struck him how to divide the fury of this combined storm; and turning short all of a sudden, gave duke Bernard half his army *, wherewith to dispute the passage of the Maine against Walftein; and then pursued his old and well-known track into Bavaria. He concluded, safely enough, that the elector must hasten to the support of his own capital and country; and sagaciously foresaw, that if the Imperial general should pass by the Weimarian troops without attacking them, and point his course towards Saxony, a circumstance which merited his utmost attention, yet still he reserved to himself the power of placing his army between the Bavarian and Austrian forces. Neither was it probable to imagine, that the elector would presume to cope singly with one, whom he and Walftein, with their united abilities, had declined to fight. In case he had an inclination to engage the Imperial general hand to hand, it then was not difficult to recal duke Bernard out of Franconia into Misnia, and command some detachments to join him from the several corps that acted under Bauditzzen and Lunenberg in the circle of Lower Saxony, and under Banier and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel in parts adjacent.

These, and other considerations of a similar nature, determined Gustavus to march half his army into Bavaria, taking with him about seven regiments of cavalry, and as many of infantry; and placing himself, as he chose to be present every where, and observe all things with his own eyes, at the head of three hundred of Steinboch's dragoons, in preference to

* At that time the king and duke de Weimar had about 24,000 men between them. Walftein's corps might amount to 18,000, and it may be ascertained, that the duke of Bavaria's consisted of 13,000; so that the combined armies lost in nine weeks encampment, by sickness, desertion, hunger, and a little fighting, something more than 15,000 soldiers, being 60,000 strong when they first intrenched themselves; and this, with allowance for a body of 8000 sent with Holk into Misnia, and 4000 dispatched to his assistance under Galas, not including two regiments commanded into Austria to repress the insurrection of the peasants; supposing too, which is not very probable, that no reinforcements had been conveyed to the head-quarters of the Imperial and Bavarian armies:—That concession granted, Walftein's losses were still greater.

his own guards; as being a body of troops less encumbered with weight than the common cavalry, for they wore no armour, and had lighter horses. They could also dismount on proper occasions, and serve on foot.

It was partly by the over-persuasion of Oxenstiern*, that Gustavus undertook this expedition into Bavaria and Upper Austria; for the statesman alledged, upon the present occasion, that his Imperial majesty valued one hereditary province more than all the other dominions in Germany. The king, afterwards, had reasons to consider this measure as neither a very prudent nor a very injudicious one, but rather of a mixed and uncertain nature; for Wallstein continued inflexible in the resolution of not pursuing him, and afforded the elector of Bavaria, at parting, no further assistance, than permitting Aldringer to attend him with his own regiment, and that of Coloredo.

No sooner had Gustavus begun to march at the head of this diminutive army, but the chancellor recalled him by an express from Nuremberg; informing him, that Galas had invested Lauf with a party of 2000 infantry and four pieces of cannon. It was a town of more consequence than strength; and of course the king flew to its assistance with 2000 horse, and 1500 *commanded* musqueteers; but on his approach to Nuremberg, the chancellor and Kniphausen met him, and gave him information, that Galas had carried his point, and advanced towards Vogtland and Mithia. Upon receiving this intelligence, the king just refreshed his troops one hour in Nuremberg, and leaving fresh occasional directions with Oxenstiern and the commander, hastened with all possible expedition to Anspach, and thence to Dunkelshpiel, where, on the sixth day after his absence, he overtook his army in its march to Donawert. By next evening he advanced twenty miles, and reached Nordlingen, where Tilly had the year before established his winter quarters. Here he was joined by 5000 Switzers, such were the effects of the chevalier de Rache's embassy to the protestant cantons, which body of troops colonel Wormbrandt had safely conducted from the foot of the Alps to Schaffhausen, and then along the banks of the Danube, in despite of Ossa, who commanded thrice the number of Imperial forces in the circle of Suabia. The king was so excellent a geographer, that though he gave his commanders occasional liberties, in case of unforeseen events, yet in all marches of length

* *Puffendorf* de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 79.

and

and consequence, he sent them a route sketched out on paper, assigning the journey of each day, and the place of station every night or evening. Perhaps one inducement to Gustavus for marching into Bavaria, which hitherto has been passed by without notice, was to preserve, in case he could not by such a step separate the elector from Walftein, this valuable body of infantry from being intercepted by the Imperial armies; for Montecuculi, who then commanded the remnant of the electoral troops in Bavaria, with which two reinforcements were joined, partly Tuscan and partly Imperial, might, with great ease, have united himself with Ossa, and hindered Ruthven and the administrator of Wirtemberg from facilitating the advance of the Switzers. Gustavus had an eye to all events, and gave the same proportionate attention to small occurrences, as well as greater ones.

Montecuculi therefore, not daring to advance one single step beyond his new district*, thought proper to give his majesty some trouble, famous as he was for passing rivers, in crossing the Lech a second time; and of course dexterously enough invested Rayn†; which gave the king no great uneasiness, for the town was excellently, though not sufficiently fortified, since colonel Mitzval, who commanded, had neglected to cast up some works, which his master had ordered when he left Bavaria. Mitzval had victuals, artillery, and ammunition in abundance, and likewise his own complete regiment of infantry, and five troops of horse under his directions; so that the king supposed he might have repulsed the Imperialists till his arrival, even without exposing himself to serious fighting. The apprehensive panics, however, to which commanders are sometimes liable, surpass all conjectures upon the subject. This unfortunate man had risen to command by the force of a military character hitherto untainted, in case we make one single exception; for he indulged immoderately in the pleasures of the table. He had performed some actions of a shining and more distinguished nature. He was an officer of long standing, having served in Poland, and commanded a regiment when the king landed in Germany; and now, all at once, to evince the fatal truth, that courage itself may be *periodical*, surrendered this important place, without alledging one circumstance in his

* Hitherto he had commanded in Suabia, Alsatia, and the parts adjacent, with this exception, that he served one half in 1630 and 1631, partly in Pomerania, and partly in Silesia, &c.

† *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 163.

defence, except that an ensign had threatened him with the mutiny of the garrison; and that his officers in a council of war had agreed with him in opinion. Gustavus replied coolly and justly: *A man of service should have punished the ensign, and that Mitzval never attempted.* What still rendered the case more exasperating, was, the king had written this commander a letter, with his own hand, beseeching him to have some regard to his reputation for a few days, inasmuch as he was in full march to relieve him from the hands of the enemy. Great therefore was Gustavus's astonishment, when, at the head of an army that breathed nothing but glory, he received the news of Mitzval's ignominious and mean-spirited capitulation: which afflicted him so much the more, as Rayn was the only convenient passage across the Lech; and an Imperial garrison lodged therein, might intercept all communication between his good allies, the great commercial towns of Augsbourg and Nuremberg*. It was the characteristic of Gustavus, whenever he was frustrated in *one* attempt, always to find out some *second* expedient. He therefore bethought himself in an instant, that there was hard by a little bridge over the Lech, at the foot of a fortified castle called Obernsdorf, which belonged to the rich family of the Fuggers. Thither he flew with all imaginable expedition, and there found 150 men in garrison, and 250 Croatians in full employment to destroy the bridge, which they took care to effect before the king arrived; yet not soon enough to secure their retreat to Rayn: for Gustavus pursued them in person at the head of Steinboch's dragoons, and having destroyed them all, returned and took the castle by storm, obtaining seven ensigns in the conflict. He then set himself to repair the bridge, and passed the river without opposition. Whether it was that Montecuculi, bearing in memory Tilly's late misfortune, feared to dispute the passage of the Lech a second time, or whether he received orders to secure the cities of Ingolstadt and Ratibon, and form a junction with the elector, who was then marching into Bavaria, is more than I can take upon me to assert with any warrantable degree of confidence.

The king, sheltered under the obscurity of a misty morning, approached Rayn before the governor knew he had crossed the Lech, and projected his attack against *that* very place, which Mitzval had neglected to fortify. Panic terrors were now become hereditary to the governors of this unfortunate

* *Bertius de Bellis Germanicis, 4^o. p. 412.*

city,

city, so that the Imperial commander, having taken the infection from his Swedish predecessor, consented to capitulate upon terms equally unfoldierlike and ignominious; for though eight days were allotted by Gustavus for completing the siege, yet the governor surrendered in less space than four and twenty hours. Nor could his majesty yet digest the disgrace which Mitzval's late conduct had thrown on the reputation of his arms, and of course consented only, that the cavalry of the garrison should depart without horses and accoutrements, and the infantry be deprived of their pikes and muskets; yet, as he had an innate aversion to mortify men of service overmuch, he allowed both parties to march out with their swords. Thence diverging to Landsberg on the Lech, he made the garrison, consisting of 600 musqueteers, all prisoners of war, not permitting them to retire, as he still continued to be mortified with the disreputation Mitzval had cast on his troops, with any marks of military honour except peeled osier wands, which he allowed them to bear in their hands*.

From Rayn the king advanced to Neuburg, in pursuit of Montecuculi, who retired towards Ratibon along the banks of the Danube. At Neuburg he ordered Mitzval to be beheaded in the presence of all the army, and commanded the lieutenant-colonel, and eight captains belonging to his regiment, to stand upon the scaffold during the execution. This period of time† was unfortunate not only to Mitzval but to his brother, who was likewise a colonel: for the very day before the present Mitzval suffered, his brother had the misfortune to be beaten in the principality of Wolfenbuttle, where he lost great part of his regiment, as well as his reputation and his liberty. During the whole of this sharp service in Germany, where battles were frequent, and encounters happened almost every day, and where attacks and defences of towns may be supposed innumerable, only *two colonels* on the Swedish side, namely Mitzval and Horneck, were condemned to an inglorious exit on a public scaffold. The latter was pardoned at the queen's intercession. Her majesty likewise, from the natural tenderness of her sex, pleaded strongly in behalf of Mitzval, and pressed incessantly for some commutation of punishment; but Gustavus represented to her, that compassion in the present instance would entirely ruin the discipline of the service. It was his intention likewise to have struck off the lieutenant-colonel's and

* *Puffendorf* de Reb. Suec. p. 79.

† *Cheumnitz*. tom. i. p. 335.

captains' heads; but the persuasive Eleonora procured their pardon.

It was now determined, in earnest, to attempt Ingoldstadt a second time *, and for this purpose Gustavus made all preparations becoming the most able and ready commander; for he transported down the Danube abundance of artillery from Augsburg and Donawert; some say to the amount of fifty pieces of the largest size, and by the same channel supplied his army with great quantities of provisions and forage. To effect this enterprize still more successfully, it was his intention to visit Augsburg in person; but an express from Oxenstiern, giving information that Wallstein had fallen into Vogtland and Misnia, in order to destroy, at one blow, the elector of Saxony, a prince of very fluctuating dispositions, and who did not greatly affect the Swedish cause †, obliged the king to change his plan of operations against Bavaria: the rather, as John George, the elector, had besought him, by two urgent letters, to march directly to his assistance ‡; and indeed there were reasons to take care of such an uncertain ally. Leaving therefore 12,000 men, of whom the new-raised Switzers made a part, under the command of Christian prince Palatine of Birkenfeld to oppose the elector of Bavaria in that duchy, till such time as Banier should be recovered from the wound he lately received; and having taken excellent care of the towns of Augsburg, Rayn, and Donawert, he marched with the residue of his army to Nurenberg, intending to penetrate the vast Thuringian forest; and keep an eye of attention towards his Saxon friend.

In one word, the conduct of this elector began to grow more and more mysterious every hour; for not many weeks before, the king had offered him the assistance of some Swe-

* *Hist. Auth. Relat.* tom. i. 335. *Merian Theatr. Eur.* part. ii. 746.

† This prince verified to a little the prediction of Paul Grebner the astrologer, which was published many years before the period in question. "Tempore illo (nempe post Bohemiarum tumultus & strepitus bellicosos magna cum defectione, &c.) *Cesar Electoris Saxonie*, naso Hispanica, fraudulenta, dolosa, blanda, insidiosa imponit *conspicilla*, & quorum naturam tandem ipse pernoſcit, proprioque edocetur experimento, quod hæc Austriaca *conspicilla*, poppyinata, & phalerata verba, sceleratæ & proditoricæ sint practicæ; quibus si ultra fidem habere duceret, seipsum, conjugem, natos & universos Christianissime—conſöderatos in perniciosum præcipitaret exitium."

In a following paragraph he likewise adds these remarkable words; "Suecus felicissimo successu *classe*, & *suo populo* terra marique in hostem utetur." ["This book," says the author of the *New Star in the North*, Lond. 4^o. 1632. "was presented by Grebner to queen Elizabeth. The original copy whereof, written by Grebner himself, was placed by Dr. Nevil in the library of Trinity-college, Cambridge, whereof he was master."]

‡ *Chebnitz. de Bello Sueco German.* tom. i. fol. 335.

dish regiments, which he excused himself accepting, under pretence of economy *. It appeared also, that Arnheim had made the expedition into Silesia purely to embarrass his electoral master : nor was Gustavus consulted in that undertaking. Thus Misnia and Vogtland were left defenceless. Arnheim declared too, that he would not act under Banier, or in conjunction with him, but, on the contrary, would resign his commission. Besides this, Arnheim, during the summer and autumnal campaign, had acquitted himself insincerely towards the interests of Sweden. He behaved reservedly and insolently to Dubalt, who commanded the royal forces ; making a thousand delays, in possessing Breslau, till he wasted an entire month, and gave the Imperialists leisure to collect their army. He assigned the Swedes no quarters but the duchy of Lignitz, already exhausted by war, and the *prefecture* of Drachenberg ; inasmuch that Walstein was heard to declare, that the Austrian cause was safe in Silesia so long as Arnheim commanded there. He indeed received his master's orders, if they were real, to return into Misnia, but put them into his pocket without regarding them †, and received a gratuity from the emperor, which surpasses all belief ; for historians make it amount to £. 120,000. sterling ‡, as likewise the promise of being elevated to the dignity of a prince §, which made him overlook the kind intentions of Gustavus, who proposed only to create him a count. What exasperated matters still more, a letter from Arnheim to Spar, Walstein's favourite negotiator, was shewn the king, concluding with these remarkable words : " My dearest colonel, I beseech you in God's name, to convey me no more letters like your last ; for if you continue a practice of this nature, you will bring the person of an honest man, and his very life and reputation, into question : moderate, therefore, your style, in such a manner, that I may have the power to communicate what you write to my electoral master §."

Spar, who was a subject of Sweden, being over-heated one night with wine, offered the perusal of this letter to the Bohemian colonel Hoffkirch ; in consequence whereof the count de Solmes either procured the original, or delivered

* See the whole transaction at large in *Chemnitzius*, tom. i. p. 362—369, &c.

† Some say he disobeyed him by dint of his influence, in a council of war. True it is, he went to Dresden to excuse himself, but took care to be attended by 2000 soldiers of his own selecting.

‡ *Chemnitzius de Bellis Sueco* Germ. tom. i. 366.

§ *Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis*, fol. p. 80, &c.

§ *Laticbius*, tom. ii. fol. in annum 1632.

a copy to John George, who convened a cabinet-council, and summoned Arnheim to appear; but the accused had the gift of natural eloquence, sufficient to confound a whole legion of jus-publicists; and thus the affair ended without consequences. Meanwhile Dubalt, who partook more of the foldier than of the politician, was long blinded by this most artful man; but Gustavus soon perceived his general to be deluded, and to avoid creating future jealousies, dispatched young Cochtitschi, a Silesian born, and a nobleman of great property, with full powers to rectify these great disorders; sending him in the quality of *legatus ad exercitum* to ease Dubalt from all except the military concerns.

Cochtitschi, previously enlightened by his royal preceptor, saw, with a single glance, through Arnheim's intentions, and gave him an insight into his ideas concerning him, which indeed was needless, at the first conference. He then informed Gustavus, that this commander would bear no equal in the confederate army, and that therefore it was necessary to cause him to be removed, or send as many Swedes as were able to prescribe laws to him. Time, the grand expounder of all doubts, soon verified this excellent advice, which Gustavus knew, but had not then the power to realize: for Arnheim afterwards took care to absent himself from the battle of Lutzen, and when news arrived of Gustavus's death, extorted Breslau from the Swedes by main force, and told them all pretensions expired at the death of their master. Then marching away from Dubalt, he left him to the mercy of the Imperial forces, who made him a prisoner*: but Walstein pitied a brave man, so shamefully betrayed, and dismissed him from his captivity without a ransom, as likewise the old count Thurn, whose blood the court of Vienna longed to see spilt on a public scaffold.

Rendered cautious therefore by the insincerity of Arnheim, and the irresolute disposition of John George his electoral master, Gustavus judged it indispensably necessary to confirm that fluctuating prince, by a personal appearance at the head of an army; and so much the rather, as he liked not Pappenheim's return, of which he now received undoubted assurances, from Maestricht. Fearing, moreover, that matters might take an unprosperous turn in the circle of Westphalia, and both the Saxons; and presaging likewise, that his conquests in Upper Germany could not be deemed truly tenable, if things proceeded unpropitiously in the Lower; he changed, all at once his resolution of fixing Oxenstiern in one of the

* Puffendorf de Reb. Succ.

Saxon circles, and chose to establish him at Nuremberg, as his representative in the southern regions of the empire. It is the custom of *great* geniuses to *decide in a moment*, and *not unfortunately*. Of course Gustavus left Christian count Palatine to command in and round Bavaria, till Banier should be recovered from his late wound ; and flew towards Misnia, as we shall relate hereafter.

We will now reflect, for a few moments, on the count de Pappenheim, who by this time, for we have before mentioned his extraordinary march to Maestricht, felt a strong desire to repass the Rhine, and regain his old quarters in Westphalia and Lower Saxony*. Many things conspired to prompt him to carry this idea into execution. He had no great confidence in his neighbours the Dutch ; and though his troops were actually encamped in the territories of another state, yet he could not absolutely depend on their geographical fidelity ; no, not though Reubens had published a plan of the siege of Maestricht, and an exact ichnography of the country round it. He had likewise no great opinion of the fortune, conduct, or honour of the Spanish generals, and doubted lest Bauditzén might be tempted to copy the very march he lately made, and, uniting himself with the Dutch troops, augment his dangers in a double proportion. Of course he rejected all the fresh offers which Isabella proposed him, and that for two reasons ; partly because she had never verified her late promises, and partly because the Swedish generals had made great progress in the departments of Lower Saxony and Westphalia during his absence.

Decamping therefore in the night, and setting fire to his huts rather than tents, he shaped his course towards the Rhine, and gained the river Rôer. Next day he approached Juliers, and, to his misfortune be it mentioned, found himself obliged to indulge his soldiers in all sorts of ravage and plunder ; not from any principle of cruelty, or avaricious and mercenary disposition in his nature, for he was alike disinterested and brave, but merely because he had *no* money, either to subsist his soldiers, or discharge their arrears. He received many expresses on the road from Walstein and the duke of Bavaria, both then encamped near Nuremberg, which he repaid only with courtesies and excuses ; alledging, that his troops were famished and harassed, whilst the Swedes, whom he had formerly coped with, remained fresh and vigorous : that the French army, in particular, obstructed his passage over the Moselle, and the emperor's affairs, in the

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 71, &c.

north-west

north-west of Germany, were all sinking into ruin by reason of his absence: nevertheless, if hereafter any great extremity should present itself, he would engage to force his way through the circles of Saxony. The man's temper was known, and his delays and excuses seen through, but there was no remedy; it being his determined resolution to receive as few laws as possible from the generalissimo or the elector.

Dispatching therefore count Merodé, before him, with a considerable detachment, he crossed the Rhine, and entered Westphalia at Kayserwerd*; dislodged Bauditzen from the siege of Paderborn; compelled him to cross the Weser, and advance towards Höchst; in order to join the duke of Lunenburg, who at that moment invested the city of Wolfenbüttele. He then refreshed his men some days in the neighbourhood of Essen, and afterwards devoured the diocese of Paderborn†, under pretence of protecting it from the Swedes; for in these days, the *protector* and *plunderer*, in the Imperial armies, often differed in name only. Pappenheim, in himself, was a man of order, generosity, and humanity; but his soldiers at this time were insatiable, and, as he had no money, and feared a mutiny, he durst not chastise them.

As the noblest minds are always most inclinable to forgive neglects and injuries, Pappenheim soon forgot the *golden fleece*, and the *pecuniary remuneration*, both promised him by the infant Isabella, and still continued sincere and unshaken in her cause, inasmuch as it was connected with the service and prosperity of his Imperial sovereign. For these reasons therefore, and partly from an ambition to convince the public that he could conduct the pen as well as the sword, he privately composed a memorial, which he took care to convey to the prince of Orange; setting forth, that as Rheinberg‡, and Orsoy, had been committed to his protection as places belonging to the empire, he besought him, "to distinguish between towns that wore the livery of Castile, and towns that owed homage to the Austrian eagle§;" protesting, at the same time, that the Hollanders should have no cause of complaint, with respect to the two places in question, since

* Kayserwerd *Cæsaris Verda*, in the diocese of Cologne, a well known passage across the Rhine. It was, in Pappenheim's days, protected by a fortress of consequence, but the allies dismantled and raised the fortifications, during the *war of the succession*.

† This bishopric contains about eighty miles square. The canons are obliged to have studied at some university in France or Italy.

‡ Then an important fortress on the Rhine, about sixty miles from Cologne. It was demolished by the allies in the war of the succession.

§ *Soldat Suedois, 766, &c.*

they

they should continue disinterestedly neutral, in all present and future differences, between the United Provinces and the Infanta. But the Dutch, without the help of political glasses, soon saw through Pappenheim's artifice. Even the punctilious Spanish honour was not supposed conscientious enough to deliver back its usurpations on the empire out of pure gallantry, and without compulsion; and the *depository*, or third person who held the stakes, was concluded to be a trustee of ambiguous faith, and as little to be relied upon as the former occupier: so that it was natural to infer, that neither the governors nor the garrisons would be changed, and no security would remain, but the promise of a person who had not power to make good his promise. However, the prince returned an answer extremely polite and full of respect, to Pappenheim, professing the great regard he had to any proposals that came from him, and engaging to deliberate effectually on the subject, and not superficially; observing indeed, by way of conclusion, that he expected information from effects, as well as words; and hoped, by way of preliminary, to see the two places purged of Spanish garrisons, the fortifications dismantled, and no protection left but the town-walls.

The elector of Cologne had sent a minister to the Hague, to explain and amplify his excuses, with regard to the permission or connivance of Pappenheim's march through his territories. The states-general made no improper reply, by forming two demands; namely, that he would furnish them with the same supplies and contributions that he had bestowed before on the Imperial commander, and reimburse the damages, that had been occasioned by Pappenheim's irruption; but the prelate found this calculation amount too high, and petitioned and remonstrated to no purpose.

Nor was the duke of Neuburg more successful in demanding the restitution of Juliers from the Infanta on the approach of the Hollanders; though this request was, in its own nature, highly justifiable; and the rather, as it was a maxim of the Spanish court, at that time, to make a present of those places which it could not keep.

Now Pappenheim, having refreshed and reinforced his army, advanced farther into Lower Saxony, fully determined to attack Bauditzen. The latter being inferior in point of numbers threw his troops into Hoëchitz; but before he could amass provisions, and complete his outworks and fortifications, he found himself surrounded all of a sudden; for the rapidity of the Imperial general's march had outstripped the calculations of the Swedish commander: and the former being greatly

greatly superior in cavalry, ordered Gronsfelt to pass the Weser, whilst himself and Merodé continued on the western side. Bauditzen perceiving the course of the river to be diverted, the town-walls being thereby rendered useless, and not caring to be immured and starved, formed a sudden resolution to retreat, though the town was actually invested, and the batteries fixed against it. He first, by concealed methods, dispatched his cannon and baggage towards Munden, and forthwith all his army. Pappenheim, by the silence of the town artillery, soon perceived the enemy's design; and as he foresaw what road it was their interest to pursue, expedited the flower of his cavalry at their heels: but the stealth of one hour's advance, other things being supposed equal, often decides the fortune of a retreat; for Bauditzen had given such excellent orders, that nothing happened but a few slight skirmishes, till the body of his little army reached a post of safety. He obtained three colours and lost two; so that upon the whole, the retreat had merit. This leaving the country open, compelled the duke of Lunenburg to raise the siege of Wolfenbüttele; and the rather, as Gronsfelt had the dexterity to throw a body of troops and some provisions into the town. Nor was the duke's retreat so fortunate as that of his comrade; for he lost two pieces of cannon, four colours, and seven hundred men: nevertheless, this loss was fortunately supplied by a reinforcement of two regiments, under the command of the duke of Saxe-Lauenberg. Lohausen, who, I believe, commanded the Brunswick troops, returned to the district of Wolfenbüttele with a few regiments, and repossessed his antient quarters, for reasons to me intirely unknown. What success could be expected from blockading a town, that had been revictualled some days before, and reinforced by a garrison half equal to the number of the besiegers; their deliverer at the same time within call, and almost within sight? Lohausen soon dislodged, and gave Gronsfelt an opportunity to demand an exorbitant contribution from the town of Hanover; but the inhabitants wisely employed that money to invite colonel Herden's regiment, and two companies of the duke of Brunswick's men, to undertake their defence, which they effected successfully.

The good people of Hildesheim, who had scared themselves out of their senses with omens and presages, not to mention rivers streaming with blood, and armies embattled in the air, now saw Pappenheim approaching in all the terrors of real danger. The Swedes shewed them no compassion, having made late offers of placing them
beyond

beyond the reach of danger: but repentance for the rejection of this proposal, and a slight breach in the town walls, immediately frightened the besieged into a capitulation. Pappenheim thrust 2000 men into the town, to preserve, as he alledged, good order; obliging the inhabitants to maintain them; and exacted £.10,000. by way of contribution. Finding also interpositions of this sort much more agreeable to his soldiers than the affair of Maestricht, he pushed on to Mulhausen, the largest town in Thuringia, except Erfurt; and as the place was of vast extent, and poorly fortified, he had only to appear and take possession, demanding and receiving the same sum which had been exacted at Hildesheim: nor was it in the power of the Swedish generals to stop this impetuous career of the Imperial commander. No resource remained for them, but to spread one part of their several armies along the banks of the Elbe, and shelter the residue under the cannon of Magdeburg*; permitting their opponent to advance towards Misnia, where Walslein, on the king's approach, expected him with earnestness.

Four weeks had now elapsed since Gustavus and Walslein had each pursued a separate expedition; for whilst the former made his irruption into Bavaria, the latter pointed his course into Franconia, and then towards the electorate of Saxony; which was something more extraordinary, as their marches were almost as diametrically opposite as the southern regions are to the northern.

It has already been mentioned in what manner Walslein and the elector of Bavaria, dislodged from Nuremberg. Being arrived at Forcheim in the bishopric of Bamberg, whence Walslein detached two regiments into Upper Austria, in order to extinguish the last remains of rebellion, they reposed their troops for a fortnight in good quarters, and there first received intelligence, that Gustavus had dispatched duke Bernard to observe their motions with half the army, and conducted the other moiety into the dukedom of Bavaria. This news startled the elector not a little, inasmuch that he besought the Imperial general to join his forces, and push this enterprising monarch to the very foot of the Alps; nor was the court of Vienna much dissatisfied with a request of this nature, as the peasants of Upper Austria had presumed to revolt under the very eye of the emperor.

Yet no remonstrances nor representations could make the least impression on Walslein's inflexibility. True it is, he paid the elector the external honour of attending him twenty-

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 341.

six miles in his return homewards, and at Bamberg they parted with all the exquisite politeness of veteran dissemblers. Walstein appeared the least supple of the two, and preserved more coldness and reserve than the old Bavarian; who, at, and after this separation, threw out indirect hints, that some secret understanding was carried on, by the means of Dewbatel, between Walstein and Gustavus*, which seems to me to be nothing more than an angry misapprehension. Be that as it may, he with more justice complained that he served in conjunction with a commander, who gave him no lights into any thing; and that he had expended, likewise, more than £.150,000. sterling, to very little advantage, since the day he first united his forces with the Imperial army †.

Walstein's first idea seems to have been the reduction of Franconia; and to this end he turned his attention, as the king conjectured, on the important town of Schweinfurt, situated upon the northern banks of the Mayne, about twenty-five miles to the west of Bamberg. Charles Harte, the Swedish governor, took care to reinforce himself from the garrison of Koënighshofen; and at that very instant, the vigilant Dewbatel, by duke Bernard's orders, threw himself into the town, at the head of his own regiment, which consisted of thirteen troops of dragoons. Meanwhile duke Bernard approached with his whole army to succour the besieged; and of course Walstein either entirely changed his original plan, or varied it occasionally into a second form, being determined at once to destroy the two electoral houses of Saxony and Brandenburg.

Therefore, to gratify his malice against the family last mentioned, he discharged his resentments on the margrave of Bareüth, who was likewise margrave of Culmbach, and uncle to the then young marquis of Anspach. The capital of Bareüth was soon laid under a severe contribution; but that of Culmbach, being better fortified, made a laudable resistance; so that the Imperial general advanced to Coburg, whose duke was related to the Ernestine branch of the house of Saxony, and uncle to the dukes of Saxe Weimar, which latter had furnished *seven* brothers, who all bore arms against the house of Austria. The town of Coburg soon became a sacrifice to Walstein's indignation, for the duke had appeared in armour in behalf of the Swedes, as likewise the rich palace and treasury; and great quantities of merchandize, from

* *Riccus de Bellis Germanicis*, 4^o. 411.

† *Idem* *ibid*.

Augsburg and Nuremberg, which were then on the road to Leipzig fair. The castle*, which stands on an advantageous eminence, was not to be reduced on such easy terms; for Dewbatel had thrown himself into it, at the head of his well-known regiment of dragoons. Wallstein wished impatiently to make this gallant officer his prisoner a second time, and Dewbatel laboured as much to avoid the repetition of so sensible a mortification. It may suffice to say, that a breach was made by the third of October; but Dewbatel had gallantry enough, at the time the walls were actually stormed in the defenceless part, and the service became as obstinate as most that had appeared during the course of the thirty years wars, to take the assailants in flank, at the head of his dragoons, which threw the 500 Imperialists, who formed the point, into total confusion. Wallstein's colonel, who led the attack, was killed in the fosse; as likewise a young nobleman of Wallstein's name and kindred. Duke Bernard had advanced from Schweinfurt to Hilperhausen, fifteen miles to the north of Coburg, having defeated forty troops of Isolani† Croatsians, and seized ten colours and a part of their baggage‡, with full intentions to raise the siege; partly from his unwearied zeal for his master's service, and partly, as some conjecture, with a collateral view to his own well-being and prosperity; inasmuch as the dukedom devolved to him on the decease of his uncles, of which the then reigning duke was one, who were both aged, and had no children. However, the glorious efforts of Dewbatel and Bernard freed their master from abundance of uneasiness; for one part of Wallstein's plan was totally defeated, his intention being to have rendered himself conqueror of this castle, whereby he would have secured the roads in one of the most wild and rocky parts of Germany; and then have penetrated through the

* Here Martin Luther lodged some months, in 1530, and the chamber is still shewn. No one can enter this fortress without express permission from the prince. In it is a vault so extremely secret, that all things of value are safely concealed there in times of war: and in the castle are preserved abundance of documents, &c. in MSS. relating to the *History of the Reformation*, which merit to be examined by the best church-historians. *Mem. communicated.*

† Isolani, created a count by the emperor: his Christian name was *Lodovico*; and as the French historians talk much of one *Lodovico*, general of the Croatsians at this period, it is worth noting, that Isolani and Lodovico are the same man. But the Croatsians and Carniolians, in resemblance of the Italians, whose language and forms of expression they are fond to imitate, usually designate a person by the *Christian name*. This surprising hero was remarkable for being beardless. He died at Vienna, 1640-1.

‡ *Riccius de Bellis Germ.* p. 411.

bleak and inhospitable Thuringian forest, and formed his junction with Pappenheim. Dewbatel destroyed one branch of this scheme, and the position of the duke's army disappointed the other. Of such amazing consequence in a campaign is the vigilance of an officer or two, who have parts to comprehend their duty, and spirit enough to carry their projects into execution! Walfstein's scheme was enterprising and extensive, like all his other conceptions: for had he gained the castle of Coburg, and crossed the Düringerwald without molestation; he had then, besides the junction of his troops with Pappenheim, a point he ardently wished for, destroyed the rich territories of a family which he mortally hated, namely, the once electoral house of Saxe-Weimar. Then purposing to have wintered in Misnia, his intentions were to have secured the banks of the Elbe, which would greatly have impeded the king's retreat; to have devoured all the wealth and provisions in the two electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg, which had enjoyed a long repose from the late devastations of war; and thus, at the first opening of spring, having totally humbled these two powers; to have spread half his army over the adjacent parts of Lusatia and Silesia; and reconquer, with the other half, his own duchy of Mecklenburg, to which his natural ambition constantly inclined him. Thus it was his firm opinion he should encircle Gustavus in a wide-spread net, and force him, as he conceived it difficult for that prince ever to reach the coast of the Baltic, either to engage in a rash and desperate battle, or capitulate upon disgraceful and inglorious terms.

Chagrined to the heart at this disappointment, for 500 men were lost in three days before Coburg, the preservation of which city saved Thuringia and the county of Henneberg to the king's advantage, Walfstein at length, after some mortification, pieced out and extended the remaining parts of his plan, as well as circumstances could then allow him. Doubtless he expected great things from his first scheme in its full extent; since he conceived it worth while to command Pappenheim for that purpose to relinquish all his conquests in so vast a tract as the circles of Westphalia and Saxony: and what more afflicted him at the present juncture was, that Pappenheim, on account of the disappointment at Coburg, might now find great difficulties in penetrating into Upper Saxony, in order to join the Imperial army in the marquisate of Misnia. As that general was formed, by nature, for undertaking perilous and extraordinary marches, Walfstein preserved some glimmerings of hope, that he would effect a junction by some inventive stratagem or other; though at that
that

that time it was hard to prescribe the measures, whereby such an enterprise was to be brought about.

From Coburg therefore, full of disappointment, he turned short to the right, and advancing to Cronach, in the diocese of Bamberg, entered Vogtland; where, adding to the cruelties of Holk and Galas, who had already ravaged all that country, he waged war, if an irruption on an unarmed multitude may be named a war, more like a man possessed by the furies, than in the character of a civilized being. At length he encamped at Weida, on the banks of the Elster, about forty-eight miles to the south of Leipzig.

We will now cast a look upon Gustavus. Had that prince survived the November ensuing, he intended to have made a second winter campaign; for the advantages accruing from the last exceeded his hopes*; and it was hoped moreover, that so severe a season might not present itself again in a great number of years. Hard and continued frosts open a new theatre of war; marches are conducted over tracts of ground, deemed otherwise to be impassable; and approaches are made to fortified towns, across morasses and waters, which, at the common seasons of fighting, are known to be inaccessible: so that the officers, who dealt in surprise and enterprise, had on these occasions a new department to engage in.

That the troops in Bavaria might be inspired to act with uncommon resolution for the service, his majesty gave the prince of Birkenfeld draughts on Augsburg and Nuremberg, and commanded him, with earnestness, to pay the soldiers punctually and honourably; expressing much concern to leave Monro's brigade behind him, which by this time was greatly shattered, and quite unable to march to Saxony; for it had fought near the king's person almost from the first weeks after he landed†; and recommending the colonel, particularly, and Mostyn, the lieutenant-colonel, to the protection of the general, he bade adieu to each regiment, and hastened onwards to Donawert. He there took leave of Banier, Birkenfeld and Ruthven, with great tenderness, ate a

* *Paganino Gaudenzio*, Singolarità, &c. 214. *Supplement de Foresti*.

It was a constant saying with the king, that he could perform greater exploits in winter than summer. *Arma Suec.* 78.

† This regiment of infantry, usually keeping company with the main army, appears, from a diary kept by the colonel, to have marched two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in a year and three quarters; and if expeditions, parties, storming of towns by night, &c. be likewise included, with which the practice of the age then abounded, it is probable the number of steps taken by the corps here mentioned, might amount to a calculation which runs higher by near a third.

short dinner with the queen, who met him there, and proposed, like a true heroine, to conclude the campaign in Saxony, and share the glory of defeating Wälstein. That night they slept at Nordlingen, from whence the king posted to Nuremberg with some chosen cavalry, and befought the queen to do him the honour of conducting the brigades of foot, first to Dunkelspiel, and then to Rotenburg on the Tauber.

When Gustavus approached Nuremberg, Oxenstiern met him on the road, and informed him that Knipphausen with a part of the garrison had invested Lauß. The king consequently went forwards to favour the enterprise of his general, but meeting Knipphausen, who returned successful, learned from him, that colonel Munich had appeared under the walls of Lauß, to succour the besieged, at the head of 1000 horse, and 300 dragoons; whereas the king had only 700 horse, and 300 dragoons, which then attended him*: but, without drafting a single man from the Nuremberg detachment, he said to Knipphausen, with an air of cheerfulness, *March you back to your charge; I cannot return till I have performed something.* Near two villages, called Schleußen and Felden†, he cut to pieces 300 of Munich's Croatian cavalry, and returned with several prisoners and two colours to Nuremberg; having thus freed that loyal and affectionate city from a sort of blockade.

Leaving the town therefore, as no enemy was near it, to the protection of its own forces, he commanded Knipphausen to follow him with three Swedish regiments, that composed the garrison, which, in conjunction with the other three regiments, not yet arrived at Nuremberg from Bavaria, made a body of 6000 men complete. The cavalry amounted to 2500, including those that attended the king; at the head of which latter party he left Nuremberg, October the 17th, in order to join duke Bernard, and expel the Wälsteiners out of Saxony, giving directions to the better half of his diminutive collection to pursue him by brisk marches, in the best manner it could contrive to advance.

This young hero, duke Bernard, had been dispatched, a month before, with an army of 12,000 men, to watch the motions of the Imperial general, and likewise secure the banks of the Mayne; protect the whole circle of Franconia; and direct his attention particularly to the preservation of the town of Sweinfurt. The most aged and experienced com-

* *Chemnitz de Bello Sueco-Germ. tom. i. 335.*

† *Chemnitz says Alenfelt and Schupfen.*

mander never discharged a duty better; for allowing his troops no rest, he presented himself in every place, as occasion demanded; preserved from insults the important cities of Schweinfurt and Wurtzburg, into the former of which places he threw Dewbatel with his regiment of dragoons, and executed a second enterprize of the same nature, when Walftein removed, and invested Coburg castle; compelling him, by vigilance and perseverance, to carry the seat of war into Upper Saxony.

By this time, the great advances made by Gustavus renewed in men's minds more and more the prediction of Tycho Brahé, just, transiently touched upon in the former part of our work; where it was specified, on the appearance of a new star in Calliopéa, anno 1572, "that a northern prince was expected to arise, who should greatly advance the interests of the more pure religion; and that the precise culmination of this astral influence should be perceived by the generality of mankind in the year 1632, or thereabouts*." At the same time, the king being now advanced to the zenith of his glory, the speculative and curious persons of the age began to pay fresh regard to Frederic Braunborn's predictions, who had foretold the death of Antichrist in the year 1636, in an explanation of the Old and New Testament, which book he published at least eighteen years before. The unfortunate death of our hero soon put an end to these airy conjectures.

Gustavus marched in fourteen days from Bavaria to the northern parts of Thuringia, including likewise three days which he spent at Nuremberg. What detained him there more especially was his perceiving the princes and states, his allies, to grow remiss in subscribing to the war, and in conveying their contingent of troops to him. He consequently formed an idea, and gave Oxenstiern full powers to convene at Ulm the principal personages of Upper Germany, in the four circles of Suabia, Franconia, and the two Rhines. The plan of this *confederation* was bold, extensive, magnificent, and worthy its great inventor, who died before it could be brought beyond its infancy; yet upon *this ichnography*, Oxenstiern, the ensuing year, established the *Convention of Heilbrun*, which has been considered by all historians as the most distinguished action of his political life. Gustavus, that he might mature his conceptions better, commanded the chancellor to attend him in his march to Erfurt in Thuringia, discoursing with him on the subject during the whole journey,

* *De Stella nova*, Anno 1572. Excus. Uranoburgi. Dan. A. MD. C. X. p. 805. *Heylmanni Leo Arctæus*, p. 12.

and inculcating and repeating his directions, as they occurred occasionally to him. It was his majesty's first scheme, had he continued in Bavaria, to have made this minister *Director-general* of Upper and Lower Saxony: but matters being now totally changed in that respect, he commanded him to return to Nuremberg with all possible expedition, and put the other new ideas into actual operation. It must not here be forgotten, that the king, before he left the last-named town, perceiving the English and Scottish regiments to be extremely thinned, combined them all into one brigade, informing the leaders and soldiers, that henceforwards they should always act near his person; assuring the former, that as this select body of troops happened by the present reformation to be trebly officered, he should prefer the supernumerary commanders into other regiments, in proportion as vacancies happened. There is reason to think, that this brigade was one of the finest bodies of troops that ever appeared in the military world. Now it was, according to the best conjectures which can be made, that Gustavus, in order to encourage and reward his allies in Germany, made a second full examination of his *grand scheme of commerce to the East and West Indies*, first published by him in the year 1626, or 1627; for my accounts vary in point of chronology. The former part may be perused at leisure in the *Appendix*; as also the subsequent additional articles, extended to all his faithful assistants and friends then in the empire.

At Arnstadt the king joined duke Bernard, where they rested six days, till the royal army arrived from Nuremberg. Here Oxenstiern took his perpetual farewell of his respected sovereign, and making an excursion by way of Francfort and the Lower Palatinate, being entrusted with the last letter his master ever wrote to the unfortunate elector Palatine; he then completed his journey by returning to his directorial office, at and round Nuremberg. Indeed no plenipotentiary character was ever greater than what the generosity of Gustavus bestowed on his chancellor; for he had a commission *unlimited* to four circles, being constituted *supreme arbiter of peace and war*. He was authorized to prelude, *without controul*, over all generals and military expeditions; to ratify all truces, conventions, and treaties, *pro re nata*; being pronounced *first in all things*, to make use of the very words in his commission, both as *VIR TOGATUS, ET SAGATUS*; receiving in charge particularly to keep a strict eye to the true interests of the protestant religion. To all which the king annexed this extraordinary confirmation: *Quicquid hac ratione in sui (scil. regis) emolumentum vi susceptorum mandatorum*

torum gereret, disponderet, ordinaret, ratum à se, perinde ac si ipse gessisset, disposuisset, ordinasset, habitum iri.*

Had not Gustavus used amazing expedition from Bavaria into the depths of the Thuringian forest as far as Arnstadt, the vigilant and enterprising Pappenheim had certainly perplexed him in two important points, namely, the possession of the cities of Erfurt and Naumburg †; which might have obstructed his majesty's entrance into Saxony, and facilitated the junction of the Imperial armies, which the king laboured to render difficult, as far as was in his power, and, if possible, to counterwork. Duke Bernard, in obedience to the instructions of his master, put a check to the former attempt; but as to the event of the latter, it was almost humanly impossible to outstrip, in a long march Pappenheim, who, not daring to invest Erfurt whilst the king lay in Thuringia, cast only a languishing eye towards that important city, having crossed the Unstrut, and approached as near it as Butstadt, a distance only of twelve miles. Then changing his plan all at once, he shaped his course through the little district of Freyburg; and, passing the Sala with the rapidity of a flash of lightning, never allowed duke Bernard, who was close on his heels, with a large body of cavalry, to overtake him.

It being now the anniversary of St. Simon and St. Jude, the king marched his two armies from Arnstadt to Erfurt, a day's journey of twenty miles; and considering such a slight effort as a kind of holiday, reviewed his troops, all drawn up in fine order, before they entered the town. Whilst he was so employing himself, he received a deputation from the magistracy, requesting him to honour their city with his royal presence; to which he returned an indistinct, but very affectionate answer; insomuch that one of the deputies afterwards acknowledged that it forced tears from his eyes. At night his majesty made his entrance privately; and first, so peculiar was his humanity to any general that was wounded or indisposed, paid a visit to duke William of Weimar; from whom hastening to the queen's lodgings, her majesty, attended by her train of ladies, politely received him on foot in the square of the market before her apartments; upon which Gustavus, dismounting at a distance, led her up stairs into her own chamber, and after a short, but tender interview, retired to military business; foreseeing plainly, that the fate of Germany was now approaching towards its grand crisis. They supped together early in the evening, and in half an hour the king

* *Chemnit. de Bello Sueco-Germanico*, tom. i. 345.

† *Nani Historia*, L. ix. *Paffendorf de Reb. Suec.* p. 80.

withdrew a second time, for he had letters to write of great importance to several princes, and particular expresses to dispatch to all the troops that could possibly reach him in ten days or a fortnight. In a word, he had the great event, which afterwards made its appearance upon the glorious but unfortunate plains of Lützen, full in his imagination.

During the few hours Gustavus staid at Erfurt, he received agreeable dispatches from all parts, if we except the fruitless and injudicious march of the duke of Lunenburg, who attempted to join him, but never had abilities to effect that junction. His majesty heard, particularly, that the prince of Birkenfeld had retaken Landisberg, and driven the duke of Bavaria into Munich, with considerable loss: that Banier had raised the siege of Rayn, and quashed a desperate enterprise of the enemy against Augsburg, the king's magazine of arms and military stores: that part of the Swedish and Wirtemberg troops had gathered laurels on the very banks of the lake of Constance: that Dubalt had cleared Silesia, and Horn had reduced Alfatia almost miraculously; and that the Transylvanian general had caused a diversion, by invading Hungary.

At break of day the king rose, and taking a slight breakfast with his beloved Eleonora, gave audience to the magistrates of the city, and then concluded an earnest and pathetic speech, with a few short sentences, to this effect: *You know, gentlemen, that uncertainty and sublunary affairs are synonymous terms, and that war, particularly, the visitation of heaven for human depravity, is precarious above all things: it is possible that something unfortunate may soon arrive to this my person, and if such be the will of the Supreme Being, transfer to my dear Consort that affection and obligation which you owe to me. On these conditions, I pray Providence to prosper you*.* Then turning round to Eleonora, he could pronounce no more than just to say, GOD BLESS YOU! and thus, abruptly, leaving the whole assembly dissolved in tears he mounted his horse, and vanished immediately in order to overtake his army, which by this time was in full march towards Saxony.

In two days and a half his majesty, by easy journeys of twelve miles a day, reached Naumburg; and hearing on the road that Holk, now created deputy velt-maréchal to Walstein, in order to make room for the velt-maréchal Pappenheim, had sent troops into the town to demand the arrears of the last year's contribution due to Tilly, dispatched co-

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part iil. p. 72.

lonel Brandstein, at the head of a body of musqueteers, with strict orders to dislodge the Imperialists. This officer requested admission at the Othmar-gate by break of day, and on the sentinel's beseeching that time might be allowed him to inform the magistracy of his demands, burst the port-cullis to pieces with a petard, and entered the city sword in hand.

Next day, at noon, the royal army crossed the bridge over the Sala. Part entered Naumburg, and the residue, though the winter began now to appear with a threatening aspect *, found themselves obliged to take quarters in the high roads that lead to Zeitz and Leipzig. It was here his majesty had commanded George duke of Lunenburg to join him with the little army which he commanded in Lower Saxony. His instructions were, either to force a passage through the enemies' quarters, by the road of Halle, or shape his course to the right, through the town of Eyselt, and then pursue much the same route which Pappenheim had taken. That general chose rather to follow his own imaginations, than the king's directions; and having left his infantry at Magdeburg, which was a great omission, and singularly affected the day's service at Lützen, took the liberty to conduct his cavalry only across the Elbe to Wittemberg, where he received orders to join the king at all hazards; but had not courage or dexterity enough to penetrate the enemies' forces. Hence arose *one* remarkable inconvenience; for the count de Pappenheim joined Walstein, but the duke of Lunenburg never more beheld Gustavus †!

Whilst we have thus pursued the king's progress from Bavaria to Saxony, by which extraordinary march he outstripped even Walstein's ideas of activity, and saved Erfurt and Naumburg ‡, a point of infinite importance to him, missing little, at the same time, of exceeding Pappenheim in vigilance, we will, for a moment, take a glance over the conduct of Walstein, whom we left encamped at Weida in Vogtland something more than a fortnight before the present period.

This commander, having dispatched Galas into Bohemia to assist Don Baltazar against Dubalt and Arnheim, commanded Holk to return from his depredations and ravages, and point his course towards the town of Leipzig, which both armies besieged in form, and rendered themselves masters of in three days. For this step the Imperial generalissimo is greatly admired by the Continuator of Foresti, who applauds all *bold* strokes, just upon the eve of some decisive battle.

* It was now Nov. 1.

† *Puffend. de Rebus Suec. p. 80.*

‡ *Nani Hist. l. 9.*

The THREE INSTANCES he selects particularly on the occasion, are, the passage of the Lech by Gustavus; the siege of Magdeburg by Tilly; and the possession of Leipzig by Walstein's orders. Be that as it will, one thing is remarkable, that the commandant, who surrendered the castle this time, was the self same man who gave it up to Tilly the preceding campaign. If his name be worth preserving, he was called Vopelius. This may serve to shew, that the elector of Saxony was neither over delicate, nor over solicitous, in the choice of his officers. In a word, he cared little, which of the two contending powers obtained the superiority.

Nor was Walstein inactive during the siege of Leipzig town and fortrefs: for in that interim he took possession of Weissenfels, Merzburg, Naumburg, and Halle, the castle of the latter alone excepted, where some veteran Swedes remained, who staid there on account of the wounds they received last year, in the battle of Leipzig.

The same general was not void of attention in another particular; for he had once formed a design of possessing Torgau-bridge by force, by which he proposed to himself the choice of various and distinct advantages; such as the more easy reduction of Saxony, if that undertaking best pleased him. By being master of the bridge he proposed also to create new difficulties, in case the elector and Gustavus intended to unite their forces, than which nothing appeared more probable. He had the power likewise, by this stroke of surprize, to enter Lower Lusatia, and the *Marches* of Brandenburg, and of course decline a battle, if he thought proper. But the elector of Saxony, who, just at *that* time, squared every motion by the directions of the king, from whom he received daily expresses, had rendered this passage superior to insults of the impetuous and momentary kind; nor did Walstein ever realize this ideal experiment; for having marched his whole force to Eilenberg, half way between Leipzig and Torgau, he there received an express from Pappenheim, with information that he was upon the wing to join him. On the receipt of this acceptable news, for it is thought Walstein would have shunned Gustavus in the absence of his *velt-maréchal*, he turned back to Leipzig by the road he came, and formed the junction at Merzburg.

Here Pappenheim, who had the power of over-persuading all men in military matters, for his bold strong sense had the appearance of irresistibility, soon induced Walstein, though in general the most reserved, sullen, and untractable commander of that age, to change his operations all at once, and embrace a project, which indeed had once occurred to him
slightly,

slightly, as before mentioned, and that was, to cross the Sala without delay, and occupy the principal towns and passes of Thuringia, particularly Weimar and Erfurt; so far as much as in the whole country duke Bernard had only one small army, and his brother William, who was then sick, could produce no greater strength than 5000 soldiers, wherewith to garrison the two cities last mentioned. As to the arrival of Gustavus with an army from Bavaria, *that incident was foreseen by no man* *.

Whilst these matters continued in profound agitation, *news arrived that the king of Sweden was on the banks of the Sala*. The alarm indeed was premature; for the report took its rise from the approach of duke Bernard's cavalry, whom the king had dispatched to intercept the rear-guard of Pappenheim's army. But in two days his majesty's arrival at Naumburg and his approach into Saxony were manifest beyond contradiction. Wallstein immediately summoned all his troops to join him under pain of death, directed his course from Leipzig to Lützen and Randstadt †, and there spread himself along the sides of the great high road which leads into the heart of Saxony. He then sent courier after courier, but without success, to recal Galas, who by that time was advanced with 12,000 men into Bohemia. Wallstein then procured from Leipzig a contribution of more than £.8000 demanded from the inhabitants about a week before: which first precaution appeared to him in no degree unnecessary, though at that time he did not sincerely believe that Gustavus, at the head of 18,000 men, would have the confidence to attack a body of troops amounting to 40,000, who had their choice of ground to intrench themselves, and no contemptible train of heavy artillery. This prepossession led him afterwards into a *slight* mistake, and that was, The detachment of Pappenheim to take possession of the town of Halle. Concluding, at least during the present crisis, that the whole winter would be spent *inactively* in quarters of cantonment, he thought the acquisition of that town and the district round it a safe and desirable enlargement of elbow-room; giving him, in truth, a

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 823.

† In this village, properly called Upper-Randstadt, is shewn a small passable house, where the duke of Marlborough made his applications to Charles XII. who resided therein a whole summer: and here the peace of Randstadt was formed and concluded, in the year 1707. This little mansion the author visited in 1748, in company with his ever-respected pupils, Mr. ELIOT, and Mr. STANHOPE; and that excellent historian M. MASCOW.

sort of elliptical range along the banks of the Sala, from the city last mentioned to the towns of Zeitz and Altenberg *.

Next morning the Imperial generalissimo advanced to Weissenfels, when the colonels Suevis † and Bredarxo ‡ who had been sent to Naumburg, to bring, into the military chest, the arrears of a contribution due to Tilly, returned with no small degree of precipitation, and declared the Swedish army to be in full march against the Imperialists. This was little less than a thunder-stroke to Wallstein, whose presence of mind began now to fail him. He had once an inclination to leave the road open to Leipzig and Dresden, and reserve to himself the power of attacking the king's rear, and giving him battle, when he saw occasion. He then, which is not uncommon when the calmness of the understanding begins to be ruffled, went directly into an opposite project, and conceived an idea of attacking the king's lines sword in hand; for by this time he heard that a camp was to be strongly fortified near the walls of Naumburg, a misrepresentation easy to be accounted for, since it was Gustavus's custom to intrench his army every night, when near the enemy. In the next place it was Wallstein's determination to take the straight road from Weissenfels to Naumburg, a distance of twelve miles, or something less: but the passage was too narrow and too miry to be undertaken with safety. He then sent the quarter-master-general Julio Deodati to examine the way, which leads thro' Zeitz; for it was Wallstein's custom, which proceeded more from haughtiness than the gout, which he alleged, as occasion served, for a general excuse, to examine no ground with his own eyes. On the same principle, and not from *that* which influenced Gustavus, he disdained convening a council of war; yet on this emergency had the condescension to request Pappenheim to collect the private opinion of all the generals and colonels, who declared unanimously against attempting to force the Swedish lines.

A new thought now occurred to him, the true cause and motive whereof has escaped the notice of all historians without exception, nay even of the *Spanish relator*, who was himself a distinguished officer in the Imperial service; and that was, *the dispatching Pappenheim to take possession of the town and castle of Halle, which commanded the great road; and this appeared to be his favourite scheme.* All writers of good sense

* *Spanish relation by an Imperial officer*, printed at Lisbon, 1633.

† ‡ The Spanish relator seems to be mistaken in these officers' names. The first, I think, should be Salis, and the second, I am sure, ought to be Breda.

appear to be puzzled * why Wallstein should detach Pappenheim, in whom himself and the army placed the greatest confidence, at the very moment when that commander's presence was *most* wanted; for the Swedish forces lay then but a few miles removed from the Imperialists. The real reason for this *movement* appears to me to be precisely thus. Wallstein, in his cooler hours of reflection, and at such periods when reason gets the better of false fears, seemed, in part, convinced, that Gustavus would not embark in an enterprise, where the disproportion against him then laid, as that of forty opposed to eighteen. Besides, as no general was more dexterous in procuring intelligence than Wallstein, it is probable his correspondents informed him, that the king, which was really the case, had no intentions to engage, till the Saxon and Lunenburg army could both join their forces with his; and therefore the Imperial general concluded, he had breathing space enough to dispatch Pappenheim, whom he could recal in twenty hours, to secure the city and fortress of Halle; which, in truth, commanded the only *great* and *practicable* road at that time of the year convenient for his private purposes. What these purposes might be, shall be explained directly. Wallstein did not greatly like the decision of an engagement hand to hand with a commander like Gustavus; and though he thought that prince would scarcely venture to give him battle, during Pappenheim's absence of three days, which by the way he hoped to conceal till the stroke was completed, yet he foresaw but too plainly, that the Swedish monarch would force him into a general action the very instant he had formed his *junction* with the elector of Saxony and the duke of Lunenburg. For these reasons, which centered entirely in his own breast, he chose to avoid a decisive engagement, if that were possible; and having secured the great road he privately wished for, proposed to himself, in case of emergency, to give Gustavus free passage to Leipzig and Dresden, and commanding his whole army to file off to Halle in an instant, transfer, by this unexpected movement, the seat of war towards the coasts of the Baltic, a point he ardently wished for, inasmuch as it had taken full possession of his mind from the very moment he dislodged at Nuremberg. From this single *false step* of detaching Pappenheim, which took its rise from diffidence and timidity, he lost his reputation at once, as a great commander, and gave birth to that very battle which he laboured hitherto to divert or decline.

* At generalissimus, nescio qua mente, Pappenheimium ut Hallas expugnaret, misit. *Waffenbergii Florus German.* p. 317.

Gustavus,

Gustavus, on Thursday, November the first, arrived at Naumburg, and thence dispatched messengers after messengers, with a plan of the junction he intended to form with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenburg, who both then laid at Torgau, making between them a small compact army, consisting of 4000 cavalry and 4000 infantry; though some historians suppose their number to be nearly double. The king's idea of uniting these forces to his own consisted in this: that the elector of Saxony should advance fourteen miles on the western side * of the Mulda, to the town of Eülenberg; and that himself, during this interim, should march to Pegau, on the river Elster, fourteen miles to the south of Leipsic, and thence to Grimma, situated on the Mulda, eighteen miles to the east of Pegau, and fourteen to the south of Eülenberg, and that the conjunction should be formed at the place before mentioned, namely, Grimma. Whoever knows Saxony, and comprehends the disposition and cantonment of Walfstein's army, will, at first sight, allow the present scheme to be *finely concerted*.

This selfsame day the king surveyed his encampments at Naumburg, and made a slight excursion round the country, to examine the aspect and position of the enemy; but the afternoon proved not so fortunate to some English adventurers, on the same errand, who falling into an ambush of Croatsians, two out of three were taken prisoners †, and conducted that night to Weissenfels, where Walfstein had then intrenched himself. He dispatched Pappenheim forthwith to examine them strictly, concerning the king's strength, and his military designs. Walfstein then commanded them to be confined in the rear of his army, where they were spectators of the battle of Lützen.

At Naumburg the king dropped some expressions to Fabricius his chaplain, which most historians have considered as prophetic; for in conversation he discovered great uneasiness, to behold himself, in some sense, *deified* as it were by the generality of mankind: *I fear, doctor*, said he, *some impending misfortune, either to my own person, or the prosperity of the Swedish forces: I am received every where with undue joy, and undeserved honours; the people rely too much on the*

* I should apprehend it ought to be on the eastern side of the Mulda; but not having examined the ground, which has been carefully performed in most other important scenes of action, I choose to conform to the authorities before me.

† Namely, lieutenant-colonel Tyrwhit, and captain Fielding, who communicated their accounts of Walfstein's behaviour during the battle, to their friends in England; and from whence part, which follows, has been copied.

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probabilities of second causes: their supposed security is a deception to them: they mistake the true object of human addresses: I take no delight in this sort of incense;—let the event be as it pleases God†!*

In addition to what has been said, many suppose the king, about this period, to have entertained certain misgivings concerning his death. Without having recourse to such superstitious presages, sure it is, the bravest of men may have their intervals of tenderness and sensibility; and this, without supposing it to be constitutional, may be occasioned by the indisposition of a single fibre; though, for my own part, I think compassion and sedate reflection were always intermingled in the character of Gustavus. They ground their opinion upon part of a letter, dispatched to the Chancellor Oxenstiern, which I shall venture to publish, as it does some honour to human nature; for never person acted with greater aptitude and presence of mind, than his majesty did some days afterwards, on the plains of Lützen. Let the reader peruse the extract, and refrain from sympathising, if he can.

* * * * * *Though the cause I am embarked in is just and good, yet the event of war, propter delicta humana, must be deemed uncertain. Uncertain likewise is the duration of mortal life; therefore I beseech and require you, in the name of our blessed Redeemer, to preserve your fortitude of spirit, though things may not proceed in exact conformity to my wishes.—Remember likewise how I should comfort myself in regard to you, if by divine permission I might live till that period, when you should have occasion for my assistance under any shape. Consider me as a man, the guardian of a kingdom, who has struggled with difficulties for TWENTY YEARS, and passed through them WITH REPUTATION, by the protection and mercy of God; namely, as a man, who loved and honoured his country and faithful subjects; as a man, who neglected life, riches, and happy days, for the preservation and glory of those he belonged to; expecting no remuneration, except to be pronounced the person, who fulfilled the duties of that station which Providence assigned him.—Those, who survive me, for I with others must expect the stroke of mortality, are, on my account, and for many OTHER reasons, real objects of your commiseration: They are of the tender and defenceless Sex:—A helpless Mother, who wants a guide, and an innocent Daughter ‡, who requires a protector!—Natural affec-*

* *Historical and Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 175.

† *Swedish Intelligence*, part iii. 74. *Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, p. 144.

‡ The princess Christina was then eight years of age.

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tion forces these lines from the hand of a Son and a Parent! ——— But I must resume myself; and recommend them, together with my soul and body, to the protection of the Supreme Being, expecting better things on earth than my present melancholy now presages; and eternal life, peace, and happiness hereafter in heaven, which may God bestow on you, at his own appointed time and hour!*

GUSTAVUS.

The next day after the conference with Fabricius, his majesty examined, in person, all the approaches and passes about Naumburg, having as yet formed no resolution to give Walstein battle †; but proposing rather to examine the great roads that were between his camp and that of the Imperialists; passages which he found upon inspection to be very deep and difficult. But the subject of this expedition being purely occasional and incidental, his grand and principal intention was, and therefore he commanded abroad several strong parties of cavalry, to engage his troops in some sharp skirmishes, in order to obtain from prisoners more certain intelligence of Walstein's situation, and examine carefully, during this confusion, the true nature of the road that led to Pegau, with a view to effect his junction more dexterously with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenburg.

The following morning, being Sunday, a Saxon peasant came running to the king with a letter in his hand, which Colorado had engaged him to carry to an Imperial officer then quartered at Querfurt. This letter appears to have been written the Saturday evening. Its purport was, that he, the officer, should march to Halle, and join Pappenheim the next morning ‡, at which time his Excellency,

* *Loccenii Hist. Suec.* 4^o. p. 605, 606.

† *Puffendorff de Rebus Suecicis*, p. 20.

‡ Le Barre, usually judicious, and on most occasions the best instructed historian I know, supposes Pappenheim to have received orders from Walstein, after the reduction of Halle, to advance to Cologne: which extraordinary digression seems in no wise to square with the then pressing and urgent necessities of the Imperial generalissimo. This difficulty is better solved by the plain narration of a party in war, than by the refined speculations of an historian in the closet. In a word, the case stood thus. At the present period, a strong report prevailed [*Spanish Relation, printed at Lisbon, 1633*] that count Henry Vander-Berg, at the head of an army of Hollanders, was in full march to invest Cologne, whose elector was a faithful friend to the Imperial interests. Upon this the Austrian party supposed, that Pappenheim, having rendered himself master of Halle, would advance thence to the banks of the *Weser*, and having joined the residue of his own army under Gronsfelt, make some attempts to raise the siege; and that Walstein perhaps might be induced to follow him, in hopes to draw Gustavus still farther from the heart of the empire. Such were men's ideas for a few days; but the alarm was false, and soon vanished into air. *Spanish Relation ut supra.*

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the generalissimo, had determined to remove his camp from Weissenfels to Lützen. Both these circumstances gave Gustavus uncommon joy; for he was never known to *dislike* the absence of Pappenheim: and the removal of Walstein from Weissenfels in no sense displeased him, as that town laid directly in the way of the intended expedition, whereby he proposed to unite his forces to those of Saxony; and Lützen is about nine miles from the high road which leads to Pegau.

Upon receiving the two articles of intelligence above mentioned, the king, who had always a secret appetite for fighting, convened duke Bernard and Kniphausen to his own apartment, having no great opinion of tumultuous councils of war for many reasons. He there expounded to these two commanders the particular circumstances of Walstein's situation, and desired their opinions candidly and generously without reserve. The former, as is congenial to the temper of youthful warriors, took flame immediately, and declared for action. The latter, brave as the youngest combatant in the army, but matured by reflection, and chastised by experience, pronounced uniformly and steadily, at the first glance, that an engagement at the present juncture was no way reconcilable to the true science of war: For, said he, no commander is obliged to encounter an enemy greatly superior to him in strength, except compelled by some pressing and unavoidable necessity. War is an affair of demonstration; and not an unpremeditated effusion of animal spirits. His majesty is neither circumscribed in place, nor deficient in provisions, forage, nor military stores.—The king submitted with complacency to good sense wherever he found it; though it is possible the first emotions of his heart inclined him to undertake an action that carried with it such a shining appearance both of glory and difficulty; yet making no remonstrance, assured both his generals positively, with an air of calmness, that he would decline the engagement, and march to join the elector of Saxony the ensuing morning*.

Leaving therefore the bulk of his baggage, and a sufficient garrison in the town of Naumburg, he ordered his drums and trumpets to summon the army into motion at one hour after midnight; for he always disdained *stealing* a march, except occasions were *pressing* and *hazardous*; and, it is probable,

* Spanheim and Chemnitz suppose the king to have advanced directly from Naumburg to Lützen, without any intention to join the Saxons. [*Soldat Suedois*, 824, 825. *Ballum Sueco Germ.* tom. i. 347.] The supposition throws some reflection on his majesty's military prudence, though nothing of that kind was originally intended by the historians.

though he declined opposing Knipphausen's arguments, that he did not privately dislike an attack from Walstein, in case that general should think fit to impede his journey; for the ground he well knew was one wide plain, which gave the enemy no particular advantage. Four hours before it was daylight, the whole army* was under march; and being now arrived half way to Pegau, and reposing itself for the sake of a momentary refreshment, having by this time, it being now ten in the morning, advanced nine miles, some gentry of the country and peasants came hastening towards the king with full and positive assurances, which report was likewise confirmed by straggling prisoners taken here and there, that the Imperial army, then on a line to the north-west, loosely and thinly dispersed in various villages, had received no alarm, nor the least intelligence of his majesty's motions. This idea, adding thereto the absence of Pappenheim, took possession of the king's mind all at once: he thought it

* TABLE of REFERENCE to the Battle of LUTZEN.

SWEDISH FORM OF BATTLE.

I. LINE.

1. Finlanders, Stalhaus.
2. Musqueteers.
3. Westergothians.
4. Musqueteers.
5. Ingermanians.
6. Musqueteers.
7. Uplanders.
8. Musqueteers.
9. Ostrogoths.
10. Musqueteers.
11. Smolandars.
12. First brigade, Harte.
13. Pretorian brigade, guards, yellow; count Weissenberg.
14. Blue brigade, guards; Wincle.
15. Green brigade; Wildesheim.
16. Duke Bernard's regiment.
17. Musqueteers.
18. Duke Bernard's second regiment.
19. Musqueteers.
20. Carberg.
21. Musqueteers.
22. Livonians; Wrangel.
23. Musqueteers.
24. Tisenhausen.
25. Musqueteers.
26. Courville.

II. LINE.

27. Steichnitz; French.
28. Musqueteers.
29. Steinboch's dragoons.
30. Musqueteers.
31. Brandstein.
32. Musqueteers.
33. Lowenstein.
34. Musqueteers.
35. Prince of Anhalt.
36. Musqueteers.
37. Hofkirch; Saxon.
38. Brigade, Mitzwal.
39. Brigade; Thurn.
40. Brigade; Knipphausen.
41. Brigade, Bösen; Saxon.
42. Ullar.
43. Musqueteers.
44. Dalwick; Hessiam.
45. Musqueteers.
46. Beckerman.
47. Musqueteers.
48. Bulach.
49. Musqueteers.
50. Goldstein.
51. Musqueteers.
52. William of Weimar.

RESERVE I.

53. Henderson: Scottish infantry.

RESERVE II.

54. Ohem: Palatine cavalry.

not

not difficult to cut the several Imperial quarters to pieces one by one, before it was possible for Wallstein to collect any considerable mass of forces together. Calling therefore all his generals round him in an instant, he, who had never yet declared his sentiments upon this occasion concerning fighting, proposed the enterprise without hesitation, and the proposal was received with the most lively demonstrations of applause and joy.—He then asked the country gentlemen, how many miles it might be to Lützen? They replied, *There, Sire, there it lies, directly under your eye.* But here arose a fatal mistake. For the country being, with a slight exception, one uniform level, and the buildings of the church and castle high in themselves, and standing likewise on a sort of eminence, the town of Lützen appeared to be one half nearer the Swedes than it really was; or, in other words, to be removed five miles from the army, instead of eight miles and something more. Here it must be observed further, that as the ground was an immense tract of cornlands, fresh ploughed to receive the grain, the passage proved to be miry and difficult beyond description. The error of distance was not observed, and the difficulty of marching seemed to be unforeseen; circumstances which in the high and sudden ardor of generals and soldiers might be easily overlooked. At a single instant the whole army made its evolutions, and bent its course towards Lützen. Never were troops known to advance with such amazing alacrity; but the ground clung to the mid-leg like clay, and when they came within two miles of the desired object, there was a morassy swamp to pass, formed by a creeping half-stagnated rivulet, over which lay a paltry bridge, where only two persons could cross a-breast. In and near a nameless village*, on the opposite side, was lodged a regiment of cuirassiers and another of Croats, who, far from disputing the pass, took the alarm, and formed themselves on a little eminence beyond the water. It was now sunset by the time the whole Swedish army had cleared the pass, and disengaged itself from this unexpected incumbrance; and, to the sensible mortification and disappointment of the whole army, the Swedes had only daylight sufficient to dislodge the two regiments from the post they had possessed. This was effected by a very sharp and spirited attack, the success of which the king facilitated greatly, by fixing some field-pieces on another little eminence, which bore hard on the enemies flank. In the heat of this rencounter one standard was taken, which all men considered, conform-

* I have since learned that this village was called Rippach,

ably to the genius of that age, a well promising and prosperous omen; for thereon was painted the Austrian eagle displayed, and the goddess Fortune; with the following inscription underneath, *Fortuna & aquila Romana* *. Some Swedes considered this a very promising omen †: but the generality rested the event upon other hopes

——— *Romano milite dignus,*
ENSIS adest augur ———

Still it was remarked, that his majesty discovered no great signs of satisfaction, when this trophy was presented to him; not that he wanted dexterity to encourage any idea which inspired his troops with vivacity and confidence, but in truth he was *chagrined* to the heart at the *deception* of distance we have lately mentioned, and perceived now, that, for the first time in his military life, he was *obliged to give battle*; not absolutely *against* his judgment, but in a *certain manner*, that did not quite please him. Nevertheless, as it was this prince's peculiar character to have greater possession of himself, in proportion as distress and difficulty encreased upon him, he soon assumed that composed air of confidence usually worn by men who rely upon some resource of firmness and genius, at the very period that their friends suppose their danger next to inevitable.

About this time, it is certain, some one of Gustavus's generals, not improbably Knipphausen, advised him still to meditate a retreat, and repass the rivulet, which the mist next morning gave him full opportunity to do. It was urged likewise, that the royal army wanted rest and provisions; and that it bordered on temerity to assail a double number of forces, protected by batteries, and secured by intrenchments. The die was cast, and the king replied with a tone of decision, *That he could not bear to see Wallstein under his beard without making some animadversions upon him; and that no disinclination, on his part, had ever hindered him from bringing the contest to a fair trial. I long, said he, to unearth him once from his subterraneous hiding-places, and behold with my own eyes how he can acquit himself in a champaign country* †. Now the king having crossed the pass, found himself under an in-

* The particularity of this ensign was not so great, as the Swedish army seemed disposed to interpret it; for most of the Croats bore the Austrian eagle on the front-side of their standards, and on the opposite side were the emblem and motto. I have seen the same eagle engraved on the officers partizans of that age.

† *Soldat Suedois*, 825.

‡ *Idem*, p. 827, 828.

dispensable

dispensable obligation to engage the enemy; for had he attempted to return the next morning, at least according to his own ideas, he might have run the risk of incurring a total defeat, or sacrificing, at least, the very flower of his army. He determined therefore, without hesitation, to begin the action two entire hours before daylight; for Wallstein's quarters were remotely dispersed, and Pappenheim, who had taken with him twelve regiments of the league, could not be supposed to return in less space than eighteen hours.—Wallstein appeared thunderstruck at this unexpected visit from Gustavus. He dispatched an officer immediately to Pappenheim, with orders to relinquish his undertaking, however prosperous it might be; and instructions were conveyed to the chieftains in their several quarters, to repair forthwith to the general rendezvous on the plains of Lützen. Thus the greater part of the Imperial army began its march before midnight; and some, more remotely quartered, did not reach their generalissimo till the ensuing morning*.

Wallstein, having dispatched his orders to recal Pappenheim, and collect his forces, and recovering, by degrees, his wonted presence of mind, began at length to reflect seriously on the nature of the ground, occupied by himself, or possessed by Gustavus. To understand both circumstances better, it must be remarked by the reader, that a large highway, from Lützen to Leipzig, bisects the plain in a line that extends from west to east, but slants gently to the eastward; on the southern side of which laid the Swedes, and the Imperialists on the northern. A great part of this road was then ornamented on each side with middle-aged willow-trees, and, as the soil was moist, deep, and rich, a considerable trench had been cut on either hand, to prevent travellers from making side-excursions along the corn-fields†. The tract of land which Gustavus covered was plain and uniform; but on Wallstein's right, near the town of Lützen, was a gently-rising eminence, where some windmills were erected‡. Here, about nine at night, he fixed two large batteries of heavy

* *Chemnitz*. tom. i. 373.

† Two ditches, one on each side, ran parallel with the road. *Chemnitz*. tom. i. 73.). That next the king was rendered deepest by Wallstein, and continues so to this hour.

‡ It is remarkable, that there was no material variation in the fields of Lützen from the year 1632 to the year 1748, when the author examined them, and compared the present ichnography of the ground with the draught published immediately after the battle, by Lotichius, Merian, Gabler, Sandrart, Danchaertz, &c. &c. That very day a cuirassier's spur was ploughed up, of enormous size; it is in my possession; and the head of a pike, or partizan, very curiously engraved, and now in the possession of Edward Eliot, Esq. of Port Eliot in Cornwall.

artillery, and secured them, in front and flank, with an intrenchment. The lower line played directly on the left wing of the Swedes; and the uppermost threw its balls obliquely through the center of the right wing. He then protected his own main body with the field ordnance; and as it was well foreseen where the king affected to appear, he placed there, namely, against the right wing of the Swedes, a fourth battery, composed of the heaviest and most destructive artillery. Gustavus, who valued the advantages of artillery as much as he, and understood its management far better, had only with him some few cannons of a moderate size, and a reasonable number of common field-pieces, two, I think, at the head of each regiment, such as are usually transported with armies in marches of expedition. At ten in the evening Walstein ordered his pioneers and soldiers to deepen and widen the ditches on the road-side, till they had brought them to the due height of a parapet: and at this work they laboured incessantly till the battle began next morning*.

The royal army carried nothing with it, except such few things as were indispensably necessary. The king himself was not proprietor of a field equipage; but passed the whole night in his coach, accompanied by Kniphausen, and duke Bernard: and as the soldiers had taken some slight entertainment before noon, and proposed to refresh themselves better the same evening at Torgau, where dispositions had been made for their reception, it is not probable they got much to eat that night, on the plains of Lützen. Monro assures us †, they stood to their arms in perfect array; for which the reasons will appear self-evident, in the ensuing paragraph.

His majesty passed the night, partly in discourse with his generals, and partly in profound contemplation. On one point he fixed his mind, as it were intuitively; and that was, to give the enemy battle two hours before break of day, well foreseeing, that their forces could then never be truly formed; that a great part of the troops could not reach the station appointed; and that the passage of the ditches could not be made so difficult, as it might be rendered in a few succeeding hours. Every circumstance, if we except there was no dismay in the case, proved unfavourable to Gustavus. The night appeared to be several degrees darker than usual; and a mist prevailed in the skies, which, at intervals in the ensuing day, rendered the air so obscure, that it was hardly possible to discern an object clearly at the distance of two pikes length.

* *Hist. or Auth. Relat.* tom. ii. 172. Low Dutch, fol.

† *Part* ii. 163.

At the moment the dawn of morning first began to appear, he found it impossible to perform any exploit in the martial way*; and therefore, sending for Fabricius his chaplain, commanded him to celebrate divine service, and ordered prayers to be read at the head of each regiment, so far as the respective clergymen could be found in such a sudden and unforeseen expedition. The king was then asked to take some refreshment, but declined it. He was requested likewise to clothe himself in steel, according to the custom of that age; but his answer was, *The Lord is my armour*. Some indeed say, he had lately received a contusion† in one of his shoulders, from a musquet-ball, which rendered the least pressure of his cuirass an insupportable pain to him. He only changed his yesterday's clothes, and wore a new plain cloth coat, and an elk-skin buff waistcoat, which fell afterwards into Holk's hands, and is still preserved at Vienna. About eight in the morning the sun began to dispel the fogs, and gave the promise of a bright and calm day; when, lo! a new and unforeseen difficulty presented itself! For in the straight line, on which the Swedish left wing proposed to advance, was a deep ditch, too difficult for the troops to cross; so that the king was obliged to make his whole army edge to the right, and then occupy the space, between the *Infgraben*, for so the Germans call a wet ditch cut to drain lands‡, and Walfstein's army; leaving his ammunition-waggons, his coach, and the few conveniences that belonged to the army, in the village of Chursitz, as will appear more distinctly by the plan. This movement cost some trouble, and employed no small space of time. At length, towards the hour of nine in the morning, his majesty, riding with an air of briskness up and down the lines, and ordering two hymns|| to be sung publicly, addressed himself to his Swedish soldiers. *My companions, and friends, shew the public this day what you really are. Acquit yourselves like men of service; observe your orders, and behave valiantly, for your own sakes as well as mine. If you do this, you will find the benediction of heaven on the points of your swords—honour, and the recompence of valour. But, on the contrary, if you think of flight, and self-*

* *Memoires communicated.* Merian, Theatr. Europ. 746.

† I have given this circumstance a place in my text, not from authority of De Prade, whose good faith I have never once depended on, but because Spanheim, (*Soldat Sued.* 828.) and the *Swedish Intelligencer*, both support the assertion. (Part iii. 128.) All I know is, it in no way appears where the king received this contusion; and, if I mistake not, he wore no armour at the battle of Leipsic.

‡ Others say, *Flot Grachten*, i. e. ditches to float wood.

|| Taken from the 46th and 67th psalms.

preservation, then your infamy is certain, as well as my disgrace and your destruction—And I here protest to you, on the veracity of a king, that not an atom of your bones shall ever return into Sweden*. Thence hastening to the German regiments, which formed, chiefly, the second line, he spoke to them briefly thus, lowering a little the tone of authority: *Friends, officers, and soldiers, let me conjure you to act a valiant part this ensuing day.—You shall fight, not only under me, but with me.—My own blood shall point you the track whereby to follow me.—Keep religiously within your ranks, and second your leader with resolution.—If you do this, victory is ours, and all its advantages, which you and your posterity will not fail to enjoy.—But if you once give ground, from that moment your lives and liberties become a sacrifice to the enemy †.*

On the conclusion of these two short harangues, one universal shout of acclamation passed from regiment to regiment, throughout the army.

The king's field-disposition‡ proceeded upon the same principles, but somewhat enlarged and improved, as had been last year exhibited at Leipzig. Here we must observe with pleasure, that Puffendorff, and the authors of the Swedish Intelligencer, and Low Dutch Relation, agree almost to a tittle in every word concerning this arrangement. The whole army was formed upon two lines; but the troops appear to me to be *not so good* as those produced last year at Leipzig; so consuming is the wear and tear of war, even on the prosperous and victorious side. Many regiments were discordant masses, composed from broken ones: that of Lowenstein, in particular, had been so lately raised, as not to be proprietor of a single standard; and the principal generals, such as Horn, Banier, Bauditzon, and Dubalt, were all absent. His majesty, according to custom, took upon himself the conduct of the right wing, where were disposed six regiments of native Swedes, supported by five intermingled bodies of musqueteers. The left-wing was committed to duke Bernard's care, and consisted of the like number of cavalry, and intermixed infantry. The centre was composed of the four invincible brigades, or columns, namely, the

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 829. *Merc. Franc. Swedish Intell.* part iii.

† I have preferred these speeches to those recorded by Chemnitz, which, in imitation of the practice of the ancient historians, seem to favour more of the library than of the field. Besides, the *Soldat Suedois*, the *Mercure François*, and the *Intelligencer*, all came out at the same period, in Switzerland, France, and England; and each author relates, nearly word for word, the very passages that I have preserved.

‡ *Chemnitz. de Bello Sueco-Germanico*, p. 372.

pretorian,

pretorian, or yellow guards, the first brigade, the white*, and the blue; supported by Henderfon's reserve of Scottish infantry, and commanded by Nicholas Brühé, count of Weissenburg.

The second line consisted of the same numbers with the first, in respect both to regiments and brigades, ranged precisely on like principles, excepting that the reserve consisted of cavalry instead of infantry. Bulach commanded the right wing, Knipphausen led the main body, and Ernest, prince of Anhalt, conducted the left wing. It was the king's custom, at this period, to make his lines only four deep in cavalry, and six in infantry; whereas Wallstein, following the ancient practice of the Low-Countries, advanced always ten deep, at the very least. The watch word, on both sides, was the same that had been used at Leipsic. The Swedes had twenty field-pieces, of a moderate size, disposed here and there to the best advantage; and several portable cannons of the king's invention were ordered to advance in the front of each body of intermingled musqueteers†.

It is difficult to give the reader a distinct account of the Imperial dispositions in this day's service; for so greatly was Gustavus admired, in the character of a field-officer, that the generality of plans, which have fallen within my reach, bear an eye principally to the Swedish form of battle. Of Wallstein's therefore we shall say the less, as we are unable to specify, by name, what colonels commanded the respective regiments; and likewise, to pronounce, decisively, which of the two Imperial ground-plots, here exhibited, was realized

* Some say the *green*.

† The chevalier de Folard must make a mistake in the arrangement, and plan, which he forms of the king's forces; and I think for the rather, because he errs in the ichnographical windings of the *Flusgraben* and the position of the gallows: so that it appears probable to me, that he never beheld the plains of Lützen, nor rightly knew the number of the Swedish forces. He allows to the eight columns, on the lowest computation, many more men, than the king, at that time, could produce; or more than he employed in the brigade, or column, then practised by him. He errs, likewise, in disposing sixteen bodies of infantry behind the columns, when, in truth, the reserves of Henderfon and Ohem made only one regiment of foot, and one of cavalry, marked in the plan 53, and 54. Thus Folard, by two augmentations, has magnified the royal army *one third* at least beyond the truth: nevertheless, the disposition of the two reserves is neither incorrect, nor unnatural. It is probable, if his Swedish majesty had been master of 5000 supernumerary soldiers, he might have placed them as the chevalier has. But as we have the names, by us, of every distinct corps which served that day under Gustavus, and cannot produce troops sufficient to enlarge the columns, and make good the imaginary battalions, we find ourselves obliged to pass these remarks on an author highly excellent in most other respects.

by

by the commander in chief: whether, for example, *that* we have admitted into the body of the copper-plate, which is Dankaertz's; or *that* subjoined, and inclosed within a line, which rests upon the authority of the Swedish Intelligencer; for both writers were faithful collectors, and published their drafts soon after the death of Gustavus. In my own private opinion, it appeared best to give the preference to the *first*, as it is drawn up, to a certain degree, upon two lines; the only material variation being, that in the centre of the second plan Piccolomini's regiment of cavalry is placed amidst the infantry. We can however observe, with greater certainty, that Walstein, in imitation of Gustavus, condescended to mix some infantry amongst his cavalry, behind the wind-mills: That the conduct of the left wing was committed to Holk, supreme commander there till the arrival of Pappenheim, who always made a point of opposing Gustavus. The right wing was intrusted to Colorado, and Walstein undertook the command of the main body; making his appearance during the whole engagement in a sedan chair, which his friends attributed to the gout, and his enemies imputed to timidity, and dissimulation of sickness.

When the king saw the vast extent of the Imperial line of battle, he could not refrain from observing to his followers, that if Walstein was supported in a manner equal to appearances, he could not produce less than 30,000 effective men; and, by the way, fresh regiments were then marching every moment to the Austrian army, and Pappenheim's corps was expected by noon: so that the Walsteiners in effect brought 40,000 men into the field, before the day's service was concluded; and as the town of Lützen touched the extremity of the Imperial right wing, care was taken to set fire to the out-lying houses, and line the garden-walls with strong bodies of musqueteers, which did unspeakable mischief the next day, till duke Bernard at night cut 300 of them to pieces.

It is agreed likewise by most authors, that Walstein drew up his army in two lines, or something nearly resembling thereto; and that the centre consisted of four square masses of infantry, posted on the angles of a larger square.—That each of these bodies contained two Imperial regiments, amounting perhaps, for war had made its havock amongst them, to 3000 men, or thereabouts;—the inner square consisting of pikemen, and the outward of musqueteers;—the whole group intirely solid:—and forasmuch as the angles of such a figure are easily struck off from the main body of that figure, each corner was strengthened with a little lozenge made up of fifty musqueteers, which, like a sort of
Satellites,

Satellites, attended the motions of these larger Jupiters. Thus, says Folard * very sensibly, a first whimsical error was corrected by the substitution of a second still more paradoxical.

His majesty, the best officer of infantry the world had ever seen †, placed his confidence this day, as he did at Leipsic, on the doctrine of columns, one of the finest pieces of military machinery, say some writers, that human wit can devise for the service of the field; since bodies of infantry thus drawn up, arranged, and supported, may be pronounced with

* *Traité de la Colonne. p. lxi.*

† It may not be uninteresting, under this article, to subjoin a few remarks relating to the field arrangements of the king, the morality and discipline of his troops, &c. made by a person of condition as early as in the month of November 1630, long before his more perfect amendments and regulations took place. The account, says an exact historian, ran thus;

*** Dicebat se *novem & pulcherrimam* in ipsius exercitu *formam aciei* observasse, quam hoc loco describere nimis prolixum foret. Summa huc redit, eam *munitioni* similem, quæ ab omni parte, qua hosti accessus patet, eum destinatis ictibus petere queat: neque tantum machinas commode posse dis- plodi, sed etiam *quemque* sclopetarium viritum jaculari, & hostem ferire: quod in *magno agmine quadrato* fieri nequeat, ubi duobus aut tribus ordinibus sclopetarios dispendentibus reliqui ictus sint inanes, adeo ut agmen illud ab irruente equitatu facile dissolvi possit: *quod in acie Suecica fieri nequeat*; nam priusquam hostilis equitatus se loco movere aut impetum facere possit, *sclopetarios* sub præsidio non tantum hastatorum, sed etiam equitum, tan- quam *duorum propugnaculorum*, quæ ad latera habeant, tutos esse: adhuc multos gradus inter sclopetarios esse ad receptum, ut priusquam hostili equitatus ad ultimum agmen pervenire & illud disturbare possit, eum dissipari necesse sit. Cum igitur *coherencia* totius aciei, equitatus & peditatus, tor- mentorum majorum ac minorum, nec non sclopetariorum maximi sit mo- menti: se non videre, quomodo hujusmodi acies, *nisi Deo ita volente, aut si prius quam instructa sit, hostis eam ex improviso invadat, fundi fugarique possit: in eo autem victoriam verti, ut ordines firventur, nec acies rum- patur.*

Regem in conflictu (quod experientia testatur) imperterritum, nec minus præfenti animo esse, quam si sit in convivio: periculum omne, ubi opus sit, contemnere: à se, qui oculos excæcet, & animum deiciat, prorsus libe- rum esse: milites autem ipsius ita *exercitatos*, ut licet ordines ipsorum tur- bentur, eos mox restituere, & in locum suum redire possint: quod eo facilius sit, quia tertia fere pars exercitus *ex præfatis & ducibus constat*: quod sit robur exercitus.

Denique summopere sibi placuisse dicebat, quod *singulis diebus, præter exactam disciplinam, preces certis horis per tota castra bis devote habeantur, & Deus rogetur, ut ipsis victoriam largiatur*, milite diligenter monito, *felices successus à Deo proficisci*. * * * * *

Cum igitur tam fortes atque animosos se [Sueci milites] præbeant, Ger- manos & Scotos ipsorum exemplo excitari, ut mori malint quam aliquo delicto commissio honoris sui jacturam facere, aut ab aliis in officio faciendo superari. Regem autem ex hac æmulatione multum emolumenti capere: quam ita fovere & moderari norit, *ne gens una alteram odio prosequatur, sed unaquæque fidem & virtutem suam Regi probet.*

justice

justice to be *next* to invincible. What this column *precisely* was in detail, even before or at the battle of Leipzig, could at this period never be known, if a minute drawing of lord Reay, one of his majesty's favourite colonels, had not been preserved, by mere good fortune. That the king, in the present engagement improved, or, through scarcity of forces, altered the plan delineated by lord Reay, is a circumstance highly probable; but whether the Frenchman's drawing be strictly true, either as to the configuration or arrangement of the brigade, shall be left to the decision of better judges*.

In addition to what has been formerly said, it may be worth remarking, that the glory of this day's service must be attributed solely to the COLUMN of Gustavus, which, in truth, according to the opinion of several excellent judges, exceeds all field dispositions, not only in fair campaign, but also in rough and contracted ground; so that some writers, without assuming the gift of prophecy, have ventured to predict, that posterity one time or other will adopt this idea and support it with earnestness. Let us only therefore compare the column in question with those *two* military dispositions which most resemble it. It exceeds the old *Burgundian square* of Wallstein, not only in simplicity, velocity, and diversity of motion, but because its angles are, strictly speaking, unassailable, giving the adversary neither hold nor entrance in whatever form he proposes to attack them. Again, this very quadrangular mass of Wallstein, the most proper configuration extant, whereby to oppose the column of Gustavus, except another column, conformable to that prince's

* Folard seems to have received his idea of the brigade from traditional accounts; for *that*, which is substituted by him, carries little or no resemblance to lord Reay's actual delineation, nor to the alteration of it into *one half*, or *thereabouts*, [see Plan No II. p. 21 of this vol.] as his majesty, on certain occasions, might be induced to practise; but it bears more than a small similitude to the king's division of *one* brigade into *four*; each of which *fourths* was denominated a *battaglia*, [Plan No III. and IV. *ibid.*] but sure we are, that *these battaglias* could not be strong enough for the central parts in the engagement at Lützen, and therefore Folard's ichnographical representation must be defective.

It is probable the king used the *half brigade* in this day's service, for we have certain proofs he *did so* in the battle of Leipzig, since Dankäertz assures us, that each corps consisted of 1200 men; and the half brigade, or more properly the *improved brigade* of the second size No II., contained, according to our computation, 1224 men. So that this brigade, No II. was not properly *half in such proportion* as the *battaglia* was a *fourth*; for the numbers stood thus:

Original brigade	-	-	-	-	-	2016
Half, or reformed	-	-	-	-	-	1224
Battaglia	-	-	-	-	-	504

arrangement,

arrangement, surpasses that refinement upon him, which the moderns have furnished the *hollow square*, whose corners are still weaker than those of the other, and its impression or resistance less violent. But the brigade or column of Gustavus is solid upon all occasions, and versatile in every respect; its fire, without talking figuratively, may be termed perpetual, and it is capable of being diversified upon every new occurrence *ad infinitum*. It can contract itself in danger, or dilate in the moment of success with equal ease; and as in the disparting of solid bodies, if one may draw a comparison from more humble subjects, more wedges than one, of sizes different, are supposed to be necessary; thus an individual column *pro re nata*, in a single instant, can divide itself into a couple of columns differing in no respects from the parent which gave them birth, except in the circumstances of weight and magnitude.

It has been asked by many, how this great tactical invention took its flight from the world *at once* after the death of Gustavus? To which question it may suffice to reply, that it expired by *swift degrees*, but not *instantaneously*. For the Swedish general Kniphausen fought and conquered upon the principle of columns at the battle of Oldendorp in 1633; and five campaigns afterwards, the victory of Wittenweyr, where duke Bernard commanded, and Turenne and Guébriant served under him, was obtained by imitating the self-same practice*.

About nine in the morning the king drew his sword, and placed himself at the head of the right wing, attended by the duke of Saxe Lauenberg, Crailham the grand master of his household, a body of English and Scottish gentlemen, whom he had *reformed* at Schlenking, and destined to be a sort of aids-de-camp, and some few domestics and grooms. But as Walstein's left wing extended further than the king's right wing, his majesty, for fear of being attacked in flank, ordered three divisions to advance from the line of cavalry, which was posted behind him†, and when Kniphausen missed these troops from their station, and begged by message to know what was become of them, the king returned him back word by the duke of Saxe Lauenberg, that after one charge, he should find them at his service in their old position.

* *Merian*, Theatr. Europæum. tom. ii.

† Namely N° 19. 21, 22. commanded by Bulach.

By this time the cannonade began to grow extremely violent; for Walstein's artillery, though not great in quantity, was exceedingly heavy, and being well mounted on proper batteries, made uncommon slaughter amongst the Swedish foldiers. This sharpened the king to bring on a general engagement as speedily as possible, having nothing with him but field-pieces, and small portable cannons. His whole army had to cross the ditches, which were well lined with musqueteers, and had been rendered, by Walstein, five feet deep, which incommoded the cavalry especially, and beyond measure; yet this important obstacle was at length surmounted, and the commanded musqueteers, in conjunction with a Swedish brigade, cleared the whole high road, and then the battle began in all its forms. Nevertheless, the four Swedish brigades of the first line, the finest body of infantry then in the world, found crossing the ditches so extremely hazardous and perplexing, that their ardour abated a little, and they seemed to pause. His majesty, who was posted at some inconsiderable distance from the centre, not perceiving them to advance in such proportion as the troops which he conducted, flew to them in an instant, and dismounting, snatched a partizan from one of the officers, in order to lead them over the fosse*. If, said he, with a tone of severity as he marched along, *after having passed so many rivers, scaled numberless fortresses, and fought various battles, your antient intrepidity has at once deserted you, stand firm at least some minutes longer, and have the curiosity to see your master die—in the manner he ought, and in the manner he chuses.* Upon this the foldiers all cried out, *Stop, Sire, for heaven's sake spare that invaluable life of your's; distrust us not; the business shall be completed †.*

Gustavus returning to the head of the right wing, soon set an example to his keenest foldiers; for making his horse spring across the ditch, his companions thought themselves obliged to follow him cheerfully. Having cast a glance

* *Continuat. Laur. Austriac.* fol. 32.

† *Theatr. Europ.* fol. 747, &c. He that describes a battle without well considering the ground, and having a distinct plan before his eyes, both which advantages we have the good fortune to boast, will commit errors upon errors, *ad infinitum*. Du Prade says, the king made this speech to the regiments of *La Tour* [Thurn] and *Chrestoph*; but unfortunately for the French historiographer, Gustavus never had such a regiment as the latter in his service. Riccio makes the reprimand addressed to the corps of Thurn and Anhalt (Nº 28. 32.) Now these troops were placed in the rear of the centre and left wing, nor were they moved from their station till some hours after the death of Gustavus.

over the Imperial wing that opposed him, and perceiving there three single masses of Imperial cuirassiers, clad in iron, and Isolani's Croatian cavalry, which terminated the first line, he called to him colonel Stalhaus, an officer of great repute, though he had been originally only a footman: *Stalhaus*, said he, *charge me those black fellows soundly, for they are the men that will undo us**: as to the Croatians, *I mind them not*. Others; with less authority, diversify the expressions: *they are the men, IT IS PROPHESED, will undo us*. Stalhaus executed the royal orders with great alacrity; but the irregular cavalry, according to custom, changed their station, and attacked the baggage-waggons, putting all at first into such confusion, that the king's own coach ran away in the universal disorder. Thus Bulach, whose three divisions Gustavus had commanded from Kniphausen's second line, was obliged to attend these desultory combatants, and afforded no other assistance to the first and grand impression, which his master undertook to make. Soon after, namely, about eleven a clock in the morning, the king received the stroke of death; and immediately a mist arose which, though the day promised to be brighter than usually appears in the month of November, obscured the sky on a sudden to such a degree, that the soldiers could hardly discover their companions at twenty feet distance. We will pass over the unpleasing event of his majesty's death for a few moments, and pursue the various changes and circumstances of the battle, which was gained upon the king's principles of arrangement, and *field-disposition*, although the great Gustavus was then no more!

As the duke of Saxe Lauenberg immediately left the field, and conveyed himself to Weissenfels, supposing, as his friends gave out, that the day was lost irrecoverably; the first intelligence duke Bernard received of his master's death, was the discovery of his horse, which being wounded in the shoulder, galloped up and down the line of battle. The duke immediately *whispered* this fatal news to Kniphausen, and they both agreed in an instant, from *that* presence of mind peculiar to great men, to spread a report, that the king of Sweden was taken *prisoner*, which soon produced the desired effect; for the soldiers thenceforwards fought like

* These were Marazini's cuirassiers, &c. which former boasted the honour of having killed the king; yet it is probable that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cavalry, and therefore Walstein made him that extraordinary present, which we have mentioned elsewhere.

enraged

enraged lions * in order to recover their leader's body; or, as Scheffer informs us † with stronger probability, every man had an ambition to expire the same day with his royal leader.

The mist, which arose about the time the king fell, proved no way inconvenient to the right wing, where his majesty commanded; for the Imperialists at that period had rather the advantage: but Stalhaus, to whom the command then devolved, made use of the incident, to reinstate and new dispose his forces, and making a fresh desperate charge, recovered the royal body of his sovereign master.

At this very period the Swedish generals led on their troops to a second conflict. Here it was, that the four central brigades, in front, performed wonders, as has been acknowledged even by the Imperialists themselves; for they drove their enemies to the foot of the gallows, and almost totally ruined that large invincible mass of troops that belonged to Piccolomini. Here it was too that the two regiments of elder Bruner and young Walstein made a resistance so very obstinate and unparalleled, that the Imperial generalissimo, when he retreated into Bohemia, adopted the residue of them for his own guards round the palace of Prague, and clothed, paid, and fed them at his own expence.

The Swedes moreover took several standards ‡, and seized a battery consisting of seven large pieces of cannon, that was planted before this body of troops; which in truth was effected the more easily, as Walstein's powder-waggons in that quarter had by some accident taken fire a few minutes before. This sharp contest lasted near an hour, and, to render matters still more disagreeable to the Imperial commander, a body of 1000 German cavalry conceived a panic terror, without any assignable reason, and consulted their safety in such a manner, as never more to return during that day's service. All they said was, for an English officer, then a prisoner, was hurried away with them in the tumult; *We know the king of Sweden very well; he always shines towards the end of a battle.*

Now, after a short intermission, the count de Pappenheim arrived, and so highly was that officer esteemed by all parties, that notwithstanding the confusion and tumult of the late engagement, a report passed from mouth to mouth

* *Loccen. Hist. Suec. lib. viii. 604. Pietro Pomo; Guerre di Germ. 4º.*

† *Memorab. Suec. Gent. 181.*

‡ *Merc. Franç. tom. xviii. 735.*

through

through either army, that Pappenheim was come at the head of his cavalry, and invincible infantry. This rumour was not strictly true, for when Walstein's message found him at Halle, his foot-soldiers had dispersed round that town and Merzburg in quest of plunder; so that he had time only to march his cuirassiers and dragoons*, which amounted, it is probable, to about 6 or 7000 combatants. He had a post preserved for him, which he always affected, and that was the wing opposite Gustavus. Of this he took the command in an instant; but whilst he was making some dispositions at the head of the line, he received a stroke from a falcon-shot. Nevertheless, as soon as the ball had reached him, the wound being given in his thigh, upon recovering his senses, he spoke cheerfully to his men, though he well knew he had received a blow from the hand of death. A coach conveyed him out of the battle, and his chaplain, whom he had sent for, attended him. As he passed through the ranks, he called a particular officer to him: Sir, said he, tell Walstein, giving him no title of highness, excellency, general, &c. that what I have received is enough for my purpose; but tell him too, that I have preserved the catholic religion, and made the emperor a FREE MAN†: for he knew at that time Gustavus was dead. He then faced death with the same tranquillity in his bed, as he had done on innumerable occasions in the field of battle: for this brave and prudent commander, as if he had determined to rival Gustavus in every thing, was one of the most moral and religious persons in the Imperial army‡. He was born the same year with Gustavus, and exceeded him in age only six months and a few days. It is remarkable, that he had triumphed over his enemies in forty-four battles and encounters, but lived not to receive the order of the Golden Fleece, which had been promised him the preceding autumn§. The chamber in which he expired is still shewn at Leipzig with great respect||. It is a little mean apartment in the castle of Pleissenberg.

Yet the name of Pappenheim, his having received the wound being generally unknown, was sufficient to revive

* Helvici Hist. lib. xxi. p. 231.

† Riccius de Bello Germ. 437.

‡ Idem, 438.

§ Relat. Espagnole de la Bataille de Lützen. Printed at Lisbon 1633. 4º.

|| Di questa morte, frà le morti riputata felicissima da soldati, finì la vita nel fiore dell' età, et delle sue glorie Goffredo di Pappenheim, ornato delle più excelse dote, ch' illustrassero giamai capitano di fama; in vita dopo Gustavo Re di Suecia, primo guerrier de suoi tempi; e nella morte, rimaso solo, del sentimento commune de gl' huomini, condegna à bilanciare la perdita d'un tanto Re. [Pietro Pomo; Guerre di Germ. Liber iv. 226.]

the ardor of the Imperial combatants; nor were the succours he brought, as his troops were the best seasoned of all that served under the ensigns of the league, considered by any man as a contemptible reinforcement.

Now began a third engagement of two hours duration; for new life was infused into the Imperial army upon the return of Pappenheim's forces. On that general's leaving the field, Holk resumed the command of the left wing, in like manner as Stalhaus replaced Gustavus. They engaged each other with various fortune, but the combat was attended with no one decisive event.

Meanwhile Piccolomini, Tertzky, and others, led on to the charge the Imperial centre, consisting of four great square masses of infantry, each consisting of 3000 men, or thereabouts, and flanked by two regiments of cuirassiers, all which troops seconded their leaders with extreme resolution. Here Piccolomini was twice or thrice shot, yet never left the scene of action. The wreck fell extremely heavy on the four Swedish brigades that confronted them*, the flower and glory of the royal army; so that excepting the right-hand brigade, commanded by Charles Harte, which the Smoland cavalry protected, and the left-hand brigade, which received shelter from duke Bernard's horse, the two middlemost had five persons out of six killed or disabled†. It was remarked that this veteran body of infantry, when the men were killed, lay stretched out almost as regularly, as if the survivors had placed the corpses in battle array.

This last desperate struggle seemed to portend no good to the Swedish cause; for the battery before taken was now regained, and eight standards lost, one of which belonged to the king's own company of royal guards. Kniphausen, who commanded the rear of the centre, an officer of unparalleled coolness and foresight, soon reinstated affairs, by dispatching to the relief of his associates the two regiments of Thurn and Mitzval‡, and four considerable bodies of horse; namely, the prince of Anhalt's, Lowenstein's, Brandstein's, and Steinboeh's§, which latter, consisting of dragoons, was a favourite corps in the estimation of their late master. This judicious reinforcement soon restored the fortunes of the day; so that the Swedes retook the battery, and another on its left hand, which contained four pieces of large artillery.

* No 8, 9, 10, 11.

† The blue brigade (Winkle's) had served under Charles IX. the king's father. *Relat. Espagnole.*

‡ No 38, 39. This Mitzval was a brother to the colonel whom Gustavus beheaded in Bavaria.

§ No 35, 33, 31, 29.

Duke

Duke Bernard in the left wing had a piece of service to engage in that was equally desperate; for the enormous battery of all, near the windmills, laid full in his front; and the road and ditch being nearer the enemy, rendered all approaches more difficult to him than the rest of the army. He had once conceived an idea of setting fire to Lützen, which Wulstein had partly effected the same morning, and attacking the Croats at the extremity of the Imperial wing, in their flank; but for certain good reasons, as the enemy could have lined the town-walls with fresh supplies of musqueteers, he forebore to put the idea into execution. Nevertheless, in the space of two hours he led his troops on to the charge twelve several times, whilst Colorado, who commanded against him, being protected by a numerous train of artillery, which it was prudent in him upon no advantage to remove himself from, allowed the young and valiant hero, already wounded in the right arm, to waste his strength against such extraordinary difficulties in what proportions he pleased; and in one of these attacks thundered against the duke with such violence, that the prince thought it not an unfoldier-like action to shelter himself for a few moments under the miller's house marked L. Meanwhile Kniphausen kept the rear-line composed and in excellent order, dispatching his little assistance to all places where they could be looked upon as needful. By this time the mist cleared off, and as all parties seemed desirous to know the fate of their companions, a kind of pause or breathing-space ensued, seemingly as it were, by the tacit desire of the combatants.

Upon this duke Bernard galloped up and down the lines of battle, in order to contemplate the countenance and situation of his fellow-soldiers. He soon perceived the greater part of the army exceedingly shattered, but rejoiced at the same time to perceive that Kniphausen had preserved the rear of the centre and the reserve in excellent order. They agreed in a moment to renew the combat. At the same time Wulstein, taking advantage of the sky then clearing, dispatched Piccolomini and Tertzky to observe the Swedes, who brought him back word, that they were new-forming themselves, and returning to a fourth engagement. It was in this onset, that the royal army brought ten of their own field-pieces to act against the windmill battery; and the eleven cannons which they had taken from the Imperialists; for the stress of the action by universal consent was now near the town of Lützen, whose adjacent walls being lined with musqueteers, sorely galled the advancing Swedes. Here Wulstein received a slight stroke from a musquet-ball that had spent its force; and duke Bernard and Colorado engaged

till evening with a fury and obstinacy that can hardly be described; pausing from and resuming the combat like fatigued duellers. The fortune of the day began now to incline manifestly to the Swedish side, which acknowledged its success to be partly due to the *intermingled musqueteers**; but the fog, not unfavourably for the Imperialists, obscured the skies a second time, so that duke Bernard could not help crying out, *Gracious God! had it not been for this darkness, I had completed the affair!*

Now a rumour ran through either army with the rapidity of lightning, that Pappenheim's infantry was at length arrived; which, though the report proved afterwards false, might have dismayed any troops, except the Swedish ones. The attack was still continued with great violence near the windmills. At length duke Bernard having rallied his cavalry, and being seconded by Kniphausen with four fresh regiments of infantry, the Imperial army was reduced to the last extremity; and night put an end to the desperate day's service on the plains of Lützen.

Yet the Swedes, if we consider the confusion the mists had created, were far from certain that the battle was concluded. Duke Bernard and Kniphausen held a consultation, whether they should retire to Weissenfels or not; at length they determined heroically, upon supposition they found the attempt barely practicable, to preserve the spot of ground they had gloriously maintained; for they were not absolutely sure they had gotten the victory. In this interval Wallstein sounded a retreat, the meaning of which the Swedes happened not to comprehend: but an Imperial horseman, who had orders to command Hoffkirk's regiment to follow the generalissimo to Leipzig, fell by chance upon colonel Ohem's regiment of cavalry, which made in the daytime the final reserve of the army, and having kept free from action, was appointed the advanced guard at night. The cavalier being asked whom he wanted, replied, naturally, Hoffkirk's regiment: Here it is, replied the sentinel, and conducted him immediately to his own commander, colonel Ohem.—Then it was the Swedish generals comprehended, for the first time, the great advantages they had obtained. The soldiers, without any refreshment, slept all night on the hard ground; and a severe frost, which came on before morning, happened to kill many of the wounded that might otherwise have survived.

The battle lasted about nine hours. The Imperialists lost 7000 men, and the Swedes between 2 and 3000. Many more might have been destroyed by the latter, but night

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 375.

prevented *all pursuit*. It is the pursuit, which gives us the *long list of dead and wounded* in a great victory; and therefore it may be worth while to remark here incidentally, that the Saxons, who fled from the plains of Leipzig, lost *doubtly* more men than the Swedes, who remained and fought valorously many hours afterwards till the close of the evening.

Amongst the killed on one side was the KING of SWEDEN, whom the Imperialists pronounced the bravest enemy, and the best general in Christendom *: as also the counts Nils and Weissenburg, colonel Gerldorf, serjeant-major-general Uslar, Ernest prince of Anhalt, count Thurn, and colonel Wildessein.

Amongst

* It may be worth while here to give mankind the idea, which the more bigoted papists, towards whom he ever comported himself with all imaginable courtesy and moderation, entertained of Gustavus. True it is, he disliked the Jesuits, and usually expressed himself with warmth on their intriguing, mischievous interferences, and relaxed morality. They, on the other hand, as the ministry in England surnamed him the *dragon-king*, always bestowed on him the denomination of *genuine anticrist*.

"Acie cecidit Gustavus, inter nostræ memoriæ duces facile primus, nisi magis pugna quam regem deceret.—Militaris disciplinæ peritia, bellicæque virtute nemo potuit cum eo componi. Erga etiam gregarios milites facilis regium supercilium demisit: quo fiebat, ut esset acceptissimus militum animis, quamvis eos a furtis & stupris poenis durioribus coereret.

"Exercitus suos severissima disciplina continuit: cultus ei corporis nihil a vulgari abhorrens; vestes nullo auro distinctæ, aut aureis amentis insignes: nihil in amictu pretiosum nitebat.—*In suæ superstitionis IMPIETATE PISSIMUS; summaque ei atque exacta suorum sacrorum cura, cum eos ritus, quibus a rudibus annis imbutus fuerat, EXQUISITA religione servaret.*

"Me sane eorum misereret, qui parentum erroribus erudiuntur, & falsis hæreticorum placitis instituti, vanis religionibus, in quibus nati educatique sunt, tenacissime hæreant. Rex tamen nunquam catholicam religionem contempsit, immo maximum honorem pluribus religiosorum hominum famillis habuit: præcipue patrum Capuchinorum arctas rigidæque vitæ rationes obstupuit; de quibus dicere consueverat, eos patres esse validissimum catholicæ veritatis argumentum."

"Fuit assentionis insensibilis hostis; nam et suos duces non ita pridem, antequam acie caderet, acribus verbis accepit, quod *suæ virtuti felicitatque victoriarum laudes, non Deo tribuerent*: et sane si rerum gestarum magnitudinem, expeditionumque fortunatos eventus atque exitus intuemur, nullus Rex multis abhinc sæculis eo felicior censeri potest: cum veluti fulmen totam Germaniæ latitudinem a Baltico mari usque ad Carnicæ rupes cuncta belli terrore evergens exiguo tempore emensus, centum & triginta urbes aut bellis domuerit, aut in fidem, & deditionem acceperit." *Riccius de Bellis German. 4.º. 433, 434.*

— "Prodotto dalla natura per vivamente rappresentar al mondo l' unica e perfetta idea d' un gran prencipe; possedeva, quasi mostro delle militari perfettioni, cumulatamente tutte le più eccelle parti, che si richiedono ad illustrare un gran capitano; la giustizia e la clemenza erano unite in lui come tempra sì forte, che mai nell' azioni sue si videro scompagnate; ne vi fù mai prencipe, ch' adun' istesso tempo meglio di lui sapesse farsi da sudditi amare e temere; parve mentr' egli visse, suonar se medesima la fortuna,

Amongst the slain on the other side may be reckoned the illustrious Pappenheim, the prince and abbot of Fulda*, count

“ per riempier lui solo di trionfi, e di gloria, e nascondendo à bell' arte i pregi proprii, voler, che solo al valore di lui s' attribuissero gl' esiti dell' imprese felici; in tutte le fattioni del comandare, e del combattere, esemplare non meno à soldati che à capitani; epilogo in somma dell' arti tute del dominare, e nella pace e nella guerra; visse ne' suoi riti religioso osservator delle più esquisite virtù morali; nè i buoni v' ebbero altro à desiderare in lui, che un vero lume di fede. Il livore e l' invidia vi trovarono di più, da notare in lui una subita colera e un ardir soverchio: ma quella, corretta d' un immediata dolcezza, e affabilità naturale, conciliava in altrui più, che odio, o timore, amore, e riverenza. Quello diffetto ordinario dell' anime grandi, che non capendo nell' angustia d' un cuor humano, sgorga, e rompe nel desiderabile della gloria, senz' avvertire all' orribile, che lo minaccia; era à ciascheduno, che lo mirava riguardevole per la grandezza del corpo e vie più venerabile per la venuta della faccia, in cui manifestò scorgevasi quel raggio di Maestà, che d' ordinario imprime Dio nella fronte di quelli, che costituiscono dominatori di qualche gran parte dell' universo.” *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania, 4.^o libr. iv. 128, 129.*

— Tal fine hebbe Gustavo Secondo, Re di Suecia, capitano e nel valore e nella perizia non inferiore a qualsivoglia de gli antichi. E non ha dubbio, che se la morte non gli rompeva sì presto il corso de' suoi vaitissimi pensieri, gemerebbe hora la Germania, e gran parte del resto dell' Europa sotto giogo Straniero. Poiche osservantissimo della disciplina militare, seppe in se stesso & ne' suoi soldati, mantenerla sempre viva. Non lasciava marciar nell' ozio la soldatesca: ma quando non v' era contrasto nemico, la teneva esercitata con moderate fatiche; et abbassandosi egli stesso dalla regia condizione a quella del più basso uffiziale insegnava a formar le squadre, a maneggiar l' armi, come si scaricasse il moschetto in piedi, come curvo, come a sedere. Non comportò mai nelle guerre di tanti anni, che nel suo esercito si trovasse donne di scandalo. E voleva ne' soldati la modestia, e l' affabilità con tutti, vietando affatto ogni insolenza. Per dar' animo agli altri soleva mettersi a combattere alla testa: & a chi lo pregava a porsi in luogo più sicuro, rispondeva, *Ch' egli era solito non di spingere, ma di guidar' i soldati alla battaglia.* Onde non è maraviglia, se nel corso continuo di tanti anni con nazioni ferocissime, ottenesse tante vittorie; e che nell' istessa battaglia, dov' ei fu privo di vita, il suo esercito restasse vittorioso. Aggungasi a tutto questo, che non havendosi eletto alcun' Idolo, al cui capriccio dovesse sacrificare la propria riputazione, e l' sangue, e le sostanze de' sudditi; ma riconoscendo i meriti di tutti, e dipendendo da se stesso; conciliassi appresso i suoi una venerazione transcendente l' humana capacità. E felice invero poteva riputarsi, s' el valore che da Dio gli era stato donato, fusse da lui stato impiegato, non in danno della religione cattolica. Ma venendo a mancare nelle sue grandi imprese la giustizia della causa, restan prive di quel premio che si deve alla pietà & religione.” *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani illustri, 387, &c.*

* John Bernard Schenk, prince and abbot, chosen March 12, 1613. Curiosity led him to the battle. A cannon-ball struck him as he contemplated the action from one of the windmills. (*Le Barre, Hist. D'Allemagne, Theatr. Europ. tom. ii. 749.*) This prelate had a title to the same motto which his late neighbour the bishop of Wurtzburg and Bamberg assumed in

count Bertholt Walstein, serjeant-major-general Breüuer, six colonels, and a prince of Ditrichstein.

The Imperialists lost only twenty-one pieces of artillery; for Walstein, who little expected the king should attack him, was not greatly provided; it being his firm opinion, till convinced by ocular proof to the contrary, that Gustavus would not attempt to act decisively before the Saxon and Lunenberg armies had formed their junction with him. So that this general, if I remember right, had but twenty-seven large cannons in all; though some writers add ten pieces more. Now such a collection may be considered as a kind of defect in point of military precaution, forasmuch as it was in his power to have procured a larger store;—and under this article we may blame him likewise for the loose and dispersed cantonment of all his forces, many of whom marched the whole night, and were half fatigued when they faced their opponents the ensuing morning*. He is censured moreover for making his appearance in a sedan-chair, and rarely, if ever, exposing his person in such trying emergencies as we have here recited. But Piccolomini made ample amends for the thinness of his generalissimo; for though he had three horses killed under him, and received ten wounds, yet he staid till the last man on the field of battle†. It may suffice to add, that Walstein retreated precipitately without a pursuer from Leipzig to Prague, and there held a severe court-martial, which might be considered as a *forensic* campaign. For most of his officers died gallantly; and a young colonel, whose scaffold was erected under our chieftain's window, began his speech in the following manner: *Gentlemen, I present myself here to die; and upon what occasion? For running away with my generalissimo.*—But Walstein, who affected to be extravagant in all things, was alike extraordinary in rewards and in punishments; for he gave many of his officers gold chains, adorned with diamonds, to which a medal of himself was affixed, that amounted each to the value of £. 500.—He presented Piccolomini with a large sum, £. 1600., as we have mentioned formerly‡; and

when

the beginning of the Bohemian wars 1618. Being obliged to furnish to the Imperial army a large contingent, as duke of Franconia, he affixed this device to his standards: *Una manu gladium, altera Breviarium*; nor would the self-same lemma twenty-five years afterwards have proved remarkably improper for Bernard van Galen, bishop of Münster.

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 373.

† Ottavio Piccolomini, descended from one of the best families in Sienna; created afterwards duke of Amalfi. The more curious may peruse his life at large in a quarto, entitled, *Scelta di Azioni egregie da generali e da Soldati Italiani dall' anno 1600 fino al 1700.* Venet. 1742. 4to.

‡ Pag. 85 of this vol.

when the king of Denmark reclaimed Holst, as his subject, under pain of confiscating his little possessions, he gave him his choice of four Bohemian signories, which contained each of them sixteen or eighteen dorps and villages.

Here it may be proper to say something more diffuse concerning the death of Gustavus, who fought sword in hand at the head of the Smoland cavalry, which closed the right flank of the centre, and, perhaps, in his ardour outstripped the brigades which composed the main body, and whose business it was to advance upon the same line with himself. As his majesty's eyesight was not the most perfect, and forasmuch as a mist began gently to obscure the sky, it is most probable to imagine * that, attended only by his own followers and servants, and the squadron commanded by him, he had a violent desire to examine the center of the Imperial army, towards which his own invincible *brigades* were now advancing, and on whose bravery and firmness he principally grounded the future success of the day's service. It is natural, I say, to conclude, that the king lost his life in some attempt like this, being prompted on by a high spirit of impatience and curiosity; for most accounts agree, that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cuirassiers, whom some place in the first line of the Imperial left wing opposite the letter C, and others place it in the very central point behind letter B: but the confusion and difficulties under each of those articles are so perplexing and intricate, that I have sometimes been induced to think, that Piccolomini was a colonel both of infantry and cavalry, and that two regiments derived their names from him; that sort of honour and encouragement being not unfrequent in the Swedish service; where duke Bernard had a couple of regiments, a substitute-colonel being appointed; and so had Teüffel, Kniphausen, Falkenberg, and others †.

Here therefore, that is, in the front of the troops first described, or, which is more probable, in the interval between them and the adjoining mass of infantry, Gustavus received a ball in his left arm ‡, which at first he either did not feel, or disregarded, still keeping foremost, with great intrepidity; yet the soldiers perceived their leader to be wounded, long before he spoke to that effect, and expressed their affliction, and consternation: *Courage, my comrades*, replied he, *the affair is nothing: let us resume our point, and return to*

* *Mémoires communiquéés. Theatr. Europ. tom. ii. fol. 742. Carezza, lib. iii. 402. 120. Colon. Agrip. 1639.*

† *Arma Suecica, p. 79.*

‡ Another account says, that he received two pistol-shots. *Mémoires communiquéés.*

the charge *. One of the equerries cried out likewise, that his majesty was wounded, for which the king reproved him harshly †. At length perceiving his voice and strength fail him, and fearing to disunite his brave associates, he whispered the duke of Saxe Lauenberg to this purport: *Cousin ‡, I perceive myself to be grievously wounded: convey me hence to some place of safety §*. In that instant, as the king's followers were preparing to retreat, an Imperial cavalier advanced, unobserved, in this momentary confusion of turning, and having cried out, *Long have I sought thee ||*, transpierced his majesty with a pistol-ball through the body; but he lived not to glory in this inhumanity; for the master of the horse to the duke of Saxe Lauenberg shot him dead with the words recent on his lips. Upon this Piccolomini's cuirassiers gave the king's companions a most desperate attack. His majesty was for some moments supported on his saddle, but the horse being at that very instant shot in the shoulder, made a desperate plunge, and flung the rider to the earth. His few personal attendants staid with him; but the troops that accompanied him were soon dispersed. One of the gentlemen of the bedchamber, who was likewise on the ground, cried out aloud, in order to save his master's life, that *he* was the king of Sweden. Upon which an Imperial cuirassier, who had alighted to strip the bodies, ran him through with his sword: Gustavus afterwards being asked who he was, replied boldly, *I am the king of Sweden, and seal with my blood the protestant religion, and the liberties of Germany*: adding likewise, *Alas! my POOR QUEEN! Alas! my POOR QUEEN!* The Imperialists gave him five dreadful and inhuman wounds; and though one shot him through the head, he had strength to pronounce, *My God! my God!* His body was stripped in an instant, the shirt excepted, for every enemy was desirous to possess some spoil that belonged to him. His buff waistcoat was sent to the arsenal at Vienna **,

* *Merc. Franc.* tom. xviii. p. 734.

† *Memoires de Santa Cruz*, tom. v. 3.

‡ This appellation was not purely an expression of regal courtesy, for the wife of Gustavus Vasa, and grandmother of Gustavus Adolphus, was a princess of Saxe Lauenberg; and our king's father's sister married Magnus III. duke of Saxe Lauenberg, who was brother to the father of Francis Albert, concerning whom we are now speaking. *Mem. communicat.*

§ *Santa Cruz*, *ibid.*

|| We have at length discovered, that this person was one *Maurice Falkenberg*, a lieutenant of cavalry in Goëtz's regiment. He knew the king, having been lately his prisoner, and received many courtesies from him on account of his surname or kindred: for if the reader remembers, there was a baron *Falkenberg*, a German born, who bravely defended Magdeburg against Tilly. *Memoirs communicated. Fide Monumenta Raderbornensia*, 216.

** *Patin. Relat. Hist.* p. 11.

but

but fell first into Piccolomini's hands*. A common soldier seized that magical sword†, concerning which the German professors have published more dissertations than one; and Holk obtained by purchase the possession of his ring and spurs. One Schneberg, a lieutenant in Goëtz's cavalry, seized his gold chain, which is still preserved in the Schneberg family; namely, at the time the *Monumenta Paderbornensia* were made public‡.

Having mentioned this work, we must beg leave to remark transiently, that it was composed by Ferdinand de Furstenberg bishop of Paderborn: and as the present part is purely digressional, it may be wondered, why this person was so extremely anxious to make such minute enquiries concerning the authors of the king's death. But his own words under this article shall solve the difficulty; for the good prelate had a mind that the natives of his diocese should claim the honour of destroying *Antichrist*; for such the Papists styled Gustavus.

Placuit hoc receus Paderbornensium militum facinus, dum vetera monumenta percensemus, hic subnectere.——NE QUI ALII, UT POST VICTORIAM IGNAVI ETIAM GLORIANTUR, HANC SIBI LAUDEM PRÆCERPANT.

Nevertheless it may be worth while to remark here, that though Schneberg took the chain, yet from the period in question to the present moment, we know nothing concerning a famous *Turquoise* enchased therein, and hanging at the bottom, of extraordinary size and beauty, and belonging from time immemorial to the crown of Sweden. *Cyano*s, says a most faithful and candid historian §, *quam aurea catenula appensum collo gestabat, singularis magnitudinis gemma, atque antiquum Suecia regum munus, nusquam inventa est, quamvis rex omnino spoliatus in campo deinceps repertus sit.* That this remarkable stone should never make its appearance since in Europe, is a difficulty hard to be accounted for; since Schneberg might have shewn the *Turquoise* in the same manner he produced the *chain*.

Meanwhile, one Innocentio Bucela, *camerado*, as the language then ran, to colonel Piccolomini, informed his friend, that the king of Sweden, whom he well knew, was naked and dead hard by them. Piccolomini flew immediately to the place mentioned, accompanied only by ten cavaliers, and found Gustavus in his last convulsive agonies.

* *Burgi Mars Sueco* Germ. p. 230. 12°.

† *Relat. Espagnole de la Bataille de Lützen* imprimée à Lisbon. 1633. 4°.

‡ Anno 1669. In *Heristalia Saxon.* p. 216. et seqq. See more in *Struve*, under the article of Ferdinand II. § 39.

§ *Burgi Mars Sueco Germanicus*, p. 230. It was of the true oriental sort, which comes out of the *old rock* in the mountains of Piruskuza, about eighty miles from the town of Moscheda. *Memoirs communicated.*

He proposed that moment to have carried off the deceased, but Stalhaus charged with such fury, that the Imperialists were obliged to relinquish their prize; and, what may be worth remarking, the king's two faithful grooms, though mortally wounded, had thrown themselves over their master's body*.

Many have supposed Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, concerning whom we have spoken amply in various places, in order to give some light into what hereafter may follow, to have had some hand in the king's death, not by open force and an act of murder, but by concealed indications agreed on betwixt him and the Imperial party.—It is not our custom to disturb the ashes of an illustrious personage, merely because he belonged to another nation, and has slept in tranquillity more than a century.—That there is a probability existing to this prince's disfavour, must ever be allowed; but truly cogent and irresistible proofs, I think, there are none. The reader shall peruse candidly and impartially the whole that we know†.

This officer, who was four years younger than Gustavus, had served in Italy, as a colonel, under Aldringer and Galas, in the Mantuan war; and by the account, which Sirot gives of him in that campaign, was a person of a very high and impetuous temper. Upon some disgust, whether real or fictitious we will not take upon us to pronounce, he demanded his discharge from the court of Vienna, and made a tender of his services to the king of Sweden. After the battle of Lützen, being looked upon with coldness by the royal army, he repaired first to the Saxon, and then a second time to the Imperial standards, and took a fresh commission under Wallstein; passed between him and duke Bernard, in the *supposed conspiracy* of the former; and was committed to prison upon the assassination of the Austrian generalissimo. We find him afterwards one of the chamberlains extraordinary to the emperor. Being taken prisoner at the battle of Sweidnitz, for then he had been restored a second time to favour, and declared commander in chief of that town and district, he was generously protected by Torstenson from the resentment of the Swedish soldiers, and died, partly by his wounds, and partly with vexation, in a few days after the engagement‡.

Some say he bore a mortal hatred to the king of Sweden, inasmuch as that prince had once given a blow to one of

* *Le Barre*; Hist. d'Allemagne. Theatr. Europ. tom. ii. 749.

† The author expected considerable helps from professor *Menke's* Dissertation *de dubio Gust. Adolphi mortis genere*; but on perusing that piece, found himself to be greatly disappointed.

‡ 1642.

his

his brothers, who made a visit to Stockholm, about the period when Gustavus first ascended the throne. The narrative runs thus. At the house of a certain lady, whom each of these princes had an esteem for, the king having lost all the money he carried with him, desired the mistress of the mansion to lend him a part of her winnings; which she declined, by saying, it was beneath the dignity of a monarch to borrow from a poor subject. In the course of the evening the duke of Saxe-Lauenberg lost his money also, and then the lady of the house made him a tender of her purse, without being solicited; adding, in terms of courtesy and politeness, "Sir, the king my master has money at hand, and in great abundance; but you are a stranger, far removed from home, and must of course depend on the chance of remittances." Upon this Gustavus took fire, and making some sharp expostulations, the duke interfering in behalf of his patroness, gave the blow we lately mentioned. This story, it must be confessed, reads no ways amiss, when delivered from the pen of an Italian novelist, or French memoir-writer: *si non e vera, e ben trovata*; but as we do not know precisely that the prince in question was ever in Sweden, not but that there is a probability a duke of Saxe-Lauenberg might have made a journey to Stockholm, on account of the consanguinity that subsisted between the regal and princely families*, we of course shall presume to pronounce nothing confidently, except more solid accounts could be procured from Germany, in reference to an affair so long removed from knowledge, and which seems to me to have taken its first rise on the southern side of the Alps†, and not from Germany or Sweden.

The circumstances, which plead strongest against duke Francis Albert, are these. When he made a tender of his services the preceding August to his majesty near Nuremberg, Oxenstiern conceived an untoward suspicion of him, at the first glance‡. For as he had great interest with the elector of Saxony, it was thought Walfstein, whose creature he was, connived at his quitting the Imperial service, in order to seduce the said elector from the Swedish interests. Of course, therefore, the Chancellor failed not to lay open all his apprehensions to the king his master; but Gustavus replied, *That a prince and pro-*

* *Genealogia Rittershusii*, fol. Tubing. 1668. See also *Hübner's Genealogies* in German. 4°.

† It is related at large, by *Roscoe de Bellis German.* 4°. 434, &c. but he, though a bold, lively historian, and peculiarly fond of all anecdotes, scruples not to pronounce the present narrative, *anilem fabellam, muliercularum deliramentum*.

‡ *Puffendorf de Rebus Succicis*, fol. p. 83.

testant

testant could neither be a villain nor an assassin. On his first arrival, many military employs, of considerable honour, were offered him; but he declined them all, and chose rather to serve near the king's person, in the capacity of a volunteer. It is remarkable, he wore a green scarf in the day's service at Lützen, which was not customary amongst the Swedish officers. He received no wound, upon supposition he attempted to disengage the king, though the master of the household, the pages, and very grooms, that attended him, were all killed, if we except one, who lay wounded, stripped, and senseless, and expired so soon after the engagement, that accounts from him can hardly be depended on with any tolerable degree of certainty. The duke often shewed the royal blood that had fallen on his cloaths. Indeed it does not make much against him, that the king received a pistol-shot in the hinder part of one of his elbows; for in such a confusion his majesty might naturally turn himself round more times than once. True it is, he conveyed himself out of the battle precipitately, and never acquainted duke Bernard and Kriphausen, the king's successors in command, of this direful and disastrous event; but, on the contrary, fled to Weissenfels, about eight miles from the scene of action, and returned next morning to the Swedish camp, when he heard the royal army had become victorious. He there found but a very cold and discourteous reception; for the universally-received opinion in Sweden, to the present moment, is, that Gustavus fell by signal agreed upon, and treachery; and this is confirmed by the tradition of officers to their friends and relations, from the very day when the battle of Lützen was fought*.

To the best of my unbiassed judgment there appears one circumstance in duke Francis's favour, namely, that his master of the horse, who was a gentleman, killed the cavalier who shot Gustavus; for had the prince been engaged in any connivance or conspiracy, it is natural to think, that this person might have borne his share therein. We can say no more, and the truth must be left to the great searcher of all secrets†.

Thus fell the King of Sweden; the news of whose death broke the heart of the unfortunate elector Palatine in about six days‡; nor did the gratitude of the Saxons erect the

* *Memoirs communicated.*

† There is a defence of this prince, by the author of the *Schaubühne der Welt*; but I never had the good fortune to procure a copy of that work, which consists of four volumes in folio, *cum fig.* Francfort 1699—1718. It was written, if I mistake not, by Job Ludolphus.

‡ He died Nov. 19, at Francfort on the Mayne, and we must allow a certain space for conveying the melancholy tidings to him. The princess Sophia, who married Ernest Augustus, elector of Brunswic Lunenburg, was his twelfth child.

slightest

slightest monument or cenotaph to the deliverer of their country. In a word, this illustrious potentate has no monument on the plains of Lützen, except this imperfect history can be called a *monument*; save only a few large and misshapen stones, which the piety of the peasants has piled together, in order to perpetuate his memory. He died, aged *thirty-seven years, ten months, and twenty-seven days*, having received thirteen wounds before the battle of Lützen was fought.—He finished his course, says a spirited historian, as an hero ought to do, *with his sword in his hand, the word of command betwixt his lips, and victory in expectation*; concluding all with this religious ejaculation, *My God! My God!*

Nor was this death non-conformable with his majesty's constant practice; for his great amusement, at leisure hours, consisted in perusing the Holy Scriptures. It was his custom to retire much to his apartment, and keep the doors anxiously closed; considering the sacred writings attentively, whilst the army concluded he was delineating plans of sieges and battles, or inditing letters to foreign potentates. Which puts me in mind of one circumstance, at the camp of Werben; when the whole Imperial army was preparing to force his lines, Steinberg, a privy-councillor had some extraordinary intelligence to report to his master; and as he half opened the curtain of his tent gently, and perceived Gustavus very intent on reading the Bible, he retired softly, and as he hoped, unobserved; but the king recalled him: *Steinberg*, said he, *I find great consolation in perusing the word of God: princes themselves must acknowledge, that the evil demon spreads the most artful snares for those who fancy they lie under no obligation to render an account to their own consciences, and their fellow-creatures*.*

Few couriers were better received than those, who conveyed the account of the king's death, to declared enemies, or concealed ill-wishers: nor did the report greatly displease the court of White-hall; where the ministry, as it usually happens in cases of timidity, had its degree of apprehensions, for fear the event should not be true; and, as I have learnt from good authority, imposed silence on the news-writers, and intimated the same to the pulpit, in case any funeral encomium might proceed from that quarter. The ungrateful Richelieu looked upon Gustavus's death as a sort of triumph. The emperor was more modest, contenting himself only with the explosion of a few rockets: but the Spaniards exhibited a mock-tragedy, which consisted of twenty-four acts, and took up twelve nights in its representation, entitled, *The Death*

* *Heylmanni* Lco Art. 76, 77.

of the King of Sweden: and, as an author of great authority * declares, kindled up so many bonfires on the occasion, that the court interposed, lest fuel should become too scarce the approaching winter. In a word, of all the catholic princes, the pope alone lamented the death of Gustavus. On the other hand, funeral sermons were preached in honour of him throughout all the protestant churches in Germany; and, what was very extraordinary, almost every preacher, without a possibility of knowing the intentions of other preachers, drew a parallel between him and king Josiah †.

Having thus finished the battle of Lützen, we may observe, that the Swedes, by a strange antithesis of fortune, obtained a *triumph*, but *lost* their hero: the Imperialists relinquished the field of battle too precipitately; yet, in truth, acquired a complete victory, for they *outlived* Gustavus! Yet the effects of the king's operative spirit never intirely left the military body that had breathed and moved under his influence. The French repassed the Rhine upon Turenne's death; but the Swedes, after the decease of their master, extended their victorious arms, not only over Lower Saxony, but to the very threshold of the Alps. The principle of acting continued the same; the proportion only of the *vis vivida* was lessened.—Nothing but a large fire could be capable of so prodigal remains.—In a few words, it may be remarked of Gustavus, that he was equally great, living, dying, and even after death; fulfilling and completing the idea of a character, CUJUS GLORIÆ NEQUE PROFUIT QUISQUAM LAUDANDO, NEQUE VITUPERANDO QUISQUAM NOCUIT.

As Alexander assigned to posterity the Ptolemys, the Antigonus's, the Seleucus's, and the Antipaters, who, after his death, founded kingdoms in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Macedonia: so Gustavus, from whose tomb, says a spirited historian, *the laurels sprung forth*, bequeathed to mankind the Saxe-Weimars, the Horns, the Baniers, the Torstensons, and Kniphaufens; who, if fair scope had been allowed them, would have given the finishing stroke to that *great* monarchy, whose very foundations their master had shaken the operations of nine-and-twenty months. These valiant chieftains, formed in the school of so excellent an instructor, gave signs neither of distress nor dismay, when their allies partly proved insincere to, and partly forsook them, at the conclusion of the peace of Prague, two years after Gustavus's death. On the contrary, they retired step by step, gloomily, and unwill-

* Vide Schaubühne ut supra.

† Chemnitz, tom. i. 376. Mem. d'Eléctrice Palatine, 4°. 310.

lingly,

lingly, from the heart of the empire*; and kept the ~~rest~~ alive, with unspeakable obstinacy, for the space of sixteen successive years; and far from being squeezed into the Baltic ocean, as men formerly, and at that time, plainly prophesied, completed their eighteenth campaign, with making a fortunate camifado on one of the towns of Prague.

In this circumstance there is something extremely *remarkable*; namely, that the amazing obstinate and extensive war which I have here in part described, after a duration of thirty years, should conclude upon the *very spot of ground where it first began*.

Thus, with more labour than I can expect thanks, I have at length finished the life of Gustavus; a prince perhaps, with whom few heroes may be compared in the several distinguishing characters of *soldier, statesman, father of his people, and sincere Christian*. Had it pleased God to have made a less infirm state of health my portion, I might have been tempted, in a second work, less circumstantial and diffused, than matters of biography usually require, to have carried on the *history of Germany down to the conclusion of the peace of Munster*: the most important, as well as most decisive era, that is to be found in the annals of Europe! But the magnitude of the undertaking partly dismayed me; not to mention the expence and difficulty of consulting, in person, the archives and libraries of various countries†. Numbers, it is certain, are to be found, amongst my countrymen, who, in every respect, are infinitely better qualified for such an undertaking than I can pretend to: and indeed it would be no inconsiderable satisfaction to me, to see our nation derive its knowledge of affairs on the continent from any historians, except the French; whose method, it must be acknowledged, is well conceived, and their style usually such as hardly allows the reader to be inattentive; but the writers themselves are negligent and romantic, insincere and partial.

* *Singularità delle Guerre di Germania*, 4°. 183. Venet.

† The author has by him, already finished in one volume, quarto, *The History of THE THIRTY YEARS WARS*, from the breaking out of the troubles in Bohemia, in 1618, till the death of Gustavus, 1632; so that only sixteen years remain to be completed. [This has never, I believe, been published. Editor.]

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following useful *SCHEME and DIARY* of the War, &c. from the King's entering Germany till the battle of Lützen, composed for the better understanding the Three Great Campaigns of 1630, 1631, 1632, though the only one of the kind I ever remember to have seen, was begun in September, 1631, and carried on till November 6, 1632, by an English or Scottish officer, who served under Gustavus. I have supplied it by an addition of thirteen months, corrected the names of places, &c. and added the *third* and *fourth* columns throughout, in order to render the whole complete; making various additions likewise to the *first* and *second* columns. Nothing can be more necessary in a Military History.

(July 1630.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI
<p>LANDED June 24. The intervening days, between that time and July, were employed in disembarking and reviewing his army, and examining the country.</p> <p>Publishes his manifesto.</p> <p>4. Reconnoitres the island of Usedom, with 4000 men.</p> <p>5, 6. Gives audience to the deputies of the dukes of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and the town of Stralsund.</p> <p>7. Takes a fort at Wolgast.</p> <p>8. Advances to the cloister and pafs of Pudegla.</p> <p>9. Makes himself master of Swein.</p> <p>10. Signs articles of confederation with the duke of Pomerania, who</p> <p>14. Writes to the emperor.</p> <p>10—25. Remains in the islands of Usedom and Wollin.</p> <p>23. Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>26. Transports his army over the Frith-hof, and invests Stetin.</p> <p>— Takes it by stratagem.</p> <p>27. Orders Banier to give a camifado to Damm.</p> <p>— Stargard and Camin taken.</p> <p>— Negotiates with the administrator of Magdeburg, who places himself under the protection of Sweden.</p>	<p>Makes weak efforts against the king, with an army of equal numbers; the duchies of Pomerania and Mecklenburg being well garrisoned throughout.</p> <p>Extorts Garz and Griffenhagen from the duke of Pomerania.</p> <p>Escamps half his army at Garz, and half at Anclam.</p> <p>Retreats to Anclam, and forms a large camp.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen.—(July 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>The chancellor Oxenstiern commands a separate body in Polish Prussia, to watch the appearance of the Poles, and the king's new friends in those parts; while Leslie and Ruthven form a second camp near Stralsund, casting an eye of observation alternately towards the islands of Rugen and Usedom on the one side, and the duchy of Mecklenburg on the other.</p>	<p>Waltscin, then expecting his recall, lived privately at Memmingen, near Ratibon, to watch the motions of the diet, and avert the impending disgrace.</p>
<p>The administrator of Magdeburg sent to oppose Tilly in that duchy.</p>	<p>Tilly employed in reducing the angravate of Heff, and securing his own grants of possessions in Westphalia and Lower Saxony.</p>
<p>Bauditzen and Hepburn act in Outer Pomerania with 8000 men.</p>	<p>Torquato de Conti had the care of Pomerania, and the duke Savelli of the duchy of Mecklenburg.</p>
	<p>30,000 veteran Imperial troops are employed in the siege of Mantua, under the command of Colallo, Aldringer, and Galas.</p>
	<p>The diet of Ratibon.</p>
	<p>8000 men stationed at Dessau-bridge, to prevent the king from marching to Magdeburg.</p>

(August 1630.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI
<p>1—8. Commanded parties abroad.</p> <p>6. Secures the pass of Stolp.</p> <p>9. Publishes a second manifesto.</p> <p>Fortifies Stetin, and fixes a camp there under Gustavus Horn.</p> <p>Offers Torquato battle.</p> <p>15. Conceives some designs against Gartz and Griessenhagen. Sends Horn to blockade Landberg.</p> <p>Resolves first to clear Pomerania and the duchy of Mechlenburg.</p> <p>The plague rages at Stetin.</p> <p>Takes Wolgast town and castle.</p> <p>20. Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>Receives a reinforcement of 8000 men from Livonia.</p> <p>Fits up Wolgast castle for his queen.</p> <p>Prepares an invasion of Mechlenburg, by taking the important passes of Tribesee, Gripnitz, and Trepto.</p> <p>In this month fell into Aligheri's ambuscade.</p> <p>Anstruther, as some conjecture, pronounces his harangue at Vienna.</p>	<p>Remains inactive.</p> <p>Quits his last camp, retires to Gartz, and thence to Stolp.</p> <p>Marches at the head of 3000 men to throw succours into the town of Wolgast, but is defeated.</p> <p>31. Breaks up his camp at Stolp, and again intrenches near Anclam.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(August 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
Oxenstiern commands in Prussia, near Brunberg.	Walslein remains inactive in Sussia, near Ratibon.
Leslie and Ruthven take preparatory measures to facilitate the king's irruption into Mecklenburg.	Tilly continues to attempt the reduction of Lower Saxony.
Christian-William, administrator of Magdeburg, opposes Tilly.	The Duke de Savelli defends the duchy of Mecklenburg.
15. The Swedes attempt to surprize Landsberg.	Pappenheim blockades Magdeburg.
18. Marvellous escape of 700 Scots, who take Rugenwald by surprize.	10. The Electors write to Gustavus.
	18. The Emperor writes to him.
	Tiefenbach and Goëtze conduct two separate armies in Silesia and Lusatia, and Balthazar di Marradas commands a third in Bohemia.
	The diet of Ratibon continues.

(September 1630.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI
<p>1. Friday, observes a solemn fast.</p> <p>— Reviews his troops, and pays those lately arrived.</p> <p>Takes Griffenberg and Golnaa.</p> <p>6. Leaves Stetin, and prepares to invade Mechlenburg.</p> <p>Sends assistance into Lower Saxony, which lands the 25th near Lubec, and joins Francis-Charles, Duke of Saxe-Lauenberg.</p> <p>13. Writes to the Catholic electors.</p> <p>14. Embarks with 12,000 men to reduce the duchy of Mechlenburg.</p> <p>— Reaches Stralsund, and takes Bart and Dangarten.</p> <p>17. Writes to Lewis XIII. and Richelieu.</p> <p>— Appoints a solemn fast.</p> <p>26. Advances to Ribnitz and forms a camp there, having taken the town.</p> <p>28. Dissolves the allegiance of Wallstein's new subjects by two proclamations.</p> <p>Detaches Banier to the frontiers of Mechlenburg, near Pomerania, and orders Bauditzen to invest Colbergen.</p> <p>Returns to Stralsund to indite proper letters to all his friends and enemies.</p>	<p>1. Aligheri, a deserter from the Swedes, attacks the king's lines.</p> <p>2. Makes another attempt.</p> <p>4. Imperialists ruin Passewalk and Uckermond, and then leave them.</p> <p>7. Retake them, and commit great outrage.</p> <p>14, or thereabouts. Lose 1000 men near Garz.</p> <p>Torquato observes the motions of Horn at Stetin.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(September 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
Oxenstiern continues in his old situation near Bruhlberg.	Aldringer, Galas, and Colallo recalled, with an army of 30,000 men, from Mantua.
The Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, Francis-Charles, and the Swedish reinforcements act in Lower Saxony, and take Boitzenburg, Lauenberg, and Nyehausen.	Colonel Reynachor opposes Saxe-Lauenberg.
4. Bauditzén and Kniphäusen form the blockade of Colbergen.	Perpetual rencounters in the duchy of Magdeburg, between the Imperialists and administrator.
Bauditzén reinforces him, having taken Piritz.	Tilly still continues in Lower Saxony, and on the frontiers of Hesse.
Banier commands an army on the frontiers of Mechlenburg next to Pomerania.	The duke de Savelli commands Wallstein's troops in the duchy of Mechlenburg.
	Pappenheim takes Francis-Charles, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, prisoner at Ratzburg-castle.
	— Reduces Allerleben to capitulate.

(October 1630.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's	
GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI
<p>Besieges Rostoch, but converts the siege into a blockade.</p> <p>— Clears the whole sea-coast with his fleet.</p> <p>— Advances towards Wismar.</p> <p>— Beats the duke de Savelli.</p> <p>[Here, some say, he first exhibits the brigade or column.]</p> <p>Writes to Charles I. the letter not extant.</p> <p>11. Returns to Stralsund.</p> <p>Camerarius pronounces a speech of the King's dictating at the Hague.</p> <p>Gustavus remains at Stralsund.— Makes a short digression into Mecklenburg; returns again to Stralsund.</p> <p>31. Writes to the emperor.</p>	<p>Imperialists convey 4000 fresh troops into Rostoch, with considerable loss.</p> <p>Torquato sends Holk's and Butler's regiments to reinforce Savelli.</p> <p>A convoy of four regiments of Walsteiners defeated.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(October 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Bauditz and Hepburn form an army of 8000 men near Rugenwald, in Back Pomerania: take Scheiffein, and enter the Marche.</p>	<p>The duke de Savelli opposes Gustavus in the duchy of Mecklenburg.</p>
<p>4. Kniphausen carries on the blockade of Colbergen.</p>	<p>3. Col. Denhoff defeated near Stetin by the Imperialists.</p>
<p>Oxenstiern continues in the neighbourhood of Elbingen to watch the Poles.</p>	<p>Offa and Montecuculi command in Suabia.</p>
<p>Banier succeeds the king in the duchy of Mecklenburg, as commander in chief.—Publishes an edict.</p>	<p>Göetz and Tieffenbach in Silesia and Lusatia.</p>
<p>The administrator of Magdeburg acts in that duchy.</p>	<p>— Don Baltazar in Bohemia.</p>
<p>The administrator of Wirtemberg in Suabia.</p>	<p>— Pappenheim in Lower Saxony.</p>

(November 1630.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's	
GUSTAVUS	TORQUATO DE CONTI
	<p>Attempts fruitlessly to throw a reinforcement into Colberg.</p> <p>— Detaches 10,000 men to raise the siege.</p> <p>5. Imperial mandate published against Gustavus.</p>
<p>12. Sends Falkenberg to defend Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Marches as far as Griffenberg to join Horn, and fight the Imperialists.</p> <p>20. Returns to Stetin, where he continues.</p>	

entering Germany till the battle of Lützen—continued:—(November 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>6 or 8. Monro takes Scherffelbein.</p> <p>Kniphaußen turns the blockade of Colberg into a siege.</p> <p>Rostoch still blockaded by Todt.</p> <p>13. The strange battle of Colbergen between Kniphaußen and Montecuculi.</p> <p>A great fire at Colbergen.</p> <p>Stations of troops in distant provinces, as in last month.</p> <p>26. A dreadful tempest at Magdeburg.</p>	<p>3. The diet at Ratibon concludes.</p> <p>9. The emperor publishes his edict concerning contributions and regulating the army.</p> <p>— The same on the Imperial side, only that Montecuculi served in Prussia.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(December 1630.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>A sea-fight between the Swedes and the Imperialists.—15 large ships under Gabriel le Roy, and 9 Swedish men of war.—Swedes victorious.</p> <p>The elector of Brandenburg publishes a manifesto against the cruelties and depopulations of the Imperialists.</p>	<p>The Duke de Savelli opposes the Swedes in the duchy of Mechlenburg.</p> <p>The Imperialists ravage and destroy all Pomerania.</p> <p>Tilly writes to the administrator of Magdeburg.</p>

(January 1630-1.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	SCHOMBERG
<p>Denied entrance into Custrin; and thereby loses the power of saving Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Takes Königsberg.</p> <p>8. Advances to Lubus, within four miles of Francfort.</p> <p>— Takes Legnits-castle and Piritz, and secures all, except Landsberg, between the Warta and the Oder.</p> <p>The winter extremely severe.</p> <p>13. Treaty of Bernwilt signed between Sweden and France.</p>	<p>— By means of Custrin, preserves Spar's, young Walstein's, Götze's, and the old Saxon regiment.</p> <p>— Represents his bad situation to Tilly.</p>
	TILLY.
<p>The king publishes twenty-two new prayers.</p> <p>18. Reviews his army, consisting of 16,000 men, at Dani.</p> <p>26. Posts Horn at Königsberg to observe Tilly's motions.</p> <p>— Grants kind protection to the inhabitants of the New Marche.</p> <p>— Gives up all thoughts against Landsberg: and, taking the advantage of a severe frost, enters Mecklenburg.</p>	<p>24. Advances to Francfort on the Oder.</p>

(February 1630-1.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>4. Sets out at the head of 16,000 men, on a second expedition into Mecklenburg.</p> <p>Takes New Brandenburg and Clempno.</p> <p>— Proposes terms to the inhabitants of the district round Stargard.</p> <p>Garrison of Trepto dislodged.</p> <p>14. Damin besieged.</p> <p>Löitch taken. Kniphausen's army joins the king.</p> <p>The king detaches Banier to take Loczin.</p> <p>— Encamps his troops between that and Trepto.</p> <p>Malchin surprized.</p> <p>Fridland and Westrow taken.</p> <p>[Gustavus in eight months renders himself master of eighty cities, castles, and fortresses in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.]</p> <p>Receives some succours from Scotland; withdraws his garrisons from the isle of Rugen; is reinforced by some of Oxenstiern's army, and by the troops that invested Culberg.</p> <p>— In expectation of Tilly, places Banier at Damin, Kniphausen at New Brandenburg, Count Ortenberg at Trepto, Horn at Fridland, and himself at the pass of Passewalk, to guard the Oder and Pomerania.</p> <p>— Encamps between New Angermond and Freyenwald.</p>	<p>Accuses the duke de Savelli, governor of Damin.</p> <p>Proposes to stop the king's journey into Mecklenburg, but desists.</p> <p>— Advances from Francfort upon the Oder towards Mecklenburg.</p> <p>— Passes the king's lines, but dares not attack them.</p> <p>Bernstein makes an unsuccessful camifado on Templin.</p>

(March 1630-1.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>1. Articles signed with the Marquis of Hamilton.</p> <p>Gustavus adds twenty new edicts, concerning plunder, extortion, &c. to his military code.</p> <p>— Arrests the garrison of Colberg, by way of reprisal.</p> <p>— Encamps between Trepto and Damin.</p> <p>— Invents brigades in his camp at Schwet. Monro, part II. 25.</p> <p>18. Crosses the Warta to observe Landberg.</p> <p>— Constructs a famous bridge over the Oder at Schwet.</p> <p>Zednick taken.</p> <p>25. The king determines to besiege Francfort.</p> <p>27. Crosses the Oder, and continues his march.</p>	<p>— Puts the garrison of Feldberg to the sword.</p> <p>9. Takes New Brandenburg by storm, with an army of 22,000 men.</p> <p>— His great cruelty.</p> <p>— Dismantles it.</p> <p>— Enters Fridland, and attempts Trepto in vain.</p> <p>— Advances to Damin, and despairs of taking it.</p> <p>— Returns to Repnin.</p> <p>— Fruitlessly attempts to destroy the king's fine bridge across the Oder.</p> <p>— Retires beyond Francfort on the Oder, whence he came; others alledge, he went back to Repnin.</p> <p>— Orders a garrison of 7000 men into Francfort.</p> <p>— And 5000 into Landberg.</p> <p>— Draws the garrisons from Trewen-Brietzen and Munchenberg.</p> <p>— Fears to invest Damin.</p> <p>— Forms designs against Magdeburg.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(March 1630-1.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>2. Colbergen surrenders, after five months siege, to Colonel Todt.</p> <p>9. Horn retires to his master near Schwet.</p> <p>New Brandenburg is taken.</p> <p>The Swedes defeat a body of Croats near Munchenberg.</p> <p>18. Remonstrance and conclusions sent to the emperor from the diet of Leipsic.</p> <p>24.—And to the Catholic electors.</p> <p>A convention of the states of Pomerania.</p> <p>25. Horn ordered to watch the Imperialists on the side of Silesia.</p>	<p>Don Baltazar, Montecuculi, Goëtz and Tieffenbach, command in Bohemia and the annexed provinces. Offa in Suabia and Alsatia.</p> <p>Coloredo attempts, in vain, to burn the king's bridge at Schwet.</p> <p>Schomberg appointed to defend Francfort.</p> <p>Pappenheim employed in the duchy of Magdeburg.</p>

(April 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>1. Arrives at Lubus.</p> <p>2. Forms his approaches round Francfort.</p> <p>— Takes the town by storm, and kills 3000 men.—Old Leslie made governor.</p> <p>— Sends 4000 men towards Landberg.</p> <p>4. Gustavus writes to the confederates at Leipzig; and the elector of Saxony appoints a thanksgiving.</p> <p>5. Follows the Landberg detachment with the gros of his army.</p> <p>— Sends the rhingrave and Bauditzen into Silesia.</p> <p>The town of Landberg surrenders after eight days siege; and thus Pomerania and Mecklenburg are cleared, and a passage opened into Silesia.</p> <p>18. The garrison marches away. The king returns to Francfort upon the Oder, negotiating, by means of couriers, about Spandau, which he obtains afterwards.</p> <p>The States-general subscribe to Gustavus about 5000<i>l.</i> per month.</p> <p>The king garrisons Francfort, Crossen, and Landberg.</p>	<p>The Francfort garrison, consisting of 7000 men, escape, part of them into Silesia.</p> <p>12. Tilly invests Magdeburg in form.</p> <p>21. Takes a strong fortress.</p> <p>— Alarmed needlessly at Gustavus's coming.</p> <p>29. Farenbach, an Imperial colonel and engineer, performs wonders.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(April 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>The rhingrave and Bauditzén command in Silesia. Take Croffen the 16th.</p>	<p>The administrator of Württemberg, [Duke Julius] and the Protestants, form an union in Saxia, and levy troops.</p>
<p>9. Treaty between France and the elector of Tryers.</p>	
<p>15. A detachment of Swedes beaten between Landberg and Schieffelbein.</p>	<p>Don Baltazar, Tieffenbach, Montecuculi, and Dhona act in Silesia, &c. against Bauditzén and the rhingrave.</p>
<p>16. Palm Sunday. The diet of Leipfic breaks up.</p>	
	<p>18. Landberg evacuated.</p>
	<p>The Imperialists attempt Croffen in Silesia.</p>
	<p>The emperor publishes an edict for raising new taxes.—Excises meat.</p>

(May 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>1. Detaches from Furstenwald, near Francfort, 10,000 infantry, and 80 troops of cavalry towards Berlin.</p> <p>— Sends count Ortenburg to demand Spandau and Custrin.</p> <p>2. Dispatches Horn on the same errand.</p> <p>3. Has an interview with the elector in Copnick-grove.</p> <p>— Obtains Spandau only for a month.</p> <p>— Enters Berlin.</p> <p>A treaty of confederation between France and Bavaria.</p> <p>The king goes to Potsdam.</p> <p>— Lies in his camp at or near Potsdam the remaining part of this month.</p> <p>6. Solicits a confederacy with the elector of Saxony in vain.</p> <p>— Enters Berlin.</p> <p>10. Hears that Magdeburg is taken.</p> <p>— Encamps at Potsdam to intercept Tilly's retreat.</p> <p>— Takes Old Brandenburg and Ratenau.</p> <p>— Views the country near Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Retakes Werben and Borg near Jericho Monastery.</p> <p>28. Escapes an ambush of Papenheim.</p>	<p>10. Takes Magdeburg by storm; burns the city and destroys the inhabitants.</p> <p>— Breaks Dessau-bridge too precipitately.</p> <p>13. Makes his public entrance into Magdeburg.</p> <p>— Stays thereabouts many days.</p> <p>— Removes from Magdeburg, and crosses the forest of Hartz.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued—(May 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Oxenstiern commands in Prussia. Horn in Silesia, reinforced by the King.</p> <p>8. A treaty of confederation and alliance, for eight years, between France and Bavaria.</p>	<p>The Imperial commanders stationed as in the two preceding months.</p> <p>14. An Imperial ban published against the Leipzig confederates.</p> <p>Fappenheim attempts to secure Havelberg.</p>

(June 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1. Takes Guterboch, to secure the two bridges, over the Elbe, Dessau and Wittenberg.	— At Altleben treats with the princes of the house of Saxony.
5. Reinstates the dukes of Mecklenburg.	— Has a design on Erfurt.
8. Restores Spandau, with great reluctance.	
11. Obtains it by a new treaty of alliance.	
— Receives four regiments from his army in Prussia, and some new levies from Brandenburg. — Sends Oxenstiern a reinforcement of 4000 men.	
12. Returns by water to Stetin. Gives audience to the Moscovite ambassador the 15th. Proposes to assist at the siege of Griepwald.	13. Advances to Weimar. 14. Crosses the Unstrut.
— Publishes his apology concerning Magdeburg. Anstruther pronounces his harangue to the emperor.	15. At Oldleben. — Goes to Mulhausen; has a design on the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.
	— Sends Pappenheim to secure Havelberg; who afterwards raises contributions at Eisleben. — Continues in these parts all the month.
29. Gustavus returns from Stetin to Berlin.	28. Proposes to march and attack Gustavus, but is dismayed by Pappenheim's and Mansfelt's ill success.
Bauditsen and Dewbatel ford the Elbe, with 4000 horse and dragoons, and take Tangermond sword in hand.	

(July 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>— Defeats Pappenheim near Magdeburg, and takes Stendal.</p> <p>9. Banier takes Havelberg, sword in hand.</p> <p>The king encamps most judiciously at Werben.</p> <p>12. Concludes a treaty with the landgrave of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>17. Gives Bernstein a camifado, and ruins four of Pappenheim's best regiments.</p> <p>— Encamps at Werben.</p> <p>— Receives a visit from the landgrave of Hesse and duke Bernard, with a tender of their services.</p> <p>21. Recals the garrison of Tangermond.</p> <p>— Discovers Tilly's plot, and turns it to advantage.</p> <p>23, 24. Several skirmishes.</p> <p>25. Gustavus repulses Tilly.</p> <p>26—30. Continues on the defensive in his excellent camp at Werben.</p> <p>— Writes a letter of thanks to the Magdeburgers.</p>	<p>Pappenheim sends for Tilly.</p> <p>Tilly, who had intended to make an irruption into Hesse Cassel, obliged to return.</p> <p>17. Advances to Wolmerstadt in the diocese of Magdeburg.</p> <p>19, 20. Reviews his army.</p> <p>21. Arrives at Tangermond, forms a plot to fire the king's camp and powder-waggons.</p> <p>25. Attacks the king's lines.</p> <p>26—30. Remains quiet at some distance, about Mulhausen.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(July 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>16. The marquis of Hamilton sails from Yarmouth.</p> <p>18. Duke Bernard acts in the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>31. The marquis of Hamilton lands at Wolgast, with 6000 English forces.</p>	<p>Furstenberg, with 18,000 men, partly the Mantuan army, forces the administrator of Wirtemberg to renounce the Leipzig conclusions.</p> <p>12. Fugger and Furstenberg, with part of the Italian army, invade the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>— Recalled to join Tilly.</p> <p>Tieffenbach commands in Silesia.</p>

(August 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>— Remains at Werben.</p> <p>12. Signs a treaty with the landgrave of Hesse Cassel.</p> <p>Queen of Sweden lands at Wolgast, with 8000 men.</p> <p>15. The king sends his forces on various destinations, and leaves Bauditzen with the standing camp at Werben.</p> <p>— Proposes to form two other camps, one at Ratenau, and another at Old Brandenburg.</p> <p>— Receives pressing letters from the elector of Saxony.</p> <p>29. Advances with part of his army to Ratenau, whilst the main body reaches Old Brandenburg.</p> <p>30. Marches towards Saxony.</p> <p>31. Arrives at Cofwick, where Arnheim confers with him.</p>	<p>— In the neighbourhood of Werben.</p> <p>10. Dislodges, and moves towards Saxony.</p> <p>16. Joined by Furstenberg, with 18,000 men, near Mansfeld.</p> <p>— Summons the elector of Saxony to enter into new engagements, and demands a passage over Wittemberg-bridge.</p> <p>26. Takes Merzberg.</p> <p>— Pillages Naumburg and Zeitz.</p> <p>29. Summons Leipzig.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(August 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>10, or thereabouts. The English joined by 4000 Swedes, newly landed.</p> <p>Horn commands in Silesia, and Todtlin the duchy of Mechlenburg.</p> <p>20. The elector of Saxony reviews his army.</p> <p>The landgrave of Hesse Cassel acts in his own country.</p> <p>The elector of Saxony encamps at Torgau to defend the banks of the Elbe. His whole army amounts to 20,000 men.</p> <p>— Prevents Furstenberg from passing the river.</p>	<p>21. Pappenheim ravages Misnia.</p>

(September 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1. Forces the elector of Saxony, whom Arnheim represented, to sign a treaty.	1. Ravages the country about Leipzig.
3. Allowed to pass the Elbe at Wittemberg-bridge. Meets the Saxon army and some Brandenburg troops at Dieben.	3. Invests it with 40,000 men.
5. Reviews the combined army.	5. The town capitulates.
6. Deliberates and halts on Tilly's taking Leipzig.	6. Tilly invites the king to battle by letter.
7. Marches and fights the battle of Leipzig.	7. Defeated at Leipzig, and flies to Halle.
8. Invests that city.	9. — To Aschersleben, and writes to Aldringer; and thence to Halberstadt; 80 English miles.
9. Pursues the Imperialists to Merzburg, and takes it. — Dispatches his army in several corps to pursue the enemy.	— Publishes monitorial letters to recal his dispersed troops.
11. Takes Halle and Merzburg.	
13. Writes to Charles I. on the victory of Leipzig.	13. Leaves Halberstadt.
14. Collects his forces.	
16. Begins his journey, and marches along the Unstrut.	17. Reaches Alvede, 15 miles.
17. Lies at Great Someren.	25. Arrives at Corvey, and crosses the Weser. Receives 5000 troops from Cologne.
18. Takes Erfurt. — Settles the affairs of Thuringia. — Sends for Oxenstiern out of Pomerania.	26. Lies at Warberg. — Points his course between Waldeck and Hesse, and arrives near Fulda.
26. Advances to Arnstadt.	
27. Reaches Ilmenau; divides his forces.	
28. Crosses the Thuringian forest.	
29. Lies at Schleüßing.	30. Advances to Fritzlar in Hesse Cassel.
30. Besieges Kœnigshofen. — Frightens the Imperial commissaries from Francofort on the Mayne.	

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(September 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Elector of Saxony lies with 16,000 men near Torgau. 2. The English troops arrive at Stetin. 3. The landgrave of Hesse returns home from the king to carry on the war, taking duke Bernard with him.</p>	<p>Gronsfelt and Beninghausen act in Westphalia and Lower Saxony, against the duke of Lunenburg, archbishop of Bremen, and the landgrave of Hesse Cassel's troops.</p>
<p>— Clears the abbacy of Hirschfeld.</p>	<p>Aldringer and Fugger oppose the landgrave.</p>
<p>12. The elector of Saxony invests Leipzig. 13. Receives its capitulation, and reduces Misnia. Banier sent to oppose Pappenheim in the diocese of Magdeburg. — Blockades Mansfeld in that town. The landgrave of Hesse wages war fortunately in the diocese of Paderborn, and the abbacy of Fulda, &c.</p>	<p>15. Hover with their troops about Erfurt; retire. The duke of Lorraine marches to join Tilly. Tieffenbach and Goëtz threaten to invade Saxony. — Quit Lusatia for private reasons.</p>
<p>26. Bauditzen marches part of the king's royal army by another road through the Thuringian forest. 27. Horn, with another detachment, frightens the imperial armies from Eytzenach. — The elector of Saxony, in conjunction with Hamilton's forces, invades Lusatia. 29. Horn takes Gotha. 30. — Returns to the king.</p>	<p>28. Aldringer near Eysenach. 30. Some Croats alarm Dresden.</p>

(October 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1. Takes Schweinfurt.	
2. Makes his entrance.	2. Removes from Fritlar.
3. Dispatches circular letters to the bishopric of Bamberg and parts adjacent.	3. Ravages some towns in the landgraviate of Hesse Cassel.
4. Forces the bishop of Wurtzburg to make his escape.	4. Joined by Aldringer.
— Invests Wurtzburg.	
5. Makes himself master of it.	
5—8. Besieges Marienberg-castle, and takes it by storm.	6. Reviews his army at Fulda.
8—14. Dispatches his army in parties to make conquests in the dioceses of Wurtzburg and Bamberg.	10. Reaches Aschaffenberg; confers with the duke of Lorraine.
15. Wertheim taken.	— Sends Aldringer to join the Lorrainers.
The king gives a camifado to three regiments of Tilly.	16. Detaches 3000 men towards Wertheim, whom the king defeats.
17—20. Visits the troops at their various stations.	17. Joined by the Lorraine army.
	18. Advances towards the Higher Palatinate.
	20. Lies about Darmstadt.
21. Commanded parties abroad, &c. which surprize Rotenberg, Bifchofsheim, and Mergentheim.	21. Repulsed near Rotenberg.
	22. Takes Babenhaußen.
	23. Solicits the city of Francfort.
26. Gustavus publishes a second manifesto.	— Marches into the Bergstrafs.
— Doubts whether he shall march to Nurenberg or Francfort on the Mayne.	30. Advances again towards the Higher Palatinate, and continues thereabouts.

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(October 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>The elector of Saxony hears Paradeisier's proposals of accommodation with the emperor, at the interposition of Cadretta, the Spanish ambassador.</p> <p>Horn stays with the king all this month.</p> <p>Lessie and the English under Hamilton, act in Lusatia and Silesia.</p> <p>7. Arnheim reduces Lower Lusatia.</p> <p>The landgrave of Hesse takes Münden.—Enters the diocese of Paderborn.—Carries the war into Westphalia, and marches to join Gustavus.</p> <p>16. Rostock surrenders to General Todt.</p> <p>Banier besieges Magdeburg; Hamilton and the English then with him.</p> <p>18. Virmond besieges Halberstadt in vain; joins Mansfeldt at Magdeburg.</p> <p>20. Arnheim reduces Upper Lusatia.</p> <p>25. The elector and Arnheim enter Bohemia; take Tetschin and Starobers, joined by old count Thurn.</p>	<p>Goëts ravages Lower Lusatia, and Tieffenbach the Upper, and conquer both provinces.</p> <p>— They retreat, by orders from Vienna.</p> <p>4. The Lorrainers pass the Rhine.</p> <p>Gronsfelt and Lessie oppose the landgrave of Hesse.</p> <p>The elector of Bavaria puts himself at the head of 20,000 men.</p> <p>Don Baltazar di Marradas commands against Arnheim, &c.</p> <p>28. The recall of Wallstein agitated at Vienna.</p> <p>Mansfeldt commands in the dioceses of Halberstadt and Magdeburg.</p> <p>The Croats attack Old Dresden, but are repulsed.</p>

(November 1631.)—*Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's*

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1. Hanau taken by surprize.	2. Retires into Franconia, and storms Mergentheim. — Proposes to rejoin the Lorrainers.
5, 6. The king passes backwards and forwards to Oxenturt. — Ill of a fever. Leaves Horn in Franconia.	5, 6. Forms a design of taking Oxenfurt sword in hand, but without success.
7, 8. Advances towards Francfort.	7, 8, 9. Reduces several towns in his way to Nurenberg.
10—13. Takes Steinheim, Proccelden, Miltenberg, &c. in his way.	13. Orders Offa to take Rotenberg.
14. Crosses the Maine at Aschaffenberg.	14, 15. Makes himself master of Weinsheim, Guutzenhausen, Weisfeuburg, and Wilsburg-castle.
15. Enters Hanau. Obtains Ruffelheim from the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt.	
16. Lies at Offenbach. — Makes his public entry into Francfort.	16. Ravages the margraviate of Anspach.
19. Takes Hoëchft.	17. Advances to Schwabach.
20. Returns to Francfort. Joined by the landgrave of Hesse Cassel with 10,000 men.	18. Invests Nurenberg.
22. Retires to Hoëchft to perform his thanksgivings in private for taking Francfort.	
23. Forms a league with the counts of Veteravia.	23. Raises the siege.
25—27. His actions near the Rhingau and Bingen.	24, 25. Lies two nights at Rott, where his powder waggons blow up.
	26. Puts his army into garrison and winter-cantonment; one part in Bavaria, and one in the Higher Palatinate.
29. The army returns to Francfort.	28, &c. Goes to Donawert.

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(November 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Arnheim summons Prague.</p> <p>5, 6. Horn with a separate army in the diocese of Wurtzburg, to observe Tilly.—Aldringer and the duke of Lorrain continue here the whole month.</p> <p>The landgrave of Hesse sent with his own army of 10,000 men to interrupt the siege of Nuremberg.</p> <p>8. The elector of Saxony makes his entrance into Prague. Count Thurn publishes a general protection in Gustavus's name.</p> <p>15. Banier sent about this time, to take the command in the diocese of Magdeburg; with him Hamilton and the English act.—They invest Magdeburg for six weeks.</p> <p>28. Arnheim and Thurn beat four imperial generals at the battle of Limburg.</p>	<p>Don Baktazar, Tieffenbach, Galas, and Goëts act against Arnheim and count Thurn.</p> <p>Osia joins Tilly, and goes with him towards Bavaria.</p> <p>The duke of Bavaria appointed generalissimo over the army of the league.</p> <p>— The Lorrainers forced to retire across the Rhine.</p>

(December 1631.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>1. Marches in order to invest Heidelberg.</p> <p>2, 3. Takes several towns in the Bergstrafs.</p> <p>4. Besieges Oppenheim fort, changing his design against Heidelberg.</p> <p>7. Passes the Rhine, and engages the Spaniards.</p> <p>8. Oppenheim town and fort surrender.</p> <p>9. The winter begins to be extremely severe.</p> <p>10. The king besieges Ments.</p> <p>13. Mentz capitulates.</p> <p>14. Gustavus makes his public entrance, it being, as some say, his birthday.</p> <p>16. A public thanksgiving.</p> <p>18. The king surprizes Fridberg.</p> <p>22—28. The Spaniards evacuate several towns in the Palatinate.</p> <p>The city of Spire sides with the king, following the example of Worms.</p> <p>Gustavus hears proposals from the Bavarian minister.</p> <p>— Erects a column on passing the Rhine.</p>	<p>2. Meets the elector of Bavaria, having reposed his army in winter-quarters.</p> <p>4. Takes Kitzingen.</p> <p>— Goes to Nordlingen, and there remains inactive.</p> <p>— Appoints Cratz field-marshal in the Upper Palatinate.</p> <p>12. The elector of Bavaria summons a diet at Ingolstadt.</p> <p>— Sends an ambassador to the emperor, and another to the king of Sweden.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(December 1631.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>3. Arnheim and Thurn take Egra; invest Budweis without success.</p> <p>4. Horn takes Kitzingen,</p> <p>10. and Weinsheim; keeping the field all the month, and making advantage of Tilly's retiring into quarters.</p> <p>12. Takes Gebfattel.</p> <p>13. Arnheim and the elector return to Dresden, which displeases Gustavus, who wanted them to keep the field.</p> <p>16. Horn takes Mergentheim; blockades and takes Rotenberg. — Marches into Suabia.</p> <p>20. Besieges and takes Hailbrun.</p> <p>21. The landgrave of Hesse besieges and takes Köningstein-castle; then retires with his army into his own territories. — Enters the abbacy of Fulda.</p> <p>24. Magdeburg proposes to capitulate, Banier and Hamilton disagree about retreating.</p> <p>26. The rhingrave commands on the Moselle, and defeats the Spaniards in various rencounters, particularly near Frankendale. Horn returns into Franconia.</p> <p>30. Takes Guntzenhausen. Col. Lohausen, after a long siege, takes Doëmitz in Lower Saxony. The dukes of Mecklenburg clear their country. The Swedes take Mergentheim, i.e. Mariendal, Friedberg, Köningstein, Hailbrun, Germerheim, Landau, and Bingen.</p>	<p>Aldringer takes the field to relieve Rotenberg, but too late; he retires to Augsburg.</p> <p>Pappenheim acts in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>13. The Imperialists attempt Prague in vain. Walslein accepts the generalship. Galas and Baltazar command in Bohemia. Boninghausen and Mansfelt act in Mecklenburg, against the dukes, Banier, Todt, &c.</p> <p>The Spaniards forsake many towns in the Palatinate.</p> <p>Pappenheim raises the siege of Magdeburg.</p>

(January 1631-2.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>Manheim taken by surprize.</p> <p>3, 4, 5. Heidelberg and Frankendale blockaded.</p> <p>Gustavus negotiates with England, France, Holland, the electors Palatine and of Cologne, and the duke of Neuberg.</p> <p>10. An armistice concluded for 14 days; the king writes to Horn on the subject.</p> <p>11. Advances in the interim to Gelenhausen, to give battle to Papenheim, who had violated the truce.</p> <p>The Spaniards disregard the convention, and pass the Moselle.</p> <p>19. The French ambassadors annex their subscription to the armistice, or treaty of neutrality.</p> <p>20. The king returns to Francfort with his queen.</p> <p>22. Sends the rhingrave against the Spaniards.</p> <p>24. The armistice expires.</p> <p>The king dispatches duke Bernard on a separate command; he takes several towns about Mentz.</p> <p>29. Protects the trade of Francfort by an edict.</p>	<p>3, &c. Goes to Donawert and Amberg, and forms a scheme of molesting the elector of Saxony, by lending the Imperialists 10,000 Bavarian recruits.</p> <p>10, 11. Returns to Nordlingen, to prevent Gustavus entering Bavaria through the duchy of Wirtemberg.</p> <p>18. Sends some ordnance from Wilsburg-castle to Offa.</p> <p>— Detaches more troops into the Upper Palatinate.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(January 1631-2.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
1. Horn continues near Weinheim.	Aldringer keeps an eye to the city of Augsbürg, and prepares to relieve Rotenberg.
2, 3. Reviews his army.	
	7. Pappenheim evacuates Magdeburg; and the marquis of Hamilton repossesses it.
10. Obeys the truce, and visits Iphoven and Nuremberg.	
— Joined by duke William of Saxe Weimar.	12. Pappenheim quits Wolfenbüttele.
Weimar surrenders to Todt and the duke of Mecklenburg.	14. The elector of Trier publishes his manifesto with regard to France.
— A battle between the garrison and the Swedes.	
The archbishop of Bremen appears with 8,000 men.	
20. The rhingrave takes Kirchberg by assault, and defeats the Spaniards near Cassel: Falls afterwards into an ambuscade.	
21. Horn returns to Sweinfurt.	22. Walftein publishes his placard to invite all deserters and discontented old commanders.
	The elector of Bavaria joins Tilly.
25. Prepares to possess Bamberg.	Cratz made field-marshal under Tilly.
29. Takes Hochstadt.	Pappenheim retreats cross the Weser to Hamelen, pursued by the generals Todt, Lunenberg, William of Weimar, Banier, the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and the archbishop of Bremen.
Duke William of Saxe-Weimar joins Banier and Hamilton in the diocese of Magdeburg.	

(February 1631-2.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1, &c. At Francfort.	
4. Quits it to repel the Spaniards, who had violated the truce.	2. Sends Cratz to succour Forcheim.
10. The king of Bohemia and Lord Craven arrive at Francfort.	8—20. Employs himself in fortifying the banks of the Danube.
11.—The marquis of Hamilton also.	
His majesty goes to Hoëchst, where the king of Bohemia finds him.	
— That prince regaled splendidly by Gustavus, as likewise a vast number of foreign ministers.	
Gustavus sends Oxenstiern ambassador to Saxony ; he does great service at the diet of Torgau.	
16.—Marches to Mentz in order to besiege Creütznaeh.	
18 Invests Creütznaeh.	
22. Takes possession.	20. Goes into the Upper Palatinate.
23. Returns to Francfort.	23. Prepares himself to attack Horu.
24, &c. Reduces the whole bishopric of Mentz.	24. Advances to Altdorf.
	27. Enters Forcheim.
	28. Advances to Bamberg.

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(February 1631-2.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Horn takes Bamberg—detained by rains and floods.</p> <p>Marquis of Hamilton sets out to wait on the king at Francfort.</p> <p>Banier and duke William of Weimar take Goslar, Northeim, Göttingen, and Erichsburg-castle.</p> <p>14. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel retakes Warberg.</p> <p>20. Horn prepares to invest Forcheim.</p> <p>Duke Bernard conquers the whole electorate of Mentz.</p> <p>Palatine-Christian of Birkenfeld levies troops for the king.</p> <p>Count Hanau takes Drufenheim.</p> <p>Ulm accepts a Swedish garrison.</p> <p>25. Banier and duke William of Weimar receive orders to march to the king on his entering Bavaria.</p> <p>— Todt supplies their places.</p> <p>28. Horn prepares to receive Tilly.</p> <p>— Duke William of Weimar sent to reinforce Horn, but did not arrive.</p>	<p>Pappenheim cuts to pieces 1,500 new raised Swedish dragoons near Corvey.</p> <p>13. Di Marradas recovers part of Bohemia.</p> <p>The town of Cologne signs a neutrality with Gustavus.</p>

(March 1631-2.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
<p>— Receives the account of Horn's defeat.</p> <p>— Assembles his army, in order to be revenged on Tilly.</p> <p>4. Sets out from Francfort.</p> <p>6. Advances to Aschaffenberg.</p> <p>7. To Lohr, thirty miles, halts there.</p> <p>9. To Warenfelt.</p> <p>10. To Arnstein.</p> <p>11. To Tettelbach.</p> <p>12. To Kitzingen; dispatching Hepburn to Osnaburg.</p> <p>26. Marches to Weinheim, his three armies being now united, and Dankelspiel.</p> <p>29. Encamps at Furt.</p> <p>21. Visits Nuremberg.</p> <p>— Has some rencounters with Tilly's army.</p> <p>— Changes his design and march.</p> <p>24. Advances to Oettingen and Pleinfeld.</p> <p>— Passes young Pappenheim in Willburg-castle.</p> <p>26. Takes Kayserheim town and cloister, and invests Donawert.</p> <p>27. Takes it by storm.</p> <p>28. Also a castle of the Fuggers.</p> <p>29. Sends the Palatine Augustus with an army into the duchy of Neuburg; he takes Höchstadt and Lawingen.</p> <p>30. Banier makes an unsuccessful carnifado on Neuburg.</p> <p>31. The king leaves Donawert</p>	<p>1. Defeats Horn, and enters Bamberg.</p> <p>— Continues about Hasfurt in the bishopric of Bamberg.</p> <p>12. Calls a council of war at Forcheim.</p> <p>13. Reviews his troops, and marches into the Upper Palatinate.</p> <p>15. Advances to Christian-Erlang.</p> <p>16. To Neumarkt, where he continues some days.</p> <p>20. Retreats towards the Danube.</p> <p>26. Continues about Ingolstadt.</p> <p>30. Retires into Bavaria.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(March 1631-2.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Horn retires from Bamberg, and makes a fine retreat, crossing the Maine.</p> <p>2. Cuts two regiments of his pursuers to pieces in retreating to Mergentheim.</p> <p>Oxenstiern left commander in chief in the electorate of Mentz, and the Palatinate.</p> <p>5. Horn retires to Schweinfurt.</p> <p>7. Writes to the king.</p> <p>11. Joins him.</p> <p>15. Conducts the van-guard to Weinheim.—Stays with his master.</p> <p>— Duke William of Weimar commands in Horn's absence, in Thuringia, &c.</p> <p>— The elector of Saxony enters Bohemia, and boasts that his troops amount to 37,900 men.</p> <p>Todt commands against Pappenheim.</p> <p>Some recruits land from England. They invest Boxtehude, and take it in three weeks.</p> <p>Sir Patrick Ruthven made governor of Ulm, and general in Suabia.</p> <p>General Todt displaced on Salvius's representations. Leslie succeeds him, and being wounded, Baudtzen is ordered to set out, and take the command.—Meanwhile Todt still acts.</p>	<p>Wallstein declared generalissimo, enters Bohemia with 20,000 men, not including Di Marradas's army.</p> <p>Pappenheim takes the field and crosses the Weser, to the eastern side.</p> <p>— Retakes Erichsburg and Eymbeck.</p> <p>— Marches through Hildesheim and Lüneburg.</p> <p>31. Count Embden with 10,000 Spaniards crosses the Moselle. He is supported with another army under Gonfalvo di Cordova.</p>

(April 1632.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	TILLY
1. Advances with his army to Northeim.	1, 2. Lies encamped near Rayn.
2. Joined there by Duke William of Saxe-Weimar's reinforcements.	
3, 4. —Erects his batteries and bridge, in order to cross the Lech.	3, 4. Spreads his troops along the Lech.
5. The battle of the Lech.	5. Defeated, and carried off the field of battle, mortally wounded.
6. The king advances into Bavaria.	6, 7, 8, &c. The Elector of Bavaria takes the command, and flies towards Ingolstadt.
7. Points his course to Augsburg.	
8. Encamps at Lechaufen.	
9. Summons Augsburg. Treaty signed between France and the elector of Triers.	ELECTOR of BAVARIA.
10. Gustavus receives the capitulation of Augsburg.	
11. Settles the government; restores the Lutheran religion.	
14. Makes his public entrance.	
15. Goes to Waldo [Aicha] in his way to Ingolstadt.	
16. Invests that town.	
17, 18, 19. Employed in the siege, and repulses a vigorous sally.	18. Surprises Ratibon.
20. Overturned by a cannon-ball.	20. Tilly dies at Ingolstadt.
22. Makes a journey to Neuburg.	
24. Gives up the siege of Ingolstadt.	
25. Takes Mosberg.	
29. Goes to Landshut, which Horn and Hepburn besieged.	

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(April 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>7. Oxenstiern, duke Bernard, and the rhingrave, oppose the Spaniards with 15,000 men.</p> <p>Horn detached to pursue Tilly's army; rejoins his master at the siege of Augsburg.</p> <p>13. Luca di Cagno, a Spanish general, intends a camifado, and is defeated by the rhingrave.</p> <p>20. The queen of Sweden escorted by Oxenstiern to the city of Mentz.</p> <p>21. Col. Horneck surrenders Spire to the Spaniards.</p> <p>23. Horn sent from Ingolstadt to penetrate again into Bavaria.</p> <p>25. Returns.</p> <p>27. He and Hepburn besiege Landshut.</p> <p>Todt orders the English to blockade Stade.</p>	<p>Walftein advances towards the middle of Bohemia; supposed to command 50,000 men.</p> <p>— Crosses the Elbe near Badin; advances to Schlan. Takes Badin and Prague.</p> <p>14. Don Philip de Sylva joins the Spaniards with 3,000 men.</p> <p>Pappenheim raises the blockade at Stade, and ruins Leslie's and Monro's regiments.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(May 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>The rhingrave opposes Don Gonsalvo in the electorate of Trier.</p>	<p>Pappenheim attempts to force a passage through Todi's army, but miscarries.</p>
<p>Bauditzén takes the command against Pappenheim.</p>	<p>— Goes to Wolfenbüttele. Negotiates about selling Stade to the king of Denmark.</p>
<p>11. Horn arrives at Francfort, to replace duke Bernard.</p>	<p>— Enters the territories of Hesse.</p>
	<p>20. Ossa besieges Biberach.</p>
	<p>21. Spanish generals forced to leave Spire.</p>
	<p>23. Greatly pressed by Oxenstiern's army and the French.</p>
	<p>25. Retreat with difficulty.</p>
	<p>26. Wallstein over-reached by Arnheim in a march. Takes Egra.</p>

(June 1632.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's	
GUSTAVUS	ELECTOR of BAVARIA
Leaves Bavaria, and marches to Munich.	— Enters the Upper Palatinate.
— Takes Aichstadt, Dillingen, and Pappenheim-castle.	5, 6. Takes Sultzbach and Amberg.
7. Arrives at Furt.	
8, 9. Reviews his army.	
10. Makes a visit to Nuremberg.	10. Advances to join Walstein, and receives from him a reinforcement of 16,000 men.
— Attempts to intercept the duke of Bavaria.	
11. —Reaches Lauff.	
12. —And Hirschbruch.	
— Retakes Sultzbach.	13, 14. Returns towards the king.
— Seizes the pass of Hartmannshoven.	
— Retires to Nuremberg, on hearing Walstein and the duke of Bavaria were in full march.	
19. Regains Nuremberg.	
— Encamps there.	
	WALSTEIN
	14. Takes Prague, and offers Saxony a peace.
	16. Having taken Leütmeritz, approaches Egra.
	— Enters the Palatinate, in order to join the elector of Bavaria, who had surprized Ratibon.
	25. Joins the duke of Bavaria.
	26. Both armies advance to Neümarkt. Walstein leaves the district round Amberg.
	27. Rencontre between his troops and Colonel Dewbatel.
	28. Advances to Freystadt.
	30. Arrives at Schwabach; and confronts the king.

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(June 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Duke Bernard left to pursue Offa. defeats Hannibal count Hohen Oerns</p> <p>Benier left with 8,000 men at Augsburg.</p> <p>Duke William of Weimar left with 12,000 men in Suabia.</p> <p>10. Arnheim enters Lusatia to oppose Don Baltazar—saves Bautzen.</p> <p>The administrator of Wirtemberg observes Offa with 8,000 men.</p> <p>Horn detached towards the Upper Palatinate.</p> <p>17. The rhingrave besieges Coblentz, and takes it the 21st.</p> <p>21. Besieges Trarbach, and takes it.</p> <p>[The French army in and near the electorate of Triers.]</p> <p>25. The elector of Saxony and Arnheim return to Dresden to listen to a negotiation, which Gustavus hinders.</p> <p>Dewbatel, with 10,000 Swedes and Brandenburgers, enters Silesia.</p> <p>Arnheim returns with his army, having made a very fine and artful retreat.</p>	<p>6. Don Baltazar enters Lusatia.</p> <p>14. Ellenbogen in Bohemia surrenders to Holk.</p> <p>28. Pappenheim offers the Swedes battle.</p>

(July 1632) — <i>Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's</i>	
GUSTAVUS	WALSTEIN
<p>4. Removes his camp to Fert.</p> <p>5—10. Common rencounters.</p> <p>11. Oxenstiern begins his march from the electorate of Mentz, to join his master.</p> <p>20. The king takes a great convey of Walstein's.</p> <p>27. Gains intelligence of the imperial magazines at Freystadt.</p> <p>30. Dewbatel gives that town a carnifado, and destroys the magazines.</p> <p>The king defeats General Spar, and takes him prisoner.</p>	<p>4. Intrenches at Fert.</p> <p>Commanded parties abroad.</p> <p>Margraviate of Anspach ravaged.</p> <p>20. Walstein sends Holk with 10,000 men into Misnia.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(July 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>3. Horn takes Graffenberg, after six days siege.</p> <p>— And Berncaffel, and Veldentz.</p> <p>12. Dewbatel seizes Great Glogau.</p> <p>Banier recovers Munich, and drives Cratz out of Bavaria.</p> <p>Duke Bernard clears the Lech from archduke Leopold's forces.</p> <p>14. Bauditsen raises the fortifications of Duderstadt, and afterwards takes Einbeck.</p> <p>— The duke of Lunenberg besieges Duderstadt.</p> <p>— Takes it the 24th.</p> <p>20. Oxenstiern joins the landgrave of Hesse Cassel; they advance into Franconia, with in all 10,000 men; wait at Wurtzburg for duke William of Weimar, who had been dispatched to bring the English, and some Swedish forces from Lower Saxony, and some Saxon regiments; in all about 8,000 men.</p> <p>24. Duke Bernard and Banier receive orders, by an express, to join their master.</p> <p>25. Arnheim clears Lusatia; receives a reinforcement of 10,000 Swedes.</p> <p>Horn returns to Mentz.</p> <p>30. The duke of Lunenberg blockades Wolfenbüttele.</p>	<p>Pappenheim, pressed by the duke of Bavaria to make a diversion in Thuringia or Saxony, which he refuses; and then marches to raise the siege of Maastricht, July 4.</p> <p>— Serves on the banks of the Weiser, about the end of the month.</p> <p>— Gronsfeldt left to command in his room.</p>

(August 1632.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	WALSTEIN
<p>1. His oration to his generals on depredations, contributions, cruelty, &c.</p> <p>4. 5. Parties sent abroad.</p> <p>8. The king pays his army. — Takes Hertzog-Aurach, to facilitate the junction of his troops.</p> <p>17. His four little armies destined to join him, advance to Bruck.</p> <p>18. The king meets and reviews them.</p> <p>20. Repairs a bridge which Walstein had broken down.</p> <p>21. The junction formed: A public thanksgiving: Battle offered to Walstein. His lines attempted.</p> <p>22. The attack continued.</p> <p>24. The desperate engagement about Altenberg-castle.</p> <p>25. The king's fine retreat.</p> <p>26. Forms a new camp close to Walstein.</p> <p>29, 30. Commanded parties sent abroad.</p>	<p>The court of Vienna highly pleased with Walstein's declining a decisive engagement.</p> <p>That general wants to enter into some accommodation with Gustavus.</p> <p>— Displeased with Felt-marshal Cratz.</p> <p>— Sends parties abroad all the beginning of the month.</p> <p>21. Renders his intrenchments extremely strong.</p> <p>24. Makes a very obstinate resistance.</p> <p>26. Sends parties abroad till the end of the month.</p>

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(August 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>1. Lunenburg and Bauditzen divide their armies. Bauditzen, in Pappenheim's absence, breaks into Westphalia. Surprizes Warburg and besieges Paderborn the 12th: Raifes the siege the 21st.</p> <p>6. Horn routs the Imperialists near Straßburg.</p> <p>9. Arnheim and the Swedes take Breslau.</p> <p>10, 11. Oxenstiern's and duke William of Weimar's armies advance to join each other: junction formed the 13th.</p> <p>Horn enters Straßburg.</p> <p>11. —Advances into the Lower Palatinate.</p> <p>13, 14. Duke Bernard's and Banner's armies unite with Oxenstiern's and duke William of Weimar's between Kitzingen and Weinsheim, having marched through the bishopric of Aichstadt into Franconia.</p> <p>15. Horn raises the siege of Willoch.</p> <p>17. Cuts to pieces 1,000 imperial cavalry by means of an ambuscade. Pushes Montecuculi across the Rhine.</p> <p>The Combined Swedish armies reach Hertzog Aurach.</p> <p>18. Lie at Bruck.</p> <p>— Arnheim and Dubalt gain the battle of Limburg.</p> <p>21. The combined Swedish armies all join their master. Horn obtains Straßburg-bridge.</p> <p>22. — Enters Upper Alsatia. Leaves Dewbatel to besiege Stollhoven.</p> <p>26. Little Jacob joins Bauditzen with 3,000 cavalry.</p> <p>30. Horn enters Suabia to assist the Wirtembergers, and takes Offenburg and Ortenberg-castle.</p>	<p>13. Holk makes an irruption into Vogtland, having taken Zwicka the 12th.</p> <p>16, 17, &c.—Ravages Misnia.</p> <p>21. Gronsfeidt forces Bauditzen to retire. Pappenheim's great effort towards raising the siege of Mastricht.</p> <p>23.—Repulses the Rhine.</p> <p>Montecuculi leaves Alsatia to assist in Bavaria.</p>

(September 1632.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's

GUSTAVUS	WALSTEIN
1, 2, 3. Small rencounters.	1—10. Sends abroad commanded parties.
4. The king explains himself to the Nurembergers about decamping.	
7. A public annual commemoration for the victory at Leipzig.	
8. The king dislodges.	12. Dislodges.
9. Lies at Neustadt.	
13. Removes to Weinheim.	14. Arrives at Forcheim.
14. Divides his army.	
15. Returns with half towards Nuremberg, then marches into Bavaria.	
— Recalled to Nuremberg by a letter from Oxenfiern.	
21. Lies at Dunkelfpiel.	21. Summons Calmbach.
22. At Nordlingen; thence advances to relieve Rayn.	
25. Mitzval surrenders Rayn.	24. Advances to Bamberg.
27. The king cuts to pieces 400 Croatsians near the Lech.	25. Parts with the elector of Bavaria and his army.
	Montecuculi takes Rayn, and attempts in vain to hinder the king from crossing the Lech.
	29. Walstein takes Bareüth.

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—continued.—(September 1632.)

SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.	IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.
<p>Oxenstiern stays at Nuremberg with General Bauditzén.</p> <p>5. Horn returns to Straßburg. — He and Dewbatal command in Alsatia.</p> <p>9. Horn besieges Benfelden.</p> <p>15. Duke Bernard, with 12,000 men, sent to observe Wallstein in Franconia on one side, and Pappenheim on the other.</p> <p>Duke William sent to collect some Swedes and English which laid near Hanover.</p> <p>Hamilton and Hepburn leave the King and set out for England.</p> <p>22. Bauditzén enters Hesse. Arnhem in Silesia and Lusatia.</p> <p>24. The duke of Lanenberg forced by Gronsfeldt to raise the siege of Wolfenbüttele.</p> <p>Rothven and the administrator of Wirtemberg command in Suabia.</p> <p>— And the duke of Mecklenburg in Lower Saxony.</p>	<p>13. Galas besieges Lauf.</p> <p>19. Pappenheim appears in the abbacy of Corvey in Westphalia.</p> <p>20. Pursues Bauditzén 20 miles. — Montecuculi opposes the Swedes and English near Hanover.</p> <p>— Gronsfeldt, Boninghausen, and Manstelt act all in Lower Saxony.</p> <p>Offa commands against Ruthven, &c. in Suabia.</p> <p>22. The two young dukes of Tuscany go to serve in Wallstein's army.</p> <p>Marradas, Tieffenbach, and Goßa act against Arnhem.</p> <p>Tieffenbach sent into Austria to repress the insurrection of the peasants.</p> <p>24. Galas ravages Vogtland and Misnia.</p> <p>25. Aldringer detached by Wallstein to assist the elector of Bavaria.</p>

(October 1632).—Scheme and Diary of the War, from the King's	
GUSTAVUS	WALSTEIN
1, 2. Passes the Lech.	1. Takes Coburg.
3. Retakes Rayn.	3. Repulsed at Coburg-castle.
— And Landberg.	
5. At Neuberg on the Danube be- heads col. Mitzval.	5. Advances into Vogtland.
6, 7. Prepares to besiege some towns in Bavaria, particularly Ingol- stadt.	
8. Marches to Nordlingen.	8, 9. Gains several towns in Vogt- land.
12. Orders Kniphausen to retake Lauff.	10. Arrives at Plauen.
13, 14. Pursues and defeats col. Munich.	11. Forms a camp at Weida.
15. Returns to Nuremberg, where he is recruited by 5,000 Switzers.	13, 14. Advances towards Leipsic.
17. Advances towards his army.	17. Sends some cavalry to make a bravado to it.
19. Arrives at Kitzingen, and meets his queen.	18. Summons it to capitulate.
21. Joins duke Bernard at Schleif- sing, having marched from Bavaria into Thuringia in 14 days.	19. Takes Weissenfels.
23. Reaches Arnstadt; stays there some days.	20, 21. Besieges Leipsic.
— Incorporates the English and Scottish amongst his other regiments.	22. Takes the town.
Oxenstiern returns to Nuremberg.	23.—And the castle [Pleiffenberg.]
28. The queen of Sweden arrives.	25, &c. Reduces other towns in Misnia.
— The king reviews his troops at Erfurt.	28. Forms his junction with Pap- penheim.
29. Marches 13 miles beyond Erfurt.	
30. Continues his march.	

<p align="center">SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c.</p>	<p align="center">IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c.</p>
<p>1. Duke Bernard advances to raise the siege of Coburg.</p>	<p>1. Galas takes Chemnitz.</p> <p>2. Pappenheim ordered to join Walstein; sends Merodé against Bauditz, and leaves Gronsfelt to observe the duke of Lueneburg.</p> <p>— Raises contributions from Mulhausen.</p> <p>— Attempts Erfurt in vain; marches on to Walstein.</p> <p>3. Holk and Galas unite their armies in Mitnia.</p> <p>4. —Take Freyberg.</p>
<p>Ruthven and the administrator of Wirtemberg act against Offa in the circle of Suabia.</p>	<p>12. —And Wurtzen.</p>
<p>28. Horn takes Bensfelden, after a siege of near 8 weeks.</p>	

(November 1632.)—Scheme and Diary of the War, &c.

GUSTAVUS	WALSTEIN
<p>1. Thursday, arrives at Naumburg.</p> <p>2. Displeased at being deified by the people.</p> <p>3. Intrenches himself, not proposing to hazard a battle.</p> <p>4. Intercepts Colorado's letter.</p> <p>5. Reconnoitres Walstein's lines.</p> <p>— Resolved to fight in Pappenheim's absence.</p> <p>6. Gains the victory at Lützen.</p> <p>— Killed.</p> <p>N. B. When his Majesty died he left six armies in the field, besides his own; namely, Knipphausen's in Lower Saxony, Dubalt's in Silesia, the Palatine of Birkenfeld's in Bavaria, Bauditz's in the electorate of Cologne, Horn's in Alsatia, and Rathven's in Suabia; not to mention four confederate armies, viz. the Saxons, Hessians, the troops of Lunenburg, and Bremen.</p>	<p>1. Sends some cavalry to Leipzig, and removes to Weissenfels.</p> <p>4. Detaches Pappenheim to Halle.</p> <p>5. Prepares for the battle.</p> <p>6. Defeated and flies.</p>

APPENDIX
TO THE
HISTORY OF THE LIFE
OF
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

I.

Oratio GUSTAVI ADOLPHI Helfingfordæ in comitiis habita,
mense Januarii, A.D. MDCXV. ætatis suæ XXI.*

ILLUSTRES, generosi domini, nobilissimi, clarissimi, prudentes ac honesti. Ego quidem in præterito quadriennio, quo per omnipotentis providentiam huic regio imperio præfui, libenter & sæpe quælivissem occasionem, quomodo possem aliquando de harum provinciarum conditione, & omnium vestrûm statu certi quid cognoscere: ut in tempore, quod ad omnium vestrûm salutem facit, ita ordinare ac disponere possim: quò sub meo imperio queatis (in quantum his incommodis temporibus fieri potest) ferveri per legum & legitimarum sanctionum custodiam; & ut ipse (prout à Deo mihi commissâ potestas hoc exigit) possim querelas vestras & gravamina comperire, & postea illis remedia comparare; sed quàm libenter hoc effectui dedissem, & quantum mihi hoc cordi curæque fuerit; tamen ab hoc per multiplices difficultates, quas bellum secum traxit, semper præpeditus fui ad hoc usque tempus & oblatam occasionem. Hanc autem prætermittere nolui quo minus. Vos omnes ad me & hæc comitia vocarem: ut vobiscum non solum harum provinciarum negotia perpenderem, sed etiam vobiscum agerem de rebus quibusdam, quæ pertinent ad commune regni & charissimæ patriæ nostræ bonum & salutem. Itaque gratias vobis benevolas ago, quod tam promptè, quàm bonos & fideles subditos decet, hic convencritis. In memoriam vobis fatis revocatis, quomodo Sigismundus rex Poloniæ eo tempore, quo secundum jus suum hæreditarium ad regiam dignitatem ascenderat, hic in dilectâ nostrâ patriâ statim ab initio, & postea continuè quoties occasio hoc ipsi dictare videbatur, eò annisus est, ut nos deducet à purâ & verâ apostolicâ doc-

* It was pronounced originally in Swedish, and translated verbatim by Loxcenius. *Hist. Suec.* 4^{to}. 526.

trinâ;

trinâ; & occœcâret nos pontificiis erroribus ac tenebris, quod omnia ejus consilia & molitiones, tam accommodationis quadam specie, quàm insidiis & vi directæ erant. Hæ ut impedirentur, rex Carolus, dilectissimus & honoratissimus meus dominus pater laudatissimæ memoriæ, unâ cum pluribus aliis rectè sentientibus christianis, Suecis, & patriæ verè amantibus viris, summopere studuit. Super istæc extranea cepit arma Sigismundus, eaque in regnum, patriam suam introduxit, & regni incolas ad civile bellum adversus seipsum concitavit & irritavit, & persecutus est beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum & illos, donec ipse & illi, necessitate coacti, defensionis arma contra Sigismundum capefferent, quibus ejus & asseclarum illius machinationes anno 1598, ad Lincopiam, divinæ gratiæ providentiâ, frangebantur & irritæ reddebantur, ejusque & asseclarum contra Deum & patriam perjurium puniebatur & vindicabatur. Inde quoque contra recens pactum ibi præstitum, patriam suam deseruit, omnem offensam & turbationem post se relinquens; per quæ non modò multi honesti viri, sed etiam totius regni status periclitari imò profus interire potuissent. Quamvis autem beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus & regni ordines satis causæ habuissent regium imperium statim ab eo ad alium transferendi; tamen prius in diversis comitiis & conventibus ipsi & ipsius filio hoc obtulerunt. Sed ab ipso deinceps nihil aliud agitatum & susceptum est, quàm damnosum bellum adversus hoc regnum, per quod postea universi regni ordines permoti sunt ad abjudicandum & renunciandum ei jus suum hæreditarium ad hoc nostræ patriæ regimen & imperium; & de cætero mutarunt veterem unionem hæreditariam, atque in beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum transfulerunt; prout Norcopiensis & plures recessus, unâ cum renunciationibus in publicum editis, ulterius continent ac ostendunt quas ut annihilaret Sigismundus rex, postmodò vi & astutiâ operam dedit. Ut autem eò melius reliquum suum propositum hoc modo persequi & promovere posset, exinde non solum bello, sed etiam vanorum scriptorum copiâ hunc præterito regni statum perturbatum ivit, velut quoque præterito tempore bello in Livoniâ, & diversis diplomatibus ac mandatis huc in regnum missis & disseminatis satis testatum fecit, in quibus non modò dominum patrem beatæ memoriæ & me, sed etiam omnes regni ordines famosis & falsò effictis scriptis, nostras & illorum actiones & facta laude digna conatur Sueciæ subditis totique mundo odiosa reddere. Ego me diversis temporibus ad amicam reconciliationem scripto obtuli: ut diuturnum illud & cruentum bellum aliquando deponeretur, atque provinciæ & regna salutarem pacem degustarent, & mala bellum concomitantia

mitantia tandem cessarent. Sed ille nihil aliud quàm probrofa verba rescripsit, magis ad perturbationem, quàm conciliationem facientia. Ulterius contra inducias inter Succiae & Poloniae delegatos præteritâ ætate factas, mandata & libellos famulos huc in Sueciam misit, eo fine, ut per eos, vos à pacis obligatione (qua vos in ante dicto induciarum pacto parenti meo & mihi devinxistis) abduceret, & sic discordiam, dissidium, atque, si fieri posset, intestinum bellum excitaret, à quibus periculosis ejus consiliis vos benevolè dehortor. Dat vobis dulcia & fallacia verba, dolet vestras vices & statum, quærit tamen sub eo fuco vos in graves condiciones conjicere. Vociferatur de eo in suis diplomatibus, quod in bello cum vicinis vestris & circumjacentibus regnis versemini; sed non addit, quod libenter vos à vestro juramento seducere, atque ad intestinum bellum irritare velit. Artificiose quoque dissimulare & reticere potest, quis in causa fuerit, ut eum vicinis nostris Russis incideremus in hoc bellum. In summa hoc agit, ut quovis modo subditorum meorum animos à me abducere possit & alienare, atque sic plus motuum creare. Quapropter vos gratosè monitos volo, ut vobis ab hujusmodi scriptis caveatis, & vestros vicinos, conterraneos & paræcios adhortemini, ne quis vestrùm per ea circumveniat. Ut verò eò melius & reipsa intelligatis Sigismundi artes, quibus semper usus est, provincias & regna populatus est, multas turbas, bellum & sanguinis effusionem procuravit, constitui summam coram vobis repetere, quomodo non solùm in animo habuerit per bellum in Russiâ gestum subigere nostram patriam, sed etiam quomodo præcipuâ in causâ (post delictorum poenam) fuerit, ut implicaremur huic Russico bello, & quâ ficia specie deceperit Russos; ut inde postea colligere possitis, quid intendat cum suis diplomatibus. Hoc satis notum est, quum rex Poloniae, bello in Poloniam traducto, contra Sueciae regnum nihil efficere posset, & ille cum suis & pontificii legati consiliis & auxiliis, modum & viam parentem meum beatæ memoriæ & Sueciae regnum occupandi ferre impossibilem deprehenderet, aliud excogitat medium, atque sic conatur uno malleo duos ictus facere, ut dici solet. Polonis enim dabatur occasio, ficto dolo Russos ad intestinum perducendi discordiam; in qua sibi non difficile fore arbitrabantur, sive unum provehendi ad imperium, qui cum illis facturus esset, sive totam Russiam sibi subjiciendi. Erat in Russia anno 1605, Boritz Fædorovitz Gudenou, qui ex vili genere & ortu erat, & czaris Frederici affinis, suo tempore stabuli magistri officium gerens, quum verò factus esset czaris affinis, præponebat eum (quia ipse parum cordatus erat) toti Russiæ, quæ re ipsi ansa dabatur plebem in suam fidem & obsequium

obsequium adducendi, & quia videbat, czarem improlem esse, cogitabat de viâ magnum ducatum sub se redigendi. Sed ipsi obstaculo erat Johannis Basilii, quondam czaris minimus natu filius, Frederici Ivanovitz frater, nomine Demetrius: eoque hunc clam occidi facit. Quum verò czar Fredericus Ivanovitz obiisset absque hæredibus, plebs desiderabat dictum Boritz, qui, pro vulgi arbitrato, non malè præfuerat imperio, defuncto czari succedere. Alioqui sibi in suâ administratoris dignitate quandam auctoritatem & existimationem conciliarat; ita ut magnates, qui possent ratione consanguinitatis esse proximi imperio, non auderent populo contradicere; sed ipsi cogerentur, licet inviti, dictum Boritz eligere in czarem. Sed ille per decennium, quo Russiam regebat, primatum invidiam & odium magis & magis in se derivabat. Quum ergo rex Poloniæ comperisset, istum in omnium Russorum odio tandam esse, effingendum sibi aliquid & tentandum esse cogitabat, quo seditio & intestinum dissidium inter Russiæ incolæ cieri posset; nihil moratus, quod ante quinquennium pacem & amicitiam ad XX annos cum eodem Boritz fecisset. Sed reperiebat fugitivum monachum gente Russum, qui ex vili Otrapiorum genere ortus, nomine Griska erat. Hunc monachum Sigismundus putabat esse idoneum, per quem consilium suum effectui mandaret; quia astutus homo & magus erat. Idcirco evulgabatru morem, istum monachum esse Demetrium, Johannis Basilii minimum natu filium, ipsius in Russia (secundum morem ejus hic in regno præterita ætate usitatum) non paucis diplomatibus & literis sub istius Demetrii nomine, prætendens, verum Demetrium non fuisse interfectum, sed illos, qui in mandatis habebant, eum occidere, subduxisse eum & abdidisse in monasterium, ubi in hunc diem educatus esset, & postea, quum ad maturam ætatem pervenisset, se contulisse in Lithuaniam, ut Boritzii tyrannidem effugeret, ideo monebat eos, ut à Boritzio desisterent ad illum, qui verus eorum dominus esset. Rex etiam monebat Woiwodam de Sandomiria, ut quasi per seipsum, ei aliquot millium auxilium præstaret, quod etiam fecit. Ita monachus iste, submentito Demetrii nomine, cum illo exercitu pergebat, & obsidebat aliquot Russicas urbes; quæ se confestim à rege Poloniæ & commento ejus decipi patiebantur. Russi, qui satis sciebant dolum subesse initio quidem ei aliquantum resistebant, sic ut rex cogeretur monacho suo plus auxiliarium copiarum mittere. Tandem tamen tædio Boritziani imperii afficiebantur, ita ut majorum ac minorum gentium subditi ab eo deficerent, & in partes Demetrii passim transirent. Itaque postquam rex Demetrii sui successum cognovit, fœdus cum eo

eo inivit, & promisit ei imperium Muscoviticum, & nuptias Sandomirii principis filiae. Ipsum contra obligatum iri ad introducendam pontificiam religionem in Russiam, & ad juvandum regem Poloniae in occupatione regni Sueciae, cum aliis hujusmodi. Proinde rex ei ingentem exercitum auxilio misit; quo nonnullos cogebat, nonnullos ex imprudentia putantes ipsum genuinum czaris filium esse, impellebat ad suas partes sequendum, quidam, ex invidia & odio Boritzii imperii, ei ultrò accedebant; donec Boritzius ex desperatione sibi ipsi mortem consciscerebat. Boritzii filius ad aliquot hebdomadas post patrem suum administrabat imperium; sed ille quoque cum matre suâ veneno sublatus est. Itaque regis Sigismundi monachus ad Russicum imperium coronatur in urbe Muscovicâ. Hic ex Boritzii casu sibi quivis cautelâ exemplum capiat, ac videat, quomodo DEUS plectat illos, qui per latrocinium & malas artes extollunt se in domini sui sedem ac thronum; etiam si DEUS hoc ad tempus ferat; fera tamen & gravis poenâ cum vindicta tandem supervenit. Hic etiam vobis considerare & cernere integrum est, quid Sigismundus rex libellis aut scriptis suis emisistiis effecerit, & quomodo dictum Boritzium imperio & vitâ dejecerit, & monachum exaltarit, Russos perturbarit: unde postea omnes hi motus exorti sunt. Potestis insuper ex his judicare & colligere, quàm periculosum propositum hujusmodi scriptis, quæ indices huc mittit, adversus patriam nostram conceperit, à quo DEUS nos clementer custodiat. Quilibet sapiens vir etiam bene perpendere potest, in quanto discrimine Sueciae regnum chara nostra patria versata sit, quando iste regis Poloniae monachus imperium Russiae tenebat: erant enim illi fœdere conjuncti; erant unius pontificiae religionis; erant duorum potentium regnorum, nobis vicinorum, compotes, ita ut, nisi DEUS illorum consilia prævenisset & fregisset, impossibile coram humanis oculis fuisset, se contra illos defendere. Sed ut illud sacrum dictum habet: Decerne consilium, & fiat irritum; armate vos, & tan:en fugam capite: quia DEUS nobiscum est; pro quo ipsi gloria sit. Quum enim iste Demetrius dicto modo à rege Poloniae extolleretur ad imperium Russiae, statim cogitabat de servando pacto suo, omnis generis præparationem ad bellum faciebat, quo secum animo constituerat adoriri Sueciae regnum. Sed quum ei, secundum ante dicti fœderis tenorem, etiam illud pactum, servaretur, ut principis Sandomirii filia ei nuptui daretur, & videretur firmum fœdus inter Russiam & Poloniam coalitutum, atque in nos redundaturum, Deus aliam ingrediebatur viam. In ipsis enim nuptiarum diebus excitabat DEUS Russicum dominum, nomine Basilium Ivanovitz Suski, qui satis sciebat, hoc merè fictum

factum opus cum isto Demetrio esse. Ille fastidivit Polonicum istud imperium; proinde commovit populum, & ipsos quoque magnates, ut eorum favor in ipsum inclinaret, atque sic, occiso pseudo Demetrio cum suis Polonis, ab ipso pendentibus, hunc Basilium Ivanovitz eligunt sibi czarem. Hic dictum fœdus jam cum suo Demetrio exspiraverat, hic omnia casta erant, pro quibus tamdiu laborarant, hic etiam amicitia inter Polonos & Russos in merum odium, vindictæ cupiditatem, & apertum bellum conversa ac mutata erat. Sigismundi regis animo non parum ægrè erat, quod ejus consilium in Russia non felicius cessisset; putabat tamen, hic nondum quiescendum esse; idcirco cum ingenti exercitu à se armato ipse proficiscebatur in Russiam. Ut autem Russis, tunc vacillare incipientibus ulterius imponeret, iterum spargebat rumorem de Demetrio, quasi non occiso, sed elapso, & apud se in castris præfente. Sic Russi, pro barbaricâ suâ levitate, majore sui parte iterum deficiebant à czare suo & revertebantur ad partes Poloni, qua defectione Polonorum castra ita roborabantur, ut czarem & paucos illos, qui adhuc in fide ejus erant, in urbe Muscovia obsidione cingerent, & in tantas angustias redigerent, ut auxilium à patre meo p. m. petere cogerentur; quia verò dominus parens meus haud ignorabat, quanti periculi res futura esset, si rex Poloniæ Russiâ potiri deberet, regia ejus majestas suæ & patriæ securitatis causa, desiderio ejus deesse non poterat. Itaque eò mittebat exercitum suum, & czarem liberabat obsidione; & totam Russiam liberasset, si quorundam extraneorum proditio non intervenisset, prout multis vestrum notum esse potest, qui ipsi adfuerunt. Hæc peregrinorum defectio tantum effecit, ut rex Sigismundus Russiam occuparet, & filium suum, czarem fieri curaret, & Basilium monachum faceret. Per hanc occasionem regis Poloniæ molitiones, quas parens meus beatæ memoriæ, patriæ securitatis causa, non poterat non impedire, primùm incidimus in hæc Russica negotia, quæ postea anno 1613, per Russorum dolum malum eruperunt in hoc bellum. Non potest illud absque admiratione tam extraneorum, quam incolarum abire, quomodo factum sit, ut nos tam subitò cum Russis, quibus nuper auxilium ferebamus, quique nostri amici erant, aded cruentum bellum nacti simus. Ut ejus rei causam sciatis, & reipsâ videatis, eam ex merâ Russorum instantiâ & perfidiâ profectam esse, paucis coram vobis referam. Postquam beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus, ut prius dictum est, ita propter regis Sigismundi molitiones permotus erat, ut succurreret Russis, pro qua re ipsi promissa erat Kexholmia ejusque ditio in remunerationem expensarum; quantumvis autem czarem Russiæ liberasset ab obsidione ferme triennali

triennali Muscoviæ urbis: non tamen poterat castelli Kexholmenſis compos fieri, niſi illud obſidere, & vi cogere deberet. Atque quum Kexholmia jam occupata eſſet, regia ejus majeſtas ſatis rationis habuiſſet ad diſpiciendum, quomodo de circumjacente terra ſibi ſtatim in rem ſuam conſulere potuiſſet; quia Ruſſi paulò ante Uladiſlaum regis Poloniæ filium, parentis mei inimicum, ſibi elegerant in czarem. Nihilominus tamen regia majeſtas in mandatis dederat ſuo mareſchallo, ut ſolummodò invigilaret horum finium deſenſioni. Sed quum Ruſſos pœniteret, quod Polonis ſubjecti eſſent, qui crudeliter & violenter illis imperarent, recolligebant ſe ſuaſque copias, tam validas, ut urbem Muſcoviam & Polonos in eâ obſiderent. Quum tamen vererentur, ſe impares fore obſidioni perfequendæ, ex caſtris ad Muſcoviam ſcribunt Novogardiam, & cives iſtiæ jubent petere Campidominum ſibi auxilio. Qui quum ex ipſorum deſiderio adveniſſet, Ruſſorum conditio quotidie melior fiebat, partim ob Polonicorum militum ſeditionem, partim ob alias diſſenſiones inter Polonos natas, ita uti Ruſſi ſibi perſuaderent, ſe per ſeipſos hoc bene effecturos. Sed Novogardienſes hac occasione circumventum ibant Campidominum, & blandis verbis eum tam diu detinebant, ut omnis ejus exercitus ad extremam faucem redactus eſſet, ea re deinceps adductus eſt ad occupandam urbem Nougardenſem. Hoc facto, Ordines Novogardenſes, qui in arce erant, inibant contractum cum Campidomino, nimirum quod vellent unum ex domini parentis mei filiis ſibi dominum & czarem eligere; quod etiam poſtea à proceribus in Muſcovia approbatum eſt, ſecundum hujus contractus vigorem poſtmodò omnes reliquæ domus occupabantur. Poſteaquam Ruſſi Polonos, qui in urbe Moſchâ erant, tamdiu fame torſerant, ut cogorentur arcem et urbem dedere; iſti (*Ruſſi*) adedò animis inflati ſunt, ut non ſolum obliſcerentur promiſſi de Carolo Philippo principe fratre meo in czarem creando; ſed etiam omnium gentium juris. Non enim modò alium ſibi czarem eligeabant; ſed quoque noſtros milites, qui Tiphini & Augdœ erant, ex improviſo obruebant (ſecundum Nougardenſium proprium deſiderium; in illorum ſecuritatē qui in præſidiis locati erant) eoſque miſere trucidabant, quod adhuc tolerari potuiſſet, ſi amicæ tranſactioni ſe accommodare voluiſſent. Ad eos diverſæ literæ monitoriæ ſcribebantur, ut nobiſcum amicè agere vellent. Sed illi eas literas quaſi metu ſcriptas interpretabantur: ingentem enim exercitum ad Brunitz collocatum hadebant. Ut autem illis oſtenderem, ſe ſibi ipſis imponere, per mea agmina ad Nougardam ſtantia excuſſionem ad eorum caſtra Brunitzenſia fieri jubebam, obſidebam quo-

que Augdoam; & Deo favente ad Brunitziam sedentes cædebantur, & Augdoa capiebatur. Ut autem mundus intelligeret, quantum mihi displiceret sanguinis effusio & cruentum bellum, deinde ex urbe Narvâ per Campidominum Aulæ & Campi Mareſcallum, ſenatum Ruſſicum ulterius admoneri faciebam, ut ad amicam compoſitionem animum applicare velint inſtruebam quoque Campi Mareſcallum Jeſperum Andreae & Magnum Martini poteſtate cum illis volentibus tranſigendi, ſed illi probroſa & inania dicta regerebant. Interea tantum valui apud Magnæ Britanniæ Reges & Ordines Belgicæ, ut ſuos legatos ad hujus negotii compoſitionem mitterent. Illi quoque jam ad ipſius compoſitionis actum conveniunt, quomodo verò Deus illorum animos ad juſtitiam & pacem ſectere poſſit, tempus docebit. Hunc in modum res proceſſit, & nos ad Ruſſicum bellum devenimus, quod mihi, per hoc triennium, impoſſibile fuit amovere ob hoſtis pertinaciam; quantæcunque etiam mihi curæ fuit. Spero tamen, Deum per media, quæ nunc dedit, omnia in bonum verſurum. Quum ergo ita fit, quod rex Poloniæ omni conatu, diplomatibus & mendacibus ſcriptis, bello per Livoniam & Ruſſiam, ſuſcitato, hoc agit, uti dictum eſt, ut dilectam noſtram patriam in perniciem præcipitet, & pontificis ac Polonorum ſervitutis jugo ſubjiciat; ideo cauto opus eſt, ne ab illis vos ſeduci patiamini, velut Ruſſi fecerunt, ſed eorum exemplum vos circumſpectos faciat, conſiderantes, quot diverſa mala imperiorum mutationes ſecum trahant; præſertim quando fit per inſtinam diſcordiam. Proinde revocate vobis ſemper in memoriam varias obligationes, quibus dn. parenti meo beatæ memoriæ & mihi diverſis temporibus vos obſtrinxiftis, additis ſcriptis & corporalibus gravibus juramentis. Ne quoque obſivioni tradatis immenſa pericula ac moleſtias, quas pater meus b. m. & ego multis modis, veſtræ ſalutis cauſa, paſſi ſumus & ſuſtinuimus. Intuemini porro cauſas & ipſum fundamennum belli Ruſſici, quod non regiæ majeſtatis b. m. vel meâ culpâ ceptum & tamdiu continuatum eſt; ſed quod ducit originem ſuam veram ex ipſorum Ruſſorum perfidia & pervicaciâ. Vos itaque boni viri velitis perſeverare in illa fidelitate, quam hæcenus in vobis comperi, ſic ego de cætero quoque, ut hæcenus, veſtræ ſaluti ſummo opere ſtudebo operamque dabo, ut vos reducam ad pacem, quietem & meliorem ſtatum; ad quod Deus omnipotens gratiam ſuam largiatur.

II.

Copy of Mr. LILLY (the Astrologer's) Letter to the King of SWEDEN, upon his receiving an honorary Reward of a gold Medal.

[In the Ashmolean Museum, MSS. No 3365.]

[This letter was written about 1612, when Gustavus was 18 years of age.]

Sir,

THAT munificent honorarium, sent from your royal hand by our valiant countryman captain Owen Cox; he (accompanied with the right honourable Sir George Atkew) delivered unto me the 5th of October last, (stylo vet.) which, with all humble thankfulness, I did receive.

But finding my weak labours have met with so great esteem in your princely thoughts, even to invite a king, from the treasure of his own virtue, and in the midst of those busy engagements your majesty has now on foot before Copenhagen, to cast your no less gracious aspect than high testimony of favour upon me, is a consideration that would surprise me with the greatest admiration, did not I perfectly see the measure of princes benefit holds more proportion with the largeness of their heart than merit of those on whom bestowed.

What brought me to honour your heroick name, and thence led on the engagement of my pen, in behalf of yourself and nation, was the large relations my only English Mæcenas (the right honourable the lord Whitlock at his return from Sweden) gave me of those princely endowments, your heroick virtues and generous inclinations: and now give me leave with humble resolves to engage, that forasmuch as your majesty's favour, like a beam cast from that king of planets, has out of your innate goodness, conveyed influence upon so obscure and remote a person, your majesty shall assuredly draw to yourself greater obligations than hitherto I could manifest; together with the resolution of failing after your own ship, and under the fortune of your own trophy, through the most perilous seas and trial of all your concernment.

And while my being is continued on earth will I retain this signal of your kindness as my chiefest treasure; intending moreover its future preservation in some eminent and public place, and with such an inscription as shall ennoble your princely bounty, and record my humble gratitude to all posterity.

G G 2

That

That God, whose great name the reverse of your medal wears, dispose of all your designs; and may the guardian angel of Sweden happily carry on your sword with compleat and continual victory, and plant your trophies throughout the dominions of all your enemies; these are and shall be a part of the earnest and hearty votes of

Your Majesty's most humble
and most obliged servant,

A true copy, Jan. 8. 1759.
Wm. Huddesford.

W. LILLY:

III.

LE CAPITOLATIONI della compagnia dell' Indie Orientali e Occidentali, instituta dal rè GUSTAVO ADOLFO di Suetia per beneficio de' suoi sudditi, fino dell' anno 1626*, che poi fù da lui pochi giorni innanzi la sua morte estesa anco alli sudditi de' suoi confederati, e di tutta Alamagna, con amplissimi privilegi, e sono li seguenti †.

I. CHE fra dodici anni à venire nissuno soggetto al regno di Suetia trapassando lo stretto di Gibilterra con altro titolo, che della general compagnia negotiasse nell' Africa, nell' Asia, nell' America, nella Magallanica, ò ne' paesi Australi sotto pena della perdita delle navi, e di tutte le mercantie; & i padroni delle navi, i quali in simili paesi havessero traficato, fossero tenuti render conto de' loro negotii, e come trasgressori de' gli ordini, e decreti regii, fossero puniti.

II. Che questa compagnia s'intendesse cominciata al prima di Maggio 1627, e durasse fino à dodici anni venturi; nel qual tempo à nissuno de' compagni fosse lecito ripigliare il danaro sborsato; nè introdurre à parte del negotio altre persone; se poi decorso i dodici anni parerà alla compagnia prolungare il tempo del privilegio, egli concede questa proroga in quel modo, che più piacerà.

III. Che ciascun anno si saldassero i conti, a i quali potessero esser presenti tutti quelli, che di sua parte havessero posti nella compagnia mille scudi. Ogni sei anni si facesse un computo finale di tutti i conti; imperochè se'l guadagno, e l'utile (il che non voglia Dio) non corrisponda al danaro postovi, in guisa, che à gl'interessati non paia doverfi continuar la compagnia, all' hora fosse disciolta.

* Loccenius says in 1627.

† Continuatione del Commentario delle Guerre successi in Alemagna, &c. Descritto dal Sign. Conte Bisaccioni. In Venet. 4.^{to}. 1634.

IV. Che

IV. Che si notificasse à tutti con pubblici editti, che ciascuno entrar potesse in questa compagnia, dandosi di tempo à gli habitatori del regno di Suetia fino alle calende di Marzo, & a' forestieri fino al primo di Maggio; di modo, che chi vorrà mettere il danaro nella compagnia debba pagarlo in quattro volte; cioè una parte nel termine prescritto, e le altre tre parti in tre anni venturi.

V. Scorso il tempo prescritto si elegano i soprastanti, i quali solo siano tanti di numero, quante centinaia di migliaia di scudi fossero contati; se però tal'uno quale havesse contribuito cento mila scudi non volesse due soprastanti, i quali però haver dovessero il salario, come se fossero un solo.

VI. I soprastanti debbano essere eletti con i voti comuni de' partecipanti, e chi non havesse contribuito mille scudi, non habbi voto nell' elettione; e nissuno sia eletto per soprastante, il quale non habbia contribuito due mila scudi.

VII. I soprastanti primieramente eletti durino nel loro officio per sei anni; e passato questo termine delle tre parti di loro, due fossero di nuovo elette; e per la terza parte fossero sostituiti i principali de' partecipanti, il che così si osservasse ogni due anni, doppo i sei anni decorati, finche terminasse il tempo prefisso nel privilegio.

VIII. Che tutti, e qualunque si fosse tanto del paese, come stranieri, che contribuito havesse nella compagnia 100 mila scudi, costituissero se gli pareva un soprastante, & a questo fine fossero apparecchiate tutte le nationi con le scritture del contratto, acciò per mezzo di quelle possano trasmettere il denaro nelle mani di coloro, ch' essi sianano fedeli, e buoni; E che claceno nella sua partita scrivesse à qual natione aggregar si volesse. Li forestieri, che risolvendosi habitare nel regno di Suetia contribuiranno 25 mila scudi nella compagnia, godano l'istesse ragioni, che i terrazzani, e siano liberi daogni tributo, purchè non esercitino nelle città negoti civili, e sia loro concesso per ogni volta, che gli piacerà, libero passo per partire.

IX. Li soprastanti siano di autorità, e di potenza eguali, senza riguardo de' gli officii, ò delle dignità, che per altro haver potessero. E datoli il giuramento promettano, di sempre eseguir fedelmente l'officio loro; ogni cosa accomodare; procurare il comodo della compagnia; evitare il danno, favorire giustamente, & egualmente tutti senza riguardo d'amicizia, di nobiltà, ò di dignità di chi si sia; non perdonare ad alcuno, nè condescendere al piacer di altri; ma doppo l'haver à tempi debiti reso i conti, & osservati i capitoli del presente trattato, sodisfare per quanto potranno à tutti.

à tutti. Che non distribuiscano nè mercantie, nè navi proprie, nè ricomprassero da se, nè per mezzo d'altri, ò direttamente, ò indirettamente dalla compagnia mercantia alcuna.

X. Che a' soprastanti si assegnassero di salario mille scudi l'anno.

XI. Se li soprastanti fossero astretti a prò della compagnia far viaggio, per la loro spesa, e fatica, oltre la paga delle vetture, havessero sei marche Suezesi al giorno, che sono di nostra valuta lire undici, e soldi cinque.

XII. Che alli secretarii, cancellieri, & altri ministri si pagassero i stipendii dalla cancellaria della compagnia. Et i soprastanti di ciascheduna camera rendessero i conti particolari de loro secretarii, e ministri.

XIII. Ma se per forte alcuno de soprastanti si riducesse a stato tale in qual si sia camera, che più non potesse assistere, & esser utile alla compagnia, si che perciò ne risultasse danno alcuno; il danno toccasse alla camera, in cui egli si ritrova, ovvero a quelli, che lo deputarono soprastante; e che si computasse il danno, sempre col danaro contribuito da lui, alla compagnia, quale per ciò resti sempre obbligato ad essa; il che anche s'intendesse de' compagni, e di quelli, ch'entrassero a parte, i quali col ricomprare molte merci havessero fatto qualche debito con la compagnia.

XIV. Che non si sostenessero; nè portassero in arresto i soprastanti, nè i loro beni sotto pretesto di render conti, nè de pagar debiti; ma tutte le preteseioni, che vertissero contro di loro si riducessero al giudice ordinario.

XV. Che i danari, che si metteranno nella compagnia siano esenti da ogni confiscatione, nè in conto alcuno si possano applicar ad altri; anzi, che se avvenisse, (il che Dio non permetta) che il rè di Suetia havesse rissa, ò guerra con altri regi, prencipi, ò repubbliche; li sudditi de' prencipi nemici, che havessero contribuita qualche somma di danari nella compagnia siano capaci di poter ripigliar la loro sorte principale, e tutti gli frutti, emolumenti, e commodi, come gli stessi sudditi, e confederati col rè di Suetia, e non altrimenti, che se co' prencipi loro non fosse guerra ò discordia alcuna.

XVI. Che le città commode alla navigatione, e che esercitano la mercantia se contribuiscano trecento mila scudi, costituiscano camera, e le cose necessarie per la rata di questa somma.

XVII. Che fosse libero anche alle città, e provincie di ridurre il denaro contribuito a questo effetto in una somma, e determinar la camera, e le cose necessarie; dichiarando però,

però, che le spese straordinarie ridondino nelle città, che ne riportano il comodo, e non nella compagnia.

XVIII. Che la flotta delle navi si radunasse à Gottemburgh, e di conserva da quel porto si partissero, e compito il viaggio di nuovo colà si riducessero: & ivi scaricassero le mercantie, e poi di novo rimandassero le navi, dove erano partite cariche, purché i venti, & il tempo lo permettano, e che non si temesse di qualche cosa sinistra a danno della compagnia.

XIX. Se qualche camera restasse sfornita di qualche sorte di mercantia, le altre, quando ne siano richieste, la provvedino, e procurino, che simili mercantie peregrine, e forestiere, si ritrovino in tutti li luoghi.

XX. Che dopo l'elezione de' soprastanti, e la deputatione della camera, in ciascheduna di esse si deputino espressi direttori, li quali ogni giorno facciano i conti, e con li soprastanti deliberino, e determinino delle cose necessarie; come del continuare, o non continuare la compagnia, della distribuzione delle mercantie portate, e di somiglianti cose.

XXI. Che si concedesse alle camere autorità di permutare qualunque soprastante da una camera all'altra; e che ogn'una di esse camere, debba tenere in Gottemburgh un'amministratore; che le camere tra di loro in termine di due mesi dopo la partita delle navi mandino i conti l'una all'altra, acciò si possa saper la spesa delle merci caricate, e de gli apparati delle navi, & ogni tre mesi rimettere la somma delle cose vendute.

XXII. Che ogni volta, che parerà necessario s'istituisca una dieta, & adunanza delle camere, acciò che deliberar si possa sopra la levata delle navi; quante, & in che modo debbano esser fornite; in che luoco, & a che prezzo finaltir si dovessero le portate mercantie; rendere i conti, & altre cose simili. Il che ne' primi anni osservar dovesse la camera, che haverà contribuito più dell'altre; la quale perciò dovrà haver la precedenza sopra le altre; le altre camere poi haveranno la loro precedenza, e luoco ad imitatione di questa.

XXIII. Che nella dieta comparissero dodici soprastanti a nome di tutte le camere, alli quali egli haverebbe aggiunto il terzo decimo voto a suo nome, acciò che con più commodità risolvere si possa sopra li maggiori affari; & a questo effetto ciascheduna camera costituisse tante persone, quante somme haveranno contribuito nella compagnia; per esempio, se qualche camera avesse la metà contribuissse sei persone, se la terza parte, quattro, se quattro parti, tre; e se la sesta parte, due; e tutto quello, che con questo modo dalla maggior parte delli voti concluso, e risoluto restasse, fosse da tutti gli altri accettato.

XXIV. Che tutte le mercantie, che fossero nel regno di Suetia introdotte, o da quello estrarre fuori, paghino di gabella quattro fiorini per cento, e questo per una volta sola, doppo la quale ne a' banchi, dogane, ò porte, se li possa far pagar altro. Donasi anco facoltà alla compagnia, che dopo l'haver pagato li quattro per cento sopradetti, possino trasportar le sue merci per tutto il regno senza pagar altro datio, o gabella; purché le dette merci non si vendano a poco, a poco, con discomodo, e danno de' cittadini, e sudditi del regno.

XXV. Che egli ricevuto haverebbe sotto la sua protezione la compagnia, e la conservarebbe nel suo libero esercizio della mercantia, & uso della navigatione, e la difenderebbe contro tutti quelli, che tentassero di nuocerli, e ne' tumulti di guerra gli aiutarebbe (richiedendo il bisogno) con la guardia sua propria.

XXVI. Che in se stesso pigliarebbe l'assunto di fabricare castelli, e fortezze in quei luochi, che saranno giudicati opportuni alla sicurezza de' traffichi, e de' mercanti stessi, e di prefiarli con armi, foldati, & artiglierie a proprie spese.

XXVII. Che le prede, e le cose tolte a' corsari, & ad altri nemici s' impiegassero in utile della compagnia, & in difesa del traffico; senza che egli, o il suo ammiraglio sopra esse pretendano ragione alcuna; ma se l'acquisto delle prede si facesse con l'opera de' foldati del rè, in tal caso la preda si compar- tisse con egual portione.

XXVIII. Che egli non prenderebbe, nè si servirebbe di navi, artiglieria, danari, o mercantie, della compagnia, per servizio di alcuno di suoi, nè meno per uso del regno, senza il volere, e' libero consenso della compagnia.

XXIX. Che egli dà facoltà a quelli, che hanno parte nella compagnia di far contratti con i popoli abitanti fra i termini, e confini sudetti, di far nuove confederationi con principi, e popoli forastieri a proprio nome, di fabricar città, castelli, e fortezze; di occupar luochi desolati, e di farli habitabili, e di operare, e procurare per quanto possono l'utile, e comodo proprio, e della compagnia. Con questo però, che non faccia violenza hostile contro gli habitatori di quei paesi, e che nè anche si tenti cosa alcuna contro i sudditi del rè di Spagna; nè che si pretenda, & eserciti commercio alcuno ne' luochi a loro soggetti senza espresa loro licenza; sotto la pena di già stabilita contra li trasgressori de' suoi ordini, e contra li perturbatori della publica pace.

XXX. Se avvenisse mai, che questa compagnia sotto specie d'amicitia fosse ingannata, o in qual si sia altro modo mal trattata, e nell'uso de' traffichi, ò per forza, o per fraude impedita,

impedita, o defraudata; all' hora gli còcedeva piena facoltà di rifarsi de' danni con qual si voglia modo, e mezo, che potranno; e di procedere contro coloro, che s'ingegnassero d'impedire li loco tranfichi, o di farli violenza, come contro corsari, nemici, assassini, e turbatori della publica quiete.

XXXI. E per maggiormente scoprire il desiderio suo di aiutare, e promuovere la compagnia, che egli vi contribuirà, e metterà a rischio della fortuna, come gli altri, quattro cento mila talarì Suezzesi.

XXXII. Che oltre li quattro fiorini per cento da pagarli in vece di datio, egli si prenderebbe il quinto dell'oro, argento, & altri minerali, che dalle cave de' metalli trasportate fossero; e la decima parte de' frutti di quei paesi, in recompensa de gli ajuti, privilegi, & esentioni, che loro concedeva. Con queste cose però egli non comprende le mercantie, le quali fossero dalla compagnia distratte; nè l'oro, e l'argento, o improntato, o no, che dalla compagnia fosse stato ricevuto in vece delle sue merci; ma che tutto ciò lascierebbe alla compagnia, & oltre di quanto si è detto non riscuoterebbe cosa alcuna.

XXXIII. E perche Guglielmo Uffelinz da Anversa Brabantino ha speso gran tempo della sua vita in ricercare i sudetti porti, e per testimonianza de' stati della Fiandra, e di Maurizio principe di Oranges, egli sia stato il principal inventore in Olanda della compagnia dell' India occidentale, e con li suoi animaestramenti habbi molto coadiuvato, & havendo egli di già risoluto di starsene nella Suetia, habbia promesso di fedelmente manifestare quanto egli con tante sue fatiche haveva penetrato; però in recompensa di ciò egli vuole, che la compagnia le paghi un fiorino per migliaro di quelle mercantie, che dalla compagnia faranno o portate, o levate, per tutto quel tempo, che si faranno i trafichi ne' luochi accennati nel privilegio.

XXXIV. E perche di già abundantemente la compagnia è stabilita, e ne' luochi forastieri sono trasmesse genti del paese; perciò s'istituisca un consiglio, il quale con gli officii, con l'autorità, e con le resolutioni attenda all' amministrazione della giustitia, alla conservatione delle buone leggi, & alla continuatione della guerra; acciò, che questa impresa con giustitia si cominci, con prudenza si profeguisca, e felicemente si fornisca.

Questo consiglio debba determinare sopra il far soldati, deputar governatori, soprastanti, e Giudici, sopra l'edificar città, e castelli; accommodar le differenze, e risse, che nascer potessero fra gli habitatori di quei paesi, & i forastieri colà passati;

passati; e lo stesso anco quando fra questi, e li soprastanti, o camere e confederati succedesse qualche discordia.

Finalmente questo consiglio habbi da mantenere, & osservare tutte quelle cose, le quali sono proprie, e convenevoli ad un buon stato, e politia.

Perche li mercanti, che devono attendere alli loro traffichi, adobbamenti di navi, conti, & alle loro corrispondenze (cosi esse le chiamano) non possono applicarsi a simili affari, perciò con l'erettione di questo consiglio restano sgravati.

Questo consiglio doverà instituirsi de' principali de' partecipanti, quali devono essere esenti da' negotii, & affari delle commissioni, de' nocchieri, & altre consegnationi della compagnia, atteso, che a queste cose doveranno attendere li soprastanti, e dar informatione a loro configlieri, delle navi, e de gli avvisi, che potessero alla giornata ricevere, che in tutte l'occorrenze si possa risolvere di quelle, che far si debba.

In detto consiglio tutte le cose si risolvino co' forme al parer de' piu.

Il numero de' configlieri si debba prescrivere conforme all'occorrenze, & al giudicio della compagnia.

XXXV. Se per sorte qualche principe, comunità, città, o compagnia contribuissi 500 mila scudi, in questa compagnia, si deputi a suo nome un'agente con ogni plenipotenza, acciò che con lui trattar si possa delle cose necessarie, che occorreranno.

XXXVI. Se alli partecipanti paresse espediente dimandare altre conditioni diverse da queste, le quali potessero essere di comodo, & utile alla compagnia, purché non repugnino a gli ordini del regno, salute della repubblica, & al beneficio della compagnia, gli siano liberalmente concesse.

Questo privilegio il Re di Suetia poco avanti la battaglia fatta a Lutzen, comunicò a gli attenenti, & a' confederati della Germania, aggiungendovi questi altri Capitoli.

I. CONCEDA ampia facoltà alli sudditi delle provincie da lui soggiogate, & a tutti quelli, che seco si confedereranno, di costituire camere, & amministrazioni fuori del regno di Suetia ne' loro proprii disretti, & in qualunque luoco, che più loro piacerà. E se a chi sarà suo attinente o amico (non confederato), che di già li fosse stato concesso di entrare nella compagnia, piacesse di adornar le proprie camere, debbano di ciò dichiararsi avanti, perche sua maestà non intende negar simil cosa, conforme però alle occorrenze, & al bisogno.

II. E perche

II. E perchè nel primo articolo del privilegio si nominano alcune parti del mondo; non doverfi ciò così rigorosamente intendere, che la compagnia fosse astretta più in un luogo, che in un altro, ma che con queste dichiarazioni S. M. concedeva facoltà d'indrizzare la loro navigatione dovunque più li piacesse, e di esercitare li loro traffichi in ogni parte, e di terra, e di mare, dove possano sperare comodo, & utile maggiore.

III. Che l'entrar nella compagnia sia concesso ad ogn'uno fino all'ultimo di Dicembre 1633, passato il qual tempo non possano più entrarci. Nel detto tempo ciascuno, che entrerà sia tenuto di pagar la quarta parte dellò somma, che vorrà contribuire; e questo acciò che la compagnia habbia il suo principio li 10 di Gennaro 1633, & indi durar debbi per lo spatio di dodici anni continui avvenire. Nel resto il secondo, e quarto articolo rimanghi nel suo vigore.

IV. Se poi qualcheduno di quelli, ch'entreranno nella compagnia volesse contribuir in una sol volta tutta la somma, a questi tali la compagnia sufficientemente prometta, & a suo tempo attenda; che fornito il tempo prescritto nel privilegio, li farà pagato la solita portione, e frutto delli suoi danari dal giorno, che li contò; non essendo di dovere, che alcuno tenghi morto il suo capitale, senza il dovuto utile, e frutto.

V. Oltre a tutte queste cose S. M. dichiarava, che il Talaro Suezzeze, di cui spesso si è fatto mentione restasse sempre nel suo valore, cioè di quattro Marche; sei e mezza delle quali fanno uno scudo Imperiale, e che li conti nella compagnia sempre si facessero a ragione di scudi Imperiali.

VI. Che le ragioni, e privilegi, li quali nel quinto, & ottavo articolo sono concessi a quelli, che haveßero contribuito cento mila Taleri Suezzezi, si restringessero a cin quanta mila scudi Imperiali, e quelli, che sono concessi nel sesto articolo a quelli, che contribuivano mille, e due mila Taleri Suezzezi si limitassero a cinquecento, & a mille scudi Imperiali; & a quanto si è detto nel decimoterzo articolo a quelli, che contribuisseno trecento mila Taleri Suezzezi, si restringa a 150 mila scudi Imperiali; e perchè nell' articolo ottavo a quelli, che conferiranno 25 mila Taleri Suezzezi, era concesso molti privilegi, come in esso capitolo appare, hora sua maestà, li restringeva a 12 mila, e cinquecento scudi Imperiali; e di più (oltre le ragioni della civiltà, e l'immunità della gabella, che in esso capitolo si contengono) vi aggiungeva, che volendo essi esercitare gli esercitii della città, & altri traffichi lo possano fare, e gli sia concesso.

VII. Che

VII. Ché li soprastanti, quali fossero in viaggio per gli affari della compagnia, senza haver riguardo a quanto fu detto nell'articolo undecimo, possano prendere dalle camere quanto farà loro di bisogno, conforme alla qualità de' luochi & occasioni.

VIII. E benché nell' articolo decimo ottavo, fusse stata destinata per camera generale, e per la radunanza delle navi la città di Goltemburgh ; con questo però dichiara S. M. che se qualche natione, o città havesse la sua camera non troppo lontana dal mare oceano, e perciò non li fosse di comodo il mandare le sue navi a Goltemburgh ; siano tenuti di significarlo alle diete generali de' soprastanti, e nominare il luogo dove potranno, o li farà comodo di unire le loro navi con l'altre.

IX. Se con l'aiuto del signor Iddio, e con l'industria, & opera de' Tedeschi avenisse, che si ergeffero più di dodici camere ; così anco si accrescesse il numero de' soprastanti, li quali per vigor del vigesimo terzo articolo, mandar si devono alle diete generali.

X. In oltre sua maestà estende il vigesimo quarto articolo del privilegio a tanto che la compagnia sia essente dal pagare dattii, e gabelle nel regno di Suetia per li primi quattro anni. Con questo però, che nissuno abusi questa gratia con fraudi, sotto pena della perdita delle navi, e delle mercantie.

XI. Forniti, che siano li quattro anni ; ne gli altri avenire si paghino le gabelle conforme all'articolo vigesimo quarto.

XII. Che le navi, e mercantie della compagnia, che capiteranno nelli porti, e città delli stati, prencipi, e partecipanti, che haveranno accettato il privilegio concesso da sua maestà alla compagnia, siano tenute di pagar impositione delli quattro per cento imposta ; a questo modo però, li due terzi per sua maestà, e l'altra terza parte sia delli prencipi, stati, e partecipanti sopradetti, proportionabilmente secondo la somma del danaro, che haveranno posto nella compagnia. Non intendendo però di contravenire alle altre impositioni, e gabelle, che potessero havere sopra le altre merci ; ma solo delle mercantie della compagnia.

XIII. Che li prencipi, città, e comunità, le quali contribuito havessero alla compagnia 250 mila scudi Imperiali, oltre il residente concessoli nel trigesimo quinto articolo, habbino anco un assessore del consiglio ; il qual consiglio doverà esser formato conforme nell'articolo trigesimo quarto si è detto.

XIV. Che per maggior confirmatione dell'amplificatione, e dichiarazione de' privilegi concessi alla compagnia, sua
maestà

maestà estendeva la promessa fatta delli 400 mila Taleri Suezzezi in 400 mila scudi Imperiali; per la qual somma di danaro egli non pretendeva maggior utile di quello fosse toccato a gli altri pro rata.

Per chiara intelligenza di ogn'uno il Talero Suezzeze, è di quattro marche, che di nostra moneta sono lire sette, e meza. Il scudo Imperiale, è meza dobla.

IV.

REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO: *Quam Rex invictissimus GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS & magnus ultimæ voluntatis instar regno populisque suis statione hac mortali functus exhibendam voluit.*

[SUPPOSED to be complete in the beginning of the year 1630, and containing thirty-five pages in quarto.—N. B. This invaluable MS. which contained the provisional disposition that was made of the government of Sweden, in case he should be killed in the German wars, during the minority of the princess Christina, who was then aged about four years and something more, was for a considerable time in the author's possession, as all his intimate friends well know; but unfortunately lost, with several other papers of consequence, in going by sea from London to Cornwall in 1758.]

V.

ARTICLES signed by GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS with JAMES marquis of HAMILTON.*

WE Gustavus Adolphus by the grace of God king of the Swedes, Goths, and Vandals, great prince of Finland, duke of Esthonia and Carel, and lord of Ingria, &c. To all and sundry whom it concerns, make it known and certain, that whereas the illustrious and our sincerely beloved lord James marquis of Hamilton, master of the horse to the most serene king of Great Britain, out of his zeal for the public good, and for acquiring eternal fame, hath resolved to dedicate himself and the fortunes and forces of all he is concerned in, for restoring our oppressed friends in Germany, and for that end hath offered to us, by the illustrious and our sincerely faithful co-

* Burnet's Memoirs of the Duke of Hamilton.

lonel,

lonel, Alexander Hamilton, his fidelity and service; and that he will, on his own expence, gather a strength of six thousand men, and bring them over as soon as may be to any place we shall appoint, either against the Imperialists, or any other of our enemies, and maintain them on his own charge, and do us all faithful and vigorous service with them, till this great affair be brought to a good issue, provided we shall authorize this his design with our protection, and give him the underwritten assistance; therefore, there being nothing dearer to us than to make all vigorous resistance to the common enemies of liberty, and having in high estimation the brave undertakings of generous men, we not only would not reject, but have heartily embraced the nobleness of so good resolutions: we have therefore admitted, like as by the vigour of these presents we admit, the said lord marquis into our service, armies, and military counsels, on the following conditions:

First, Whenever he shall signify to us that he is ready to bring over his forces, we shall assign him a place for his landing, either to come and join with our armies, or to make an impression elsewhere, as we shall think fit.

Next, If we appoint him to land in any place from whence he shall not come straight to us, we shall, for strengthening his forces, send to the place we shall assign for his landing four thousand foot out of our armies, whom we shall furnish with all necessaries, and maintain on our charges a whole year.

Thirdly, Because the said marquis thinks two thousand horse are necessary for his foot, for whose levy and pay he promises all assistance; we shall therefore think of all ways and means for raising and maintaining these.

Fourthly, We not only give the said illustrious marquis the absolute command of this army in our absence, but shall also join to him a counsellor with whom he may consult in all things, that so his deliberations be more expedite and clear.

Fifthly, Whatever the illustrious lord marquis shall take from the enemy, the lands and territories shall belong to us, but the revenues and all the emoluments shall go to him, and to the relief of his army: yet so as these revenues shall be gathered decently and in order, without depredations or plunderings; since our design is not to oppress those who have been already enough pressed, but rather to deliver them from the oppressions of others, as much as by the divine assistance we can.

Sixthly, That the marquis may more effectually perform what he hath bravely resolved, and may sooner make those warlike instruments of his own invention, on which he relies

MUC 1

much in his expedition, we shall not only with the first occasion furnish him with a hundred ship-pounds of crude iron, but shall also assign hammers for working it according to his design ; of which instruments he hath promised to leave a model with us, and we shall be careful that none of our servants shall make use of them before he hath first made trial of them himself.

Seventhly, We shall also furnish him with three hundred and seventy ship-pounds of iron-ball for his guns, and two thousand and five hundred pikes, and as many musquets.

Eighthly, Whenever the marquis shall advertise us of his needing gunpowder, we shall assign him bills of exchange in Holland for buying seventy-two ship-pounds of gunpowder.

Ninthly, If any other kings or states shall concur with us, all they contribute shall be at our disposal ; but if the marquis his necessities require further assistance, we shall not abandon him, but faithfully assist him, as much as our affair shall permit.

Tenthly, For all which the said illustrious lord marquis with all his forces hath promised fidelity to us, and shall be bound to it as well as our men, and these who receive our pay, are, for which both he and all his captains shall be particularly engaged.

But because there is to be a treaty betwixt our commissioners and the Imperialists at Dantzick, therefore if a peace shall be there concluded, so that we shall not need the service of the marquis and his army, he hath obliged himself to pay for the foresaid materials at their entire value.

All which things being thus concluded, and to be firmly observed by us, we have subscribed these articles with our hand, and commanded our royal seal to be put to them. At our castle in Stockholm the last of May, Anno Dom. 1630.

Signed,

L.S.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

VI.

ARTICLES signed by the marquis of HAMILTON with
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

WHEREAS there is a mutual compact agreed betwixt the most serene and mighty king of Sweden and me, for joining of our forces ; that the articles be fully ratified, and lest any thing afterwards fall in which may put a stop in our counsels,

and them, and bind both myself and them; and for the confirmation of this I do subscribe this article with all the preceding, and put my seal to it, at London the 1st of March Anno Dom. 1631.

(L. S.)

HAMILTON.

VII.

. SPECIALES CAUSÆ BELLI SUECICI*.

QUANQUAM autem nascens, & e Germaniæ malis valla cum tempore incrementa sumens Austriacæ domûs potentia, extraneis regibus, principibus, rebus publicis, sensim hoc modo magis magisque formidolosa facta fuerit, maximè cum, intra imperii Romani fines jam se non amplius continens, vicinos quoque, missis in Italiam, Borussiam, Transilvania diversis exercitibus, laceessere haud vereretur: Gustavus tamen Adolphus, secundus ejus nominis & magnus, Sueciæ rex, imprimis suspectum habuit, luculenter deprehensum; quo magis Baltici maris littoribus illius vires appropinquarent, eò plures majoresque adversum se indies feri bellorum occasiones.

Velut jam anno milésimo, sexcentésimo, vicesimo sexto, literæ quædam regis Sueciæ ad Transilvaniæ principem, nec ab hoste, nec ad hostem missæ, a Cæsarianis reſeratæ, interceptæ, ac confictâ in regis invidiam verborum interpretatione, publicatæ fuerant: ipso internuncio in carcerem compacto, ac durè & hostiliter habito. Quæ injuria, quo inopinatò magis regem a Cæsare, quem, nec verbo, nec factò, hucusque læſerat, perculit, eò altius in pectus penetravit, ac descendit: maximè, cum verus literarum tenor nihil, in Cæsaris aut imperii Romani præjudiciũ tendens, loqueretur, sed bellum, quod regi Sueciæ cum Polonis hac tempeſtate intercedebat, solummodò concerneret.

Porro regi a fide dignis relatum: licet componendorum inter Sueciæ ac Poloniæ regna diffidiorum sæpe numerò spes affulgeret; commissariis utriusque regni annuatim in eum finem congregientibus: pacis tamen hos offores, per internuncios ac literas, sedulò apud Polonos operam dedisse, ne vulnus in cicatricem coiret, antequam in Germaniâ suum plene attingisset scopum; spe certâ Polonis datâ, Germaniæ

* Chemnitius de Bellò Sueco-German. vol. i. p. 7, &c. The reader may peruse a fuller copy of this manifesto in the Merc. Franç. tom. xvi. p. 297—317.

electoribus, principibus, ordinibus sub jugum missis, sese igitur, omnibus viribus collatis, eò gnaviter incubituros; ut Sueciæ quoque regnum à Polonis penitus opprimeretur.

Et quo verbis facta statim responderent, Suecosque omnibus bellorum gerendorum mediis, quantum pote, nudatos, Polonorum armis, favore suo suffultis, debellandos exponerent, & omni militum, & rei bellicæ commercio, quod utrumque liberum Polonis, Suecorum tunc hostibus, reliquerat, regi Sueciæ in Germaniâ interdicere visum.

Clarius autem odium eorum in regem anno millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo emicabat; quando Adolphus, Holsatiæ dux, cum copiis haud contemnendis, Sigismundo tertio, Polonorum regi, subsidio ablegatus: idque eo. potissimum tempore, quo, equitatu Polonico ad Dirschaviam dissipato, & toto exercitu in consternationem haud exiguam coniecto, periculum erat, ne ipsis castris Poloni pellerentur. Quapropter hoc præter opinionem & inmerito suo, illatum vulnus, regi eò magis doluit, quo certior spes erat, hostilem exercitum, absque hoc foret, ad internecionem cæsum, atque ita hac vice debellatum iri. Nec verò, missione militum, nec alio prætextu colorabantur istæ suppetiæ: quin potius ipsius Cæsaris signa & imperii Romani aquilæ in hostili acie apertè fulserunt. Dux quoque Holsatiæ, post navatam Polonis strenuam aliquamdiu operam, è Borussia cum residuo milite in Pomeraniam regressus ibidem, non secus ac aliæ Cæsaris legiones, hiberna nactus est: ut vel inde, e Cæsaris stipendio nunquam excessisse, appareret.

Interea Cæsareus miles. regis Sueciæ subditos, qui, negotiorum suorum ac innoxiorum commerciorum causâ, in Germaniam appulerant, ubicunque, nancisci contingeret, hostiliter tractare: ablatis vi mercibus, & navibus fisco addictis. Quod iidem, non aliò locorum se justius confugere rati, ad regem detulerunt: ejus opem, auxilium, patrocinium supplicibus ac querulis præcibus implorantes.

Imprimis septentrionalibus regibus ac regnis maximè suspectum accidere: quod Cæsar ac rex Hispaniæ supradictio millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo, & sequenti anno, per Georgium Ludovicum, comitem Suartzburgensem, & Gabrielem de Roy, commissarios suos, Lubecam, aliasque urbes Hanseaticas, in partes suas traducere conati, illarum ope classem in mari Baltico comparare molirentur. Ut ut enim alius color rei quæsitus nil aliud, videlicet, intendi, quàm ipsarum civitatum commodum; hac etenim ratione, abrogatis, quæ exteri invexissent, monopolis, navigationem & commercia civitatibus facta, tecta conservatum, ac, inter alia, Hispanicarum mercium vectarum ad solos eorundem portus

portus astrictum iri : septentrionalium tamen regnorum reges, re altius penetratâ, aliorum id interpretati, aliquid monstri alere negotium existimabant ; nec modo in regalium suorum super mare Balticum, cujus tutelam & protectionem, ex majorum instituto, sibi asserunt, insigne vergere præjudicium, sed & ipsis in regnorum visceribus oppugnandis, media ac occasionem quæri.

Que suspicio in rege Sueciæ validiora incrementa sumsit, postquam, finito bello Danico, a classe & navibus armandis minimè cessatum : in se enim, reconciliato Daniæ rege, fabam hanc cudi, haud sine causâ ominabatur. Præsertim, quia Cæsariani, spe de adjungendis sibi civitatibus Hanseaticarum viribus evoluti, Gedanensium & Polonorum, cum quibus regi Sueciæ apertum bellum, naves in consortium asciverant, illarumque ope mare Balticum, harum artium hactenus insolens, piratica infestum reddebant : in tantum ; ut rex Sueciæ, regalium suorum, & securitatis maritimæ, commerciorumve conservandorum, classem & ipse suam magnis incommodis atque impendiis adornare, illaque Cæsarianos occupatis portibus, præsertim Wismariensi, inclusos tenere coactus fuerit.

Cum autem anno millesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo octavo, Stralsundæ urbs a supremo Cæsareæ militiæ Imperatore, Fridlandio, præsidia, quæ imperabantur, admittere detrectans, arctissimo premeretur obsidio, ferroque ac flammâ extrema quæque perpeteretur, recepit illa quidem ab initio a Daniæ rege militem auxiliarum, quem spontaneo motu, defendendæ urbi, hic submiserat, & necessitate exigente, plus auxiliorum ab eodem consequi poterat : ne tamen cum Cæsaris hostibus [quos inter tunc temporis Daniæ rex] conspirare argueretur, mox ad Sueciæ regem, confugiens, ut addicti neutri parti principis, cujus benignitatem antehac luculentis rerum testimoniis experta fuerat, tutelæ ac patrocinio, sequestro velut deposuit exagitata infestis hostium armis libertatem. Nec rex justissimis de causis, quas ipsi met Stralsundenses per legatos suos deduxerant, recusare ullatenus potuit ; quin civitati, non ipsius modò, sed et publicæ, communisque securitatis gratiâ, misso non contemnendo militum subsidio, subveniret.

Salvâ tamen obedientiâ, Cæsari & duci Pomeraniæ, tanquam superioribus, debitâ ; nec ad Cæsaris, aut cujusquam offensionem, sed solam civitatis, portusque Stralsundensis, & consequenter, totius maris Baltici defensionem, commerciorumve libertatem : ut ex fœdere, cum Stralsundensibus initio, sole meridiano clarior apparet.

Inde militum tribunis, qui Stralsundensibus supplicia missi, in mandatis datum : ne extra obsidium, & necessariae atque legitimæ defensionis cancellos, adversus Cæsaris exercitum quicquam tentarent. Qui & ipsi, ab initio, Danis, quamdiu illic loci unâ commorati sunt, in expugnatione oppidi Bart, aliisve factionibus, nequequam ad capeßenda contra Cæsarianos hostilia arma, instigantibus; regis sui mandatum caufati, intra hos terminos immoti steterunt.

Eodem penè tempore Cæsar duces Megapoleos omnibus ditionibus, quas ab imperio ipsi, eorumve majores, tot per annos, feudi nomine possederant, privârat; ducemque Fridlandiæ summum terrâ, mari militiæ suæ imperatorem, his investitum ierat. Quorum, & religionis, & sanguinis pexu junctorum, ducum vicem rex, ipsâ Christianâ caritate, arctâque necessitudine flagitante, jure miseratus : præsertim cum, omni aliâ ferè spe destituti, in his angustiiis ad regem, velut sacram anchoram, confugerent.

VIII.

The Monthly Pay of a SWEDISH Regiment of Infantry,
under GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

Military Establishment.	Per Month.		
	Dollars.	English Money	
		£.	s. d.
To the colonel - - - - -	184	— 32	4 0
Lieutenant-colonel - - - - -	80	— 14	0 0
Serjeant-major - - - - -	61	— 10	13 6
Chief quarter-master - - - - -	30	— 5	5 0
Captain - - - - -	61	— 10	13 6
Lieutenant - - - - -	30	— 5	5 0
Ensign - - - - -	30	— 5	5 0
Two serjeants, each - - - - -	9	— 1	11 6
The <i>Fuhrer</i> *, <i>Furrier</i> †, <i>Muster-writer</i> ‡, } and the <i>Rust-master</i> §, each - - - }	7	— 1	4 6
Drummers and pipers, each - - - - -	4	— 0	14 0
6 Corporals, each - - - - -	6	— 1	1 0

* The *Furrier* attended the ensign, and took the colours when he was disabled or killed.

† The *Furriers* were under quarter-masters, and appeared in action armed with a halbert or partisan.

‡ The *Muster-schreiber*, as he is called in German, was clerk of the musters.

§ The *Rust-master* saw that the soldiers kept their arms clean and bright.

Military Establishment.

Per Month.

Dollars. English Money,
£. s. d.

15 <i>Rot-masters</i> *, each - - -	5 —	0	17	6
21 Inferior <i>Rot-masters</i> , each - -	4 —	0	14	0
A common foldier - - -	3½ —	0	12	3
18 <i>Passe volants</i> †, each - - -	3 —	0	10	6

Civil Establishment, &c. of the same Regiment.

2 Chaplains, each - - -	18 —	3	3	0
2 Examiners, or registers of the court- martial, each - - -	30 —	5	5	0
4 Surgeons, each - - -	12 —	2	2	0
4 Provost marshals, each - - -	12 —	2	2	0
Clerk of the regiment - - -	30 —	5	5	0
Clerk of the council of war - - -	18 —	3	3	0
Serjeant of the council or court of war,	18 —	3	3	0
2 Bedels, each - - -	3 —	0	10	6
The executioner - - -	7 —	1	4	6

And here it must be remarked, that if the service required *Lehnung*, or advance money, it was his Swedish majesty's custom (a certain sum being due to his officers and soldiers at the expiration of each month) to divide the said month into thirteen equal parts, and pay his troops a fixed portion of their stipend beforehand, upon the first, the eleventh, and one-and-twentieth day, amounting at the three several payments to the following proportion:

Per Month.

Dollars. English Money,
£. s. d.

Colonel - - -	69 —	12	1	6
Lieutenant-colonel - - -	32 —	5	12	0
Serjeant-major - - -	14 —	2	9	0
Chief quarter-master - - -	11 —	1	18	6
Captain - - -	14 —	2	9	0
Lieutenant - - -	11 —	1	18	6
Ensign - - -	11 —	1	18	6
2 Serjeants, each - - -	5 —	0	17	6

* The *Rot-masters* took care of the several rots (each rot, or file, consisting of six men) which were committed to their charge. Twelve rots of musqueteers and nine of pikemen, making a compleat company of 126 men, not including officers, *passe-volants* and servants.

† The *Passe-volants* were servants to the officers, and carried arms in the day of battle.

		Per Month.		
		Dollars.	English Money.	
			£.	s. d.
Fuhrer, furrier, muster-writer, and rust-	}	4	—	0 14 0
master, each				
Drummers and pipers, each	-	2	—	0 7 0
6 Corporals, each	-	3	—	0 10 6
15 Rot-masters, each	-	2	—	0 7 0
21 Inferior Rot-masters, each	-	1½	—	0 5 3
4 common foldier	-	1½	—	0 4 4½
18 Passe-volants	-	1	—	0 3 6

Civil Establishment, &c. of the same Regiment.

2 Chaplains, each	-	7	—	1 4 6
2 Examiners, or registers of the court-	}	11	—	1 18 6
martial, each				
4 Surgeons, each	-	7	—	1 4 6
4 Provost-marshal, each	-	7	—	1 4 6
Clerk of the regiment	-	11	—	1 18 6
Clerk of the council of war	-	7	—	1 4 6
Serjeant of the council or court of war	-	7	—	1 4 6
2 Bedels, each	-	1½	—	0 5 3
The executioner	-	5	—	0 17 6

IX.

"ARTICLES de Confederation accordez entre le Roy de SUEDE, & le Duc de POMERANIE, pour eux, leurs Successeurs, Provinces & Sujets *, July 10th, 1630.

"PREAMBLE reciproque entre Gustave, & Bogislaus, * * *
 * * * * *
 * * * * *

Après que nous Gustavus Adolphus, &c. avons avec tres grande compassion, considéré les tres-griefues & inouyes oppressions que ledit seigneur duc de Stettin & Pomeranie, avec les subjects & provinces, a souffertes pendant trois ans, & qu'entre la couronne de Suede & les provinces de Pomeranie y avoit non seulement conjonction de sang & de religion, mais aussi une tres grande amitié & confiance, par le moyen du commerce mutuel exercé & inviolablement entretenu de temps immemorial entre les subjects desdits estats, & prin-

* Mercure François, tom xvi. 286. Historical but authentic relat. in Low Dutch, tom i. 169.

cipalement

cipalement par une étroite confederation contractée entre nos predecesseurs d' heureuse memoire, les roys de Suede & les ducs de Pomeranie, leurs provinces & estats, en la pacification faite entr' eux le jour de saint Luc l' an 1570, ensemble aussi nostre grand interet à cause de la mer Baltique, entant que les provinces de Pomeranie située a la coste de ladite mer ayans esté occupées, servoyent de retraite aux ennemis, pour, (à nostre grand prejudice) empêcher la liberté du commerce, & infester nos royaumes & estats; ayans mesmes, pour pallier leurs violences, abusé de nostre nom. Apres avoir aussi considéré que la confederation pour la neutralité (de l'entretenement de laquelle ledit seigneur duc, nous avoit requis) n'estoit assez solidement établie, nous avons estimé (quoyque non requis devoir accourir au secours dudit seigneur duc & ses estats, pour avec l'assistance divine les delivrer d'oppression; & mesmes pour repousser de nos estats les cruelles hostilitéz, & venger les machinations & injustes oppressions faites contre nous; estans à ces fins, par l'aide de Dieu arrivez avec *une assez puissante armée* en Pomeranie (apres avoir pris la principauté de Rughe [Rugen] y ayans occupé *sans aucune resistance* toutes les isles, villes, ports, & forts, servans pour la defence & conservation de la ville de Stetin, capitale de la province, ayans toutes les places esté abandonnées par ceux qui les tenoient) *nous prîmes occasion; contre l'opinion & l'esperance du dit sieur duc d'entreprendre & venir heureusement à bout de reduire la dite ville de Stetin.*

D'autre part nous Bogisläus, &c. &c. ayans considéré (1.) q'estans destituez de tous secours, (2.) nous seuls n'eussions peu resister à si grandes forces, (3.) nos subjects ayans esté pour la plus part desarmez par les precedents pretendus defenseurs (4.) estans mesmes despouillez de tous leurs biens, & privez de tous vivres & moyens de defence, (5.) &, qui plus est, affoiblis & extenquez par une cruelle oppression, durant trois ans, n'ont eu pensée ny courage de se delivrer, ny de resister, pour n'empirer leur condition. (6.) Si bien que n'esperans plus aucun secours: (apres tant de capitulations & promesses saintement jurées & toutefois enfreintes.) (7.) Survenant le louable & tres chrestien secours de la sacrée royale majesté de Suede. (8.) Qui n'est point venu contre l'empereur ny l'empire, avec lesquels sa majesté n'a rien de fâcheux à desmeler. (9.) Mais contre ceux qui contre tout droit & equité avoient occupé nos provinces, (10.) afin de les delivrer de violence, & les remettre en leur premier estat & liberté, & pour par mesme moyen asseurer sa personne, & sa couronne, & ce avec des protestations chritiennes & amiables, qui ont esté suivies de leur effet, à l'esgard de la ville de Stralsund, & de la duché de Rugen, occupé par sa majesté.

majesté. Nous avons eu plustost sujet de louer & accepter, que de refuser à nostre tres grand prejudice, & de nos sub-jécés, son secours & assistance.

Pour ce est il que nous Gustavus, &c. et Bogislaus, &c. avons ensemble convenus & accordez les suivans articles par nous d'un mutuel consentement approuvé.

I. Nous avec nos estats, provinces & sujets respectivement, voulons et promettons sincerement et de bonne foy, conserver à l'avenir entre nous une ferme et constante amitié uile, et convenable à des bons voisins, et ne faire ny ne permettre estre fait l'un à l'autre ouvertement ou covertement, par qui, et en quelque maniere que ce soit, aucun hostilité ; ains nous defendre les uns les autres par armes, et par mutuel secours, contre toutes violences, invasions, ravages, *contributions*, oppressions, et contraventions, ne nous point abandonner, beaucoup moins nous trahir, ou subjurer, mais plustost rechercher, et accroistre le profit et avantage, et destourner tout dommage l'un de l'autre : avancer de tout nostre pouvoir le trafic et commerce de Suede en Pomeranie, et de Pomeranie en Suede ; faisans pour ce, cesser toutes inhibitions et empeschemens. A l'effect dequoy, nous roy et duc susdit, pour nous, nos successeurs et estats, avons non seulement renouvelé ladite ancienne paction et accord, pour l'entretenement d'un bon voisinage entre nous, nos royaumes, duchez principautez et leurs appartenances, mais, aussi l'avons par le present traité de nouveau confirmé et corroboré, pour durer à jamais. Voulans en outre que la presente confederation soit de dix ans en dix ans renouvelée et re-integrée,

II. Le dit accord s'entend estre renouvelé pour la *defence* mutuelle contre la violence, non point pour l'*offence*, (*si non que pour l'entretien des choses convenües entre nous, il fust grandement requis*) auquel cas, chacun de nous sera obligé de prester l'un à l'autre, *jusqu'au dernier effort*, mutuel ayde et secours.

III. Au moyen de ce, le present traité ne doit point estre réputé fait contre la *majesté sacrée de l'empereur ny de l'empire*, mais plustost pour le conserver en son ancienne forme, liberté, religion, et paix religieuse et seculiere contre les tumultuaires, et perturbateurs de la paix publique : *n'entendans point nous departir de l'obligation par laquelle nous Bogislaus duc susdit sommes tenus à la sacrée majesté imperiale et à l'empire, et au cercle de la Saxe Superieure ; ains au contraire, protestans de nous y conserver selon nostre devoir (à la charge tout à fois qu' ils ne requerront de nous aucune chose contrevenante au present traité,)* et de demeurer avec nos duchez, estats, et sujets joints à l'empire, audit cercle, et aux constitutions Imperiales ; ne voulans qua l'occasion du present traité

traicté l'estat de nos provinces soit *changé* ny que rien nous soit osté ny diminué de nostre souveraineté, ny quant aux droicts royaux, dignitez, juridictions, droicts domaniaux et territoriaux à nous appartenans, ny semblablement quant aux privileges, tant generaux que particuliers de la noblesse de Pomeranie, et des sujets et estats; ny aux concessions, droicts, statuts, loix fondamentales, ny aucun autre droict particulier.

IV. Puis que cette union tend principalement à ce que nous duc susdit puissions estre delivré de la cruelle oppression, de laquelle nostre constante & fidelle innocence, a esté travaillée pour l'espace de trois ans, contre les lois sacrées de l'empire & dudit cercle, & contre les claires & expresses constitutions de la paix publique, & mesmes contre les speciales sincerations, mandemens & declarations de la sacrée majesté de l'empereur, & les provinces & pays de Pomeranie estre conservez en leur ancien estat, sans recevoir aucuns empeschemens limites, ports & passages, & estre delivrez à l'advenir de tous dangers. Pour ces raisons a esté de part & d'autre unanimement convenu entre nous, de s'opposer par jonction de forces à toute autr qui en l'empire Romain contraire, & peut en quelque façon que ce soit contravenir à la paix de la religion obtenüe avec tant de peine & de travaux.

V. Les villes, lieux & provinces de Pomeranie, par nous roy de Suede occupéz, ou que nous pourrons cy-apres occuper, seront par nous remis entre les fidelles mains & au pouvoir dudit seigneur duc de Pomeranie avec toutes leurs appartenances, droicts, regales, & juridictions, sans nulle reserve, ny tergiversation, & sans repetition de frais de la guerre: mesmes la ville de Stralsund luy sera par nous rendüe, pourveu que, comme ledit seigneur duc ne doit rien aliener desdites provinces de Pomeranie, principalement la principauté de Rugen; aussi il establisse ès dites provinces tels officiers, qui en tout ce qui concernera la defence & conservation desdites provinces, se monstrent de bonne volonté envers les commissaires de Suede: pourveu aussi, que les privileges de la ville de Stralsund soient maintenus en leur entier, & que specialment par dessus tous l'alliance faite par la dite ville avec sa dite majesté soit conservée inviolablement *, & que les griefs par eux pretendus soient promptement reparez, & equitablement jugéz.

VI. D'autant l'evêché de Camin estant dans les provinces & estats de Pomeranie, & en consequence de ce, devant jouir en son particulier de tout ce qui par le present traicté

* His Majesty, in the year 1628, renewed a treaty (for former ones had subsisted) betwixt Sweden and the town of Stralsund. It was to hold in force twenty years, and is preserved by Lotichius, tom. i. 608.

a esté

a esté accordé, pour le bien general de la Pomeranie, a esté particulierement convenu, que si contre les privileges, statuts, & loix fondamentales de l'evesché & du chapitre, est attenté quelque chose au fait d'election de l'evesque ou du coadjuteur, ou à quelque autre occasion que ce soit, nous roy & duc susnomméz l'empeschérons conjointement de tout nostre pouvoir, & maintiendrons la liberté du chapitre & du diocese, ensemble la libre election de l'evesque, son estat, ses droicts & ses dignitez.

VII. *Nul de nous sans le vouloir & consentement de l'autre, ne pourra renoncer au present Traicté, & beaucoup moins nous duc de Pomeranie ne pourrons, pour ce qui concerne la presente defence de nostre estat, faire aucun traicté, ny alliance, avec qui que ce soit que si sa royale majesté pour nostre bien et de nos provinces, vouloit faire quelque traicté, l nous devra estre communiqué, duquel, si y voulons entrer et estre joints, ny nous, ny nos provinces ne pourrons en estre exclus.*

VIII. Si quelque prince chrestien se veut adjoindre à la presente confederations, et s'y associer à conditions raisonnables, il luy sera libre de la faire, moyennant que par la dite jonction les estats d'aucuns de nous n'en recoivent dommage, et n'empirent leur condition.

IX. Parceque qu'en cette confederation particuliere (permise de tout droict, entant qu'elle est pour la conservation de la paix religieuse et seculiere de Pomeranie) nulle mention n'a esté faite des autres confederations et accords cy-devant faits pour la conservation d' icelle; les dits accords ne pourront en rien prejudicier au present traicté, ny estre allegués contre iceluy. Et nous duc susdit promettons de ne nous point allier par traicté avec qui que ce soit, sans le special vouloir et consentement de susdit royale majesté.

X. Si le dit seigneur duc, ses provinces, et sujets, à l'occasion de la presente confederation, estoient assaillis en guerre par qui que ce soit, en tel cas non seulement nous roy de Suede et nos royaumes et estats serons obligéz, et promettons d'entreprendre soigneusement et fidellement la defence dudit seigneur duc, mais aussi y attirerons les autres princes nos confederez, pour augmenter et fortifier le nombre et les moyens de la defence. Comme aussi au reciproque, nous duc de Pomeranie, nos provinces et sbbjets serons le mesme, au cas que sa royale majesté et ses royaumes et estats fussent infestez par guerre, à cause du present traicté.

XI. Par la presente confederation le privilege de naturalité s'entend estre respectivement accordé aux sujets du l'une et de l'autre parties, royaumes et estats de Suede et de la

la duché et estats de Pomeranie : et la nation Suedoise honorerà, aydera et procurera le profit et advantage de la Pomeranoise, et la Pomeranoise de la Suedoise en temps de paix et de guerre ; sauf respectivement aux uns et aux autres, leurs droits, privileges, et immunités particuliers.

XII. Pour la conservation, facilité et advancement du commerce, la monnoye royale de Suede aura cours en Pomeranie, et celle de Pomeranie en Suede, et sera exposée selon l'évaluation qui en aura esté faite sur les lieux.

XIII. Si survient quelque différent ou quelque mesintelligence entre sa royale majesté et ledit seigneur duc ou entre leurs sujets, ou estats, elle ne se terminera point par l'épée et par guerre, ains en la façon présente par la pacification de Stetin en l'année 1570, c'est à sçavoir par personnalités d'autorité, nommés par les parties, ou esleus par sort.

XIV. Finalement, nous roy de Suede nous sommes expressément réservé, qu'au cas que ledit seigneur duc vient à deceder sans descendans mâles, ses heritiers, avant que l'electeur de Bradenburg (auquel comme au futur successeur de l'estat, l'hommage a déjà esté fait) ait approuvé et ratifié la présente confederation, et avant que le dit successeur soit venu en personne pour la liberation de ces provinces, ou au cas que cette succession fust revoquée en doute, et rendue litigieuse au dit seigneur electeur ; nous roy de Suede, ou nos successeurs de nos royaumes et couronne, retiendrons cesdites province en forme de sequestre et de protection, jusques à ce que le droit successif ait esté pleinement esclairci et establi ; et que par le successeur les frais de la guerre nous aient esté entierement payez et rembourséz (sans toutefois en faire souffrir aucune charge ny contribution aus dites provinces, estats et sujets de Pomeranie) et jusques à ce que la présente confederation ait esté par luy déüement ratifiée et confirmée.

Tout ce que dessus s'entend avoir esté accordé & promis de bonne foy & sans fraude. Pour certitude & perpetuelle fermeté de quoy, nous roy de Suede, &c. pour nous, nos successeurs, &c. & nous duc de Pomeranie, &c. pour nous, nos successeurs, &c. avons la present nostre convention & confederation approuvée & confirmée de nos seaux royal, & ducal, & reale, signée de nos mains, au vieil Stetin le 10 jour de Juillet, vieil stil, l'an 1630.

GUSTAVUS.
BOGISLAUS.

X.

LETTRE du duc de POMERANIE à l'Empereur.

TRES Haut, &c. *cum titulis majoribus*, * * * * *

J'estime que ce seroit chose superflüë de redire au long à vostre majesté les non meritées calamitez & griesues miseres, esquelles les ruinaux logements de gens de guerre faits depuis trois ans en mes duchez de Stetin, Pomeranie, & en toutes les provinces, & dependantes d'icelles, m'ont plongé ; puis qu'il est notoire à tout le monde, & que les plaintes que moy & le miens en avons faites, & les iterées responce que sur icelles il a pleu à vostre majesté imperiale, me donner, les tes moignent plus que suffisamment, sans faire mention de ce que j'ay encore envoyé expres mes deputez à la presente diete electorale de Ratisbonne, tant à vostre majesté imperiale, qu'au college des electeurs, pour y faire remonstrer en toute humilité & respect, & par toutes sortes de circonstances, l'extremité en laquelle je suis reduit. Mais bien m'est il forcé de représenter à vostre majesté que sur ces entrefaites le roy de Suede, &c. est arrivé en mes pays avec une puissante armée, & a trouvé si peu de resistance, en ceux qui avoient esté destinez pour la defence (& qui sous ce pretexte ont espuisé moy, & les miens jusques au fond, & outre ce, defarmé la pluspart de mes sujets, & mesme osté leur chevaux) que d'abord il a pris le duché de Rugen, & ensuite le havre de Penemond devant Wolgast, puis s'est emparé de l'isle, & de tout le pays d' Usedom, avec la ville bien munie d'iceluy ; du port Wollin, des deux havres Schwein & Divenau, outre le fort qui y avoit esté commencé à si grands frais, & la ville bien murée de Wollin, qui estoient autant de retranchements & forts pour defendre l'accés de cette ville de Stetin, lieu de nostre residence ; & notamment l'isle de Rugen, ou il y avoit plusieurs bonnes fortresses. De mesme l'havre de Penemond estoit bien fortifié & retranché, comme aussi Usedom, Wollin, Schwein, & Divenau. De sorte qu'il est à presumer, que si ces defenseurs eussent voulu faire bonne resistance, & se porter vaillamment, le roy de Suede n'eust peu en si peu de temps, faire de si grands progres. Mais au lieu de cela, des qu'ils entendirent la venue dudit roy, sans l'attendre, lesdits defenseurs pillerent les places susdites, mirent le feu en quelques unes, & les abandonneret à la haste, tournans leurs armes, qu'ils devroient employer contre le soldat estranger, contre les pauvres habitans defarmez du pays ; qu'ils ont comme en pays ennemy par une cruauté inouye pilléz & saccagéz, de sorte que c'est chose horrible à descrire, mais neantmoins veritable

& dont les preuves & tesmoignages se pourront suffisamment produire cy-apres. Voire on n'en est pas demeuré là, ains ils ont attaqué mon chasteau & ma ville d'Uckarmond, qui est à un notable passage, chassé d'icelle ma garnison contre l'accord exprez, & tout aussi-tost l'ont quittés laisser vuide. A Wollin ils ont pillé la maison de la princesse doüariere, soeur d'electeur de Saxe & tasché d'y mettre feu. De là est ensuivy que le roy de Suede, prenant l'occasion & son temps, (pendant que Torquato Conti mareschal de camp pour vostre majesté imperiale avec la plupart de l'armée se jettoit contre la Pomeranie) est arrive le 20 Juillet à la faveur du vent (qui luy fit faire six lieux en deux heures) devant cette ville, que tout aussi-tost il investit de telle vitesse, & bloqua de tous costez, faisans ses approches de si près, qu'il fut impossible de se mettre en defenſe, beaucoup moins recevoir ou attendre secours de vostre majesté.

Que si là dessus il plait à vostre majesté imperiale, selon sa grande bonté & prudence, de laquelle elle est douée de Dieu, aux electeurs & princes de l'empire, voire à tout le monde, de bien considerer & juger comment, & par quels moyens je suis tombé en ce malheur : je ne crains point d'encourir de droict & equité autre jugement ny censure, si non que la sincerité & constance de ma foy vrayement Allemande (en laquelle je suis demeuré ferme, nonobstant toutes mauvaises procedures) à esté mal recogneüe ; & que tout ces malheur se doit attribuer à cette nouvelle invention de loger des gens de guerre contre les statuts de l'empire, & *exiger de si grosses contributions* que la ruine totale du pays s'en est ensuivy, pour ne point toucher aux autres raisons. Car par la grace de Dieu, je suis tout asseuré en ma conscience, de n'en avoir jamais donné le moindre sujet, ny par union ny par correspondance, beaucoup moins par conspiration ou aucune action suspecte, ains plustost comme un vray & fidelle membre de l'empire Romaine, demeurant toujours ferme en termes d'integrité & innocence, pour destourner ces malheurs, perils & extremitez de mon pays, ay recherché jusques à present toutes voyes & moyens, & tant envers vostre majesté imperiale, que vers les college des electeurs, comme aussi vers vos generaux, capitaines & tous autres, qui pouvoient servir à la cause, envoyé des ambassades notables à vostre majesté & aux susdits electeurs ; & de fraiche memoire, par l'advis des grands ministres d'estat de vostre majesté commandans icy, *une ambassade à la couronne de Suede*. Encore une à Dantzic ; mesmes encore une presentement à vostre majesté imperiale ; si peut estre, par une singuliere & gracieuse volonté de Dieu, il se pouvoit trouver remede & repos. Que si tout cela jusques à present

présent ait rapporté peu de fruit, & que cette occasion y soit survenue, ny moy, ny mes pays innocens n'en devons point patir. Ains tant plus & faudroit-il penser aux moyens d'une salutaire paix & à destourner le mal. Aussi ne veux-je perdre toute esperance de paix & de remede, *veu que par le peu de discours que j'ay eu avec le roy de Suede je ne l'ai pas reconnu si animé, qu'il se porte pour ennemy de vostre majesté ny de l'empire Romain; mais que son dessein n'est que de conserver la liberté du commerce de la couronne de Suede & les membres de l'empire ses voisins, de tout temps confederez en leur ancien estat*, les defendant contre toute violence injuste que les gens de guerre ont entrepris d'y exercer sous le nom & souvent contre l'intention & mandement de vostre majesté. C'est que la necessité urgente m'a fait declarer à vostre majesté & la supplier tres humblement de me faire sentir les gracieux effects de sa clemence & promesses imperiales, & renvoyer mes deputez, par lesquels je la supplie en toute humilité de me descharger de tant de difficultez, avec bonne despesche. Cela non seulement tournera à la louange & gloire immortelle de vostre majesté, mais le tout-puissant la comblera encore de toute prosperité & benediction, & moy je ne cesseray par continuelle obeyssance & devotion de servir vostre majesté & la serenissime maison d'Autriche; recommandant tres affectueusement vostre majesté en la protection du tout-puissant, à ce qu'il luy donne un regne heureux & plein de prosperité & moy en toute subjection avec mes pays aux bonnes graces de vostre majesté. Donné à Stetin ce 14 Juillet 1630.

De vostre imperiale majesté

le tres humble, tres obeyssant,

& fidele prince de l'empire, & Feodal,

BOGISLAUS.

XI.

LETTRE des electeurs catholiques à la lettre du roy de SUEDE.

NOUS Anselme Casimir par la grace de Dieu, archevesque de Mayence, Philippe Christophle archevesque de Treves, Ferdinand archevesque de Cologne, Maximilian duc de l'une & l'autre Baviere, Jean Georges duc de Saxe, George Guillaume marquis de Brandebourg, archichancelier, grand es-cuyer, grand mareschal, grand chambrier, & princes electeurs du saint empire Romain, par la Germanie, la Gaule le royaume d'Arles & Italia.

Roy

Roy serenissime, nostre tres amé cousin & allié, vostre dignité royale nous à exposé par ses lettres du septiesme Avril plusieurs plaintes, ausquelles elle desiroit remedié par nostre entremisse, avant que la necessité la pressast de se pourvoir des remedes qu'elle jugeroit estre plus convenables, lesquels pourroient causer de grands maux en l'empire : comme aussi elle s'excusoit, de ce qu'elle avoit secouru la ville imperiale de Stralsond. Toutes ces choses ayans esté considerées, nous n'estimons point, que de là puisse naistre aucun sujet qui porte votre dignité royale à desseigner & mediter quelque mauvais dessein contre l'empire Romain : que si ceux de Stralsond se fussent montrez d'avantage affectionnéz, plus parfaits que par paroles envers l'empereur, leur souverain seigneur, la voye pour gagner sa clemence imperiale, eut esté expediente au remede plus prompt contre les dommages de la guerre : car il ne leur estoit pas convenable d'appeller à eux des secours estrangers, ny d'en donner aux estrangers, au prejudice de l'empire.

Que si vostre dignité royale a esté offensée, & si elle a receu quelques indignitez par les ennemis de la paix ; c'est chose que nous n'approuvons pas : & si en la suscription de nos lettres il n'y avoit pas ce qu'elle desiroit, cela n'a pas esté fait d'aucune mauvaise volonté, ny avec dessein de diminuer son honneur, mais bien selon le stil duquel nous usons mesme envers les autres roys. Et pour ce qui concerne les armes imperiales conduites en Basse-Saxe, & par apres aux costes de la mer Baltique, qui ont esté suivies de preparatifs de guerre : pour ces choses nous ne croyons point que sa majesté imperiale ait jamais esté provoquée contre la couronne de Suede, ny ordonné estre entrepris aucun acte d'hostilité sur l'estat de vostre dignité royale : mais que son conseil a esté, d'aller au devant de tous sujets de trouble, que vouloient exciter ceux qui estoient plus portez à ayder les conseils ennemis, qu'à embrasser la bien veillance de sa majesté imperiale qui leur estoit offerte.

Et de ce qu'elle se fache, que ses voisins & parents ont esté privez de leurs seigneuries paternelles, pour ce qui concerne les principautez & fiefs dependans immédiatement de l'empire : nous sçavons que vostre dignité royale deferera d'autant plus equitablement l'arbitrage de cette cause à sa majesté imperiale, comme seigneur direct des fiefs de l'empire, que plus elle recognistra que sadite majesté est portée à la clemence, & qu'elle est tres-prompte d'administrer la justice à ceux qui la demandent. Aussi auparavant nous avons fait voir nostre soin par nos lettres, de recommander à l'equité de sadite majesté imperiale, la cause des
ducs

ducs de Meckelbourg ; & que pour les secours qui ont esté envoyez au roy de Pologne en Prusse, nous ne croyons que cela ait rendu sa majesté imperiale ennemie de vostre dignité royale, veu qu'il n'apport rien de la raison de ce fait : mais bien croyons nous qu'elle a en a eu des causes particulieres, pour lesquelles elle a jugé n'estre à propos de n'abandonner le party d'un roy, qui lui est parent & amy : & d'avantage, puis qu'à present les trefors sont accordées de part & d'autre ; si vostre dignité royale veut pretendre de là, ou de quelques autres causes, avoir esté offensée, nous ne pouvons croire toutefois, que telles choses puissent ou doivent estre sujet de troubler l'empire par les armes, veu qu'il ne manquera pas d'autres voyes & remedes pacifiques pour composer les differents, & satisfaire à l'une & l'autre partie. Ce qui est cause que nous exhortons vostre dignité royale de ne se laisser induire par les conseils de qui que ce soit, de lever les armes contre l'empire, ny de vouloir faire juger les differents de ceux, qui jusques à present ont refusé de rendre obeyssance à sa majesté imperiale : & ne pouvons nous empescher de trouver estrange de voir maintenant, d'armées levée contres l'empire par vostre dignité royale, & de ce qu'elle ne retire ses troupes : veu que voicy le temps auquel on peut consulter de plus grandes affaires avec nostre empereur invincible, nous promettans de travailler à l'establissement d'une bonne & solide paix en cette assemblée de Ratisbonne. Et si elle fait autrement, chacun pourra voir qu'elle ne veut recevoir aucun conseil important à sa seureté ; mais que vostre dignité royale veut entendre aux mauvais desseins de sa majesté imperiale. Restel donc qu'en nous promettant de meilleurs succez en toutes ces affaires, & nous confiant en l'assurance de la paix, nous offrons nos offices mutuels à vostre dignité royale, lui souhaitans que toutes choses heurieuses luy soient concedées par Dieu tout puissant. Donné à Ratisbonne le dixiesme jour d'Aoust mil six cens trente. De vostre dignité royale, les tres prompts amis & alliez.

XII.

LETTRE du roy de SUÈDE aux electeurs catholiques *.

GUSTAVE ADOLPHE. Reverendissimes, tres nobles & tres-illustres princes, nos tres chers amis & alliez. Nous avons receu les lettres de vos dilections du dixiesme Juillet, & dixiesme Aoust à nous rendues depuis peu de jours, &

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 338, &c.

ayans

ayans considéré la forme extérieure d'icelles, nous avons reconnu que maintenant avoient été corrigées les choses contenues aux lettres précédentes de vos dilections, concernant notre titre de roy, ainsi qu'il étoit raisonnable : & ayans ouvert les vôtres dernières, il y a de quoy s'étonner, de ce que, contre la coutume ordinaire, & le stil usité aux lettres electorales adressées non seulement à nous, mais aussi aux autres roys & princes sujets à l'empire Romain, les noms de vos dilections sont exprimés à vos lettres, comme si cela avoit été fait à dessein de préférer les noms des autres à notre titre royal, & pour causer quelque préjudice à notre dignité & majesté royale. Mais nous voulons croire que tout cela s'est fait par les secrétaires, la plume desquels a possible été ainsi conduite par quelques ennemis de la paix publique, afin que toute communication & commerce de lettres d'entre nous & vos dilections, soit à l'avenir rendu plus difficile, veu qu'ils cognoissent fort bien que nous ne voulons admettre ny permettre aucune chose qui soit contraire à notre dignité royale : & pour même sujet nous n'avons aussi deü par aucune raison recevoir ny accepter les lettres que l'empereur nous a écrites depuis peu, en la subscription desquelles sa majesté nous appelle *Useren Fursten* (notre prince) en sorte qu'il semble nous vouloir comprendre au nombre de ses sujets, & neantmoins nous ne tenons du bénéfice imperial la moindre poignée de terre ; mais nous disons que tout ce que notre empire embrasse est tenu par nous de Dieu seul & de l'espéc, sa divine bonté par sa clemence ayant favorisé notre très-juste cause en toutes les guerres que nous avons faites jusques à présent. Mais nous ne voulons point nous arrêter plus long-temps sur ces choses, veu principalement qu'il se sçait assez, que par tels actes chose aucune ne peut estre derogée d'avantage à notre majesté royale, que de là il n'en puisse arriver autant à la dignité de vos dilections.

Et pour ce qui concerne ces choses, nous avons eu pour agreable, de ce que vos dilections assurent n'avoir peu approuver les injures & indignitez à nous indignement & injustement faites par les communs perturbateurs du repos public : mais nous aurions bien plus agreable, si les remèdes convenables à ces maux eussent été appliquez en temps & saison ; il semble que maintenant vos dilections s'eslevent contre les choses par nous commises, & excusent aucunement & non entierement desadvoient tout ce qui s'est fait jusques à présent par nos ennemis ; veu qu'au paravant par nos lettres, nous avons suffisamment exposé les raisons qui nous contraignoient de donner secours à la ville de Stralsund & de procurer autant qu'en nous étoit possible le salut de cette ville voisine, qui depuis plusieurs siècles est conjointe par divers liens à nous & à

notre couronne, & d'aller promptement au devant du péril imminent, qui menaçoit nos estats & la mer Baltique. Et neantmoins nous n'avons enterpris aucune hostilité contre l'Empire Romain, ny attenté aucune chose à son prejudice ; mais plustost nous nous sommes persuadéz qu'en cela nous remportons de grandes louanges de l'Empire par nos merites, pour avoir empêché que cette ville ne fust opprimée par les iniques persecuteurs contre sa mesme autorité imperiale, & l'ayant veu presse à tomber és mains des ennemis de l'Empire Romain, nous avons comme embrasé la meilleure voye pour sa conservation, l'avons maintenüe saine & entiere au mesme Empire : et estimons n'estre necessaire ny convenable de reciter icy toutes les particularitez de cette affaire, veu que nous pouvons facilement esperer, que nul (au goust duquel non premiers actes n'ont peu satisfaire) ne pese de rechef toutes choses d'une balance esgale : scavoir si la ville de Stralsund n'avoit pas assez de causes justes & pressantes d'implorer un secours estranger contre une force non moins injuste qu'extreme ; & scavoir si elle pouvoit trouver une voye meilleure & plus expediente, pour s'aller rendre à la clemence de sa majesté imperiale, comme à un autel d'un port de salut. Ceux mesme du destroit du fond sont tous prests de faire voir cela devant tous les juges plus equitables du monde, & chacun pourra facilement recognoistre combien peu profitoient en ce temps là les decrets de l'Empereur, non seulement pour delivrer cette ville innocente du danger d'estre ruinée, mais aussi pour pouvoir tant soit peu refroidir & temperer cette haine mortelle & fureurs inhumaines, qui s'allumoient à la ruine extreme de cette place ; ses ennemis posans tout droict & raison à la violence des armes.

D'avantage vos dilections disent qu'elles ne peuvent croire que l'empereur n'ait esté provoqué à prendre les armes, & faire des preparatifs de guerre pour envoyer en Basse-Saxe, & qu'il avoit ordonné qu'apres que ses armes seroient conduites és costes de la mer Baltique, elles se jetteroient en ses estats & pays. Ce que nous eussions creu aussi tres-volontiers, si tant d'exemples funestes contraires, que nous avons veu de nos yeux, ne nous eussent fait recognoistre, que plusieurs en ce temps là, pour avoir adjousté trop de foy à ces choses, ont esté chastiez par des peines tres severes : & eussions jugé estre chose indigne de nostre dignité & autorité royale, de donner quelquefois trop de creance en de choses de si grande importance, qui regardent le salut de l'estat & des peuples que l'eternel a mis sous nostre puissance. Mais nous ne pensions pas qu'il fust trop tard de se plaindre de cela. Toutefois pour ce qui est de l'empereur, nous ne nous promettons pas rien de mal de son costé, quoy que

que plusieurs ayent esté assez offenséz par ses ministres : mais comme tels perturbateurs de la paix, n'estans par nous provoquéz, n'ont pas laissé de nous faire mille indignitez, & d'adjouster injures sur injures (ainsi que vos dilections cognoistront par la deduction des dommages & offenses receus d'eux, que je leur aye depuis peu envoyée) & ainsi nul ne doit trouver estrange, si estans frappez de crainte & d'apprehension non vaine & inopinée, mais tres-juste, nous avons commencé d'avoir tels procédez plus que suspects. C'est pourquoy nous asseurans sur le droict tres-equitable de la defense, et que nous nous sommes resolus de defendre nostre dignité par d'autres voyes, & avons esté forcéz à prendre en tels maux le remede plus salutaire pour en prevenir de plus grands, & pourvoir soigneusement, qu'eux qui sont faits à la navigation, n'entreprennent d'entrer en nos provinces qui leur sont voisines, & en celles de nos royaumes qui sont au delà de la mer, sans empêcher que le domaine direct sur les choses qui dependent des fiefs de l'empire, ne soit conservé à l'empereur en l'empire Romain. Et toutesfois ce droict d'amitié, de voisinage & de consanguinité, ne se peut rompre, ny fuire en forte qu'il ne soit licite de se condouloir sur les adversitez des amis & voisins, & beaucoup plus des parents & alliez, & qu'il demeure encores à nous comme roy & prince d'avoir leur cause & raison pour recommandée, veu principalement que non tant en leur propre faute, mais bien que les sinistres desseins des ennemis estans sans defense, & ny ayans en leur cause aucun ordre de droict gardé qu'avoit accoustumé d'estre conservé en l'empire Romain, tant à convaincre qu'à condamner, ils se sont veus precipitez en une si grande calamité.

Vos dilections se persuadent aussi, que l'empereur a eu ces causes particulieres, pour quoy il n'a pas jugé estre à propos que les amis & parents du roy quittassent son party, & que pour cela secours avoyent esté envoyez au Polonois en Prusse, & que par ainsi ils n'estiment pas cela estre si grande chose, qu'il n'y ayt encores d'autres moyens pacifiques pour composer les affaires, & partant que l'empire ne devoit estre troublé par d'autres mouvemens de guerre. Et nous au contraire, nous nous laissons facilement persuader, que ces causes impulsives & persuasives n'ont manqué à nos ennemis pour envoyer ces secours, ou bien que ces raisons là sont pour justifier les causes de cet affaire, ou bien pour improuver nos actions. Nous voulons que vos dilections jugeants l'amitié qui est entre l'empereur & le roy de Pologne, ne nous inposent pas la necessité de ne pouvoir souffrir telles invasions & actes d'hostilité : & n'y a sorte de droict qui decide, qu'il ne nous soit loisible de defendre nostre dignité contre tels violateurs, qui ont

exercé toutes fortes d'hostilitez au tré grand prejudice de nos estats, & d'en poursuivre la vengeance par le juste droit de la loy talion ; & qu'il vaut mieux les aller chercher finalement de hors, & aux costes estrangeres, qu'en la maison & aux entrailles de nostre royaume. Ce qui ne se peut faire, qu'avec une perpetuelle sollicitude & agitation : pour ce que nostre droit, ny les treves faites entre nous & le royaume de Pologne, ne peuvent se rompre ny diminuer. Et quoy que toutes ces choses soient ainsi, les dernieres pourtant ne doivent pas estre premierement entreprises. Car vos dilections se souviendront, combien de fois nous nous sommes travaillez, pour oster toute discorde par composition amiable : mais si les choses que nous avions si bien meditées, ont manqué au sucez désiré, cela ne nous doit estre imputé, mais bien à leur iniquité, subterfuge & malice, qui ont indignement rejeté, & se sont en partie moquez des moyens par nous proposez. C'est pourquoy les remedes leuitifs ne profitant de rien, il ne se faut scandaliser, si nous nous sommes resolu aux remedes corrosifs & severes. Et pour ce que vos dilections par leurs lettres n'ont couché aucunes paroles des remedes qui se devoient esperer, afin que par vostre autorité & interposition il fust pourveu à faire cesser ces justes plaintes, ce n'est pas avec injure que nous les recherchons. Car quelle autre chose se pouvoit-il recueillir de là sinon une option ou une necessité qui nous ressoit, de pourvoir au salut de leurs estats, & du nostre par une autre voye ?

Neantmoins nous voulons bien repeter icy ce que nous avons souventefois protesté, que nous ne voulons estre ennemis de l'empereur Romain, ny de vos dilections, ny des autres ordres & membres de l'empire, qui ne nous ont offensé, ny les provoquer à l'advenir ; mais seulement de demander par nos armes, que l'ambition, fureur & licence particuliere d'aucuns qui sont accoutumiez de pescher en eau trouble, soient reprimées, afin qu'elles ne croissent outre mesure ; & que la seureté de nous & de nos voisins soit certaine. Ce que faisant, nous ne troublerons l'empire Romain, ny ne voulons allister ceux qui refusent l'obeyssance deuë à l'empereur & à l'empire, ny offenser aucun de ses estats, mais plutôt poursuivre les perturbateurs du repos public, & conserver les nobles membres de l'empire de ruine & de ravages, & de venger les injures par eux faites. Finalement vos dilections nous exhortent de retirer & emmener nos armées, ce que nous jugeons devoir faire, sinon lors que nous serons asseurez de la satisfaction des injures à nous injustement faites, & qu'il apparaisse de la seureté, tant de nous que de nos voisins. Que si avant l'année courante les autres qui ont esté plusieurs fois admonestez, se fussent monstrez prompts

prompts à rappeler leurs troupes ennemies de la Prusse, nous n'eussions maintenant amené nos armées en ces costes. Toutefois si quelques conditions de paix, justes, equitables, & assurées, sont mises sur le tapis, & que nous reconnoissions que la chose se fassé par l'autre partie: tant s'en faut que nous nous monstions contraires au traictés de la paix, que nous confessons ingenuëment que le but principal de nos armes n'est que la paix juste & assurée. C'est pourquoy nous faisons de congratulations à l'empire Chrestien, & à vos dilections, de ce que nous apprenons qu'elles elevent leur esperance à une solide paix, & qu'elles semblent promettre, que la vertu, le soin & l'affection de vostre illustre college inclinent à la paix commune de la Chrestienté: & comme nous nous promettons toute sorte de biens & amitié de vos dilections; aussi nous trouveront elles tous-jours disposez & preparez à la paix. Donné à Stralsfond le 13 Septembre 1630. De vos dilections bon amy & parent Gustave Adolphe roy de Suede.

Le mesme roy de Suede ayant veu les lettres que l'empereur luy escrivit au mois d'août, cy-dessus inserées, & par celles comme sa majesté imperiale s'estonnoit de ce qu'il estoit entré es terres de l'empire, le blasnant de cette entreprise; voulut se justifier par ce qui suit.

XIII.

LETTRE de l'EMPEREUR au ROY de SUEDE.*

NOUS Ferdinand par la grace de Dieu, empereur des Romains, &c. Au serenissime prince Gustave Adolphe, roy de Suede, des Goths & Vandalles, &c. nostre amitié, dilection, & salut. Serenissime prince & tres cher amy, il nous a esté rapporté de divers lieux, dignes de foy, que vostre dilection a dressé n'agueres une puissante armée de cavalerie & infanterie, dont elle a inopinément fait entrer une partie, apres avoir passé la mer, dans les isles de l'empire Romain, & en terre ferme au duché de Pomeranie, s'y estant emparée, non seulement de quelques places, villes, & chasteaux d'importance: mais a aussi outre cela commencé d'usurper les gabelles & peages (qui en vertu de droict royal, n'appartiennent qu'à nos) & est encores en volenté de nous assaillir par toute sorte d'hostilité, & d'empieter d'avantage sur les pays

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 334, &c.

dudit empire. Nous n'avons point souvenance, que depuis que nous soustenons cette grande charge d'empereur il soit arrivé entre nous aucun contraire ou sinistre accident, ou que nous ou l'empire ayons donné occasion de trouble ou dissension, moins d'une si ouverte hostilité. Et pourtant il nous semble fort estrange, que vostre dignité a entrepris de jeter contre nous & l'empire, les fondemens d'une guerre, possible tres facheuse à l'une & à l'autre des parties, & ce pour quelque different particulier, touchant la ville de Stralsund, duquel vostre dignité n'a deu concevoir aucun ombrage de danger ou prejudice. Car tout cela s'est passé dans nostre terriore, & de l'empire, & concerne les droicts, & privileges d'iceluy, esquels vostre dignité n'a non plus de droict de nous faire la loy, qu'avec raison elle se trouveroit offensée, qu'en semblables débats l'on entreprist, de la maistriser en son royaume de Suede. Et ce d'autant plus, qu'à nostre opinion ledit different pourroit facilement estre composé & assoupy, sous des conditions equitables, sans venir à aucune hostilité ou effusion de sang, par l'entremise du roy de Dannemarc, qui n'a fait aucune difficulté de s'en charger, aussi promptement qu'on le luy avoit proposé & conseillé, si vostre dignité s'y fust portée de mesme zele & affection que nous, & qu'elle eust au temps prefix & assigné envoyé ses ministres avec instruction suffisante. Mais comment que ce soit, il estoit plus que raisonnable par le droict des gens, que vostre dignité (supposé, qu'elle eust creu d'estre assez bien fondée de nous attaquer par armes & de rompre toute amitié) nous eust préalablement denoncé la guerre par un deffi public & legitime, avant qu'envahir l'empire si injustement, assurant vostre dignité, que nos preparatifs de guerre prez la mer Baltique, & ailleurs, n'ont point esté faits pour l'offencer, ny cy devant, ny à present : ains qu'au contraire nous avons eu le desir, de continuer entre nous les effets de bon voisinage & toute amitié mutuelle, comme nous avons encore cette mesme affection, pourveu que vostre dignité par ses procédures contraires ne nous donne plus de sujet de nous porter à d'autres resolutions, & qu'elle fasse cesser cette guerre non necessaire. C'est pourquoy nous l'exhortons amiablement, de ne s'ingerer plus avant es affaires de l'empire & que (ne luy ayans donné nulle occasion) elle n'offense ny nous, ny les membres dudit empire, ains qu'elle retire son armée, au plus tost des isles & terres d'iceluy par elle occupées : Qu'elle n'empesche plus par ses navires, la navigation & le commerce maritime, & qu'elle ne nous incommode point, soit par mer, soit par terre, en la perception des droicts de l'empire. Que si au contraire (ce que nous n'estimons pas) il arrive,

arrive, que vostre dignité en mesprisant nostre presente declaration imperiale, & confidente assurance de nostre amitié, persiste en cette hostilité, & s'opiniastre à retinir les places par elles prises, par ruse de guerre, ou par force : nous, avec l'ayde & conseil des electeurs de l'empire mettrons promptement en estat pour les recouvrer, & prendrons à cœur la conservation de nostre reputation & de l'empire, ensemble la defence & manutention des estats, qui continueront la fidelité & obeïssance qu'ils nous doivent, afin d'obvier à une plus grande calamité. Nous esperons, que vostre dignité ne permettra point, que l'affaire vienne à cette extremité ; & selon qu'elle aura deferé à nos presentes lettres imperiales, nous serons tres prompts & disposez à luy faire paroistre par bons offices nostre amitié & bien-veillance en ce qui luy sera agreable. Donné à Ratibonne, le dix huitiesme Aoust, mil six cens trente. D. V. D. cousin & affectionné,

FERDINAND.

XIV.

LETTRE du ROY de SUEDE à l'EMPEREUR*.

AU serenissime & tres puissant prince Ferdinand II. de ce nom, empereur esleu des Romains, d'Allemagne, d'Hongrie, Boheme, Dalmatie, Croatie, & Sclavonie, roy, archiduc d'Austriche, duc de Bourgogne, Stirie, Carniole & Wirtemberg, comte de Habshourg & Tirol, nostre tres cher cousin & amy.

Serenissime & tres puissant empereur, cousin & tres cher amy. Nous avons (non sans admiration) entendu par la lettre de vostre serenité, datée du 18 d'Aoust, & a nous renduë seulement le 6 de ce mois, en nostre camp de Ribnitz, qu'elle s'emerveille beaucoup, que cet esté passé nous soyons entrez avec nostre armée en Allemagne, & que vous taschez de nous rendre coupables, tant de cette entreprise mesme, que de ce qu'elle soit faite sans aucune denonciation ou desl public. Certainement nous ne pensions jamais que vostre serenité eust peu tomber en une si profonde oubliance des choses passées, ny se mesprendre contre la personne de celuy qui a commencé d'offenser l'autre par ses armes, puis que nous nous sommes tousjours promis de son equité, qu'elle n'imputeroit jamais à la partie innocente ce que la coupable avoit commise, & ne chargeroit l'une de la faute de l'autre :

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. 347, &c.

attendu que c'est le maistre de camp de vostre serenité, qui sans aucune prealable denonciation (nous ne rapporterons icy par le menu une infinité de cruautez & de hostilitéz contre nous exercées) nous a jetté sur les bras és années passées une grande & puissante armée, tant de cheval que de pied, sous les estendarts ou aigles de l'empire Romain. Ce qui est notoire, & autant manifeste comme il est tres veritable que nous n'avons que trop experimenté les mauvaises intentions & violences de ladite armée, lesquelles, ny nous-mesmes, par nostre innocence, ny le conseil de nostre royaume, par ses remonstrances bien fondées & tres equitables, n'avons peu faire arrester ny revoquer. C'est pourquoy, bien que nous le pezions en gros, ou en detail, nous ne pouvons comprendre sous quel pretexte ou titre on nous pourroit charger de la cause de cette guerre, & par quelle raison on pourroit précisément demander de nous la denonciation, laquelle vostre serenité a mesme negligée, estant certain que nous n'avons travaillé qu'à tenir pour nostre seureté la guerre esloignée de nous, sans la faire à autrui. Nous ne voyons aussi aucune raison, qu'on nous charge du crime commis contre le droict des gents, puis que ce droict contient en son vray sens, qu'és guerres desfenives les desits ne se font tousjours par des herauts ou rois d'armes, mais par la nature & qualité mesme de telles guerres, quand on se sent contre le droict tout-a-fait offensé, & ouvertement assailli: voire qui plus est, pour ne manquer à une denonciation, quoyque superflue, & pour ne donner sujet de se plaindre de nous avec fondement, comme si nous eussions trompé le monde par les projets d'une paix, au envahi l'empire à l'improviste, nous nous sommes servis de cette precaution d'escrire à deux diverses fois aux electeurs de l'empire Romain, comme aussi nous avons admonesté vostre serenité par un député de nostre dit conseil vers le general de vostre serenité, que si l'on n'avoit esgard à nos justes plaintes, en nous donnant satisfaction des fautes contre nous commises, nous serions contraints de pourvoir par autre voye à la seureté & conservation de nostre estat & dignité.

Vostre serenité dit bien, que depuis son advenement à la dignité imperiale elle n'a commis ou permis aucune chose tendante au prejudice ou danger de nostre estat; que vos appareils & preparatifs par terre & par mer, n'ont jamais eu le but d'apporter aucun domage à nous ou à nos estats, & que par des moyens paisibles on eust peu composer nos differents, n'estans pas d'une telle importance, qu'avec raison on se pouvoit formaliser pour troubler l'empire. Mais sur cela nous disons que nous n'avons pas l'intention de debatre icy, si ces protestations ne sont directement contraires

traies aux actes & effects si evidens, remettans tout au jugement libre de tout le monde. Et que nous ne scavons pas aussi exactement, si vostre serenité (dont les pensées nous sont incogneues) ait eu quelque intention de nous faire du mal, ou de nous offencer : mais que sous l'ombre & l'autorité du nom, & de la haute dignité imperiale, soit par vostre commandement, ou par une grande connivence nous nous trouvons offencés, & outragez de beaucoup de dommages & affronts. Nous le scavons & sentons, veu qu'il est aussi manifeste, que si quelqu'un se vouloit amuser à en faire des demonstrations ou deductions plus amples, ce seroit esclairer le foliel en plein midy. Dont nous appellons sans difficulté à la conscience de vostre serenité, laquelle nous prendrons pour tesmoin ou juge. Et quant à l'appareil de guerre, & de ce que nous en avons deu juger, nous rapportons à la cognoissance que tout le monde en a, & aux discours tant passez que presens de vos ministres et officiers : mais principalement à leurs actes, traictez, entreprises, excez, desseins & conseils, lesquels comme trop suspects & apparens, descouvrent assez ce que nous en avons deu attendre. Et si tout cela n'estoit assez notoire, le duché de Pomeranie & les provinces voisines pourroient tesmoigner, que sous le faux pretexte de la crainte de nos armes, mais en effect à dessein de nous desplaire & faire du mal, les gens de vostre serenité les ont tourmentez, pilléz et entierment ruinez.

Nous advoüons bien clairement & simplement, que les differents survenus entre nous pouvoient estre utilement terminez par autres moyens que par armes, d'autant qu'il seroit à souhaiter que vous n'eussiez enterpreté sinistrement, ains acunement souffert nostre secours justement donné à la miserable & trop injustement oppresée ville de Stralsund, sans prejudicier en aucune façon à l'empire Romain, ains plustost pour garantir les decrets de vostre serenité, comme nous avons de bon cœur, et d'un courage endurey à la patience & constance, postposé à la commune tranquillité, et au repos public de la Chrestienté, toutes les indignitez et offences que nostre cousin le duc de Hulslein, par vostre commandement, et sous les enseignes de l'empire nous a faites. Par ainsi nous ne doutons point que nous n'eussions peu venir à quelque accommodement, au lieu qu'au rebours on nous a contrains d'assembler avec grande despence une puissante armée, et la passer et loger en Allemagne, pour obvier en temps aux perils et dangers qui s'advançoient et nous menacoient trop evidemment. Mais puis qu'il a plu à vostre serenité de choisir une voye contraire, et vos subdeleguez, lors presens en la ville de Lubec, pour assister au traicté qui s'y faisoit avec

avec le roy de Dannemarc, s'estans enhardis, contre le droict des gens, de refuser et defendre l'accez à nos ambassadeurs y envoyez à cette fin, pour travailler à la composition de l'affaire de Stralsund; joinct aussi que les armées de vostre serenité se sont ouvertement declarées de nous en vouloir, & l'ont confirmé par toutes sortes d'hostilitez: nous avons cette grande confiance, qu'il n'y aura ame vivante, aimant le droict & l'équité, laquelle estant autorisée pour juge ou arbitre, ne declare que la faute ou coulpe n'est pas en nous, mais bien en vous-mesmes, qui avez mieux aimé de preferer la guerre à la paix par une certaine malveillance & inimitié conceue contre nous sans aucun sujet. Or combien que nous sentons si iniquement & sans aucune juste cause provoquez nous voyans hors de toute esperance de venir à quelque accommodement, estans bien certains qu'on ne nous imputera jamais aucun dessein ou attentat inique, ny desraisonnable, pour lequel nous, pour estre plus exempts de tout sinistre soupçon, ne serions plus obligez d'entendre à la paix, quon nous a voulu vendre trop chere: toutefois pour manifester à la Chrestienté nostre zele & ardeur au bien & tranquillité publique, nous n'avons point voulu desister de nos conseils & intentions dirigées à icelle, mais par nos serieuses & assidues recherches, avons esmeu le roy de Dannemarc, à ce que par son interposition, durant l'hyver passé, il nous preparast le chemin d'une amiable conference, qu'on seignoit devoir estre entamée entre nos commissaires de part & d'autre en la ville de Dantsick, ou nous avions envoyé, nostre chancelier avec les adjoints, bien munis de suffisant pouvoir & instruction. Et afin que les factions de guerre ne troublassent ou empeschassent les propositions & deliberations de paix, nous avons arresté & dilayé de faire avancer nostre armée, non sans grande perte de temps, desavantage notable, & frais extraordinaires. Pour lequel soin particulier, qui ne visoit qu'au repos universal de la Chrestienté, nous avons pour récompense, que non seulement nos bonnes & salutaires pensées ont esté aneanties par plusieurs illusions & subterfuges: mais que vostre serenité ose encores nous imputer la malheureuse issue dudit traité, au lieu qu'avec raison elle devoit plustost examiner les actions & procedures de son commissaire, par lesquelles vostre serenité auroit cogneu, qu'il a empesché que les mediateurs de cette affaire estans à Dantsick ne peussent mesmes venir à quelque entreveuë avec nos ambassadeurs, pour donner fondement a un traité selon que la coustume & la raison requierent en tel cas.— Vostre serenité eust aussi outre cela mieux fait, de considerer que ledit traité se pouvoit autant commodément &

bien

bien faire en quelque autre lieu, qu'en la ville de Dantfick, puis que cette place, pour quelques differents survenus entre nos officiers & ladite ville, s'estoit renduë suspecte. Et vostre serenité eust deu quitter toute opiniafreté plustost que de causer au repos publique des prejudices & dangers si grands, ou de rompre totalement & à dessein tout traité ;— principalement à l'esgard que nos commissaires esprouverent assez clairement par des raisons manifestes & urgentes, qu'il ne leur estoit plus loisible ny possible de condescendre a aucun traité au susdit lieu de Dantfick, bien que vostre commissaire fist des instances toutes contraires.

Quand donc tout cecy, tant en general qu'en particulier, fera bien consideré, nous pouvons fort librement laisser le jugement à toute personne sincere & exempte de passion, lequel de nous deux a plus juste cause de se plaindre ; & sans aller plus loin, nous remettons tout a l'interieur de vostre conscience, afin qu'elle en soit juge, veu que la nostre nous assure fermement, que vous mesmes nous tenez pour incouppables.

Vostre serenité dit bien, que'elle veut conserver avec nous & nostre royaume de Suede une amitié indissoluble, à condition que nous quittons & rappellions nos armées. Mais les choses sont venuës trop avant, & ne sont plus en leur entier, puis que les dangers qui ont menacé & menacent toujours nous & nos sujets, ne sont point imaginatifs, mais reels & effectifs : outre ce qu'on nous a, non par paroles, ains par armes, rudement attaqué, en exerçant contre nous toute sorte d'hostilité, tant par mer que par terre. Et pourtant nous esperons que vostre serenité nous excusera, si pour nostre seureté nous ne pouvons accepter telles offres & promesses, que vous appelez des sincerations, veu qu'icelles ne nous pourront jamais donner aucune satisfaction, parce que nous sommes plus grièvement blesez & offencez en effect, que de simples paroles : & croyons que vostre serenité ne prendra en mauvaise part nostre resolution, de tenir fermes nos armes, que la necessité inevitable, & vos outrages nous ont fait prendre ; & de ne ceder, ny ployer en aucune maniere, jusques à ce que nous soyons exempts par vrayes & parfaites cautions, du peril trop evident qui penche sur nous, & que les grandes offenses, & violents affronts à nous faits, soient reparez par une solide & réelle satisfaction sans aucune tache de nostre reputation. En cette constante & tres-juste intention, nous attendrons constamment tout ce qui nous arrivera de la main de Dieu, à la bonté duquel, comme à la justice

justice de nôtre cause, nous avons tout remis, & recommandé.

Mais si d'aventure vostre serenité est cependant touchée d'un sentiment, qu'il soit désormais que le vaisseau de la Chrestienté, agité & tourmenté par des orages de guerre, soit en fin conduit au port de la paix, autant salutaire & profitable, comme souhaitée de tant d'oppressés sous le joug des miseres, sans l'abandonner plus aux tempestes furieuses des ravages & desolations, & que pour cet effect le renouement d'un traité de paix aggréera à vostre serenité : nous donnons parole d'y vouloir promptement entendre, & d'y apporter tout ce qui sera en nostre pouvoir pour l'avancement & le progres d'un œuvre si saint & glorieux.

Ce qui aura lieu, si vostre serenité promet & demontre, effectivement ; que les princes & villes d'Allemagne, comme respectivement nos tres chers cousins, beaux freres, parents, amis, allies & voisins, seront restitués en l'estat au quel ils estoient devant ces derniers troubles, en sorte que nous puissions esperer cy-apres de jôûir d'une entiere seureté, pour nostre estat, de ce costé là : que l'amitié & bonne correspondance entre nostre royaume & ledites provinces soit reestablie, & que nous scachions estre cassez, aneantis, & revoquez, tous appareils & equipages de guerre par mer, comme nous estans trop suspects & contraires à la prerogative que nous avons de protecteur de la mer Baltique : & que finalement les despenfes par nous faites pour nostre defense, à laquelle nous avons esté obligés & contraints par vos injures & offenses, viendront en juste deuë consideration. Alors vostre serenité n'aura pas si tost de son costé accompli ces choses, que par effect elle trouvera que nous ferons voir à tout le monde combien nous sommes poussez d'ambition à maintenir, tant avec vous qu'autres nos voisins, une amitié inviolable, sincere & constante, & que nous desirons sur toute chose vous vaincre & surpasser par toute sorte d'amitié & de bons offices, apres que la bonne intelligence entre nous sera reestablie, & tous mal-entendus ôtes. Les choses doncques estans remises en tel estat, nous ne voudrions veritablement donner aucun sujet à personne de soupçonner, ou de se plaindre justement que nous mclallions impertinemment ou presomptueusement des affaires qui ne nous touchent point, ou peu. Car comme nous ne sommes accoustumés de nous ingerer aux affaires d'autrui, quand elles ne sont tellement jointes à nos interets, que celles là traînent ceux-cy avec elles : tesmoin nos deportements, durant le temps de la guerre par tout allumée en Allemagne, où nous n'avons songé qu'à ce qui concerne nostre

notre royaume, & non à la Germanie jusques au temps que par outre evidence & iniquité de vos ministres, les affaires esloignées nous sont venues sur les bras, & par leur union, conséquence, & reflexion, nous ont poussé & engagé à prendre soin de celles d'autrui, comme des nôtres propres. Par ainsi l'on nous trouvera maintenant & à l'advenir en si bonne intention, que nous ne tenons, ny ne voudrions tenir, en aucune façon que ce soit, les affaires d'Allemagne, pour les nôtres, & vous asseurons de ne vouloir vous y donner la moindre fâcherie.

Nous concluons donc avec cette sincere & sainte protestation, que tout cecy soit entendu, ou droictement, ou finistrement, & que cette affaire se tourne, ou en paix, ou en guerre: que nous ne couvons aucune inimitié ou hostilité contre l'empire Romain, jaoit que vous taschiez de vous servir de telles expositions pour vostre descharge & excuse, & pour nous charger de hayne & de blasme. Mais tant s'en faut, que nous voulussions jamais songer à aucune chose, tendante à son prejudice ou dommage; qu'au contraire nous declarons, de vouloir continuer & conserver une pure & vraie amitié & correspondance aussi longuement, que de sa part on s'abstiendra de toute hostilité contre nous, & qu'on ne favorisera par assistance nos ennemis, pour ne nous forcer de venir à des oppositions & revenges legitimes. Et tout ce que dit est vous iuffra pour le present d'une declaration bien nette de nostre affection & volonté sur ce sujet. Vous recommandant à la sainte grace de Dieu. Escrit à Stralsund ce dernier jour d'Octobre mil six cents trente. De vostre serenité tres-affectionné cousin,

GUSTAVE ADOLPHE.

XV.

HARANGUE de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre (c'est à dire le chevalier **ROBERT ANSTRUTHER**) à l'empereur **FERDINAND II**: Prononcé à Vienne en mois d'Aoust, 1630.

LE serenissime, & tres puissant roy de la Grande Bretagne, mon seigneur & prince tres clement, salué affectueusement vostre majesté imperiale, luy souhaitant tout bonheur, prosperité & longue vie.

Comme ainsi soit que le serenissime roy mon maistre ait appris tant par lettres & responce, de vostre majesté qui me furent mises en main à Ratibonne, (touchant l'affaire du prince

prince Palatin :) Que par le rapport de bouche que je luy en ay fait, jusques ou il auroit esté procédé en traitant dudit affaire, à sçavoir que vostre majesté imperiale se seroit declarée, *Que si le prince Palatin accepte tout ce qui est contenu és quatre conditions prescrites en la responce de vostre majesté & y consent avec la submission requise, & l'accomplit de bonne foy, que vostre majesté, non par aucune obligation de droit, ains meüe de sa pure grace, & en consideration des intercessions tant du roy catholique, que de celuy de la Grande Bretagne, non seulement luy offroyeroit le pardon de toutes les choses passées, recoqueroit la sentence de son ban, mais aussi luy fourneroit son vivre & entretenement des revenus du Bas Palatinat, & de ce que serenissime infante a sous sa puissance & combien, que cette declaration & responce fut telle qu'elle auroit peu justement esinouvoir l'affection du serenissime roy mon maistre, & le porter à embrasser & employer les autres moyens, qui pour lors luy estoient, & luy sont encores à present offerts & en main, il auroit toutefois mieux aymé preserer la voye d'un traité amiable, & j'y tant de fois essayé, le fiant & appuyant sur cette esperance & promesse donnée, tant de la part d'Espagne que d'ailleurs, à luy & à ses ministres, que par la continuation du traité commencé, & par l'establissement de la paix entre sa majesté, & le roy d'Espagne, Il viendroit en fin à bout de son juste & equitable dessein par le moyen d'une composition amiable: & que pour y parvenir il a une grande confiance, en la mansuetude & clemence de vostre majesté imperiale.*

Puis donc que par la singuliere grace & faveur de Dieu, l'affaire en est venu jusques là, que toutes occasions de guerre & diffentions estant de tout levées & assoupies, avoit esté faite & affermie une paix heureuse & reciproque entre le roy mon maistre, & le roy d'Espagne, l'incertitude de laquelle avant sa conclusion estoit alleguée, comme empeschement & retardement, à ce que cette affaire ne fut amené à une heureuse fin: il a maintenant jugé à propos & expedient de me deputer derechef comme son ambassadeur vers vostre majesté imperiale, pour faire paroistre à tout le monde par ce nouvel essay, qu'il ayme trop mieux obtenir ce que justement il desire & demande par la voye douce (& sans guerre) d'une amiable composition. Pourveu qu'il voye quelque apparence probable de n'en estre frustré de ces pretentions; que d'embrasser les moyens & conseils plus violents, & remettre l'affaire au danger d'un hazard incertain & formidable. Ce qui mesme ne le pourroit pas faire, sans faire esbranler ou rompre l'amitié & correspondance qu'il a eu jusqu' à present avec la maison d'Autriche.

Or

Or afin qu'il ne manque rien, de ce qu'il pourroit estre requis pour hafter & avancer l'affaire de questions, le roy mon maistre, comme chacun peut sçavoir par clairs & divers témoignages qu'il en a donné, *a tant fait qu'il a persuadé & disposé* le serenissime prince Palatin son beau frere, en sorte qu'il est prest de satisfaire aux *quatre conditions proposées & prescrites* par vostre majesté, *autant qu'il se peut, avec son honneur & sauve sa conscience*, & autant qu'il sera trouvé convenable, à l'équité & à la raison: se promettant au reciproque, que vostre majesté imperiale, revoquant le ban dudit prince le recevra en grace comme auparavant, & le restablira en *ses pays & droicts patrimoniaux & hereditaires*, apres tant de calamitez & l'exil de plusieurs années, qu'il a souffert & souffre encores, non sans esmouvoir à compassion tous ceux qui pensent à son estat & condition presente.

Or en quelle sorte & par quel moyen le prince entend de satisfaire ausdites conditions, je l'exposeray plus amplement quand il aura pleu à vostre majesté imperiale (comme tres humblement je l'en requiers) de nommer quelques uns de gens de son conseil, comme il fut fait dernièrement à Ratisbonne, pour ouyer & entendre le tout: car si je voulois presentement exposer lesdicts moyens en presence de vostre majesté imperiale, ce seroit vouloir abuser de la patience d'un si grand prince qui me donne une audience si favorable.

Ces choses estant en ce point, & la declaration du prince Palatin estant telle, que l'on espere, que vostre mansuetudé & clemence s'en contentera & n'exigera rien d'avantage ou de plus dur de la part dudit prince: le serenissime roy mon seigneur & maistre requiert instamment de vostre majesté imperiale, ayant en fin esgard à ce qu'on s'est essayé par tant d'ambassades & de traictés, & qu'en considerant tant de recommandations de roys & princes, comme aussi tant d'autres raisons & considerations tant de foyes mises sur le tapis: & que mettant aussi en consideration l'estat tant present que futur des affaires d'Europe; & finalement en pesant en la douce balance de sa clemence la susdite declaration, recoive son beau-frere en grace, & le retablisse selon la poursuite qui en a esté faite depuis tant d'années, avec tant d'ardeur, travail & soin, y estants mesmes intervenues les intercessions presque de tous les roys & princes de l'Europe; & que vostre majesté ne restreigne point si fort la grace qu'elle luy veut faire, que de la renfermer dans *de limites si estroits, que de ne luy vouloir accorder plus que son vivre*, ains qu'elle l'eslargisse & amplifie autant qu'il est convenable à la grandeur & clemence imperiale du
plus

plus grand prince de la Chrestienté, & comme l'ont esprouvée quelques autres, qui toutefois avoyent failli & choppé plus lourdement, à ce qu'il apparaisse & soit notoire à tant presens qu' à venir, que vostre majesté imperiale, aura eu esgard tant à sa propre grandeur, & à sa clemence renommée par tout le monde, ne voulant point que la splendeur & le lustre de sa grace soit obscurci par le nuage d'une beneficence trop refermée, & qui seroit comme contre son naturel: comme aussi qu'elle aura mis en consideration, la dignité des roys & princes, comme estant chose peu convenable à leurs qualitez, si apres une telle moderation, de laquelle ils ont usé dès le commencement de ces mouvemens, apres tant de prieres & services, apres tant d'ambassades, & apres avoir employée tants de labeurs & de despeses, ils ne pouvoient encore rien impetrer en faveur de leur parent & allié, *si non son vivre simplement: ce qui toutefois tant par la prescription du droict, que par la loy de pieté ne peut justement estre denié à aucun*, & finalement que vostre majesté imperiale, aura eu esgard à la condition & qualité du prince, en faveur de qui on intercede: comme estant issu d'une tres-illustre maison, & allié aux plus grands roys & princes de l'Europe. Consideré mesme, qu' estant, pour lors, encore jeune & non en age de majorité, il auroit plustot esté poussé par les conseils precipitez des autres, que non point porté de son propre mouvement à faire ce qu'il a fait, & finalement qu'ayant un grand nombre d'enfans en tout ce fait innocens, il seroit digne d'esprouver une d'autant plus favorable condition & grace plus liberale.

Si donc vostre majesté imperiale le reçoit en son ancienne bien vueillance, & le restablit en sa premiere condition, elle donnera la parachef, & mettra la comble à tant d'illustres triumphes, & rendra la memoire de son auguste nom, non seulement recommandable par tout le monde, comme sur un haut theatre, mais mesme la rendra venerable, comme consacrée au temple de la clemence & de la vertu, ayant atteint le faisc des victoires, qui est de se vaincre soy mesme. D'avantage s'il est vray que les princes en pardonnant sont rendus les plus semblables à Dieu, comme a dit quelqu'un: vostre majesté imperiale laissera un tesmoignage à toute la posterité, & un exemple digne de loüange, montrant combien elle a eu à cœur, & s'est étudiée d'imiter les vertus divines en toutes ses actions, sur tout en s'effargissant à donner & conferer ses graces. En outre, vostre majesté par ce moyen gratifiera à tant des roys & princes entremetteurs, & faisant grace à un obligera tous les autres, & entre tous s'obligera le serenissime roy mon seigneur & maistre d'un
bien

bien de tant plus ferme d'une amitié inviolable : & obligera encore le prince son beau-frere, & ses nepveux issus de sa tres chere & unique soeur, à une obeyssance & reverence perpetuelle ; & avec tout cela affermira sa puissance & son estat, & la grandeur de toute la tres illustre maison d'Autriche, comme d'un boulevard invincible d'amour, & la laissera assurée pour ses enfans & leurs descendans à tousiours.

D'abondant vostre majesté imperiale exaucera par ce moyen, & appaisera les soupirs, les doleances, les complaints, les gemissemens & prieres du peuple innocent & foulé depuis tant d'années, & sur lequel retombent toutes les incommoditez & les troubles qui naissent de la guerre; tandis que les plus grands & le plus puissans en demeurent exempts : restaurera aussi & resjouira plusieurs milliers de pauvres personnes tres affligées, & qui ne demandent autre chose que d'estre fomentées par une douce paix, les garentira de la ruine qui leur pend sur la teste, & obligera chacun à prier continuellement pour la prosperité & conservation & de vostre majesté, & de toute la maison d'Autriche.

Finalement vostre majesté imperiale empêchera que ceux qui se sentent interessez & auxquels il importe, perdans patience, pour se voir entretenus en vain par des longueurs & retardemens à dessein, & par l'apparence de quelques esperance douteuse & ambigüe, ne viennent à se jeter dans les conseils precipitez d'une dangereuse necessité, & coupera les racines d'autres mouvements, & les pretextes de nouveauté que les voisins & estrangers, prompts à en rechercher, & prendre les occasions, pourroient facilement prendre de là : & en suite posera un ferme fondement par lequel d'autant plus promptement & asseurement la paix sera rendüe non seulement à l'Allemagne, mais aussi à toute l'Europe, & seront aussi d'autant plus aisement appeaisez les autres mouvemens qui semblent s'elever & glisser à cette occasion : & pour auxquels remedier il n'y aura aucun de tous ceux qui auront part au plaisir & benefice; du reestablisement & reconciliation du Prince Palatin, qui ne s'y employ promptement & volontiers, estant autrement à craindre que se sentant offensez au mespris qu'on aura fait de leur intercession & priere, ils ne s'en esmeuvent, & qu'ils n'ayment mieux, & n'estiment plus à propos de pourvoir à leurs affaires, en jettant de l'huyle sur le feu, que de l'eau pour l'esteindre.

Que donc vostre majesté imperiale daigne mettre en consideration selon son incomparable bonté & sagesse, toutes telles & semblables raisons, & se remette devant les yeux d'un costé *les prieres intercessionnaires faites les années passées de Philippe III. roy d'Espagne, & de l'archiduc Albert de glorieuse mé-*

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moire;

moire; & comme aussi la *moderation* de laquelle a usé le défunct roy de la Grande Bretagne en la guerre de Bohême, & ses *merites non petits* envers la maison d'Autriche, & ses diverses ambassades, tant en Allemagne qu'en Espagne, avec de souvent reiterées protestations; & d'autre costé qu'elle ayt esgard au moins à cette presente ambassade du serenissime roy mon seigneur & maistre, appuyée d'une part du consentement, autorité, & conjunction du roy catholique, & d'autre, comme comblée de la nouvelle intercession du roy de Dannemarc, comme pour mettre la dernière main à toutes les autres; & ensemble ait esgard aux humbles prieres, si affectueuses & tant de fois reiterées du prince, du fait duquel il s'agit, aux lettres écrites de sa propre main avec tant d'humilité & de soumission, à l'affection & desir qu'il a de se monstre tres prompt à rendre à vostre majesté imperiale toute fidelité & obeissance, constamment & inviolablement, & de recompenser à l'advenir par un grand soin & diligence tous les devoirs & services qui par injure du temps auroient esté obmis.—Que vostre majesté imperiale daigne aussi jeter les yeux benignes de sa grace sur une toudre nombreuse & innocente famille Palatine, & sur une troupe d'autres leurs parents & allies qui embrassent en suppliant les autels de vostre clemence & bonté imperiale! & pour fin, que vostre majesté imperiale contemple la gloire, l'utilité, la felicité & le profit qui en redonderont à jamais sur vostre majesté imperiale & sur toute la maison d'Autriche, & s'espandront sur tout l'empire, voire par toute la Chrestienté!

C'est ce que j'ay eu charge & mandement de la part du serenissime roy mon maistre de représenter à vostre majesté imperiale, attendant là dessus avec toute humilité & devotion une favorable response.

XVI.

LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE au Roy Tres-Christien.*

TRES serenissime, & tres puissant prince, frere, & cousin; l'ambassade que vostre majesté nous a envoyée, au mois de juin dernier, nous a esté d'autant plus agreable, que par icelle, elle a déclaré quelle estoit son amitié & sa bienveillance envers nous, comme aussi son affection louable & constante, qui a regné si long temps entre les roys de l'un & l'autre royaume, nos predecesseurs, soit maintenant renouvelée;

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 360, &c.

voire plus estendue & amplifiée pour ce qui concerne l'utilité de l'assurance, & liberté mutuelle, des peuples des nos royaumes; ce qui estoit à desirer singulièrement en l'estat de l'Europe troublé & agité. Aussi votre majesté nous a elle tellement recogneu enclin & porté à cette affaire salutaire, en ce que nous nous trouvons maintenant conformes en mesmes desseins & desirs. Mais pour ce que l'ambassadeur de vostre majesté le sieur baron de Charnacé a (pour quelque consideration, qu'à peine pouvons nous comprendre) trouvé un scrupule en l'inscription des patentes de nostre traité d'alliance, & n'a peu agreer que nous missions nos titres & nom aux patentes expedées de nostre part pour ledit traité, ainsi qu'ont accoutumé de faire tous les autres roys: chose, que nous avons trouvé fort estrange, de s'arrester à un point de si peu d'importance, qui ne convenoit nullement à la diminution, ou augmentation de l'une ou l'autre majesté! Toutesfois à peine avons nous estimé estre du devoir d'un roy de negliger les moindres choses qui concernent la dignité royale; & plutost eussions nous souffert la rupture de ce traité, que de relascher aucune chose de cette dignité que nous avons reçüe de Dieu & de nos ancestres. Mais pour ce que nous ne pouvons nous persuader en quelle façon nous devons interpreter ce fait dudit sieur ambassadeur, ne voulans croire que cela ait esté fait de la volonté & par commandement de vostre majesté; pour ce que nous avons tousjours reçu des bons tesmoignages de son amitié, & bons offices reciproques & esperons encore les mesmes d'icelle; pour ce sujet nous avons mieux aimé agir avec elle par toute sorte de bienveillance & offices mutuels, que par aucuns prerogatives, & esperons d'elle toute affection reciproque, & qu'elle recognoistra que nos majestez ne dependent que de Dieu seul, & ne voudra souffrir aucune chose contraire à nostre dignité.

Que si vostre majesté juge estre expedient pour le bien commun, & pour nos royaumes, que la traité d'alliance soit encore continué entre nous & vostre majesté (afin que nous persuasions que c'est nous, outre l'utilité commune qui le requiert, & sur l'assurance que nous avons de l'assistance à nous promise de vostre majesté, que nous nous employerons en cette guerre d'Allemagne) il sera necessaire pour rendre plus facile l'effect de ce traité, que nos ambassadeurs soient à l'advenir munis & instruits de bons & suffisans pouvoirs, pour exprimer la force & intention des premiers en ce qui concerne cette alliance. Nous recommandons affectionnément à la clemence & faveur de votre majesté, les illustres personnes comte de Lenoue, & baron de Samur, porteurs des presentes, qui nous semblent dignes de cette charge, & lesquels nous

desirons employer à lever des troupes, sous le bon plaisir & permission de vostre majesté, tant à eux qu'aux autres qui seront par nous envoyez en vos royaumes, *y faire levés des soldats pour nous & nostre armée*, & quoyque nous ne doutions nullement de sa bonne volonté, neanmoins nous demandons amiablement avoir d'elle quelque chose d'assuré, surquoy nous puissions croire qu'il plaist à vostre dite majesté nous gratifier en cette affaire. C'est dequoy nous la prions, comme aussi de se vouloir persuader que nous userons de mesme promptitude, & tant en cette affaire qu'en toutes autres : & que nous sommes tres prests de luy témoigner toutes sortes d'affection & service, priant finalement Dieu tres puissant, qu'il donne à vostre majesté toute bonne & heureuse protection, ainsi que nous le desirons de tout nostre coeur.

Donné à Stralsund

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

le 17 de Septembre 1630.

XVII.

LETTRE du Roy de SUÈDE au Cardinal de Richelieu *.

PAR vos lettres à nous rendües de la part de votre dignité illustrissime, le ; Nous avons veu comme elle recognoissoit la digne estime, que nous faisons de ses rares & eminentes vertus, & comme nous magnifions sa grande & loüable affection pour le bien commun : aussi nous sommes nous persuadéz, que vostre mesme dignité illustrissime recognoissoit quelle estoit nostre constante affection & intention ; & que non seulement elle conserveroit cette bonne opinion qu'elle en avoit conceüe, mais aussi la rendroit plus illustre pour meriter du bien commun, & du desir de la servir. Aussi ne doutons nous point que nous n'eussions perceu quelque fruit des soins qu'elle a pour la seureté, repos, & liberté publique, si le sieur baron de Charnacé, ambassadeur de sa majesté très Chrestienne, *n'eust trouvé du scrupule, en ce que moins nous esperions y en avoir*. C'est pourquoy il fera advisé suivant les conseils tant estimez de votre dignité illustrissime, par quel conseil salutaire toutes les choses destinées au bien public pourroient estre conduites à la fin tant desirée, & oster toutes sortes de remises & delais à une affaire si salutaire & importante ; en quoy la fera deüe à votre dignité illustrissime, laquelle meritera grandement de nous, & de tous autres qui ont principalement interest en la

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 363.

cause dont il s'agit. Sur ce nous recommandons votre dignité illustrissime, à la divine protection, & sommes prêts de faire tout ce qui servira à sa gloire.

Donné à Stralsund GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.
le 17 de Septembre 1630.

XVIII.

HARANGUE du Sieur CAMERARIUS, Ambassadeur du
Roy de SUEDE, aux États de HOLLANDE & PROVINCES
UNIES.

[Pronounced in October 1630.]

ILLUSTRES & tres-puissants seigneurs, &c. Je ne doute point que les lettres du roy mon maître que je presentay avant hier à M. le président, n'ayent esté lues à vostre assemblée: mais ayant charge expresse de sa majesté de vous deduire plus amplement de bouche ses bonnes intentions, je suis venu pour m'en acquitter en peu de paroles, pour ne point prejudicier au bien public parmy vos grandes occupations.

Vous vous souvenez combien vous avez eu le soin du salut & de la seureté publique, depuis que par le changement des affaires d'Allemagne la maison d'Autriche en Allemagne est devenue puissante, & commencé à entreprendre sur la liberté presque de tous les roys & estats: & avez depuis quelques années exhorté sa majesté par ambassadeurs expiés de donner secours aux oppressez. Vous savez aussi que sa dite majesté vous a tousjours communiqué en confiance tous ses desseins, & offert par plusieurs fois son affection & secours: c'est ce qu'il fait encores à présent, vous donnant à entendre, les causes & motifs qui l'ont fait résoudre à passer la mer avec son armée.

Le vint-uniesme de Mars dernier, sa majesté vous avertit que par l'intercession du roy de Dannemarc il s'estoit porté pour entendre à un traité de paix à Dantzic, vous donnant moyen, si le trouviez bon, d'y envoyer de vostre part des personnes, qui par leur conseil pourroient servir au bien public & au vostre particulier. Ses lettres vous ont esté rendües un peu tard; & je ne sçay si à cause de cela vous n'aurez point mal pris la bonne intention du roy mon maître; mais vous avez recogneu par effet, que la retardement n'y a point fait de prejudice. Mais je n'ay peu entendre si vous

avez répondu, & quoy, aus dites lettres de sa majesté, qui se sachant de ce que je ne luy fait nulle mention d'une chose de si grande consequence, je m'assure que si je n'obtiens autre chose, pour le moins vous me justifierez envers elle, de ne luy avoir peu escrire ce que je n'ay peu scavoir de vous.

Or espere-je que, comme sa majesté, ne vous a rien celé jusques icy de ses desseins & conseils, que vous aussi selon l'amitié, qui depuis tant d'années a esté contractée avec vous, traicterez sa majesté avec pareille confiance, afin qu'elle puisse prendre & executer ses résolutions plus promptement & seurement, soit pour la paix, soit pour la guerre, principalement quand il entendra, que vous virez unanimement au mesme but de recouvrer la liberté publique ?

Le dés en est maintenant jetté :—sa majesté a passé non seulement le Rubicon, mais la vaste mer*, & s'efforcera, moyennant l'ayde de Dieu, d'acquiescer par armes sa seureté qui n'a peu jusques icy obtenir, ny par lettres, ny par ambassades, ny pour soy, ny pour autres : ou, pour le moins ; de mettre l'affaire en tel estat que les armes facilitent la paix.

Et sa majesté ayant entrepris une telle charge, non point pour aucune utilité particuliere, mais seulement en consideration de la calamité publique, & principalement pour remettre la mer Baltique (à la domination de laquelle l'Espagne & l'Autriche aspirent il y a long temps pour vostre ruine) en son premier estat : pour faire resflorir le commerce, & procurer vostre bien & utilité ; elle se persuade que vous seconderez ses genereux efforts, non seulement de vos vœux & faveurs, mais aussi de vostre conseil & assistance. . . Sa majesté n'est point ignorante de l'incertitude des choses humaines, & sçait fort bien que les armées sont journalières, & partant elle espere qu'en tout evenement vous ne permettrez point qu'elle se voye du tout negligée & destituée de ses amis, au peril & cause commune, elle se porte avec moins d'allegresse en sa prospérité, ou que Dieu ne vueille, elle se trouve plus empêchée à se relever en adversité.

Si le bonheur, dont le ciel vous a comblé cette année passée par tant de victoires & emoluments, est si grand, que vos ennemis mesmes ne peuvent croire que vous ne vouluf-

* One may take the liberty here to hazard a slight conjecture. The expression of *vastmer*, considering the short passage from Stockholm to the isle of Rugen, cannot with any propriety be applied to the expedition of G. On the other hand, the Germans, if I mistake not, usually call the Baltic the *East Sea* [*die Ost-see*] La Oest-mer ; which the capital initial to *Vasle* in the French copy, and the hyphen between *that* and *mer* seem to confirm. But a Frenchman thinks nothing deserves orthography, which happens to be out of the limits of his own country.

liez vous prevaloir de tant de favorables occasions à leur ruine, en faveur de vos amis : ne permettez donc point que le fruit de vos victoires vous soit oté & à vos amis, & retourne à vos communs ennemis : ce qui ne peut faillir d'arriver, si vous ne vous portez à rompre de plus en plus les forces d'Espagne déjà fort ébranlées : ou pour le moins, assistiez vos amis, qui se portent courageusement à les divertir de vous.

C'est ce que sa majesté m'a commandé de vous représenter, & sérieusement enjoinct de luy faire entendre votre résolution *au plutôt*, pour pourvoir de bonne heure à ses affaires, soit pour la guerre, soit pour la paix. *Partant, je vous prie bien humblement de ne point différer vostre repos, si d'aventure vous ne desirez traiter de cecy particulièrement avec moy par les députez.* Je vous obeiray de tout mon pouvoir, comme messieurs, &c. &c.

XIX.

TREATY of Confederation and Alliance for five years, between LEWIS XIII. King of FRANCE, and GUSTAVUS II. King of SWEDEN, for the re-establishment of the Princes and States of Germany; concluded at BERNWALT in the Marquisate of BRANDENBURG, Jan. 13, 1631*.

SERENISSIMI ac potentissimi principis domini, domini Gustavi Adolphi, Suecorum, Gotthorum, Wandalorumque regis, magni principis Finlandiæ, ducis Ethopiæ & Careliæ, nec non Ingridiæ domini, domini nostri clementissimi commissarii : nos infra scripti Gustavus Horn, de Malla & Heringa, eques auratus, & exercitus Suecici campi marefcallus, Joannes Bannerius militiæ generalis, regni Sueciæ senatores; & Carolus Bannerius de Hufsten, secretarius natus & pro tempore ad aulam Pomeranicam legatus, notum testatumque facimus :

Quod cum ad componendum bellum Sueco-Policum à Serenissimo ac potentissimo principe ac domino, domino

* The present copy is taken from a very curious work, entitled, *Recueil des Traiés de Confederation & d'Alliance, entre la Couronne de France, & les Princes & Etats Etrangers Depuis l'an MDCXXI, jusques à l'an MDCLXXII, sine loco.* Here are inserted many pieces which the grand collectors of treaties in the French interests have been ashamed to own.—We find another copy of the treaty of Bernwalt in the Swed. Intellig. Part I. 75.

Ludovico XIII. Galliae & Navarrae rege Christianissimo, missus esset illustrissimus dominus Hercules baro Charnacæus; consiliarius status & tribunus, ac post illud negotium feliciter peractum, non minorem sacrae regiae majestatis nostrae zelum intelligeret, quam serenissimi sui regis voluntatem foederis ineundi, in communium amicorum vicinorumque libertatem recuperandam.

Et quoniam conditiones quibus ejusmodi libertas recuperari, & mutuum fœdus iniri posse videretur, à sacra regia majestate domino nostro, cui horum locorum constitutiones omnium optimè sunt perspectæ, antehac propositæ serenissimo Galliae regi per dominum legatum communicatæ, ipsi adeo placuerunt, ut mandata & plenipotentiam procuratoris domino legato dederit de iis tractandis ac concludendis; nosque ex parte sacrae regiae majestatis domini nostri deputati essemus, ut cum eo de toto hoc negotio conveniremus.

Post acceptas igitur traditasque utrinque legitimas principum nostrorum plenipotentias, cum præfato domino legato Galliae de dicto fœdere, nomine sacrae regiae majestatis domini nostri, sequentes articulos statuimus & conclusimus, sicuti & vigore harum statuimus & concludimus.

I. Ut sit fœdus inter præfatos serenissimos Sueciae & Galliae reges pro defensione suorum respectivè communium amicorum, securitate etiam maris Balthici, & oceani, libertate commerciorum, nec non restitutione oppressorum imperii Romani ordinum; et ut fortalitia ac propugnacula quæ extructa sunt in portubus ac littoribus alterutrius maris oceani aut Balthici vel in Rhœtia demoliantur, & in eum statum reducantur in quo proximè ante hoc bellum Germanicum fuerunt.

II. Et quoniam adversæ partis animus à justa illatarum injuriarum reparatione in hanc usque diem alienus fuerat, factasque hæcenus intercessionones rejecerat, ideo communi amicorum salus armata manu vindicator.

III. In eum finem rex Sueciae pro tanta belli mole exercitum triginta mille peditum & sex mille equitum suo sumptu in Germaniam ducat & habeat. Rex Galliae *quadringenta milia talerorum imperialium quotannis tribuito*, ejusque summae mediam partem 15 mensis Maii, alteram 15 Novembris Lutetiae Parisiorum vel Amsterodami in Hollandia (prout regis Sueciae ministris videbitur) infallibiliter numerato ac tradito.

IV. Conscriptio militum ac nautarum, exportatio navium ac rerum bellicarum in mutuis territoriis libera sit, hostibus verò denegetur.

V. Delin-

V. Delinquentes in disciplinam militarem & fugitivi, domino suo pro administranda iustitia in eos tradantur.

VI. Si deo placuerit regi Sueciæ felices successus concedere, in negotio religionis non aliter se geret in occupatis deditisque locis, quam secundum leges & constitutiones imperii, et in locis in quibus exercitium religionis catholicæ Romanæ reperietur, in integro remaneat.

VII. Ad hoc fœdus quicunque alii statūs vel principes voluerint, sive in Germania, sive extra eam, admittantur. Idque debite caveatur, ut qui admissi fuerint, nec clam, nec palam, suo vel alieno nomine adversæ parti faveant, aut regibus præfatis, vel communi causæ noceant, quin potius singuli ad hoc bellum sumptus contribuant, quantos unicuique vires permiserint & interesse requirit, eaque peculiari conventionione transigantur.

VIII. Cum duce Baviaræ & liga catholica in imperio Romano amicitia vel saltem neutralitas servetur, si illi reciprocum præstiterint.

IX. Quod si per dei gratiam occasio tractandi se offerat, ex communi fœderatorum consilio tractetur, nec ullus fœderatorum sine altero quid statuito pacemve inito.

X. Hoc fœdus quinque annos durato, à data nimirum præsentium usque ad primam diem Martii Stilo Veteri, anni supra millesimum sexcentesium trigessimæ sexti; intra quod tempus nisi secura pax obtineatur, ex communi rursus fœderatorum consilio prorogetur.

XI. Convenit tandem ut quoniam præterito anno de hoc fœdere tractari cœptum, ut in sex annos concluderetur.

Et cum rex Sueciæ multos interea in hoc bellum sumptus contulerit, ideo pro priori illo anno jam ferè elapso nomine regis Galliarum ipso die subsignationis præsentis tractatus N. N. imperatorum imperialium præstentur, quæ etiam per certas cambii literas à nobis recipientur, & ad cæterorum quinque annorum summam non pertinebunt.

In quorum omnium fidem, &c.

Actum in Stativis regiis Bernwaldi in Nova Marchia Brandenburgensi, decima tertia Januarii, anno 1631, stilo veteri.

XX.

A short NARRATION of the PROTESTANT DIET held at LEIPSICK : beginning February the 8th, 1630-1, and ending April the 3d, 1631. Printed at London 1632.

[N. B. In republishing this piece, we have altered here and there a few inaccuracies of style, and rectified such errors in point of fact as occurred to us.]

THE imperial diet at Ratibon thus ending November 7th, left matters in a far worse state than it found them : for that men perceived now their very hopes to be taken away, as their liberties and goods had been before : and the protestant princes finding themselves startled by four things especially, perceived it high time now for them to take the alarm. The first of the four was this : that whereas the duke of Saxony had, in the time of the diet, written advice unto the emperor, of the king of Sweden's approaching ; the emperor tells him again, how he hoped that himself (the elector of Saxony) and Brandenburg would well aid him with money, ammunition, and other necessaries. By which answer, the elector of Saxony perceived a new bill of charges coming upon the protestants next those parts where the king of Sweden was landed. The second was this : the compendious course taken by the emperor for the recovering of the church lands ; which neither the elector of Saxony was able to stop by his letters unto the emperor, nor the elector of Brandenburg, and other princes, with their presence at the diet * : but that even before their own faces, daily commissions were sent out against them. A third was this : the rigid course (taken by advice of the jesuits) for reformation of the protestant churches and schools, and the forbidding of the liberty of the Augustan confession. The fourth was, that decree of the emperor (published four days before the breaking up of the diet, though projected long before) for the continuance of the wars against the king of Sweden : whereas the way had been propounded and advised upon before, how to compound the matter, rather than how to continue the troubles. And what aggravated the decree for the wars being, not only that the princes were to be at the charges of it, but that the levies were to be laid and collected, not by the consent of those who should pay them, but at the pleasure of the imperial commissaries : for the moderating of whose power,

* We have proved the contrary of this assertion, in the part of our history that relates to it : the two electors alleging, by way of excuse for their personal absence, that the imperial troops had rendered them unable to defray the expences of such a journey. See also *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg*.

and

and repressing the numbers and insolences of the soldiers, notwithstanding some slight promises were now made, yet how far they would be kept, was in their own pleasures. The protestants by these arguments being not only made suspicious, but sensible too, that there were not over many good intentions in the emperor towards them, their estates or religions, began to enter into a consultation for their own safety. The plot for it was laid thus. That whereas there had been a conference between them and the catholics at the former diet, concerning the church lands, the further treaty thereupon was referred unto a diet (procured by the catholics) to be held at Francfort upon Mayn, in August following; the duke of Saxony should write his letters unto the emperor (which was seconded by the mediation of the electors of Mentz and Bavaria), intreating liberty for the protestants to hold a diet by themselves, in some convenient place; that so by their united councils they might be provided, for an answer at the future diet of Francfort.

The imperial assent being thus obtained, the protestant princes, by their letters and ambassadors, agree upon the diet: the place to be Leipzig, and the time the 8th of February. That the several princes and states therefore might know beforehand, what instructions to give unto the ambassadors they were to send, the duke of Saxony, in his invitatory letters to each of them, lays open the purpose of the intended diet; fairly communicating the main propositions, both unto them and to the emperor. The contents whereof were, first, to consult how the church might with a good conscience be maintained in her ancient liberties and happy state. Secondly, how to keep their due obedience to the emperor, and yet preserve the ancient constitutions and peace of the empire. Thirdly, how to maintain correspondence with the catholic princes. And, fourthly, what to answer for themselves both in general and particular, as well concerning the maintenance of the reformed religion, as to the emperor's edict concerning the church lands, where they should come to meet at the diet of Francfort.

The princes thus invited, and the time now come, upon the 4th of February 1631, the elector of Saxony enters Leipzig in great state, and the elector of Brandenburg a little after him. Thither in person came these protestant princes also: Christian, another marquis of Brandenburg, John, William, and Bernard, dukes of Saxe Weimar. William landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, Frederick marquis of Baden, Augustus prince of Anhalt, Frederick count of Solmes, John, George, and Ernest Lodowicke; counts of Mansfeldt,

and

and the deposed dukes of Mecklenburg. The following princes sent their deputies, the duke of Deuxponts, John Ernest, another duke of Saxony, Frederick Ulrick, duke of Brunswick, the duke of Lunenburg. The several princes of the Circles of Suabia and Franconia*, the lady of the abbey of Quidlinburg, the bishop administrator of Mecklenburg, the counts of Stolberg, the barons of Reussen and Schonberg. These towns and states sent their agents also: Norimberg, Straßburg, Francfort, Lubec, Bremen, Brunswick, Hildesheim, Mulhausen, and Northausen†. Duke Lodowic Frederick, administrator of the dukedom of Wirtemberg, was newly dead, and duke Julius not yet settled; and therefore being not able to come himself, he sent the vice-chancellor of the dukedom, called Dr. Loeffler, and some other counsellors, as deputies for that duchy. And these are the protestant party in the empire: some whereof being Lutherans and some Calvinists, they first of all agree to have that distinction of names (which had caused so much schism and hatred heretofore) to be utterly taken away, making a general decree, that both professions should from thenceforth be called by one name of Evangelical.

No man was suffered to stay within the town, whose business was not known: the streets ends were chained up and barricadoed; guards set at the several ports; and the keys of the gates every night brought into the duke's chamber; and all this was to prevent spies and surprises. The duke, elector of Saxony (on whose greatness and countenance the party and action very much depended) makes a speech first of all, which had reference unto his former letters of invitation unto them; protesting withal, his own firmness and forwardness for the peace of the empire, and the maintenance of the Religion; and that he would be ready to venture both life and goods in the cause; so desiring every man freely to give his counsel in such manner as they might be able to render a fair account of it unto the emperor. Unto this meeting, the king of Sweden also sends his ambassador, Dr. Cheminitius, who in his master's name delivers them this assurance: that his majesty's intentions were no other, than to restore the empire to her ancient peace, the princes to their liberties, and to defend the church in her religion; telling them moreover, that the French king was newly entered into a league with him for

* Duke of Saxe-Altenberg; add likewise John Casimir duke of Saxe-Coburg, Augustus count Palatine, and Augustus prince of Anhalt.

† Add the deputies of the archbishoprick of Bremen,

five years to come. The ambassador had both speedy audience and honourable entertainment. The diet, to be brief, broke up on Palm Sunday, the 3d of April following. The conclusions agreed upon, themselves express in their letters, in humble and complaining manner, enlarged in many sheets of paper, sent by an express courier unto the emperor, in which their joint desires were thus signified.

Their complaint and remonstrance I reduce into these propositions:—

That the golden bull and constitutions of the empire had of late been all abused; that the emperor's late edict for restitution of the church lands, and his endeavours to root out the protestant religion, were the main causes of these late troubles. The first of these, breeding jealousies and discontents betwixt the protestants and the papists, and the second tending to the utter ruin of the two electors of Saxony and Brandenburg. Then they complain of injustice done unto particular princes and cities, some of which were injured by the violent taking away of their church lands: as the dukes of Wirtemberg and Brunswick, the prince of Anhalt, the counts of Hohenloe, Stolberg, Lippe, Waldec, Werthimb, Erpach, &c. the town of Augsburg, and others; some hindered in the exercise of their religion, as Augustus and Frederick, princes Palatine, and younger brothers unto Wolfgang William, Palatine of Newburg, now turned papist. Others had their estates confiscated, as the lady electress Palatine*, and her son Lewis, prince Palatine, the dukes of Mecklenburg, &c. for whom the whole college of electors had interceded in the late diet, but not prevailed. Others complain of the violent altering of the feods and tenures of their lands and lordships, as the last beforenamed princes and John Casimir elector of Saxony, into whose lands the imperial commissaries have with force and arms intruded, changing the tenures of the tenants, and altering the religion. Ernestus, marquis and elector of Brandenburg, complains of the same wrongs offered unto his pupils, the young marquises of Ouspach†. Ulme duke of Brunswick complains, first, of the ravages of his lands done by Tilly, upon pretence of monies owing to the king of Denmark, and made over by the said king unto the emperor, who employed Tilly thus to strain for them. Secondly, of the seizure of his bishoprick of Hil-

* The mother and brother of the king of Bohemia, Lewis being duke of Simmern.

† Which are of the house of Brandenburg: their lands lying by Nuremberg.

desheim. And, thirdly, that the chief town of his own residence, Wolfenbuttle, had been forced to take an imperial garrison.

Others complain, how they might not have the benefit of the law, but were driven away by threatenings and discourtesies. The electors and princes complain of contempts and indignities offered unto their persons, some of them having been threatened the *bastinado* by some of the emperor's soldiers. The cities and circles of the empire complain, that undue and excessive impositions and taxes had been laid upon them, not by the consent of themselves (as the imperial laws command) but at the pleasure of any of the emperor's commissaries. That, under colour of protecting them, they have been forced to afford quarter and maintenance unto the imperial armies, who, when they should indeed have defended them, most cowardly ran away. That when they would not endure the soldiers' insolencies, they have been declared enemies of the empire, and forbidden to defend themselves; that their lands have been given to soldiers, as if they had been conquered. That they have been forced to contribute to imaginary companies of soldiers (perchance to four or five), as if they had been a complete band. That the commissaries have assigned quarters and passages unto the soldiers, without ever asking leave of the princes or countries: that people have been tortured for their money, had their cattle driven away, their houses fired, and all commerce driven out of their country. That the soldiers neither observed martial discipline nor moral honesty, neither keeping the laws, nor fearing God; that virgins and women have been ravished upon the high altars; that if the weekly contributions were not paid at the commissaries' absolute pleasure, the soldiers then spoiled the country. The marquis of Brandenburg complains, that notwithstanding the king of Sweden had two parts of his country (the old and the new Mark) yet was he forced to pay a full contribution for the whole marquissate to the Imperialists. That himself, by the soldiers being so long in his country, was left so poor, that he was not able to entertain a garrison for the defence of his own palace, and was fain to abridge even the necessary provisions of his own table and family; that the soldiers, entertained by the protestants for their own defence, have been turned against them, to take away the church lands; that trebly more contributions have been raised against no enemy, than ever were when the Turks were in Germany. That when the princes of the house of Saxony, as, namely, Altenburg, Weymar, and Coburg, had excused themselves of disability to pay each of them 1454

dollars a month, which the commissary Ossa had required of them; then Tilly threatened to draw 10,000 more dollars a month out of them. That considering all this, they could perceive nothing else, but that the emperor had intended their utter ruin: whereas he had dealt more gently with those of his own hereditary dominions. That all this is most contrary unto the oath of the emperor, and unto the laws of the empire; inasmuch as such hath been complained of by the several electors and princes, and by them protested against in the late diet of Ratibon; wherefore they now humbly petition to be relieved, protesting otherwise that they are no longer able to endure, but shall be enforced to defend their persons, consciences, estates, and subjects; resolving notwithstanding to continue their due loyalty and obedience unto the emperor, humbly now desiring a fair and gracious answer from him. Leipzig, March 18, 1631.

Their conclusions were answerable unto their propositions.

1. That considering it was their sins which deserved these punishments; they command public prayers to be made unto Almighty God for the diverting of these miseries.

2. That means might be thought upon, and a friendly treaty appointed with the catholic princes, for removing all jealousies, and restoring good terms and concord betwixt them, as for seventy years before it had been.

3. That when the time and place for this treaty were once appointed, the protestants should there appear a little before, to prepare themselves what to say in it.

4. And the more fairly to dispose both Cæsar and the Catholics unto their intentions, that their grievances should in humble manner be beforehand, by letter, presented both unto the emperor and the three catholic electors.

5. That these grievances should in those letters be pressed to be contrary unto the emperor's oath, the imperial laws, the privileges of the princes, the honour and safety of the empire. That the wars would undo all; the insolencies of commissaries and soldiers were so insufferable, as that it stood neither with their consciences, their safeties, nor their honours, to suffer themselves and subjects to be any longer thus abused; and that they would hereupon desire the benefit of the emperor's so often promised protection.

6. That seeing these greater and fuller assemblies were both chargeable and tedious, they agreed, that certain deputies should, as necessity required, be, in the names of all the rest, appointed, both to treat and determine of what should seem convenient for the common cause.

7. The

7. The decree of levies of foldiers (both of horse and foot) to be made in their several dominions and divisions, without crossing the constitutions of the empire, or offence of any, and only in their own defence.

8. That whereas in a diet of the empire held 1555, it had been decreed, how that neighbouring princes should live neighbourly, and if any oppressed others, the rest should relieve them; this relief they now promise one another, desiring, that if in these troublesome times, the levies and other carriages could not possibly be every way agreeable to the constitutions of the empire, that it might not be interpreted to be done on purpose.

9. They decree the continuance of their loyalty and obedience unto his imperial majesty.

10. They agree also upon the proportion of the levies.

Thus the elector of Saxony engages himself to raise six regiments, Brandenburg three. The several Circles of Suabia, the Rhine, and Franconia, three regiments apiece; and the Circle of Lower Saxony agreed to furnish monies for the raising and paying of one regiment. Each regiment of foot was to be 3,000 strong, and of horse 1,000. And thus the diet being ended upon Palm Sunday with a sermon, Saxony displays his defensive banner, beats up his drums, begins his levies, and so at their coming home do the rest of the princes.

These conclusions and resolutions of the protestants were not a little boggled at at court, did not slightly displease the emperor, and startle the catholic leaguers, with their adherents. The protestants hear of it in both ears; for this are they, both by words and writings, threatened and reviled; yea, their new league and strength were by some confident not a little scoffed and scorned at. But they that had been used to hard deeds before, were sufficiently hardened against foul words now; they were not to be discouraged this way, they did their business, and let the others talk their talks. Things going thus on, it was by the middle of May every where perceived, how that these leaguers of Leipzig were now in very good earnest. For now upon the taking of Magdeburg, the protestants strongly suspecting by the inhuman cruelty there used by the imperialists, that it was not a heat of war alone, but that there was a core of malice discovered in it, not an imperial, but a popish spite, unto that city above others, for having been one of the first that harboured Luther and his religion; they begin to make in their own case, and that, for their religion's sake, they were

were all not likely to be much better used. Some therefore of the neighbour princes (those, namely, of Saxony and Suabia) demand of the cities of Ulm and Memmingen, &c. situate in Suabia by the river Danube (which were of the protestant league with them) to entertain for garrisons some of these new levied forces. Memmingen consents; but Ulm, being a greater city, relies upon her own strength. These things being done, command is given by the emperor unto Eggon count of Furstenburg (appointed general of the Circle of Suabia) to employ those 8,000 (lately come out of Italy, after that the wars of Mantua were ended) together with 8 or 10,000 more, against those towns aforesaid. Furstenburg presses so hard upon Memmingen, that about the beginning of June, he enforceth it to renounce the new league, and to purchase the emperor's pardon at the rate of 50,000 florins ready pay, and 25,000 monthly contribution. The protestant league being now noised abroad, and another meeting at the latter end of May at the same Leiptic intended, thither come the ambassadors of England, Sweden, Saxony, and Brandenburg; there is the uniting of their forces with the king of Sweden propounded, but not concluded; only the passage of Wirtemberg, heretofore denied him by Saxony, is now yielded to, to be open for his army. M. Tilly about the same time dispeeds a message unto Saxony with overtures of a peace, promising shortly to come himself with sufficient commission to confirm it. This being suspected to be a plot, either to divert or stagger the resolution of the duke, or a trick to gain time, and that Tilly's commission might perchance be in his scabbard, the message was not accepted, notwithstanding that Tilly did, in the mid June following, come in person indeed, and at Oldsleben had treaty with the duke's ambassadors.

When this would not do, and the emperor, by the duke's second letters (dated the day after the end of the late diet), understanding the resolution of the leaguers, which by their general levies he perceived them ready to maintain; and hearing withal, the king of Sweden to be victoriously already advanced quite through Pomerania and Mecklenburg, into some places of Brandenburg, out thunders he his imperial ban against the Leiptic leaguers, dated at Vienna, May 14, peremptorily forbidding any place of the empire to grant either relief, passage, or place of quarter, muster, or rendezvous, unto any of their forces; commanding every man to destroy, kill, and persecute them as enemies: and the easier to dehorte the leaguers, his majesty offers to release them of their oaths taken in prejudice

of him at Leipsic, and to grant pardon to as many as should come in: upon pain of death forbidding all their subjects either to contribute to their levies, or to serve under their ensigns, but to turn both their monies and persons towards the advancement of his imperial service, promising the freedom of conscience and estates to all that should thus obey him.

Divers people are naturally afraid of thunder; some of the leaguers, therefore, (and especially the grave-headed burghers in the richer cities) began now to quake at the noise of this so hideous a proclamation: which fear of theirs much cooled their blood, made them the less zealous and warm in the resolution; but he that hath not courage enough to fight, hath wit enough commonly to excuse his cowardice. So fell it out here; divers of the backwardest palliating their own remissness with the news they pretended to have heard, of the manumering of the chief man in the action, the duke of Saxony. And this had like to have arrested the whole design. Saxony hearing of all this, notwithstanding he was at this instant hard laid at, by Hagenmüller, the emperor's ambassador, to come over to his master; yet (to prevent a jealousy) would he not so much as once speak with him, then at Torgan, but referred him for audience over unto his privy council.

Hagenmüller's propositions were these four:—

1. To consult how the business about the church lands might best be compounded.
2. How the inconveniencies occasioned by the wars might be eased.
3. That the agreement of Leipsic, for standing upon their own defence, might be cancelled.
4. That he would advise how a peace might honourably be concluded with the Swede, and that the duke would mediate it.

The answer of the duke's council is too long to insert; and, to be brief, the ambassador returns not well satisfied. Immediately hereupon, the duke dispatches his letters unto the several leaguers, assuring them of his own constancy, and inviting them with all speed to hasten their preparations.

These letters of Saxony brought about the matter again; and he, to shew that he meant to do more than write letters, lays sure guards upon his own frontiers some eight or ten thousand men; proceeding warily hitherto, and all upon the defensive. The protestant princes of Suabia (which lie along the Danube, between the dukes of Wirtemberg and Bavaria) do hereupon assemble at Edingen, resolving to stick close to the articles of Leipsic, reinforcing their levies thereupon.

And

And now the fair city of Norimberg in the Upper Palatinate returns to her former resolution, notwithstanding the particular threatenings of the emperor, to give the spoil of it unto their great neighbour the duke of Bavaria. The city of Strasbourg arms also; and the city of Ulm, encouraged by the new administrator of Wirtemberg, duke Julius, refuses to give passage to the late troops coming that way out of Italy, and sends 300 musqueteers to aid their neighbours of Memmingen against them.

The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel (against whose country it was generally reported that Tilly would forthwith come, and that he was already for that purpose upon his march as far as Düringen) bestirs himself all this while, levies men, and fortifies his frontiers. Tilly sends before he comes to him, and that these four demands:—

1. To pay the arrear of the contribution due unto the emperor.

2. To give sufficient hostages or security for the future; directly professing him either a friend or a foe to the emperor.

3. Immediately to cashier his army.

4. To lay open his passages for the emperor's forces, to receive imperial garrisons into Cassel and Sichenheim, and to give quarter to five other regiments.

Hard terms all. Unto which the landgrave returns though a negative yet a modest answer. This way not speeding, it seems the way of practice and of treachery was attempted, for the landgrave presently upon this discovers some correspondency entertained by two or three of his own chief lords with Tilly, for the delivering up his two chief towns of Cassel and Sigenheym, for which they are executed. Tilly after this in a rage sends three several troops into his country, his own intended expedition against him being diverted by news of the king of Sweden.

All this while (namely, until the latter end of June) was there no assurance of the protestant princes purpose to unite with the king of Sweden; but they all stood upon terms of neutrality, kept their obedience unto the emperor, standing only upon the defensive, without once offering any act of hostility, where they were not first provoked. Saxony had now 17,000 foot and 3000 horse all in a readiness. Upon the same terms stands the marquis elector of Brandenburg, who, notwithstanding the near alliance betwixt the king of Sweden and himself (the king having married the sister of the said marquis) yet that he seemed far enough from uniting with him, appears by an action of his, which had like to have

cost him dearly. The elector denies a request of the king's, for two passages for his army (now in the Brandenburgher's country), and especially for that the marquis now desired his town of Spandau again, which upon some terms had at the first been lent unto the king; which the king taking very unkindly, (divers circumstances perchance occurring) all of a sudden besieges the elector's town of Berlin, bending his cannon upon the very palace, threatening to pillage it. The difference is at length appeased by the electreis, together with the promise of 30,000 rix-dollars a month, and to have the town of Spandau (Cultrin he also desired) again conigned over unto him as before.

XXI.

Regis SUECICI de MAGDEBURGENSI excidio publica- expurgatio.

Quocirca rex culpam amissa, nec servatæ urbis, publico scripto à se amolitus est :
[Chemnit. de Bello Sueco-Germ. tom. i. 134.]

ERRORE Magdeburgensium, quo in ipso turbarum limine, ad habendos delectus sufficientem pecuniæ summam minime anticipando, impegerant, *sub initium perfrictis, luculenter deinde, & ad oculum demonstrans*: summis quidem viribus ad succurendum Magdeburgo contendisse, nec quicquam in eo fecisse reliqui: sed ineluctabilia obstacula objecta, quæ conatus suos remorata fuerint; nec, nisi in præsens exitium seque suosque præcipitare voluerit, priusquam, hoste Viadri & Wartæ ripâ ad Francofurtum Landbergamve depulso, quæ e tergo erant, in tuto collocaret, iter maturare potuisset. Nihilominus, utut hostis post Francofurtanam cladem ad Glogoviam majorem se recollegerit, plus obsessæ urbis salutem ipsi cordi, quàm pericula, quæ ab hoste, vires integrante, imminerent, curæ fuisse, aut sollicitudini: ideoque Cæsarianos, quos profligatos persequi ratio belli dicitabat, ad præsens omisiss, versus Havelam & Albim signa, liberandæ urbi, transtulisse. Quod autem propositum hoc effectu caruerit, electores vicinos unice in causâ. Quippe cum Saxo, cujus vel maximè interfuerit urbem servari incolumen, non modo arma regiis armis jungere, sed & transitum, comneatum, tormenta, rem tormentariam flagitanti præbere detrectarit: Brandenburgicus verd, nec comneatum, naves, similia, ad tentandam rei aded momentosæ aleam necessaria, quæ alibi reperire non erat, satis maturè subministravit aut subministrare potuerit,

potuerit, nec idoneam cautionem, qua filius rex ulterius progredetur, præstiterit tempori; partim quoque de iis, quorum rex certus esse volebat, ac sensum suum eousque, dum Saxo mentem suam explicaret, suspenderit. Summatim, uterque ita se gesserint: ut rex, hostiline an amico in se essent animo, non satis nosset, nec quicquam solidi aut firmi de iis sibi posset polliceri.

XXII.

TRAICTE de Confederation & d'Alliance pour huit ans entre LOUIS XIII. roy de France, & MAXIMILIEN electeur de Bavière, signé par le dit electeur à Munich, le 8 May 1631.

QUANDOQUIDEM rex Galliae & elector Bavariae amicitiam bonam ac defensionem reciprocam confirmare & inire desiderant, idem in sequentes articulos sub fide data secretos consenserunt.

Sit inter regem & electorem Bavariae sincera, bona & constans amicitia ac defensiva utrique firma obligatio ad octo annos, virtute cujus rex obligatur novem millibus equitum, cum convenientibus tormentis bellicis, & propriis sumptibus defendere electorum Bavariae ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadantur; possit tamen elector Bavariae, in ejusque optione consistat, à rege vel militem, vel pecuniam tanto militi sufficientem petere.

Eodem modo elector Bavariae obligatur tribus millibus peditum, et mille equitibus ac convenientibus tormentis bellicis propriisque sumptibus defendere regem Galliae, ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadantur: similiter tamen in arbitrio regis positum sit, ab electore Bavariae vel militem ipsum, vel pecuniam tanto militi æquipotentem postulare.

Rex Galliae promittit arma sua nullo modo applicare vel conferre contra vel in electorem Bavariae ejusque supradictas provincias, nec directè nec indirectè assistere militibus aut pecunia iis qui volent electorem Bavariae aut ejus provincias hostiliter invadere, nec eis permittere ut militem in regno Galliae contra electorem & supradictas ejus provincias conscribant, aut illis arma, tormenta, vel pulveres tormentarii ab illorum amicis subditis regiis submittantur.

Vice versa elector Bavariae promittit sua arma nullo modo applicare, & conferre in & contra regem ejusque provincias hæreditarias, sive acquisitas, nec directè, nec indirectè

assistere militibus, vel pecunia, nec permittere conscriptionem militum in suis provinciis, vel extractionem armorum, & pulveris tormentarii iis qui volent regem ejusque provincias invadere hostiliter.

Rex promittit agnoscere, defendere & manutenere dignitatem electoralem in persona ejusdem electoris & domo Bavarie, contra omnes qui voluerint vel tentaverint illam dignitatem eis auferre, aut eos in exercitio dictæ dignitatis impedire.

Quandoquidem ex urgentissimis causis necessarium est, ut hæc amicitia & defensio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Bavarie conclusa, nulli alii pateat, sed secretissima maneat, ideo utrinque de secreto observando in specie quoque cautum est.

Quos omnes articulos ed libentius rex Christianissimas & elector Bavarie inter se comprobarunt, & sibi invicem promiserunt, quia & jure naturali liciti, & regie majestati, & electorali dignitati convenientes sunt: reservat ideo tamen ac excipit hic elector juramentum suum imperatori & imperio præstitum; reservatione autem sic excepta præfatus elector omnia, & singula quæ in hoc tractatu mutue amicitie & reciproce defensionis continentur sincere, exacte, & bona fide se præstiturum promittit, regemque Gallie ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas adversum quoscunque defendere tenebitur, eo modo quo in supradictis articulis continetur.

Vicissim verò quoque rex Gallie omnia ea se denuo sincere, ac bona fide præstare velle promittit quæ in supradictis articulis sponndit.

In fidem horum omnium elector Bavarie propria manu subscripsit, eaque proprio sigillo communiri fecit.

Datum in urbe nostra monachio 8 die mensis Maii, anno Domini 1631, subscripsit Maximilianus, & infra Gulielmus Jocher, cum insignibus electoris Bavarie.

Il est ainsi en l'original, que j'ay mis entre les mains de monseigneur le cardinal duc de Richelieu. A Paris, le 20 Juin, 1634.

Signé, BOUTHILLIER.

Il y en a un autre pareil signé par le roy à Fontainebleau, le 30 May, 1631. Louis, & plus bas, Bouthillier: avec les armes de France; dont l'original a esté remis des mains dudit seigneur cardinal duc de Richelieu.

XXIII.

HASSLÆ Landgravii cum Rege Fœdus, ejusq; capita.

Quod fœdus velut norma fuit, ad quam reliqua pleraque postmodum amissitata; ideoque plenius & articulatum historiæ nostræ intexere, operæ pretium durians.

[Chemnitz. Bellum Sueco-Germ. tom. i. lib. &c.]

REX Landgravio in tutelam, protectionem, & clientelam recepto, quicumque offendere, aut armis impetere eum intenderent, pro hostibus haberet, non secus, ac si ipsimet, coronæ suæ injuriam ac bellum intulissent; pro virili parte, quantum occasio permiserit, hostiliter persequeretur; landgravio consilio, auxiliove adesset; nec cum quoquam alio, seu extra seu intra Romanum imperium, fœdus, quod huic derogeret, iniret. Imprimis vero

2. Si landgravio aut ejus subditis vi hostiliti eripi quippiam, aut munitiones & arces ejus obsidio cingi contingeret, illia liberandis rex nil faceret reliqui; arma landgravii armis jungeret; summis viribus laboranti succurreret, nec ulla cum ratione desereret.

3. Cum Cæsare, & pontificii fœderis sociis, aliisve hostibus, de pace minime gentium transigeret aut exueret arma; nisi landgravio pactis, & ita quidem incluso; ut ei, ejusque subditis nomine illorum, quibus, cum in conscientia sua, tum alias gravatos se, justissime, conquerebantur, satisficeret; de justitia adversus quemcumque equaliter administranda cavetur; et is in statum, quo landgraviorum stirpis Castellanae familia ante Bohemicas & Palatinas turbas fuerat, omnino reponeretur.

4. Sicubi rex, ejusve miles a landgravio in munitiones, arces, urbes, exigente necessitate reciperetur, nihil, quod regalibus, privilegiis, utilitati, juribus landgravii præjudicio esset, tentaret; sed necessitate & causâ receptionis cessante, loca isthœc landgravio iterum in manus consignaret.

5. Sin tormenta quoque, & alia belli gerendi instrumenta, regi è landgravii munimentis præberentur (id autem non, nisi cautione prius de restituendo præstitâ, factum iri) postquam pro tempore satis usus, restitueret.

6. Quod si landgravius propriis viribus ac Marte aliquem pontificiorum ordinum, qui regis hostes ultrò semet professi, opprimere, ejusve ditiones, urbes, loca occupare potis esset, perinde ac si ipse patraffet, rex id rati haberet, & landgravium, siquidem eo nomine infestaretur, regiè propugnaret.

7. Si ipsemet rex landgravio, ut fœderato suo, præsens adesse, & absolutæ belli gerendi directioni, a landgravio

delatæ, vacare impediretur, egregium habilem expertæque prudentiæ ac virtutis ducem landgravio adjungeret: qui ipsius, ut capitis & principis in contracto fœdere, loco landgravii, copiis præesset, in militaribus, gerendove & continuando bello summi imperii clavum teneret, & hoc nomine data speciatim fide obstrictus, quæ belli ratio flagitat, ad communem fœderatorum scopum consequendum, communi consilio perageret ac exsequeretur. Quod rebus decenter & ordine gestis, confusio, aliàs facillè irrepenti, omnis præcluderetur rima. Quos summi imperii fasces.

8. Rex ipsimet landgravio contulit ac permisit.

9. Quod dexterius autem omnia administrarentur, & aliquis exercitui afforet, observantiæ fœderis (ne, aut huic, aut regis imperio quicquam committeretur adversum) rei que simul pecuniariæ intentus; utile visum, summo armorum imperatori fidelem & prudentiâ clarum consiliarium bellicum adjungere: qui illi, ut legatus ad confœderatos, adhæreret, consilio opeve juvaret, & providam, ut dictum, omnium rerum curam gereret; cum quo etiam imperator è secretioribus quibuscque statum rerum concernentibus, communicatum iret.

10. Quod landgravius haud abs re fore arbitrabatur, id nec regi displicuit; videlicet, hominem candidum & rerum intelligentem, legati ordinarii seu residentis titulo ad regem a landgravio mitti; qui, ut individuus comes, nunquam non eundem sequeretur, landgravii petita, temporum successu emergentia, ad eum deferret, & mutuæ communicationi per literas daret operam. Tandem

11. Rex landgravio alios principes, comites, barones, civitates, ordines, universitates in fœdus hoc recipiendi potestatem contulit: iisdem illos legibus admittere, nec minùs, ac si cum ipso ea de re tractassent & transgissent, flagitantibus assistere pollicitus. Quod si alii eventum demùm rei operire, animum inducerent, & jam fœderatos cum belli periculis luctari solos finerent, post trium mensium decursum haud potituros ampliùs optimis his conditionibus, sed ad novos tractatus, & novas condiciones paciscendas, remissum iri.

E contra Landgravius data fide recepit.

1. Eandem subire cum rege fortunam, nec eum deserere, nec ulli tractatui cum illius hostibus præbere aures, multo minùs de pace transigere; nisi præcio, volente, & consentiente rege: ita ut ipse, ejusve corona pactis simul includeretur; ea penitus calculo suo approbaret; tractatui adhibitus,

tus, deque eo certior tempore factus foret; et omnia rati habuisset.

2. Ut federatum regis & clientem, ejusdem, illiusve fœderatorum ac regnorum damnum avertere, commodum autem promovere; nulli consilio aut actioni immisceri, quæ regi, aut ejus regnis, principatibus, dignitati adversarentur; fideliter potius illi assistere, et pro virili, ad bellum hoc debellandum, milite pecuniave adminiculari: munimenta autem sua, quantum in se foret, communi fœderatorum bono conservare; hostes in ea nequaquam admittere; sed, quo inde excluderentur, laborare enixè & summis viribus.

3. Illa ipsa munimenta, provincias, arces, ac loca transitu opportuna, necessitate flagitante, regi, cum in adventu, tum in receptu, abique tergiversatione rescrare, et permittere, ut aut singulatim, aut cohortatim & turmatim, aut integris legionibus pertransiret, nec circa illa modò, sed et in illis ipsimet hospitaretur. Militem tamen intromissum utrique fide addictum esse debere, et landgravio simul in fœderis hujus articulos sacramento obligandum: omnemve arrege ac regis hac in parte captionem abscire.

4. Si quando rex landgravio e copiis suis subsidio mitteret, jungere se illis; eas suscipere; uterque pro alterutrius incolumitate laborare; et in communem hostem toto impetu ferri.

5. Exercitum aliquot millium, nulla interposita morâ, suis cogere impensis, eundem, quantum possibile, citiùs aut serius, prout occasio serret, grandire; simul ac in prociucta stare, seve, suasve provincias tributo, hostibus penitenti solito, subtrahere; potentiam viresque eorum minuire ac suppressere; militem hostilem, in territorio suo hospitantem, concidere; diribitoria hostium disturbare, et ubicunque fieri posset, tum exigendo tributum, tum urbes, arces, ac loca situ commoda occupando, præsidiove militari firmando, quinimò, si daretur occasio, personas eorum in potestatem redigendo, noxam illis inferre ac detrimentum.

6. Si, a rege clade affecti aut profligati in landgravii confiniis receptum quærerent, penitus eos dissipare ac disjicere; ne coire illic locorum, aut gradum denuò firmare ullatenus possent.

7. Comites, nobiles, alios quoscunque, seu fines ejus inhabitarent, seu extra fines haberent domicilium, vassallos, cum equestribus, ad quæ intuitu possessorum feudorum obstricti, servitiis, quotiescunque necessitas exigeret, ad regis postulatam & commune utriusque placitum convocare; imò subditos, sicubi videretur, viritum ad arma concire, militarive illorum opera, sub regis imperio uti. Quo in articulo rex
landgravio

landgravio vice versa cavit: Si forte *vassalli* aut *refractarii* existerent, aut *moratores*, affore illi ope sua, in ordinem eos redacturum, pro *hostibus* habiturum, & *privationis* pœnam executioni adversus *commeritos* daturum; ita quidem, ut landgravio tanquam domino directo, dominium factum, tectum maneret; utilitas vero, seu *reditus* feudorum *fisco* & *communi* *ærario* inferrentur. Ubi tamen præstitutum scopum attigissent, aut maturius forsitan, si inter utrumque de eo conveniret, utile quoque dominium ad dominum directum redundaturum, et cum proprietate consolidatum; landgravium autem a rege hoc in casu propugnatum, nec cuiquam, ejus *ingratis*, veniam *admissi* concessum iri.

8. Cautum, ut neuter ab altero, sumtum, qui bello gerendo, aut *munitionibus* extruendis impenderetur, nomine, quicquam præter id, de quo expressè conventum, posceret, sed uterque conventionis legibus, et *communi* *ærario*, brevi instituendo, acquiescerent: pacta quoque hæc reliquis omnibus *fœderibus*, quæ cum aliis *magnatibus*, *electorumque* ac *principum* familiis essent inita (si hi forte alterutri *fœderatorum*, hujus *fœderis* & *piae* intentionis, animo illis *propositæ*, intuitu, *hostes* redderentur, aut ipsa *fœdera*, ut contraria, invicem se destruerent) quantum ipsorum scopum attinet, præferrentur, nec *vetustiorum* *fœderum* respectu alter ab altero *resilire*, nec nova, huic *adversantia* contrahere animum induceret.

9. Si rex landgravii munimenta, majoris securitatis ergò, novis adjectis operibus, *munitiona* reddi, è re *communi* *arbitraretur*, landgravius non *permitteret* hoc modò, sed *subditos* quoque, *inevitabili* necessitate *flagitante*, compelleret ad manus operi *admovendum*.

10. Regiis copiis landgravii ditionem transeuntibus, & illic *divertentibus*, *pedes* *candelâ* & *ligno*, *eques* *stramine* & *fœno*, *servitiorum*, quæ vocant, nomine præbitis, contenti, nulla *ulterioris* *flagitationis* molestiâ *hospites* vexarent: modò alia sustentationis media in promptu forent. Extra vero hunc casum, & in *hostico*, *alimenta* sua exinde, secundum commune utriusque *arbitrium*, *miles* quæreret.

11. Si in landgravii territorio *militum* *diribitoria* instituere ratio *boni* *publici* necessariò *exigeret*, id quod landgravium æquo *passurum* animo: ultra duos tamen cum dimidio *avenæ* *modios* in *equos* singulos, unâ cum *sex* *straminis* *mergitibus*, & *fœni* *vehe*, ipsisque *equitibus*, *equitumve* *ductoribus*, cujuscunque conditionis, loco *alimentorum*, ultra duos *Joachimicos*, usque ad *armilustrium*, quot *mensibus* minimè præbitum iri.

12. Rege arma in *Austriam*, aut aliàs in *hosticum* *transerente*, et *hostem* illic, ne *fœderatorum* *terras* *infestare* posset, occupante,

occupante, landgravium tot militum millibus, quot securitate propria salva liceret, subsidio ei affuturum; militemve hunc communi utriusque impensâ sustentandum.

13. Quod si a rege unum, alterumve locum, extra illa, que pertinerent ad landgravium, aut in quibus jus aliquod haberet, expugnari contingeret, regi, donec de expensis eidem satisfaceret, landgravium in manibus illa relicturum, & ne adversarii rursus evincerent, sedulam unâ cum rege daturum operam.

14. Controversiâ aut lite intæ federatos subortâ, duos a rege arbitros, & totidem neutri parti obnoxios, a landgravio nominandos; qui de tertio conveniant. Horum fidei negotium committendum: proposita pactorum formulâ, & in medium adductis, quæ causæ decisioni facere videantur. Quicquid autem hi æquum judicaverint, eo utrumque contentum fore, & acquieturum.

15. De transfugio utrinque conventum: ne quis alterius ductores, equites, pedites, aut facinorosos etiam, transfugientes, in stipendia sua reciperet, aut ullatenus toleraret; sed si quis ejus notæ, ubiubi tandem, seu intra seu extra jurisdictionis terminos, deprehenderetur, cujuscunque ordinis aut dignationis, in vincula conjicerent, delitescentes quoque summa industria, quantum pote, indagarent, alter alterum de iis redderent certiores, & comprehensos pœnis militaribus afficerent. Subditos autem, si qui, criminis hujus rei, pœnæ se subtrahere effugio niterentur, honorum, tribuum, jurium omnium ac bonorum privatione quisque eorum mulcicaret, nec ullum, nisi alterius consensu, in integrum restitueret. Demum, ultimo, landgravius pollicebatur, primo quoque tempore contra subditos ac vassallos suos, hosti stipendia merentes, acerrima promulgare mandata avocatoria, confiscationis bonorum, tam allodialium, quam feudalium, amissionis insuper vitæ ac honoris pœnâ præstitutâ: illaque stricte & rigide exsequi, si unus alterve, cujuscunque dignitatis aut conditionis, morem his gerere differret, præterlabi pateretur.

Werbenæ, pridie Iduum Augusti, 1631.

XXIV.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, Dei gratia Suecorum, Gothorum, Vandalorumque Rex, magnus Princeps Finlandiæ, Dux Estoniæ et Careliæ, nec non Ingridiæ Dominus, Serenissimo & Potentissimo Principi Domino CAROLO Dei gratia Magnæ Britanniæ.

SERENISSIME princeps, frater, consanguine & amice charissime. Cumque serenitatis vestræ in rem communem et erga nos constans propensio est; certi sumus ex illis, quæ nobis prosperè, et bono periclitantis rei Christianæ evenirent, serenitatem vestram partem sibi quoque fumere, intermittere noluimus, quin de memorabili quam divina benignitas nobis (hisce diebus) largita est victoriâ, vos certiores redderemus. Postquàm armis nostris sua elector Saxonie junxit, nobis cum utroque exercitu contra hostem progressis, hostilis exercitus generalis illius universas copias suas è castris Lypfice ad Milesum lapidemeductas, septimâ die Septembris opposuit. Prælio incepto magnâ contentione per 4 amplius horas res utrimque acta est, donec singulari Dei beneficio, hostilis exercitus (virtute indefessâ nostrorum) in fugam versus dissipatusque est; nostris fugientem sub mænia usque urbis prosequis, tormenta ac res armamentariæ hostis nobis cesseret crepta ei vexilla derelicta à conturbato ad Lypfica castra cum impediementis. Generalis accepto vulnere in episcopatum Halberstadensem discessit; iis, quos deinceps insequi sumus gratiæ nostræ et militiæ relictis. Occisi ex hostibus in loco pugnae jacuere plurimi, cum illis generalis vigilum, aliique apud hostem præfecti. Inter captivorum aliquot millia dux Holstatie, & ex-præcipuis alii, quorum successuum laudes cum Deo optimo maximo tanquam auctori debeantur, ejusque divinæ benignitati tribuendum meritò sit quod nunc non solum illa tot millium votis hætenus expetita restituendæ religionis et libertatis spes, sed et erigendi afflictam regis Bohemiæ causam facilitas affulgeat. Non diffidimus quin serenitas vestra non tantum gaudio et affectu prosequendam hanc victoriam, sed etiam tam pulchrâ occasione utendum, et omnia huc deinceps conferenda esse judicatura, atque ipsi rei Christianæ suorumque salutis, heroicis suis consiliis auxiliisque consultura regio studio sit. In nobis amplius aliquid desiderari non patiemur, serenitatem vero vestram divinæ protectioni ad auspiciata rerum omnium incrementa commendamus. Dat Halæ Saxonum, 13 Sept. 1631.

Bonus frater et consanguineus,

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

XXV.

The famous *Armistice*, or *Treaty of Neutrality*, accorded by GUSTAVUS, at the intercession of France, to the *Princes of the League*.

[N. B. Having never been able to see the original of this treaty, we have thought it more proper to give the English translation thereof, made in the year 1682, than render into modern language the French translation, published in the same year, and preserved by the author of the *Mercurie François* (tom. xviii. p. 135, &c.); since that ed. only proves to be the version of a version, and might depart still more and more from the first meaning.]

HIS sacred majesty of Sweden, taking special notice of the desire which the duke of Bavaria and the Catholic Leaguers have for obtaining a Neutrality; although, by their making themselves parties with the emperor in the wars, they have deserved nothing of him but hostility: yet upon the earnest intercession of the most christian king, presented by his ambassadors, and to testify withal his own brotherly affection unto him; he is contented to conclude the Neutrality upon these following conditions:

1. Let this Neutrality be religiously and inviolably kept with his sacred majesty of Sweden, his kingdoms, dominions and subjects, as well those that are hereditary to him, as those that have in Germany been conquered by him: as also with his confederates, the electors, princes, nobles, cities, commonwealths, commonalties, and states, and with the elector of Saxony in particular; by the duke of Bavaria and his associates the catholic princes and states of Germany: who shall also give sufficient caution unto his majesty, for the sure keeping of it.

2. Let the said duke of Bavaria, and the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, forbear all acts of injury and hostility, both towards his sacred majesty of Sweden, his army and dominions now in his possession, and towards his confederates the evangelical electors, princes, earls, nobles, cities, commonalties, states, and all other evangelical professors of what condition soever; and let them not by their soldiers be troublesome hereafter unto them in their dominions, upon any pretext whatsoever, nor suffer them to be disturbed by any forces of the emperor's.

3. Let the duke of Bavaria, and the said catholic princes of Germany, as many as are of the League, restore unto the evangelical princes and states, of what condition soever, all and singular strengths, fortresses, castles, cities, territories and

and countries how many soever, which in all the time of this war, begun in the year 1618, they have taken and kept from the evangelics in the Lower Saxony: and leave them in the same state they were in, before the beginning of the war.

4. Let the duke of Bavaria, with the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, withdraw all their armies out of the countries of the evangelical electors, princes, and states, so soon as may be; sending for the soldiers into their own territories.

5. Let the army of the duke of Bavaria, and of the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, be reduced to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men: all the rest being presently cashiered. Which army, let it be distributed and enquartered here and there among the cities and proper dominions of the said princes, and not be kept together in one entire body.

6. The duke of Bavaria, and his associates the said catholic princes of Germany, shall not with the said soldiers (being either cashiered, or distributed among their territories) give assistance, either openly or underhand, unto the emperor or any other prince, enemy unto his sacred majesty of Sweden.

7. Nor let the duke of Bavaria, and his confederates the catholic princes of Germany, give leave unto the house of Austria or any other whatsoever enemy of his sacred majesty of Sweden, to raise soldiers, appoint places of muster or rendezvous, buy up arms, or make any other military provisions within their dominions: but let them every where observe an inviolate and sincere Neutrality.

8. Let all their passages be without deceit either open to either party, or shut up, as it shall be agreed upon: provided it be without all injury and damage unto the owner.

9. His sacred majesty of Sweden, with his confederates, in like manner shall in no ways offend the duke of Bavaria, nor any prince or state of the Catholic League, whose dominions he is not yet master of, excepting only the bishop of Bamberg; nor shall he lay any other kind of military impositions upon them, but shall keep and observe a sincere neutrality with them.

10. All those places of the Lower Palatinate whatsoever, now taken away from the duke of Bavaria, will his sacred majesty restore unto the said duke of Bavaria again, until, by the mediation of the kings of Great Britain and France, there be some friendly composition made betwixt the duke and the prince Palatine, for which some short day shall be appointed. So likewise will his majesty restore unto the archbishops of

Trier

Triers and Cologn, wharsoever places are taken from them, the city of Spiers, and the places now remaining unto it, being left* intire unto itself.

11. All other countries and places of the catholic princes and states (besides those forenamed) already possessed by his sacred majesty, shall not the duke of Bavaria, nor the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, make demand of again, in any kind, either by themselves or by others, but shall leave them in his majesty's hands until some general treaty.

12. All states, princes, earls, nobles, cities, and commonalties, evangelical, whosoever will, may be under the protection of his sacred majesty of Sweden; nor shall they to the prejudice of the said protection be disturbed any manner of way, either directly or indirectly, by the said catholic princes of Germany.

13. Let all commerce with his sacred majesty of Sweden, his subjects and evangelical confederates, on the one party, and with the duke of Bavaria and the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, on the other party, be free and open every where, and no ways hindered.

14. Let all prisoners on both sides be delivered without ransom; and in particular, let the administrator of Magdeburg, taken by Tilly, be forthwith set at liberty without prejudice.

15. For the better security, shall the most christian king of France engage his royal word that the duke of Bavaria, and all other catholic princes, states, and cities of Germany, his confederates, shall religiously observe this neutrality in all the articles of it; which if they shall infringe, then shall he declare himself for his sacred majesty of Sweden, and fall with all his power upon the violaters, until he hath compelled them unto satisfaction.

XXVI.

The Subscription of the French Ambassadors to the *Treaty of Neutrality.**

NOUS soubsignez ambassadeurs de tres-chrestien roy de France, sçavoir faisons, que le serenissime & tres-puissant prince & seigneur Gustave Adolphe par la grace de Dieu roy de Suede, &c. ayant voulou comprendre dans le traité

* *Salvâ civitate Spirensi, sibi que relicta,*

* *Merc. Franç. tom. xviii. p. 139, &c.*

public

public de la neutralité avec l'électeur de Baviere, & la ligue catholique, que tout ce qui avoit esté pris par droit de guerre par les dits électeurs & ligue catholique, sur les princes & estats protestans & evangelique tant en la haute Allemagne qu'en la Basse Saxe, & qui est occupée par les garrisons des dits duc de Baviere & la ligue catholique, seroit rendu à tous les seigneurs & precedens possesseurs evangeliques: nous, pour eviter certains scrupules qui eussent peu en provenir, & apporter difficulté, à l'entretenement du traité de la dite neutralité, avons de faire retrencher des articles du dit traité, la caution & l'assurance promise au nom du roy tres-chrestien nostre seigneur, & que nonobstant cette clause tout ce qui avoit esté pri par droit de guerre & estoit occupé par les garrisons du duc de Baviere & de la ligue catholique, sur les prince & estats evangeliques & protestans, comme s'il estoit nommement stipulé & accordé par les actes du dit traité, seroit rendu, & restitué ausdits evangeliques & protestans, ausquels il auroit esté osté: & pourtant nous promettons au nom du roy tres-chrestien nostre seigneur, que sa dite majesté royale fera en sorte, que la restitution desdits lieux pris par droit de guerre sur les princes & estats evangeliques, sera faite tout ainsi que si le mesme avoit esté promis par les articles de la neutralité: excepté toutes fois les lieux & places qui auparavant appartenoient au duc de Baviere en l'un & l'autre Palatinat. En foy de quoy, &c.

A Mayence le 19 de Jan. 1632, St. Vet.

XXVII.

The KING's Letter to GUSTAVUS HORN (and probably to all his other Generals) concerning *the Armistice*.*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, by the grace of God king of the Swedes, &c. Right trusty and well-beloved, &c. We will not conceal from you, how that the king of France hath made a kind, brotherly suit unto us, by his ambassadors, for a neutrality betwixt us, and the elector of Bavaria and the catholic league. Forasmuch as we have thereupon framed certain articles, and delivered the same to the said ambassadors, who have promised to bring us, within the space of fourteen days, a plain declaration and confirmation thereupon; and in the mean while, by virtue of their power to take order, that Pappenheim shall forthwith withdraw himself with his troops out of Westphalia and the bishoprick

* From the copy printed in London 1632, 4to.—*Mercurius Gallicus*, tom. xviii. p. 134.

of Magdeburg, and likewise, that the forces of the electors of Bavaria and of the catholic league, should forthwith be called and drawn out of Bohemia, if any there should be. For this reason, and for the furtherance of such a work, and to gratify withal our said good brother the king of France, We have thought good to yield them so small a time, and to abstain from all hostility, during the said fourteen days, against the said catholic league and the duke of Bavaria; if to be that (according to the said promise) they do behave themselves in like manner, withdraw their forces, and use no hostility against us; whereof We do hereby give you notice: and withal do will and command you forthwith to publish this said cessation of arms for fourteen days throughout the army which you do command (to which end we have dispatched this trumpet unto you) and thereupon to cease and abstain from all hostility, pillage, robbing, and other deeds of enmity against the said elector of Bavaria and the catholic league, and during the said time to remain quiet.* But yet we have expressly excepted (as the said ambassadors do know) and we do intend, that such towns, places, and castles, which are now by us besieged and blocked up, shall so remain besieged and blocked up; and that the besieged shall have liberty during the said time, to treat, conclude, and compound with us, to deliver up the said places, and to depart from thence according to the agreement that shall be made with them. This you are to observe, and to govern yourself accordingly. And if some one or other place be at this present by you besieged, or blocked up, you are by no means to remove or depart from the same, but rather to continue and finish the design, with all your best endeavours, as being a thing no ways contrary unto the said cessation of arms by us granted, &c. Given at Hoëchst the 10th of January 1631.

* Pourvuque le duc de Bavière se comporte de mesme: *Merc. Franç.*

XXVIII.

TRAICTE de LOUIS XIII. roy de France, &c. avec PHILIPPES CHRISTOFLE archevesque de Treves, electeur & evesque de Spire : Par lequel le roy s'oblige d'assister ledit electeur, contre ceux qui le voudront opprimer; & de plus, de faire sortir desdits archéveché & évêché les gens de guerre du roy de SUEDE. A Ehrenbreitstein, l'an 1632, le 9 Avril.

NOS Philippus Christophorus Dei gratia archiepiscopus Trevirensis, ac princeps elector, episcopus Spirensis, administrator Prumiensis perpetuus, & præpositus Weissemburgensis, & Ludovicus de Briançon de la Saludie, magister de campo christianissimæ regis majestatis Franciæ, cum plenipotencia missus legatus; notum facimus atque fatemur: postquam christianissima regia majestas se intra serenissimum & potentissimum regem Sueciæ, ac serenissimos, illustrissimos ac reverendissimos electores principes, aliosque catholicæ unionis status, pro salute ac pace publica in Germania reintegranda ac restabilienda uti mediatorem, fide jussorem ac sponso rem interposuit, illa intentione ut neutralitas in regiam majestatem Sueciæ, & prædictos unionis catholicæ status erigeretur, quæ neutralitas à parte utraque non fuerit conclusa, approbata & confirmata, sed potius contrariis factis cassata, idcirco nos cum regis majestatis Franciæ legato supradicto, sequentes pacis articulos conclusimus, approbavimus, sigillisque nostris & manuum subscriptione munivimus, sequentis tenoris.

1. Nos Philippus Christophorus archiepiscopus Trevirensis & princeps elector, in manus & custodiam christianissimæ regis majestatis Galliarum fortalitium de Ehrenbreitstein nostræ archiducæcæ Trevirensis primum deponemus eo usque donec pax generalis in Germania sit conclusa; ex tunc enim christianissima regia majestatis militem abducatur, ac dictum fortalitium in liberas nostras nostrorumque successorum manus in eo statu quo tempore depositionis inductionisque militis fuit, iterum tradat & restituat.

2. Pro qua custodia & assistentia christianissima regia majestas mille peditum & centum equitum selectorum Gallorum mittet, ut ingrediantur supradictum fortalitium.

3. Qua militia ita introducta ex Christianissimæ majestatis permissione & mandato, quod in simul transmittetur nobis jurabit.

4. Rogamus

4. Rogamus tamen christianissimam regiam majestatem, ut eadem propter devastationem modernam archiepiscopatus Trevirensis, ad sustinendum militem tertiam partem expensarum & stipendiorum eo usque exsolvere dignetur donec subditi nostri contributiones necessarias præbere possint & valeant.

5. Et ad statim atque depositum fuerit supra nominatum fortalitium, christianissima regia majestas ex archiepiscopatu Trevirensi exturbabit, expulsiabitque non solum copias regis majestatis Sueciæ, sed & omnes alias quas tum inveniat; in quem effectum expressam ordinantiam ante ingressum pro majori asscuratione ostendet, curabitque & omnia loca satrapia, civitates, pagi & territoria occupata quantocius deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberas nostras manus tradantur; ac conditione ut iisdem in locis cessis, aut deoccupatis nos uti ante occupationem disponere, proprioque militi ibidem quarterium absque ullo impedimento concedere possimus.

6. Eadem regia majestas christianissima non solum predicto modo nostrum fortalitium Ehrenbreitsstein custodiat, sed etiam nobis nostrisque subditis, contra hostilitates, oppressiones & offensionesque reali assistentia succurret, omnia quartiria & pressuras avertet, omnibusque quibus potest modis ac viis defendet.

7. Quo in casu christianissima majestas ex regia liberalitate sumptus expendet, nec à nobis plusquam subditi territoriumque nostrum Trevirensi in comiteatu præstare possint postulabit, neque ullam aliam actionem contra nostrum archidiccesin, nos ac successores nostros in futurum prætetdet.

8. Et quam primum fortalitium Ehrenbreitsstein predicto modo custoditum, & reliqua juxta articulos præmissos asscurationata fuerint, tunc supra positis conditionibus eodemque plane modo nos fortalitium nostrum Philipsburgum in christianissimæ majestatis manus depositum, mille peditibus & centum equitibus selectis intromissis, quoque trademus; ita tamen ut supradicto modo totus episcopatus Spirensis, ac omnia loca satrapia, civitates, pagi, & territoria ex tunc quantocius à regia majestate Sueciæ ejusque adhærentibus deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberas nostras manus tradantur, hoc modo ut nos iisdem in locis cessis & deoccupatis uti ante occupationem disponere, proprioque militi ibidem quartirium absque ullo impedimento concedere possimus.

9. Eadem quoque christianissima regia majestas non solum, uti predictum nostrum fortalitium Philipsburgum custodiet, sed etiam nobis nostrisque subditis contra hostilitates oppressionesque quascunque reali assistentia succurret, omniaque quartiria

quartiria & pressuras avertet, omnibusque quibus potest modis ac viis defendet.

10. Hæc tamen cum clausula ut in utroque fortalitio cum aulicis nostris, ordinaria guardia & cancellaria nostra pro libitu nostro manere, ibique rebus nostris vacare possimus.

11. Ulterius casu quo metropolis nostra civitas Trevirensis à milite regie majestatis Sueciæ occuparetur, tunc illa ad manus nostras mediante christianissima majestate tradenda erit, ac in eandem nullum aliud præsidium quam nostrum prædicto modo plane iisdem sub conditionibus introducatur de sustentetur.

12. Ukimo transitus omnes utrique parti militanti sine frande sint aperti, sine injuria & damno proprietarii.

Igitur nos Philippus Christophorus archiepiscopus Trevirensis ac princeps elector promittimus observare, & observari facere sincerè, realiter & cum effectu, absque aliqua sinistra interpretatione, & ego Ludovicus de Briançon Baro de la Saludie, magister de campo christianissimæ regie majestatis cum plenipotencia legatus missus, prædictos articulos nomine ejusdem christianissimæ majestatis totidem verbis pro more stipulatus sum, polliceorque me certò effecturum christianissimam regiam majestatem omnes & singulos articulos & conditiones, uti & hanc nostram conclusionem, subscriptionem ac sigillationem, manu propria & sigillo regio confirmaturam, realique assistentia adimpleturam. In quorum fidem has præsentés propriis manibus subscripsimus, & sigillo nostro communivimus.

Acta conventaque hæc omnia in fortalitio nostro Ehrenbreitsteiniano, die nona mensis Aprilis, 1632, ainsi signé, Philippus Christophorus archiepiscopus Trevirensis, & la Saludie, avec le cachet dudit sieur electeur.

XXIX.

ODE sur la Mort du GRAND GUSTAVE.

Par M. Arnaud d'Andilly.

I.

PLUS vite que l'esclair, plus craint que le tonnerre
 Portant avec moi la terreur & la mort,
 J'ay pafsé comme un Mars des rivage du nord,
 Par tout où m'appelloit la justice & la guerre.

II.

L'Allemagne m'a vû briser comme du verre
 Tout ce qui s'oposoit à mon puissant effort;
 Et mon secours fatal lui servit de suport
 Lorsqu'il ne sembloit plus qu'elle en eût sur la terre.

III.

Le plus sage au conseil, le premier aux hazards;
 Mes vertus ont terni le lustre des Césars,
 Et rendu l'univers étonné de ma gloire.

Quel siècle vit jamais un si grand conquérant?
 Vivant j'ay triomphé, je triomphe en mourant,
 Et choisis pour tombeau le champ de ma victoire.

TRANSLATED

By E. S. B.

SWIFT as the lightning, direful as the roll,
 Around me spreading pale dismay and blood,
 I cross'd the streams that bind the icy Pole,
 And won'dring nations hail'd me great and good:

Germania saw me, 'midst her loud alarms,
 Exterminate all who dar'd my arms oppose;
 Beheld me aid her with my fatal arms,
 When aid seem'd vain, and hope was at its close.

Discreet in council, ardent in the strife,
 My tow'ring virtues, Cæsar, tarnish thine;
 The world, astonish'd, views my glorious life;
 What age can boast a victor so divine!

In death, as life, my triumph is attain'd;
 I chuse my tomb beneath the fields I gain'd.

M M 3.

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